| Internet-Draft | OAuth Mission Deferred Approval | June 2026 |
| McGuinness | Expires 1 January 2027 | [Page] |
The Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 profile records an approval event at which an Approver consents to a Mission's derived Authority Set, but it treats that event as immediate. A human review of an agent's proposed Mission is often asynchronous and frequently results in approval of a narrowed subset rather than an all-or-nothing decision. This document defines an OPTIONAL Mission Deferred Approval profile. It profiles OAuth Deferred Token Response so a Mission approval can be deferred and polled, and adds a revisable approval mode in which the Authorization Server, when it can grant only a narrowed version of the proposed Mission, invites the client to push a narrowing revision and continue the same deferred approval rather than abandon it and start over. Revisions can only narrow the proposed Mission.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 January 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
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The issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (the "issuance profile") derives an Authority Set from a submitted Mission Intent and records an approval event at which an Approver consents to that authority. It specifies what the approval commits, not how the approval is obtained over time. Two facts about agent approval are left unspecified:¶
A human Approver review is asynchronous: the agent submits a proposed Mission and must wait, sometimes for a long time, for a decision.¶
A reviewer commonly approves a narrowed subset of the proposed Mission, not an all-or-nothing outcome. With no way to revise in place, the agent must abandon the proposal and submit a new one, losing the approval state and any preceding work.¶
This document supplies both. It profiles OAuth Deferred Token Response [I-D.draft-gerber-oauth-deferred-token-response] (the "deferred substrate") so a Mission approval can be deferred and polled, and it defines a revisable approval mode: when the Authorization Server can grant only a narrowed version of the proposed Mission, it signals which dimensions it refused and invites the client to push a narrowing revision, then continues the same deferred approval. The client keeps its place; the approval resolves over the narrowed proposal.¶
This is narrowing only. A revision can reduce the proposed Mission; it can never broaden it. Widening an approved Mission is a different operation with its own fresh approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).¶
This document is OPTIONAL. A deployment that obtains Mission approvals synchronously, or that abandons and resubmits when a reviewer narrows a proposal, is fully conformant to the issuance profile and is unaffected by this document. It places no new requirement on the issuance profile.¶
A deployment claims this profile only when it defers Mission approvals under the deferred substrate or accepts revisable approvals. The approval event, the Authority Set, the subset rule, and the integrity anchors are unchanged; this document governs only how the approval is reached over time.¶
This document depends normatively on the issuance profile and on the
deferred substrate, and is not implementable alone. It reuses, without
restating, the issuance profile's Mission Intent, submission via PAR
[RFC9126], authority derivation, approval event, subset rule, and
integrity anchors, and the deferred substrate's deferral response,
continuation polling, cancellation, and sender-constraint rules. It uses
the terms Agent (Client), Approver, Mission Issuer, Mission Intent, and
Authority Set as the issuance profile defines them, and completion_mode,
deferral_code, and the deferred grant type as the deferred substrate
defines them.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The Mission Intent and the Authority Set the Mission Issuer derived from it, pending an approval decision.¶
A narrowing of the proposed Mission, submitted by the client while the approval is deferred, that replaces the proposed Mission's Authority Set with a subset of it.¶
A Mission approval MAY be deferred. The client submits the Mission
Intent through PAR as the issuance profile requires, and includes
deferred among the completion_mode values on the resulting token
request, opting in to the deferred substrate
([I-D.draft-gerber-oauth-deferred-token-response]). When the Mission
Issuer cannot decide the approval immediately, for example because it
routes the proposed Mission to a human reviewer, it returns the
substrate's deferred response (authorization_pending with a
deferral_code) instead of a token, and the client polls with the
deferred grant type until the approval resolves to a Mission-bound token
response, access_denied, or expired_token.¶
Deferral changes only the timing of the approval event. The Authority
Set the token is issued against, its authority_hash, and the recorded
consent are exactly as in a synchronous approval.¶
A client signals that it accepts a narrowing revision by including
revisable among its completion_mode values alongside deferred:¶
completion_mode=deferred revisable¶
revisable is a completion-mode value registered in the deferred
substrate's OAuth Completion Mode Values registry (Section 12). It
authorizes only the revision handshake defined here. A Mission Issuer
MUST NOT invite a revision unless the client offered revisable.
revisable has effect only together with deferred; a Mission Issuer
that receives revisable without deferred MUST ignore it, because
there is no deferred approval to revise.¶
When the Mission Issuer determines that it cannot approve the proposed
Mission as stated, but could approve a sufficiently narrowed version,
and the client offered revisable, it returns the deferred substrate's
authorization_pending response extended with revision parameters
rather than resolving to access_denied. Using the substrate's existing
pending response, as the substrate permits a profile to do, keeps a
client that does not implement this profile polling normally; only a
revisable-aware client acts on the added parameters.¶
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error": "authorization_pending",
"deferral_code": "dc_9P2K7zT1mX8b3N",
"revision_required": true,
"clarification_handle": "ch_4QFJ3P9",
"rejected_scope": "crm:write",
"rejected_authorization_details": [
{ "type": "payment", "limit": "10000" }
],
"expires_in": 420,
"interval": 5
}
¶
revision_required (boolean) and clarification_handle (string) are
REQUIRED on this response. rejected_scope and
rejected_authorization_details are OPTIONAL; they tell the agent which
dimensions of the proposed Mission were refused so it can plan a
narrowed revision without further out-of-band interaction. A Mission
Issuer MAY omit them when disclosure would reveal sensitive policy
state.¶
The clarification_handle is bound to the deferred approval and
authorizes one revision submission. It is not a token, grant, or
continuation handle, and it is sender-constrained to the same key as the
deferral_code ([I-D.draft-gerber-oauth-deferred-token-response]). A
client MUST NOT treat revision_required, the rejected dimensions, or
the handle as evidence of any granted authority; the proposed Mission
remains unapproved.¶
The client submits the narrowed Mission Intent to the PAR endpoint
[RFC9126] with the clarification_handle as an additional parameter,
sender-constrained as the deferred substrate requires. The Mission
Issuer:¶
verifies the clarification_handle is bound to a deferred approval
in the revision-required condition, is unexpired and single-use, and
matches the client and sender-constraint of the deferred approval;¶
derives the Authority Set for the revised Intent, under the same
policy_version that governed the proposed Mission, and verifies it
is a subset of the proposed Mission's Authority Set under the issuance
profile's subset rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), with
authorization_details narrowing per the inclusion semantics of
[RFC9396]. The revision MUST narrow every dimension named in
rejected_scope or rejected_authorization_details
(Section 6.1) and MUST NOT broaden any dimension. Deriving
under the proposed Mission's policy_version keeps the subset
comparison reproducible; if policy has changed since the proposal, the
Mission Issuer re-derives the proposed Authority Set under the current
policy to re-establish the baseline before comparing, or refuses the
revision;¶
invalidates the clarification_handle;¶
replaces the proposed Mission's Authority Set with the revised one and re-reviews it.¶
The client continues polling the existing deferral_code; the revision
does not start a new approval. If the Mission Issuer returns a PAR
request_uri, it is an artifact of PAR and MUST NOT be used to start a
separate authorization transaction.¶
If the revision is not a subset, or otherwise fails validation, the PAR
endpoint returns an error and the deferred approval stays in the
revision-required condition. Because the handle is single-use, the
client obtains a new clarification_handle from a subsequent
authorization_pending response before retrying. A Mission Issuer
MUST bound the number of revision cycles per deferred approval and MUST
resolve to access_denied once the bound is reached or no acceptable
narrowing remains, so a client cannot drive an unbounded revision loop.¶
A revised proposed Mission is a different disclosure. Where a
deployment records Consent Evidence
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]), the
re-reviewed revision MUST get a fresh consent_rendering_hash; prior
consent does not transfer to the narrowed proposal.¶
The rejected_scope and rejected_authorization_details parameters
are the machine-readable input a client-side shaper
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-shaping]) uses to plan the
narrowed revision. Shaping narrows a proposal before submission; this
profile narrows it during review. Together they let an orchestrator
propose, learn what was refused, and re-propose without losing state.¶
The approval commits the final, narrowed Authority Set. The
intent_hash and authority_hash are computed over the revised
Mission Intent and Authority Set actually approved, not the originating
proposal.¶
This profile narrows only, and only while an approval is deferred. It is distinct from widening an approved Mission, which requires a fresh approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]), and from drawing authority from a pre-consented ceiling without a per-step human (progressive authorization, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).¶
Agent s6BhdRkqt3, acting for alice, proposes a Mission to reconcile
Q3 invoices that asks for both read and write on the ERP. It submits the
Mission Intent through PAR and opts in to both deferral and revision on
the token request:¶
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=authorization_code&code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA& client_id=s6BhdRkqt3& completion_mode=deferred%20revisable¶
The Mission Issuer routes the proposed Mission to alice for review and
defers:¶
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{ "error": "authorization_pending",
"deferral_code": "dfc_7M2R4kP9sT1x",
"expires_in": 600, "interval": 5 }
¶
The agent polls with the deferred grant type. On review alice approves
read but not write. Rather than deny, the Mission Issuer narrows and
invites a revision, extending the pending response:¶
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{ "error": "authorization_pending",
"deferral_code": "dfc_7M2R4kP9sT1x",
"revision_required": true,
"clarification_handle": "clh_4QFJ3P9wZ2",
"rejected_authorization_details": [
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["journal-entries.write"] } ],
"expires_in": 540, "interval": 5 }
¶
The agent pushes a narrowed Mission Intent, dropping the write, to PAR with the clarification handle:¶
POST /par HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded mission_intent=%7B...read-only%20Q3%20invoices...%7D& client_id=s6BhdRkqt3& clarification_handle=clh_4QFJ3P9wZ2¶
The Mission Issuer verifies the handle, confirms the revised Authority
Set is a subset of the proposed one, updates the deferred approval, and
re-reviews (here, policy auto-approves the now-narrower read-only
Mission). The agent keeps polling the same deferral_code, which now
resolves to a Mission-bound token over the final, narrowed authority:¶
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{ "access_token": "eyJ...",
"token_type": "DPoP",
"expires_in": 300,
"authorization_details": [
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["invoices.read"],
"constraints": { "period": "2026-Q3" } } ],
"mission": {
"id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
"origin": "https://as.example.com",
"authority_hash":
"sha-256:l3KvZ4mP5x0wQrR6tY2nD9bM7sX1cF8gH2vJ4kE5pNQ" } }
¶
The agent never abandoned its request; the approval resolved over the
narrowed proposal, and the committed authority_hash is over the
read-only Authority Set actually approved.¶
A Mission Issuer conforming to this profile MUST:¶
support the deferred substrate for Mission approvals it defers;¶
offer a revision only when the client signaled revisable;¶
enforce that a revision is a subset of the proposed Mission under the issuance profile's subset rule, never a broadening;¶
treat each clarification_handle as single-use and
sender-constrained to the deferred approval; and¶
commit the approval over the final narrowed Authority Set.¶
A client conforming to this profile MUST treat a revision-required
response as unapproved, submit only narrowing revisions, and continue
polling the existing deferral_code.¶
The deferred substrate's security considerations apply in full, including deferral-code entropy, sender-constraint continuity, cancellation, and oracle resistance. This section adds only what the revision handshake introduces.¶
Narrowing only. A revision MUST NOT broaden the proposed Mission on
any dimension. The Mission Issuer enforces the subset relation per
parameter (scope, resource, audience, authorization_details) before
re-review.¶
Single-use handle. A clarification_handle MUST be invalidated after
one submission, success or failure. A new handle is issued on a
subsequent revision-required response.¶
Sender-constraint continuity. The handle MUST be sender-constrained to
the same key as the deferral_code. An attacker holding the handle
without the key cannot push a revision.¶
Handle lifetime. The handle lifetime MUST NOT exceed the remaining
lifetime of the deferral_code, and SHOULD be shorter when the handle
is exposed to orchestration layers outside the OAuth client.¶
Stale consent. A re-reviewed revision MUST be presented to the reviewer as a new disclosure with a fresh consent commitment (Section 7); prior consent does not transfer.¶
Policy disclosure. rejected_scope and rejected_authorization_details
can reveal policy boundaries; a Mission Issuer SHOULD disclose only the
minimum needed to narrow and MAY omit them.¶
Revision bounding. A Mission Issuer MUST bound revision cycles per
deferred approval and resolve to access_denied at the bound
(Section 6.2), and SHOULD log excessive cycles as a
security event, so a client cannot drive an unbounded reshape-and-retry
loop to wear down a reviewer.¶
The rejected-dimension parameters and the revision history reveal what authority an agent sought and was refused. A Mission Issuer SHOULD treat them as sensitive, minimize what it discloses, and retain revision history under the same controls as other approval-event records.¶
This document registers one value in the OAuth Completion Mode Values registry established by the deferred substrate ([I-D.draft-gerber-oauth-deferred-token-response]):¶
This document registers the following in the "OAuth Parameters" registry. For each: Change Controller IETF; Reference this document, Section 6.1.¶
revision_required (token endpoint response)¶
clarification_handle (token endpoint response, PAR request)¶
rejected_scope (token endpoint response)¶
rejected_authorization_details (token endpoint response)¶
PAR [RFC9126] carries the revision as authorization-request parameters
without a distinct usage location, so the pushed submission of the
narrowed Intent and clarification_handle needs no separate
registration.¶
This document is part of the Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 work and profiles OAuth Deferred Token Response for asynchronous, revisable Mission approval.¶