| Internet-Draft | OAuth Mission Issuance Grant | October 2026 |
| McGuinness | Expires 29 April 2027 | [Page] |
This specification defines the Mission Issuance Grant, a profile of the JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization grant of RFC 7523. A Mission Authority Server, which approves and records Missions without changing an estate's OAuth authorization servers, issues the grant for an active Mission: a short-lived, single-use JWT for one client and one authorization server. The client presents it at that authorization server's token endpoint and receives Mission-bound tokens, which carry the Mission, are bounded by the authority the grant conveys, and expire no later than the Mission. An authorization server that checks Mission state at redemption and at every refresh stops issuing and renewing those tokens once the Mission is no longer active, and narrows them when its authority is narrowed; one that does not issues no refresh tokens. Approval, the Mission record, and its lifecycle stay at the Mission Authority Server.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-issuance-grant.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-issuance-grant/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 April 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (the "issuance profile") binds issued authority to a durable, human-approved Mission, with the authorization server (AS) as the Mission Issuer. The Mission Authority Server (MAS, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]) hosts the same Mission without changing the estate's authorization servers: it validates Mission Intents, runs approval, records Missions, and operates their lifecycle. The tokens those authorization servers issue remain ordinary. They do not carry the Mission, and their issuance and refresh do not depend on Mission state; enforcement can relate them to a Mission only at the point of use, through the Mission Join.¶
This specification defines the issuance join, in which the MAS remains the Mission Issuer and an estate's AS issues Mission-bound tokens. The carrier is the Mission Issuance Grant, a JWT the MAS issues for an active Mission and the client presents to the AS as a JWT authorization grant [RFC7523]. RFC 7523 defines how a client presents a JWT as an authorization grant and how the AS validates it. This profile defines what the grant contains, how the MAS issues it, what the AS issues in return, and how the AS keeps issuance and refresh bounded by the Mission's current state and authority.¶
Every grant is minted against current Mission state, so a Mission that is not active receives no new grants. An AS with a Mission-state integration (Section 2) also checks the Mission at redemption and at every refresh; one without issues no refresh tokens. Either way, every path to new tokens passes a Mission-state check, an issuance gate a MAS alone does not provide ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]). Where that check is the grant's minting, the grant's remaining lifetime adds to the issued token's (Section 12).¶
The AS implements none of the issuance profile's intake, approval ceremony, authority derivation, record, or lifecycle surfaces; those stay at the MAS. A deployment can adopt the issuance join at some authorization servers and keep the Mission Join at others (Section 10).¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses Mission, Mission Intent, Authority Set, Mission
Issuer, the mission claim, the subset rule, and the integrity
anchor authority_hash as the issuance profile defines them; Mission
Authority Server (MAS), Mission Join, and the Enterprise Mapping
Contract as [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server] defines
them; and Effective Authority Set as
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status] defines it. Under this
profile the MAS is the Mission Issuer. It additionally uses:¶
The integration this document defines: a MAS-approved Mission carried by a grant that an authorization server redeems at its token endpoint.¶
The signed assertion of Section 4, issued by the MAS and redeemed for Mission-bound tokens.¶
An OAuth authorization server [RFC6749] that redeems Mission Issuance Grants at its token endpoint; conformance role of Section 11.¶
A consuming AS's means of resolving the Mission's current state and Effective Authority Set at redemption and at every refresh (Section 6.3.1). A consuming AS either has one and applies Section 6.3, or has none and issues no refresh tokens under a grant (Section 6.4).¶
The refresh tokens descended from one redemption of a grant (under the authorization code flow carriage, one code exchange), including every rotation, and the authorization they carry.¶
The remaining authority a consuming AS persists for a refresh family (Section 6.3.4): after each successful issuance, the surviving authority of that issuance (items 1 to 3 of Section 6.3.2). A narrowing the client requests at the token endpoint does not reduce it, and it is not the contents of the last access token issued for one audience.¶
The following figure shows the issuance join between the client, the MAS, and a consuming AS:¶
Client MAS Consuming AS
| | |
|-- (A) grant request --->| |
|<-- (B) grant -----------| |
| | |
|-- (C) token request with the grant ------------------->|
| |<-- (D) Status, per audience -|
| |--- state and Effective ----->|
| | Authority Set |
|<-- (E) access token (and refresh token) ---------------|
| | |
|-- (F) refresh request -------------------------------->|
| |<-- (D) repeated -------------|
|<-- (E) new tokens -------------------------------------|
¶
(A) The client requests a grant from the MAS for an active Mission, naming the consuming AS as the audience (Section 5).¶
(B) The MAS returns a grant bound to that AS and to the client, and carrying a subset of the Mission's current authority (Section 4).¶
(C) The client presents the grant at the consuming AS's token endpoint as a JWT authorization grant (Section 6).¶
(D) A consuming AS with a Mission-state integration resolves the Mission's current state and Effective Authority Set, with one Mission Status request per audience the grant's entries are relevant to (Section 6.3).¶
(E) The consuming AS issues Mission-bound tokens within the grant's authority and that set (Section 6.2).¶
(F) Each refresh repeats (D) before (E). A consuming AS without a Mission-state integration skips (D) and issues no refresh token (Section 6.4).¶
Trust is pre-established and bilateral. A consuming AS accepts
grants only from Mission Issuers its local policy names, resolving
their signing keys from the MAS's jwks_uri
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]); a MAS mints
grants only for authorization servers its configuration names as
audiences. The deployment's mapping policy governs how a grant's
(iss, sub) pair and client_id correspond to the consuming AS's
accounts; where the Enterprise Mission Authority Profile is claimed,
the Enterprise Mapping Contract governs
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]). The audiences
the MAS scopes a consuming AS's grants to (Section 5.2) are the
audiences it authorizes that AS to request from Mission Status
(Section 6.3.1). The issuance join is the same-estate case:
a deployment does not use it across domains, where cross-domain
projection applies instead (Section 10).¶
The MAS holds the approval event, the record and its anchors, the lifecycle, and grant minting. The consuming AS holds client authentication, token issuance bounded by the grant, and refresh.¶
A Mission Issuance Grant is a JWT [RFC7519] signed as a JWS
[RFC7515] by the Mission Issuer. Its JOSE header MUST carry the
typ header parameter with the value mission-issuance-grant+jwt
(Section 14) and a kid that resolves in the Mission Issuer's
published key material.¶
Claims:¶
iss:REQUIRED. The Mission's issuer: the MAS issuer URL.¶
sub:REQUIRED. The Mission's Subject as a MAS-local identifier, which the
MAS maps from the recorded (subject.iss, subject.sub) pair
before minting (Section 5.2). The consuming AS interprets the
(iss, sub) pair under the deployment's mapping policy
(Section 3.2).¶
aud:REQUIRED. The consuming AS's issuer identifier [RFC8414], as a single string (Section 6.1). This restricts Section 3 of [RFC7523], under which a token endpoint URL can also identify the AS; Section 4 of [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis] keeps both forms for authorization grants.¶
iat, exp:REQUIRED. exp MUST NOT be more than 300 seconds after iat.¶
jti:REQUIRED. Unique per grant; single use (Section 6.6).¶
client_id:REQUIRED. The Mission's recorded agent client identifier as the consuming AS knows it (Section 4.3 of [RFC8693]); the MAS sets it under the deployment's mapping policy (Section 3.2). Only this client can redeem the grant (Section 6).¶
mission:REQUIRED. The issuance profile's mission claim object, with the
members Section 4.1 requires.¶
authorization_details:REQUIRED. Authorization details [RFC9396] that the consuming AS issues against, of the types Section 4.2 admits: a subset of the Mission's Effective Authority Set, limited to the entries this AS serves (Section 5.2).¶
cnf:OPTIONAL. A confirmation claim [RFC7800] binding redemption to a
key: the jkt member for OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP, Section 6.1 of [RFC9449]), or the x5t#S256
member for mutual TLS (Section 3.1 of [RFC8705]). The MAS sets it
as Section 5.2 requires, and the consuming AS verifies it as
Section 6.1 requires.¶
The following is an example of a decoded grant payload for the
Mission of the examples in
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]. Its entry is a
subset of that Mission's invoice-read entry, and its sub is the
recorded subject.sub copied verbatim, which Section 5.2
permits where it collides with no other principal's sub. The request
example of Section 5.1 presents a DPoP proof, so the grant's
cnf carries that key:¶
{
"iss": "https://mas.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR",
"aud": "https://as.example.com",
"iat": 1793606400,
"exp": 1793606580,
"jti": "mig_7Kq2Rv9Lp4xW1nT8",
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"cnf": { "jkt": "0ZcOCORZNYy-DWpqq30jZyJGHTN0d2HglBV3uiguA4I" },
"mission": {
"id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
"issuer": "https://mas.example.com",
"authority_hash":
"sha-256:rspctkzaH13fMUjC6FxL5npl9HREFVrQIk0WN8O_CGs",
"expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z"
},
"authorization_details": [
{
"type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["invoices.read"],
"constraints": {
"resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
"resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
}
}
]
}
¶
mission Claim
The grant's mission claim is the issuance profile's mission claim
object ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Claim"), with two members that object does not otherwise require:¶
expires_at. REQUIRED here, although OPTIONAL in the issuance
profile's claim. The Lifetime rule (Section 6.2) caps every
token issued under the grant at this value.¶
authority_hash. The mission object MUST carry
authority_hash ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section
"Integrity Anchors"), which the issuance profile's baseline claim
omits. It names the approved Authority Set the grant derives from,
for a consuming AS that, without a Mission-state integration, has
no other channel back to the Mission Issuer. The consuming AS
records it with each issuance (Section 8) and does not verify it.¶
A grant's authorization_details can carry entries of any type that
both the MAS and the consuming AS support
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization
Details Types"; the MAS's supported types are those its deployment
documentation names); this profile requires no particular type. Each
entry's audience relevance, subset relation, and transformations
follow its type's specification and the transformation capabilities
each party declares for that type, through the carriers that section
lists, deployment documentation among them. A consuming AS
serves an entry that is relevant to an audience for which that AS
issues tokens. An entry's audiences come from its type's
specification and the deployment's trusted configuration relating
entries to audiences, not from its operation target: the issuance
profile keeps an entry's resource, a token request's resource
parameter, and a token's aud distinct
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Audience and Token
Response"). For example, a mission_resource_access entry
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]) whose
resource is https://api.example.com/orders/123 can belong to the
audience https://api.example.com.¶
Omitting a whole entry always yields a subset. Narrowing within an
entry, or projecting it to scope, needs the corresponding declared
capability, and neither party performs a transformation it has not
declared for the entry's type. An operation this document calls for
that a party cannot perform fails closed:¶
The MAS MUST refuse, with invalid_authorization_details
(Section 5.4), a grant request whose requested narrowing it
cannot perform.¶
The consuming AS MUST refuse, with invalid_grant, a grant that
carries an entry of a type it does not support
(Section 6.1).¶
The consuming AS MUST NOT issue an entry it cannot narrow except unchanged, where the current Effective Authority Set and its own policy each contain an entry equal to it under the subset rule; otherwise it omits the entry (Section 6.3.2).¶
The consuming AS MUST refuse a requested narrowing it cannot
perform with invalid_authorization_details. It refuses a scope
projection it cannot perform as the issuance profile maps that
failure (invalid_target, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Error and Challenge Mapping").¶
A MAS implementing this profile serves a Mission Issuance Grant
endpoint, published as mission_issuance_grant_endpoint in its
metadata (Section 9).¶
The requester sends an HTTP POST request with an application/json
body to the endpoint, which has the TLS and client-authentication
requirements of the MAS's Mission submission endpoint
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section "Mission
Submission") with this endpoint in its place: an access token's
audience names this endpoint, and the MAS publishes Protected
Resource Metadata [RFC9728] for it, naming its resource, required
scope, accepted sender constraints, and DPoP algorithms
(dpop_signing_alg_values_supported). The MAS ignores body members
it does not recognize. The body carries:¶
mission_id:REQUIRED. A string. The Mission the grant is minted for; its
issuer is this MAS.¶
audience:REQUIRED. A string. The issuer identifier of the consuming AS the
grant is for. The MAS compares it literally with the issuer
identifiers its configuration names and sets the grant's aud to
the matching identifier (Section 3.2).¶
authorization_details:OPTIONAL. An array. A narrower subset the requester asks the grant to carry, under the issuance profile's subset rule. If it is omitted, the MAS scopes the grant to the entries the named audience serves (Section 5.2); if it is present, it MUST NOT widen beyond that scope.¶
client_id:CONDITIONAL. A string, REQUIRED with mutual-TLS client authentication, as Mission Status requires for that mechanism ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section "Authentication").¶
client_assertion_type:CONDITIONAL. A string, present exactly when the requester
authenticates with a private-key JWT: the value
urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer
(Section 2.2 of [RFC7523]).¶
client_assertion:CONDITIONAL. A string, present exactly when client_assertion_type
is: the client-authentication JWT. These two members carry as JSON
strings the values Section 2.2 of [RFC7523] defines as form
parameters, and the MAS processes them as Mission Status's
private-key-JWT mechanism requires
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section
"Authentication"), with the MAS's issuer identifier as the
assertion's sole aud.¶
A requester obtains a key-bound grant by presenting a sender
constraint on the request: a DPoP proof (Section 4 of [RFC9449]) in
the DPoP header field, with htm POST, htu the endpoint URL,
and ath only where a DPoP-bound access token authenticates the
request, which the MAS checks as Section 4.3 of [RFC9449] requires;
or the client certificate of a mutual-TLS connection [RFC8705].
Neither is client authentication by itself. The MAS MUST verify any
DPoP proof presented with the request and refuses a request whose
proof fails (Section 5.4). A client that does not want its
connection certificate bound presents a DPoP proof, which takes
precedence (Section 5.2).¶
The following is an example of a grant request that authenticates with a private-key JWT in the body and presents a DPoP proof for key binding:¶
The MAS MUST apply the following rules:¶
Requester. The MAS authenticates the requester as its Mission
submission endpoint does
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section
"Mission Submission"), with the client assertion carried in the
JSON body where it uses private-key JWT (Section 5.1). The
requester MUST be the Mission's
recorded client. Any other caller, including a delegate or
enforcement point that the Mission Join Assertion endpoint admits,
receives not_found (Section 5.4).¶
State gate. The MAS mints a grant only while its own record
shows the Mission active, and otherwise refuses.¶
Subset and audience. The grant's authorization_details MUST
be a subset, under the issuance profile's subset rule
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Subset Rule"), of
the Mission's current Effective Authority Set
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]), so a contained
capability is absent from it
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment], Section
"Derivation Gating"). The grant MUST carry only the entries the
named consuming AS serves. The requester MAY request a narrower
subset. The MAS MUST refuse a request for a wider one.¶
Derivation event. Each grant minted is a derivation event.
Where the Mission's established derivation_limit is set, the MAS
MUST count grants against it atomically and refuse beyond it, as
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits], Section
"Mission Issuance Grant Minting", defines; redemption and refresh
at a consuming AS are not counted.¶
Key binding. When the MAS verified a sender constraint on the
grant request (Section 5.1), it MUST include cnf with that
key: the public key of the request's DPoP proof, as jkt, or,
where the request carries no DPoP proof, the certificate of the
mutual-TLS connection, as x5t#S256, whether or not that
certificate also authenticated the client. When the MAS includes
cnf, it MUST take the key from a sender constraint it verified on
the grant request. The MAS MUST NOT derive cnf solely from
client-assertion authentication:
a client assertion authenticates the client, and DPoP is not client
authentication (Section 3 of [RFC9449]), so the binding comes
only from a sender constraint verified independently on the
request, even where its key is the one the assertion used. A
request with no verified sender constraint yields a grant without
cnf, which a public client cannot redeem (Section 6).¶
Subject. The MAS MUST derive the grant's sub from the
Mission's recorded (subject.iss, subject.sub) pair by an
injective mapping established before it mints, as the issuance
profile requires of an AS for an external Subject
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Subject
Establishment"). Two home issuers can both name a principal
alice, and the mapping keeps them apart. The mapping is stable:
every grant for one Subject carries the same sub. Copying
subject.sub verbatim is valid only where it collides with no
other principal's sub at this MAS. Every Mission has a Subject, a
service-owned or
organizational Mission included
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authority
Sources").¶
On success the endpoint returns HTTP 200 with an application/json
object:¶
grant:REQUIRED. A string. The Mission Issuance Grant JWT of Section 4. Its
exp bounds redemption (Section 6.1).¶
expires_in:REQUIRED. A JSON integer. The number of whole seconds from the
generation of the response until the grant's exp, rounded down so
that it never indicates a time after exp.¶
The following is an example of a grant response:¶
A failure returns the MAS error object
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section "Error
Responses") with one of the following error codes, which this
document defines for this endpoint. A 401 response carries the
WWW-Authenticate challenges that section defines for the MAS's
endpoints, naming this endpoint's Protected Resource Metadata.¶
| error | HTTP | Condition |
|---|---|---|
invalid_request
|
400 | A missing or malformed member, or an unparseable body |
invalid_client
|
400 | Direct client authentication (mutual TLS or private-key JWT) failed, only one of client_assertion_type and client_assertion is present, or no credential was presented where no access-token scheme is accepted |
invalid_dpop_proof, use_dpop_nonce
|
400 | A DPoP proof presented for key binding (Section 5.1), with no DPoP-bound access token authenticating the request, fails the checks of Section 4.3 of [RFC9449], carries ath, or lacks a nonce the MAS requires (Section 8 of [RFC9449]); a proof that constrains an authenticating access token fails as unauthorized
|
unauthorized
|
401 | Access-token authentication failed, or no credential was presented where an access-token scheme is accepted |
not_found
|
404 | Unknown mission_id, or the requester is not the Mission's recorded client |
invalid_audience
|
400 |
audience names no AS this MAS issues grants for |
mission_not_active
|
409 | The Mission is not active
|
invalid_authorization_details
|
400 | The request is wider than the Effective Authority Set or the audience's scope, or asks for a narrowing the MAS cannot perform (Section 4.2) |
derivations_exhausted
|
409 | The Mission's derivation_limit is reached |
rate_limited
|
429 | The requester is rate-limited |
unavailable
|
503 | The MAS temporarily cannot serve the request |
not_found covers both an unknown Mission and a requester that is
not the recorded client, so the response is not a membership oracle.
invalid_audience, mission_not_active,
invalid_authorization_details, and derivations_exhausted reach
only the authenticated recorded client, to which Mission state is
already visible. mission_not_active is returned during a suspension
and after termination alike; the Mission's state tells the two apart.
derivations_exhausted reports the condition the mission_error
value of that name reports at a token endpoint
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits]), and no
fresh grant under that Mission cures it.¶
The client presents the grant to the consuming AS's token endpoint
as a JWT authorization grant [RFC7523]. The following example shows
a confidential client that authenticates with a JWT
(Section 2.2 of [RFC7523]) and proves possession of the grant's
cnf key with a DPoP proof (Section 5 of [RFC9449]); line breaks
are for display purposes only:¶
The grant is an authorization, not a client credential. A
confidential client authenticates as Section 3.2.1 of [RFC6749]
requires, and possession of a cnf key does not replace that
authentication. A public client sends client_id and can redeem only
a grant that carries cnf, since proof of possession of that key is
then the only binding of the redemption to the grant's client_id.¶
In addition to the processing Section 3 of [RFC7523] requires, the consuming AS MUST validate the following and refuse the request if any check fails:¶
the typ JOSE header parameter is mission-issuance-grant+jwt,
checked first so that no other artifact's validation rules are
applied to the grant (Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] and
Section 3.12 of [RFC8725]);¶
the signature, under a kid resolving in the published key
material of an iss its local policy trusts for issuance joins;
and the mission claim's issuer equals iss;¶
the mission claim carries id, a string in the Mission
Identifier character set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Mission Identifier Format"); expires_at, an RFC 3339
date-time [RFC3339] later than the current time; and
authority_hash, in
the form of the issuance profile's Section "Integrity Anchors",
which the consuming AS does not recompute;¶
aud is a single string identical to this AS's issuer
identifier, compared as a literal string with no normalization, so
an array, a token endpoint URL, or another alias fails; exp is no
more than 300 seconds after
iat, compared exactly; iat is not after the current time and
exp is after it, with the clock-skew leeway of
Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519] applied to these two comparisons with
the current time only; and the jti has not been seen, a seen
jti being retained until exp plus that leeway passes
(Section 6.6);¶
the client is the grant's client_id (Section 6): the
authenticated client equals it, or, for a public client, the grant
carries cnf; and whenever cnf is present, the request proves
possession of that key, with a DPoP proof
(Section 4.3 of [RFC9449]) whose public key has the jkt
thumbprint or a client certificate on the TLS connection whose
SHA-256 thumbprint matches the x5t#S256 value, and presents no
DPoP proof for any other key (at the PAR endpoint, no dpop_jkt
other than the jkt value); a client certificate that only
authenticates the client does not conflict with a jkt value;¶
the (iss, sub) pair maps to a local account under the
deployment's mapping policy (Section 3.2), and every entry of the grant's
authorization_details is of a type this AS supports and is one it
serves (Section 4.2).¶
On success the consuming AS mints tokens under these rules:¶
mission claim. Issued tokens carry the grant's mission
object as the issuance profile's mission claim, unchanged except
that they need not carry authority_hash; id, issuer, and
expires_at always carry over (Section 4.1).¶
Subset. Issued authorization_details MUST be a subset of the
grant's. The consuming AS's own policy can only narrow them: it
MUST NOT widen, remap, or supplement them. Representing them as
scope (below) is not a remapping.¶
Token response. The token response carries the issued
authorization_details as the issuance profile requires
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section
"Audience and Token Response", and Section 7 of [RFC9396]),
any projected scope beside them (Section 5.1 of [RFC6749]), and
the mission_id and mission_expires_at parameters as the issuance
profile recommends ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section
"Binding the Mission to the Grant").¶
Scope projection. Where a target's enforcement path consumes
scope, the consuming AS also projects the issued
authorization_details to scope as the issuance profile's Scope
Projection rule requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Scope Projection"), so it supports [RFC9396] even where
its targets consume only scope.¶
Lifetime. The consuming AS MUST NOT issue an access or refresh
token under the grant with an expiry later than the mission
object's expires_at. That ceiling is the Mission's expiry, not a
liveness bound, so access tokens issued under a grant SHOULD be
short-lived (Section 12).¶
Key binding. When the grant carries cnf, the consuming AS MUST
bind every access token it issues under the grant, at redemption, at
code exchange under the PAR carriage, and at each refresh, to that
confirmation value: as a DPoP-bound access token with token_type
DPoP (Section 5 of [RFC9449]) for jkt, or as a
certificate-bound access token (Section 3 of [RFC8705]) for
x5t#S256. It MUST NOT issue such a token as a bearer token or bind
it to any other key. Refresh tokens follow the issuance profile's
rules ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Refresh
Tokens"), and every refresh still proves possession of the grant's
cnf key (Section 6.3.4).¶
Effective Authority Set projection. A consuming AS with a Mission-state integration also applies Section 6.3.¶
No re-approval. The approval event already occurred at the Mission Issuer. The consuming AS MUST NOT prompt the Subject or any user for consent at redemption.¶
The following is an example of a successful token response:¶
A consuming AS with a Mission-state integration applies this section at redemption and at every refresh.¶
A consuming AS with a Mission-state integration MUST, at redemption
and at every refresh, resolve the Mission's current state and
Effective Authority Set through the Mission Status operation
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]) or an equivalent
state source, and refuse when the Mission is not established
active. The consuming AS MUST NOT rely on an equivalent source
unless it is authenticated, is audience-scoped to the entries this AS
serves, carries the Mission's current authorization_details and
a monotonic state version, and answers within a staleness bound
the deployment publishes (Section 11).¶
The consuming AS MUST NOT rely on a response it validated earlier, at a later redemption or refresh, unless all of the following hold:¶
it is within its reliance bound
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section "Caching")
and within the staleness bound the deployment publishes, measured
from the response's iat, whichever ends first;¶
it is for the same Mission (mission.issuer and mission.id) and
the same requested audience; and¶
its version is not below the version the AS has retained for the
Mission.¶
Where a held response meets these conditions, a transient failure of a new request does not refuse the redemption or refresh (Section 6.3.3).¶
Through the Mission Status operation, the consuming AS resolves
authority per entry audience, not for an audience of its own. For
each distinct audience the grant's entries are relevant to (on
refresh, the family ceiling's entries), resolved as Section 4.2
describes, it sends one request whose audience is that audience
identifier; it sends an entry's resource value as the audience
only where that resolution establishes the two are equal. The Mission
Issuer authorizes each audience separately
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section "Request").
The consuming AS validates each response against the audience it
requested, and MUST combine only responses whose mission.issuer,
mission.id, and mission.version are identical. A response below
the version the AS retained for the Mission before this resolution
began is a rollback (Section 6.3.3). Where responses within
one resolution differ in version, the AS re-queries each audience
whose response is below the highest version collected, without using
a cached response, up to a bound the deployment configures. Once all
responses report one version, the AS combines them and retains that
version; an entry relevant to several audiences survives only where
every one of their responses admits it. If it still cannot obtain
responses at one version within
the bound, the state source has failed (Section 6.3.3). A
not-found response for an audience the grant's entries are relevant
to means the Mission is not established active: the AS refuses
with invalid_grant and carries no mission_error value, since a
not-found response establishes only that the AS cannot proceed, not
that the Mission terminated
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section "Failed
Status Checks").¶
Lifecycle state alone, such as an active state or a Status List
VALID bit, is not enough from any source, and a source that reports
only lifecycle state is not a Mission-state integration: containment
and discharge narrow an active Mission without changing its
lifecycle state, and a Status List bit carries no
authorization_details.¶
A source that is unavailable or rate-limited (Mission Status's
unavailable or rate_limited), fails verification, or reports a
state version older than one already observed for this Mission is a
transient failure, never authority exhaustion, and is refused in a
machine-readable shape: this profile defines a token-endpoint use of
the OAuth temporarily_unavailable error code [RFC6749]
(Section 14.4), carried with HTTP status 503. The
response MAY carry Retry-After per the deployment's declared
state-recovery policy, which also governs any value forwarded from a
Mission Status Retry-After. A held response that meets the conditions of
Section 6.3.1 still satisfies the check, and the failure
then refuses nothing. For a per-audience resolution, the version
already observed is the one the AS retained before the resolution
began (Section 6.3.1). The consuming AS leaves the family
ceiling unchanged. On the refresh path a transient source failure
MUST NOT consume or rotate the presented refresh token, so the
client retries with the credential it already holds. invalid_grant
stays for the permanent failures (Section 6.7).¶
A refresh family's ceiling MUST NOT widen across refreshes within the same Mission, and no token issued in the family exceeds it. The consuming AS MUST persist the narrowed family ceiling atomically with each successful issuance, and applies the rollback test of Section 6.3.1 as well: detecting a rollback does not replace the persisted ceiling. A refresh that fails leaves the family ceiling and the presented refresh token unchanged. Concurrent refreshes in one family MUST NOT restore authority that an earlier successful issuance in that family removed.¶
Where the grant carried cnf, each refresh request MUST prove
possession of that key: a DPoP proof whose public key has the jkt
thumbprint, or a TLS client certificate whose SHA-256 thumbprint is
the x5t#S256 value, and present no DPoP proof for any other key. The
consuming AS refuses a refresh request that does not as
Section 6.7 specifies.¶
A consuming AS without a Mission-state integration MUST NOT issue
refresh tokens under a grant, and relies instead on the grant's
active-at-minting gate and the short access-token lifetime
(Section 6.2). A consuming AS that cannot perform the
projection of Section 6.3 MUST NOT claim
containment- or discharge-aware issuance.¶
A token a consuming AS issues under a grant carries the mission claim
under this profile, which states the elements the issuance profile's
Claim Reservation names for a path whose minter is not the Mission's
issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Claim Reservation"):¶
Grant. The Mission Issuance Grant the MAS mints for the Mission (Section 5.2), validated by the consuming AS and redeemed once (Section 6.1, Section 6.6).¶
Authority bound. Issued authorization_details are a subset of
the grant's; a consuming AS with a Mission-state integration also
projects them onto the Effective Authority Set
(Section 6.2, Section 6.3).¶
Mission state. The MAS establishes that the Mission is active
when it mints the grant (Section 5.2). A consuming AS with a
Mission-state integration also resolves the Mission's state at
redemption and at every refresh, within the staleness bound the
deployment publishes (Section 6.3.1). One without
relies on the minting gate and the short access-token lifetime,
issues no refresh token, and claims no containment- or
discharge-aware issuance (Section 6.4); its residual is
the revocation latency Section 12 declares.¶
Consumer checks. A resource server applies the issuance
profile's resource-server requirements; the token's iss is the
consuming AS and its mission.issuer the Mission's issuer
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Resource Server Enforcement").¶
Consumption is atomic with issuance. The single-use jti check of
Section 6.1 refuses a grant already recorded; the record
itself is written atomically with successful issuance, after the
Mission-state check and the projection of Section 6.3
where they apply. A redemption that fails before issuance, a transient
source failure (Section 6.3.3) in particular, therefore
leaves the grant unconsumed and retryable, and concurrent
redemptions of one grant are resolved by that atomic record: the
loser is a replay, refused invalid_grant. Under the authorization
code flow carriage, PAR validation is the consuming step instead
(Section 7).¶
The consuming AS responds to a failed redemption or refresh with an
error response as defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749]. A grant that
fails any check of Section 6.1 is refused with the
invalid_grant error code (Section 3.1 of [RFC7523]), except as the
next sentence says of DPoP proofs, and failed client authentication
with invalid_client. At the PAR endpoint, at redemption, at code
exchange, and at refresh alike, a DPoP proof that fails the checks of
Section 4.3 of [RFC9449] is refused with invalid_dpop_proof, or
with use_dpop_nonce where the AS requires a nonce
(Section 8 of [RFC9449]). When the grant carries cnf, a request
that proves no key, proves a key other than the cnf key, or
presents a DPoP proof for another key is refused with
invalid_grant. The other refusals are:¶
| Condition | Response |
|---|---|
The Mission is not active
|
invalid_grant
|
| The authorization is exhausted (Section 6.3.2) |
invalid_grant
|
The requested scope exceeds the surviving authority |
invalid_scope
|
The requested authorization_details exceeds the surviving authority |
invalid_authorization_details
|
| The state source fails (Section 6.3.3) |
temporarily_unavailable, HTTP 503 |
A client tells four cases apart:¶
Retry. temporarily_unavailable means the authorization is
intact and the same credential can be presented again.
invalid_scope and invalid_authorization_details name a request
the client can narrow and re-send under the same grant.¶
Get a fresh grant. An expired or already redeemed grant is cured by a fresh one (Section 5). The other grant validation failures (an untrusted issuer, a wrong audience, an unmappable subject or authority) are configuration faults that a fresh grant does not cure, and so is a refusal after a Status not-found response.¶
Wait. A suspended Mission refuses until a resume returns it
to active ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]); a fresh
grant then cures the refusal. A refused refresh leaves its refresh
token unchanged (Section 6.3.4), so once the Mission is active again
the client may instead present that token while it remains valid,
with the client authentication of Section 6 of [RFC6749] and,
where the grant carried cnf, a new proof of possession of its key.
The consuming AS does not treat that earlier refusal as grounds to
refuse the retry. Permission to retry is not a promise of issuance:
the consuming AS applies every refresh check to the retry, including
its current policy, the family ceiling, and the token's validity,
rotation and reuse checks, and a resume restores no authority that
an earlier issuance removed.¶
Stop. A terminated Mission, or one whose expires_at has
passed, refuses for good: neither a retry nor a fresh grant cures
the refusal. The consuming AS refuses every later refresh in a
refresh family bound to that Mission. This profile adds no
revocation duty and removes none that another specification or the
deployment imposes.¶
The AS SHOULD include the issuance profile's mission_error member
when Mission state reports that the Mission is not active, so the
client can tell Wait from Stop: suspended for Wait, and for Stop
revoked, expired, or superseded
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Issuance Gating")
or completed ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]). The
MAS's own refusals of a fresh grant request are in Section 5.4.¶
Deployments whose clients must traverse the authorization code flow
MAY carry the grant in a Pushed Authorization Request [RFC9126] as
the request parameter mission_issuance_grant (Section 14).¶
The AS MUST accept the mission_issuance_grant parameter only in a
pushed authorization request, whether sent directly or inside a
Request Object [RFC9101] pushed there. It MUST reject, with the
invalid_request error code (Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749]), an
authorization request that carries the parameter any other way,
including in a Request Object passed to the authorization endpoint
outside PAR. The front channel then carries only client_id and the
request_uri. Direct redemption at the token endpoint
(Section 6) is unaffected.¶
The AS applies the grant validation of Section 6.1 at the PAR
endpoint, refusing a grant that fails it with the invalid_grant
error code, which Section 2.3 of [RFC9126] permits there, and
treats the grant as the authorization already obtained.
It MUST NOT re-prompt for consent; at most it renders the Mission
reference.¶
The AS consumes the grant at PAR validation: it records the jti as
seen there, the atomic issuance step of Section 6.6 under this
carriage, so the grant cannot be replayed into a second authorization
request. From then on the request_uri, and then the authorization
code, carry the authorization; a flow the user abandons, or the AS
refuses, after PAR validation leaves the grant consumed, and the
client obtains a fresh grant.¶
When the grant carries cnf, the authorization code inherits it. The
token request at code exchange MUST prove possession of that key, as
Section 10 of [RFC9449] binds a code to a DPoP key (for jkt), or
arrive over a mutual-TLS connection with that certificate (for
x5t#S256, Section 3 of [RFC8705]), and present no DPoP proof for
any other key; the AS refuses a code exchange that does not as
Section 6.7 specifies.¶
The grant's window is not re-evaluated at code exchange, since the
authorization code carries its own lifetime. The other redemption
rules (Section 6.2, Section 6.3 or
Section 6.4, and Section 6.7) apply at the
token request unchanged. A
transient source failure at code exchange refuses
temporarily_unavailable and MUST NOT consume the authorization code.¶
This carriage serves user-delegated Missions
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authority Sources"),
where an authenticated resource owner exists to bind. The AS MUST
refuse the request unless the resource owner authenticated at the
authorization endpoint is the grant's Subject under the deployment's
mapping policy (Section 3.2), so the grant cannot mint tokens for
another resource owner. It refuses with the access_denied error
code (Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749]), redirecting the error to the
client only where that section allows. A grant for a service-owned
or organizational
Mission has no delegating user to authenticate; it is redeemed
directly (Section 6), not carried through the authorization code
flow.¶
The MAS MUST record each minting with the Mission record: the jti,
audience, requested and granted entries, any cnf, and time. The
consuming AS MUST record each issuance under a grant, each refresh
included, with the grant's jti, Mission reference, and
authority_hash. Only the jti
identifies the minting: several grants can share a Mission and an
authority_hash, and the single-use record (Section 6.6) expires
with the grant's acceptance window. Together the records attribute
what was approved to the MAS and what was issued to
each consuming AS.¶
A deployment SHOULD reconcile MAS minting records against consuming-AS redemption records. A deployment SHOULD treat a redemption with no matching minting record as a security event. A deployment states its reconciliation posture in the statement Section 11 describes. A deployment operating under the Enterprise Mission Authority Profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]) MUST reconcile within the window its statement declares.¶
A MAS that issues grants publishes the following members in its metadata ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section "Mission Authority Server Metadata"):¶
mission_issuance_grant_endpoint:REQUIRED. A string containing the URL of the MAS's Mission Issuance Grant endpoint (Section 5).¶
mission_issuance_grant_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:REQUIRED. A JSON array of strings naming the client-authentication
methods the Mission Issuance Grant endpoint accepts, with the value
space and meaning of
mission_submission_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]).¶
mission_issuance_grant_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported:REQUIRED when
mission_issuance_grant_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists
private_key_jwt. A JSON array of strings: the client-assertion
algorithms this endpoint accepts, with the meaning of
mission_submission_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]).¶
A consuming AS publishes the following members in its Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414]:¶
mission_issuance_grant_supported:OPTIONAL. Boolean value indicating whether the AS redeems Mission
Issuance Grants at its token endpoint (Section 6). If omitted,
the default value is false.¶
mission_issuance_grant_par_supported:OPTIONAL. Boolean value indicating whether the AS accepts the
mission_issuance_grant parameter in pushed authorization requests
(Section 7). If omitted, the default value is false.¶
The cross-domain grant is this shape across a trust boundary. Cross-domain projection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]) carries a Mission to a Resource AS in another domain, under federation trust and identity chaining. The issuance join is the same-estate case (Section 3.2), with bilateral, pre-configured trust and no identity chaining.¶
Native Mission-aware issuance replaces this grant. An AS that becomes natively Mission-aware implements the issuance profile and mints without grants for its own resources. It consumes the record, anchors, and lifecycle the MAS already operates, so nothing is re-approved in migration.¶
The Mission Join remains for other tokens. Runtime enforcement reads the Mission from tokens issued under this profile (credential-carried composition, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), so the Mission Join's limit does not apply to them: the join proves a credential belongs to the Mission's parties, never that it was issued for the Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section "Mission Join"). The estate's other tokens are unchanged and compose through the Mission Join; the two joins coexist per resource and per AS.¶
A Mission Authority Server implements Section 5 in full, issues grants exactly as Section 4 requires, and records each minting (Section 8).¶
A consuming AS implements Section 6 in full, including Section 6.3 when it has a Mission-state integration and Section 6.4 when it has none, and records each issuance (Section 8). The PAR carriage of Section 7 is OPTIONAL.¶
A deployment claiming this profile MUST publish a deployment statement declaring the following. The declarations are part of its Enforcement Scope Statement ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], Section "Enforcement Scope and Conformance") where it publishes one, and stand alone otherwise; this profile does not require Runtime. The statement declares:¶
which authorization servers consume grants, and which of them have a Mission-state integration;¶
the staleness bound of each one's state gating, and the bound on its Mission Status re-queries (Section 6.3.1);¶
whether each claims containment- or discharge-aware issuance (Section 6.4); and¶
its reconciliation posture (Section 8): the window within which minting and redemption records are reconciled, or that they are not.¶
A consuming AS that supports this profile publishes
mission_issuance_grant_supported, and one that supports the PAR
carriage publishes mission_issuance_grant_par_supported
(Section 9).¶
The security considerations of [RFC7523], [RFC7519], and [RFC8725] apply. This section adds those specific to the issuance join.¶
Grant theft. A grant authorizes issuance, so its defenses are
layered: a 300-second lifetime, a single-use jti, one audience,
redemption bound to the Mission's client_id, and cnf key binding
whenever the grant request is sender-constrained. A stolen grant is
useless to any party that cannot also
authenticate as the recorded client, or prove possession of the cnf
key, at the named AS within that window. Deployments whose client
credentials are weak SHOULD require cnf (DPoP [RFC9449] or mutual
TLS [RFC8705]).¶
Mission Issuer compromise reaches issuance. In a MAS-only deployment, MAS compromise corrupts records and state. Under this profile a compromised MAS also mints grants every consuming AS honors, so compromise reaches token issuance across the estate. The consuming authorization servers' redemption records (Section 8) are the independent record that bounds and exposes such minting; at estate scale, reconciling them against the MAS's minting records is the only check on this compromise class.¶
Externally derived authority. The consuming AS issues authority
derived elsewhere. The grant bounds its exposure: it issues only
within the grant's authorization_details, only to the grant's
client, and never past the Mission's expires_at
(Section 6.2). Its own policy can narrow further or refuse a
grant outright; nothing obliges issuance.¶
Type confusion. Three issuer-signed JWT artifacts describe
Missions: the Mission Mandate
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate], evidence), the
cross-domain grant (foreign domain), and this grant (same estate).
Explicit typing with mutually
exclusive validation rules (Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] and
Section 3.12 of [RFC8725]) is the defense: every consumer checks
typ first, and none accepts another's type.¶
Revocation latency. New grants stop at the MAS active gate when
the state change commits. A grant already minted can still be
redeemed within its 300 seconds at a consuming AS without a
Mission-state integration. The residual there is the grant's
remaining lifetime and clock-skew leeway (Section 6.1), plus
the issued token's lifetime, plus that of each further exchange that
checks no Mission state, capped by expires_at. Under the PAR
carriage the grant is consumed at PAR validation, and the sum then
runs through the pending authorization request, bounded by the
request_uri lifetime (Section 2.2 of [RFC9126]) and any
resource-owner interaction timeout, and through the authorization
code's lifetime, before the issued token's; expires_at still caps
it. Hence the short-lifetime recommendation (Section 6.2). In
either mode,
issued access tokens run to their own expiry. With a Mission-state
integration, an outstanding refresh token is refused at its next
use, and a refresh re-projects through the Effective Authority Set
(Section 6.3), so a Mission contained or discharged
between issuance and refresh does not renew its original, narrowed
authority, within the staleness bound the deployment publishes
(Section 11). Where the runtime layer is deployed, the Policy
Decision Point's re-check bounds outstanding-token use independently.¶
Consent integrity. The approval the grant rests on was rendered and committed at the Mission Issuer under the issuance profile's rules. The consuming AS relies on that approval and does not substitute one of its own: its non-prompting duty (Section 6.2, Section 7) prevents consent-surface confusion where the Subject holds accounts at both.¶
The grant carries the Mission reference, the Subject's sub, the
client_id, and an authority subset to the consuming AS, which may
be operated by a different organizational unit than the MAS.
Minimization is structural: the MAS scopes authorization_details
to what the audience serves (Section 5), and nothing else of the
record (no purpose text, no Intent, no full Authority Set) travels.
The Mission identifier is a correlator across MAS and AS logs by
design; that correlation is the audit trail, and the issuance
profile provides no cross-audience unlinkability
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Identifier
Correlation").¶
IANA is requested to register one media type per [RFC6838].¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: mission-issuance-grant+jwt¶
Required parameters: none¶
Optional parameters: none¶
Encoding considerations: binary; a Mission Issuance Grant is a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters¶
Security considerations: see Section 12¶
Interoperability considerations: see this document¶
Published specification: this document¶
Applications that use this media type: Mission Authority Servers and OAuth authorization servers implementing this profile¶
Fragment identifier considerations: n/a¶
Additional information: n/a¶
Person and email address to contact for further information: see the Authors' Addresses section¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage: none¶
Author: see the Authors' Addresses section¶
Change controller: IETF¶
IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Extensions
Error" registry [RFC6749]. The name is the existing OAuth error code
of Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749], registered only for the
authorization endpoint; this entry adds its token-endpoint use
(Section 6.3.3), as [RFC8628] did for access_denied.¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
Mission-Binding Profile states the grant, authority bound, state
check (with and without a Mission-state integration), and consumer
checks under which a consuming AS's tokens carry the mission
claim, as the issuance profile's Claim Reservation requires. No
requirement changed (#1531).¶
Redemption Errors says how a client recovers a refresh refused during a suspension: after a resume it may present the same still-valid refresh token, which the consuming AS checks as any refresh, and a resume restores no removed authority. After termination every later refresh in the family is refused, with no added revocation duty (#1583, D702).¶
Transient Source Failure names Mission Status's rate_limited as
transient, beside unavailable; a forwarded Retry-After stays
under the deployment's state-recovery policy (#1582, D702).¶
Normative follow-ups to the tightening pass (D685). The grant
admits any supported authorization-details type under that type's
semantics and fails closed on an unsupported transformation. Its
sub is an injective MAS-local mapping of the recorded Subject, and
its aud is the consuming AS's issuer identifier only. Grant
Validation checks the required mission members. The grant
endpoint carries client assertions in JSON, advertises its
authentication methods, defines its own error codes, and always
binds a verified sender constraint into cnf; a cnf grant yields
key-bound access tokens through code exchange and refresh. A
requested narrowing that exceeds the surviving authority is
refused, not truncated. The refresh family and its ceiling are
defined, and the ceiling is persisted at every issuance. A Status
not-found refusal carries no mission_error, and reliance on a
cached Status response is bounded, a held response that still meets
those bounds survives a transient failure, Status requests name each
entry's resolved audience rather than its resource, and an entry
relevant to several audiences survives only where all of them admit
it. The
grant endpoint publishes Protected Resource Metadata with its DPoP
algorithms, accepts client_id for mutual TLS, and verifies any
DPoP proof presented; DPoP error codes are the same at the grant
endpoint, the PAR endpoint, redemption, code exchange and refresh.
PAR errors are named, the consuming AS's issuance record is a
requirement, the causal-attribution rule for authority_contained
moves to Containment, the scope statement moves to Trust, and a
deployment statement is required.¶
Tightened throughout with no requirement change. Each rule has one
home: the cnf possession check is in Grant Validation, the jti
record in Single Use, the typ refusal in Grant Validation, the
per-resource version rule in Mission State Source, and the MAS's
refusal notes in Grant Errors. Single Use and Without a
Mission-State Integration are Redemption subsections, Issued Tokens
folds into Relationship to Other Artifacts, Composite Provision is
removed (Architecture and the MAS draft state its positioning), and
a new Issuance Records section holds minting records, redemption
records, and reconciliation, including the Enterprise
reconciliation requirement that Security Considerations carried.
Restatements of the issuance profile's Scope Projection, the MAS
error object, and Derivation Limits' counting rule are pointers.
The equivalent-source properties bind the consuming AS. The Mission
Authority Server Metadata registration uses that registry's
template fields. The Substrate, Architecture, and Consent Evidence
references are removed.¶
Redemption Errors separates a suspended Mission, which a resume
restores and a fresh grant then cures, from a terminated one,
which neither a retry nor a fresh grant cures. The mission_error
values follow the lifecycle migration and include suspended and
completed, and mission_not_active at the MAS is no longer called
an unconditional signal to stop. No requirement changes.¶
The author thanks the implementers and reviewers of the Mission-Bound Authorization work for feedback that shaped this profile.¶