Network Working Group K. McGuinness Internet-Draft Independent Intended status: Standards Track 27 October 2026 Expires: 30 April 2027 Mission Approval Governance draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance-latest Abstract Mission-Bound Authorization records one accountable Approver for each Mission and leaves multi-party approval and approval-authority provenance to a governance layer. This document defines that layer's record, the Approval Governance Record: an issuer-signed, issuer- retained record of the policy, assertions, and evaluation behind one approval event. Before the Mission is created, the record is part of the approval decision; afterwards, it is immutable evidence of who approved, under which authority, and why the decision satisfied governance. The record never appears on tokens or protocol messages, and the Mission's single accountable Approver is unchanged. This document also defines the governed_policy approval basis, under which a policy version that an accountable human approved activates Mission proposals, and the Approval Context Commitment, a digest over a Mission's immutable creation facts that lets two authenticated artifacts be matched to one approval. About This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft- mcguinness-mission-approval-governance.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft- mcguinness-mission-approval-governance/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 April 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Conventions and Definitions 3. Relationship to the Issuance Profile 4. Recording Triggers 5. The Approval Governance Record 5.1. Record Members 5.2. Assertion Members 5.3. Assertion Authority 5.4. Approval Policy Reference 5.5. Example 6. Assertion Requirements 6.1. Assertion Validation 6.2. Accountable Assertion 7. Policy-Approval Recency 7.1. Recency Declarations 7.2. Evaluating Recency 7.3. High-Risk Classes 7.4. Scope of the Recency Rules 7.5. Relationship to Standing-Consent Recency 8. Evaluation and Atomic Commitment 9. Envelope and Verification 10. Re-checking an Evaluation 11. Portable Approval-Binding Check 11.1. Example 11.2. Example: An Approver's Transfer 12. Governed Policy Approval 12.1. Consented Root 12.2. Instance Record 12.3. Activation 12.4. Example 13. Consent Evidence Relationship 14. Mission Evidence 15. Approval Context Commitment 15.1. Manifest 15.2. Construction 15.3. Computation and Versioning 15.4. Limits 15.5. Carriage 16. Conformance 17. Security Considerations 17.1. Forged or Padded Assertions 17.2. Policy Substitution 17.3. Manufactured Accountability 17.4. Stale Policy Approval 17.5. Immutability Witness 17.6. Issuer Key Compromise 18. Privacy Considerations 19. IANA Considerations 19.1. Media Type Registration 19.1.1. application/mission-approval-governance+jws 19.1.2. application/mission-approval-governance+json 20. References 20.1. Normative References 20.2. Informative References Appendix A. Approval Context Commitment Test Vectors Appendix B. Portable Approval-Binding Check Vectors Appendix C. Document History Acknowledgments Author's Address 1. Introduction Mission-Bound Authorization records one accountable Approver for each Mission and leaves multi-party approval and approval-authority provenance to a governance layer. Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (the "issuance profile") states this rule for the OAuth binding, which records the Approver in approval_basis.consent_principal; this document consumes that binding's record members. An enterprise review process is often that governance layer. One approval can involve several principals, a threshold or separation- of-duty rule, and a delegation-of-authority policy. An auditor later has to prove not only who approved, but under which authority the approval was valid. The issuance profile answers who is accountable for a Mission. This document answers under which authority that approval was made, and why it satisfied governance. It defines: * the Approval Governance Record (AGR), the record of the policy, assertions, and evaluation behind one approval event (Section 5); * the governed_policy approval basis (Section 12), under which an accountable human approves a bounded policy version once, and that policy then decides eligible Mission proposals, each activation committing a record; and * the Approval Context Commitment (Section 15), an optional digest over a Mission's immutable creation facts that other authenticated artifacts can disclose. The record has two phases: * Before commitment, it is part of the approval decision. An assertion that fails authentication, event binding, or policy authorization does not contribute (Section 6), and a record that cannot be evaluated or persisted prevents activation (Section 8). * After commitment, it is evidence: immutable, signed (Section 9), and consumed by audit, never by enforcement. This document is optional. A deployment that records nothing beyond the Mission Record's accountable approval_basis.consent_principal is fully conformant to its Mission binding and unaffected by this document. A profile can require the record; Section 4 defines the conditions under which one does. The record is independent of the approval ceremony. It applies alike to synchronous approval, to deferred approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]), and to the native asynchronous approval of a standalone Mission Authority Server ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]), and it depends on no deferral substrate. 2. Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. All JSON shown in this document is non-normative and illustrative; the member definitions in the surrounding text are authoritative. An example line too long for the page is folded with the single backslash strategy of [RFC8792]; the canonical-bytes blocks of Appendix A are wrapped as that appendix describes. This document uses JSON [RFC8259] as the data model for the Approval Governance Record. JCS canonicalization [RFC8785] applies wherever this document computes a digest or a signing input, under the canonicalization rules of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]; this document does not define a second canonicalization. A digest is encoded in the integrity-anchor encoded form of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]: the sha-256: prefix followed by the base64url, no-padding encoding of the digest. This document defines no digest algorithm of its own. Its digests are constructed with the issuance profile's commitment mechanisms ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) and classified under the substrate's default commitment construction, which this document imports normatively ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-substrate]): approval_policy.digest, approval_context_commitment, and submission_evidence_commitment are envelope anchors, and the record digest (Section 9) is a canonical-object digest. The terms Mission, Mission Record, Mission Issuer, Approver, Subject, approval event, Mission Intent, Authority Set, audit horizon, approval_event_id, intent_hash, and authority_hash are used as defined in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]. This document defines the following terms: Approval Governance Record (AGR): The policy, assertions, and evaluation standing behind one approval event (Section 5). Assertion: One principal's authenticated decision statement carried in an AGR (Section 5.2). Accountable assertion: The assertion that satisfies the accountable- approver rule (Section 6.2). Evaluation: The issuer's determination of whether the recorded assertions satisfy the referenced approval policy (Section 8). Record digest: The digest over a complete record, envelope included, that every external binding names (Section 9). Recording trigger: A condition under which a profile requires this record for an approval event (Section 4). Recording Issuer: A Mission Issuer that records Approval Governance Records (Section 16). Relying Auditor: A party that verifies a retained record and can re- check its evaluation (Section 16). 3. Relationship to the Issuance Profile The Mission Record carries exactly one accountable principal, approval_basis.consent_principal, and this document does not change that. The accountable Approver remains the only principal that any downstream projection, token, or enforcement point consumes. The record captures the standing behind that approval, never a second authorization surface visible outside the issuer. The approval_event_id member joins the record to the approval event and to the Mission Record it governs ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). The record never appears on tokens or in any protocol message; it is issuer-retained control- plane state. OAuth standardizes the authorization data that a client requests and is granted ([RFC9396] for rich authorization requests), not an organization's internal approval provenance, so the record also stays out of enforcement projections, matching the issuance profile's control-plane discipline. The record governs the Mission approval event. An action-time approval under the runtime profile's re-evaluation surfaces ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]) is a different layer and never joins this record. Where the governed Mission populates approval_basis.adjudication ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Role Mapping") and this record exists: * adjudication.governance_record is true; * adjudication.kind names the mechanism the approval basis fixes: human for direct, and policy for a standing-consent basis, including governed_policy (Section 12). It is never a value that names this record itself, and never a flattening of its assertion set into a single principal; and * where the record carries an accountable assertion (Section 6), that assertion's own kind MUST equal adjudication.kind. 4. Recording Triggers A profile MAY require this record; the Enterprise Mission Authority Profile does so under these recording triggers ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]). The triggers are defined here so that a profile cites one list. Under a profile that adopts these recording triggers, the record is REQUIRED for an approval event when any of the following holds: 1. the Mission Record's approval_basis.consent_principal differs from its subject; 2. more than one principal contributes to the decision; 3. a non-human assertion contributes to the decision; 4. a threshold, veto, or separation-of-duty rule is evaluated; or 5. validating any assertion requires authority standing outside the Mission Record. A deployment that adopts no profile requiring the record has no obligation to record one merely because a trigger holds. Independently of any profile, every activation under governed_policy records an Approval Governance Record (Section 12). Every Approval Governance Record a deployment records, whether required or not, MUST satisfy the requirements of this document. The Approver is always approval_basis.consent_principal ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so a Mission whose Approver differs from its Subject holds the first trigger, and the Enterprise Mission Authority Profile always records an Approval Governance Record for it. Direct self-approval by one authenticated human is the degenerate case: the Mission Record already carries it completely, and no record is required. This presumes that the human resolved the approval on the approval surface itself. Where an agent resolves it on its own behalf, there is no human decision for this list to be degenerate about ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). The following table gives an example approval for each trigger, and for the degenerate case. Each row names one trigger that holds; others can hold too. +=======================================+=======================+ | Approval | Trigger that holds | +=======================================+=======================+ | A manager approves a Mission whose | The Approver differs | | Subject is Alice | from the Subject | +---------------------------------------+-----------------------+ | Alice and a finance co-approver both | More than one | | approve | principal contributes | +---------------------------------------+-----------------------+ | A delegation-of-authority policy | A non-human assertion | | asserts alongside Alice (Section 5.5) | contributes | +---------------------------------------+-----------------------+ | A two-of-three finance rule decides | A threshold rule is | | the approval | evaluated | +---------------------------------------+-----------------------+ | An approver's authority comes from a | Validating an | | delegation matrix held outside the | assertion requires | | Mission Record | outside standing | +---------------------------------------+-----------------------+ | Alice alone approves her own Mission | None; no record is | | on the approval surface | required | +---------------------------------------+-----------------------+ Table 1: Recording trigger examples 5. The Approval Governance Record An Approval Governance Record is a JSON object. Section 5.1, Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 define its members. Section 6 and Section 8 define how the issuer builds and commits it, and Section 9 defines its integrity protection. 5.1. Record Members approval_event_id: REQUIRED. A string. The approval event's identifier, equal to the Mission Record's approval_event_id ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). mission: REQUIRED. An object binding the record to the approved Mission: issuer (the Mission Issuer), intent_hash, and authority_hash, each equal to the committed Mission Record member of the same name. A record whose binding does not match the Mission Record it is retained with is invalid. approval_policy: REQUIRED. An object identifying the governing delegation-of-authority policy: id (an identifier), version (a string), and digest (an integrity anchor over the retained policy snapshot, in the encoded form Section 2 fixes). Section 5.4 defines the digest and the snapshot's retention. assertions: REQUIRED. An array of one or more decision assertions (Section 5.2). evaluation: REQUIRED. An object recording the outcome, with these members: decision: REQUIRED. A string. The only value a committed record carries is approved, since a record exists only for an approval that committed (Section 8). evaluated_at: REQUIRED. An RFC 3339 timestamp. contributing: REQUIRED. An array of the assertion_id values the evaluation counted toward the rule the approval satisfied. A denial the policy evaluated that did not block the approval is recorded but not contributing, and a blocking denial leaves no committed record (Section 8), so a deny assertion never appears in contributing. approval_context_commitment: OPTIONAL. A string. The Approval Context Commitment over the governed Mission's immutable creation facts (Section 15), in the encoded form Section 2 fixes. It is a member of this record, never of the Mission Record (Section 15.3). An issuer that records it computes it in the same commit that creates the Mission and persists this record, before the record is signed (Section 8), so the signed payload commits to it. A verifier checks it against the Mission Record (Section 9). envelope: REQUIRED. An object. Integrity protection over the members above, in the form Section 9 defines. 5.2. Assertion Members Each element of assertions is an object with these members: assertion_id: REQUIRED. A string, unique within the record. principal: REQUIRED. An object with iss and sub: the principal in whose name the assertion is made. * For a human assertion, the authenticated human who decided. * For a policy assertion, the human who approved the exact policy version its authority names (where a consented root commits a separate evaluator that decides, the human who approved that root), as the issuer's retained, authenticated governance state records. Where several humans approved that version together, as under dual control, it is the one human that state names as accountable for the approval, as the issuance profile records one accountable Approver ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Single Accountable Approver"). The policy is the decision mechanism, never the principal. * For a service assertion, the service that produced the decision. kind: REQUIRED. A string, one of human, service, or policy. decision: REQUIRED. A string, one of approve or deny. decided_at: REQUIRED. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] timestamp. authority: REQUIRED. An object recording the provenance under which the principal was authorized to decide. Its members depend on kind (Section 5.3). reason: OPTIONAL. A string. 5.3. Assertion Authority An assertion's authority is an object whose members depend on the assertion's kind. Each member below states its type, its presence, and the source the issuer takes it from. A member this section does not define for the assertion's kind carries no semantics under this document. A human assertion's authority records the authentication the issuer verified for the decision (Section 6.1): auth_time: REQUIRED. An RFC 3339 timestamp: when the principal authenticated for this decision. acr: A string: the authentication context class reference of that authentication. REQUIRED when the issuer possesses it at the approval event. amr: An array of strings: the authentication methods references of that authentication. REQUIRED when the issuer possesses them at the approval event. The issuer takes these members from the authentication it verified, never from the requesting client or agent. A policy assertion's authority names the deciding policy version and its human approval: policy_id: REQUIRED. A string: the identifier of the policy that decided. version: REQUIRED. A string: the exact version of that policy. approved_at: REQUIRED. An RFC 3339 timestamp: the human approval instant of that exact policy version, not the assertion instant. The decided_at member records when the policy asserted, and approved_at records when a human approved the version it asserts under. approved_by: OPTIONAL. An object with iss and sub: the human who approved that version. When present, it MUST equal principal. The issuer takes policy_id and version from the policy it evaluated, or from the authenticated decision it verified. The approved_at and approved_by members are corroborated provenance, never self- authenticating evidence: the issuer MUST verify approved_at from retained, authenticated governance state for the named policy_id and version, and it MUST NOT accept approved_at as the assertion's own uncorroborated clock value (Section 7). It takes approved_by from the same state and MUST NOT accept it from the asserting party. A service assertion's authority identifies the logic that produced the decision, and the model where a model produced it: logic_id: REQUIRED. A string: the identifier of the logic (for example, a workflow, a rule engine, or a model) that produced the decision. logic_version: REQUIRED. A string: the version of that logic. model_id: A string: the identifier of the model that produced the decision. REQUIRED where a model produced it. model_version: A string: the version of that model. REQUIRED where model_id is present. Where the logic is itself a model, logic_id and logic_version carry the model's identifier and version, as model_id and model_version do. The issuer takes these members from the integrity-protected channel or signature it verified for the assertion (Section 6.1). 5.4. Approval Policy Reference The approval_policy.digest preimage is the issuance profile's integrity-anchor envelope ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), canonicalized with JCS [RFC8785], with these members: * typ: mission-approval-policy, which domain-separates this anchor from every other integrity anchor; * iss: the Mission Issuer, which prevents cross-issuer replay; and * value: an object of content_type (the snapshot's media type) and content (the base64url, no-padding encoding of the snapshot bytes). The snapshot bytes and their media type, or the referenced policy version they represent, MUST be retained for the Mission's audit horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so an independent auditor reproduces the digest exactly and re-checks the evaluation against the policy that governed it. Threshold, quorum, veto, and separation-of-duty semantics live in the referenced policy; any human-readable summary of them in deployment tooling is advisory and carries no semantics in this record. 5.5. Example The following is an example of an Approval Governance Record. Its Mission, msn_h8ucQfVYsc9ttvVWaQ2SN6ZKc5KLpUlj, is not the issuance profile's Worked Example Mission, but it shares that Mission's Intent and Authority Set, and so its anchors. { "approval_event_id": "ape_hON9D0svLKQAMyy-uug", "mission": { "issuer": "https://as.example.com", "intent_hash": "sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r0", "authority_hash": "sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM" }, "approval_policy": { "id": "dlg-matrix", "version": "v7", "digest": "sha-256:OAbEIh2DTYUVP7DjRhHct4aapsT8PybZq2ILdut9UP0" }, "assertions": [ { "assertion_id": "ast_1", "principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "kind": "human", "decision": "approve", "decided_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z", "authority": { "acr": "urn:example:acr:phishing-resistant", "amr": ["pwd", "hwk"], "auth_time": "2026-11-02T07:59:00Z" } }, { "assertion_id": "ast_2", "principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_dC9yqLHPbadQRVw" }, "kind": "policy", "decision": "approve", "decided_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z", "authority": { "policy_id": "dlg-matrix", "version": "v7", "approved_at": "2026-09-15T09:00:00Z" } } ], "evaluation": { "decision": "approved", "evaluated_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z", "contributing": ["ast_1", "ast_2"] }, "envelope": { "format": "jws-compact", "value": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImFzLWtleS0y..." } } In this example: * The Mission Record's accountable approval_basis.consent_principal is Alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR at https://idp.example.com). ast_1 is her own approve assertion, which satisfies the accountable- approver rule of Section 6.2 directly. * ast_2 is a policy assertion in the name of the human who approved dlg-matrix version v7 (user_dC9yqLHPbadQRVw). It is recorded alongside the accountable assertion rather than in place of it. Because a second principal and a non-human assertion contribute, the second and third recording triggers hold (Section 4). * The envelope member's value is the JWS whose payload is the JCS canonical bytes of this object with envelope itself removed (Section 9). 6. Assertion Requirements These rules govern the assertions the issuer evaluates (Section 8). 6.1. Assertion Validation The following rules apply to the assertions in a record: * Every assertion that contributes to the evaluation MUST be authenticated: a human assertion with the authentication the issuance profile requires of an Approver at an approval event, a service or policy assertion through an integrity-protected channel or signature the issuer verifies. * Every assertion MUST be bound to this approval event: an assertion is made against this approval_event_id, this intent_hash, and this authority_hash, and an assertion captured for one event MUST NOT be replayed into another. An assertion that can narrow the authority, such as a model output an activation consults, is made against the authority_hash of the set it evaluated rather than of the narrowed result; the issuer records that set with the activation's inputs, and the committed Authority Set lies within it. * Every contributing assertion MUST be policy-authorized: before counting it, the issuer verifies that the asserting principal was eligible to assert under the referenced approval_policy version. For a policy assertion, that means both that the policy its authority names was eligible to decide under approval_policy and that its principal was eligible to approve that policy version (or, where a consented root commits a separate evaluator that decides, that root). * Denials and vetoes MUST be recorded: an assertion set that omits a negative assertion misrepresents the decision. An assertion that fails authentication, event binding, or policy authorization MUST NOT contribute to the evaluation and MUST NOT be counted toward any policy rule. The following example shows the assertions and evaluation members of a record, other members omitted, whose delegation-of-authority policy requires one finance approval beside the accountable approver's. Alice approves directly; one finance approver approves and another denies. Under that policy a finance denial does not block an approval that another finance approver supports, so the denial is recorded but not contributing. { "assertions": [ { "assertion_id": "ast_1", "principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "kind": "human", "decision": "approve", "decided_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z", "authority": { "acr": "urn:example:acr:phishing-resistant", "amr": ["pwd", "hwk"], "auth_time": "2026-11-02T07:59:00Z" } }, { "assertion_id": "ast_2", "principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_t1yd3CZCLPOis5n" }, "kind": "human", "decision": "approve", "decided_at": "2026-11-02T07:58:10Z", "authority": { "acr": "urn:example:acr:phishing-resistant", "amr": ["pwd", "hwk"], "auth_time": "2026-11-02T07:58:00Z" } }, { "assertion_id": "ast_3", "principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_Kq-iUUKDYl8jhWF" }, "kind": "human", "decision": "deny", "decided_at": "2026-11-02T07:57:40Z", "authority": { "acr": "urn:example:acr:phishing-resistant", "amr": ["pwd", "hwk"], "auth_time": "2026-11-02T07:57:30Z" }, "reason": "Asks for a lower journal-entry cap." } ], "evaluation": { "decision": "approved", "evaluated_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z", "contributing": ["ast_1", "ast_2"] } } More than one principal contributes and a threshold rule is evaluated, so the second and fourth recording triggers hold (Section 4). 6.2. Accountable Assertion The accountable-approver rule ties a record to the Mission's one accountable principal, the Mission Record's approval_basis.consent_principal. The Mission's approval_basis.type fixes how a record satisfies it: * For direct, the record MUST carry exactly one human assertion whose principal is consent_principal and whose decision is approve: the human decision a direct approval event carries ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Contributing policy and service assertions do not replace it. * For governed_policy, the record MUST carry exactly one policy assertion whose principal is consent_principal, whose decision is approve, and whose authority names the deciding policy (Section 12.2). The policy is the decision mechanism, and the principal stays the human who approved it. * For any other named standing-consent approval_basis ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), the Mission satisfies the rule through its authenticated approval_basis record, not through an assertion: consent_principal, root_commitment, and approved_at, fixed at the approval event and immutable, stand in for an accountable assertion. The record can still carry contributing policy and service assertions. A record that does not satisfy the rule for its basis does not commit (Section 8). The assertion that satisfies it under direct or governed_policy is the accountable assertion; no other basis has one. The accountable assertion's kind MUST be human or policy: a service assertion, including one a model produced, is a contributing governance input, never the accountable assertion. Under every basis, the high-risk-class restrictions of Section 7.3 apply. No assertion is fabricated in the name of the activating policy or the requesting actor to stand in for a fresh human decision that did not occur. Where the Mission populates approval_basis.adjudication, the accountable assertion's kind also equals adjudication.kind (Section 3). 7. Policy-Approval Recency This section bounds staleness on the AGR policy assertion path: it governs a policy assertion's authority.approved_at and the kind of the accountable assertion (Section 6.2). It does not apply to a human assertion, whose decided_at is the approval instant itself. 7.1. Recency Declarations A Recording Issuer that admits policy assertions MUST declare a maximum policy-approval age per consequence class (a *recency ceiling*) and a bounded clock-skew allowance, and MAY declare, per class, an *exception* admitting a policy assertion as the accountable assertion for that class, each exception carrying its own maximum age. The ceiling, the skew allowance, and any exception MUST be part of the retained approval_policy snapshot that approval_policy.digest commits (Section 5.4), or a separately versioned declaration committed from that snapshot. A mutable, out-of-band deployment statement MUST NOT serve this role: it would make the evaluation impossible to reproduce, contrary to the purpose of the retained policy, which lets an auditor re-run the decision (Section 5.4). 7.2. Evaluating Recency At evaluation, the issuer MUST classify the committed Mission's consequence classes from the derived Authority Set and from any consumption bound the Mission Intent carries ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]). The issuer MUST select, across every class either source carries, the strictest maximum age that applies, accounting for any declared exception. This is a property of the whole committed Mission the record's mission.authority_hash and mission.intent_hash bind to (Section 5.1), never of one assertion or entry in isolation. For a class with a declared exception, the maximum that applies is the smaller of that class's recency ceiling and the exception's maximum age: an exception admits a policy accountable assertion for its class and never lengthens the ceiling. For each policy assertion the evaluation would count toward the applicable maximum, the issuer: * uses the authority.approved_at it verified under Section 5.3; * MUST measure the assertion's age as evaluation.evaluated_at minus authority.approved_at, using the atomic-commitment instant (Section 8); * MUST enforce authority.approved_at <= decided_at <= evaluation.evaluated_at, subject to the declared clock-skew allowance; and * MUST reject the assertion if authority.approved_at or decided_at is later than the issuer's own clock at evaluation, beyond that allowance. A policy assertion whose age exceeds the applicable maximum, or whose ordering the checks above do not admit, fails policy-authorization under Section 6.1: the issuer MUST NOT count it toward the evaluation, and by Section 8 the Mission MUST NOT be created active on an evaluation that depended on it. An evaluation.evaluated_at later than the issuer's own clock, beyond the declared allowance, is a defect of the record rather than of one assertion: the evaluation MUST NOT be treated as complete, and by Section 8 the Mission MUST NOT be created active on it. 7.3. High-Risk Classes Four conditions are the high-risk classes the issuance profile defines: irreversible action, external commitment, privileged administration, and a consumption bound ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Where the committed Mission's derived Authority Set or Mission Intent ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]) carries one, the assertion satisfying the accountable-approver rule of Section 6.2 MUST be kind: human, unless a committed, class-named exception under Section 7.1 admits kind: policy for that class. Only governed_policy has a policy accountable assertion (Section 6.2), so a governed policy activates a Mission carrying one of these classes only under such an exception. The same default binds a Mission whose accountable-approver rule is satisfied through its own approval_basis record rather than an assertion (Section 6.2): recording an AGR for such a Mission carrying one of the four classes requires a committed, class-named exception under Section 7.1; absent it, the record MUST NOT be created and, by Section 8, the Mission MUST NOT be created active. 7.4. Scope of the Recency Rules Recency is issuance-time eligibility. It determines whether a Mission activates and does not reach back into a Mission already active: that Mission's governing policy approval was measured fresh at its own approval event, and a later change to the ceiling, the exception, or the policy's freshness does not narrow or terminate it. An Approval Governance Record is historical evidence: it records who approved, under which policy, at the approval event, not current organizational standing. Whether a later change to an Approver's role, a delegation, or the governing policy affects an existing Mission is deployment policy. A deployment that makes reliance continue to depend on such an authority declares and enforces that dependency through the lifecycle operations or the runtime profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], Section "Authority Dependencies"); the recency rules above still govern only activation eligibility (Section 11.2). Approval Governance is an optional extension (Section 1). The rules of Section 7 are a conservative default of this document, not a guarantee of every Mission-Bound Authorization deployment, and a deployment that records no Approval Governance Record is unbounded by them. The kind: human requirement is not by itself an assurance property: the authentication-strength, rendering, and accountable-principal requirements the issuance profile and Section 6 otherwise impose still carry that property; Section 7 only decides which assertion kind MUST be present. 7.5. Relationship to Standing-Consent Recency Section 7 bounds the AGR policy assertion path and, by extension, a standing-consent Mission whose approval_basis record stands in for that assertion (Section 6.2). The issuance profile's standing-consent bases carry their own human- approval instant in approval_basis.approved_at, traced through consent_principal and a commitment ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). The template profile's template basis and the progressive profile's ceiling_drawdown basis both populate it, and each profile declares its own maximum age against it: review_cadence for template, and the ceiling review cadence for progressive ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]). Under governed_policy the two instants coincide: approval_basis.approved_at equals the accountable policy assertion's authority.approved_at (Section 12.2). This document's ceiling therefore bounds that basis, alongside any standing-consent recency ceiling the deployment declares ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Standing-Consent Recency"). The two recency paths are analogous, each bounding staleness against a retained human-approval instant, but they gate different things: * this document's ceiling governs whether the issuer may count a policy assertion, or activate a Mission whose approval_basis stands in for one, at evaluation; and * a profile's own maximum age governs whether the dispatch or drawdown may happen at all, independent of whether an AGR is ever recorded. 8. Evaluation and Atomic Commitment Where a deployment records the Approval Governance Record for an approval, the record and the Mission are one commit. Within that commit, the issuer: * validates the assertions (Section 6); * evaluates them under the referenced policy version; * where the record carries approval_context_commitment (Section 5.1), computes it from the Mission Record being created; * signs the evaluated record (Section 9); and * persists the signed record in the same commit as the Mission's creation. The only order the commit fixes is evaluate, then sign, then persist, with approval_context_commitment computed before signing; the other checks this document requires, including those of Section 12.3, complete before signing, in whatever order their inputs allow. A value of approval_context_commitment computed after the commit is not covered by the record's signature and MUST NOT be added to a committed record. Where a deployment records the Approval Governance Record for an approval, the Mission Record MUST NOT be created active unless the evaluation's decision is approved and the signed record persists atomically with the Mission's creation. Failure to authenticate the contributing assertions, to complete the evaluation, or to persist the record MUST prevent activation; there is no Mission whose governance record was meant to exist and does not. A governance evaluation that denies creates no Mission and no committed record. Negative assertions retained inside a committed record document dissent (Section 6.1), and a wholly declined approval's evidence surface is consent evidence's declined outcome ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]), which exists without a Mission Record. A committed record is immutable. A subsequent governance action, such as a re-review or an incident finding, is a new record about a new event, never an edit. 9. Envelope and Verification The envelope member (Section 5.1) is an object with format (a string, required) and value (a string, required). The default format is jws- compact: a JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] over the JCS [RFC8785] canonical bytes of the record with the envelope member removed, signed by the Mission Issuer under a key resolvable in its published key material. The signed record, envelope included, is the retained, registrable form. This document defines only the jws-compact format; an implementation MUST reject an envelope whose format is unsupported rather than accepting it unverified. The JWS protected header MUST carry: * a kid resolvable in the Mission Issuer's published key material; * a typ of mission-approval-governance+jws; and * a cty of mission-approval-governance+json. These values are the registered media types application/mission- approval-governance+jws and application/mission-approval- governance+json (Section 19) with the application/ prefix omitted, as Sections 4.1.9 and 4.1.10 of [RFC7515] recommend. A verifier compares each value as a media type under those sections: it treats a value that contains no / as if application/ were prepended, and it compares type and subtype names case-insensitively. Neither media type defines a parameter, so a value that carries one matches neither. A verifier MUST accept either form of each value, and MUST reject a JWS whose protected header lacks typ or cty, or whose typ or cty does not match this pair. Normalization applies only to the comparison: a verifier MUST NOT rewrite the signed header, the payload, or the retained record, so the record digest below covers the record exactly as signed and retained. The following is the decoded JWS protected header of the envelope value in Section 5.5: { "alg": "ES256", "kid": "as-key-2", "typ": "mission-approval-governance+jws", "cty": "mission-approval-governance+json" } A verifier MUST perform the following steps, in order, and MUST NOT treat a record as verified if any step fails: 1. Resolve the Mission Issuer's signing key from the JWS protected kid in its published key material. 2. Verify the JWS signature and protected header against that key. 3. Compute the JCS canonical bytes of the outer record with the envelope member removed. 4. Require byte-for-byte equality between the decoded JWS payload and the canonical bytes of step 3, rejecting the record on any difference. The signature authenticates only its own embedded payload; a record that differs from that payload is unauthenticated regardless of whether the signature itself verifies. 5. Validate the mission binding of Section 5.1 against the Mission Record it is retained with. Where the record carries approval_context_commitment, the mission member carries no Mission id, so a verifier recomputes the commitment from the Mission Record this record is retained with, which step 5 resolves, and rejects the reference on a mismatch (Section 15.3). The *record digest* is the digest, in the encoded form Section 2 fixes, over the JCS [RFC8785] canonical bytes of the complete record, envelope included. It is the one byte sequence every external reference names: * audit registration hashes exactly these bytes (Section 14); and * consent evidence's approval_governance_digest equals exactly this value (Section 13). 10. Re-checking an Evaluation A Relying Auditor re-checks an evaluation by replaying it from retained evidence: the policy and any evaluator that decided, the inputs they evaluated, and the recorded assertions. Conformance requires it to obtain the retained policy version before treating the evaluation as re-checked (Section 16). The re-check has these steps: 1. Verify the record (Section 9). 2. Obtain the retained snapshot of the approval_policy version the record names, and recompute approval_policy.digest over it (Section 5.4). 3. Where that snapshot commits a separate evaluator that decides, as a governed_policy root can (Section 12.1), obtain the retained snapshot of that evaluator and recompute its activation policy reference digest ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Activation Policy Commitment"). 4. Obtain the inputs the deciding policy or evaluator evaluated, as the issuer recorded them ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Principals and Approval Basis"). These include each model output in full, with its verdict and any narrowing, which the matching service assertion records only by identifier. Confirm that each input carries this record's approval_event_id, the Mission's intent_hash, and the authority_hash of the set recorded as evaluated, and that each contributing service assertion corresponds to one of them. 5. Re-run the deciding policy or evaluator, at its exact version, over those inputs and the recorded assertions, and confirm that it approves, counting exactly the assertions contributing lists (Section 5.1). 6. Apply the recency rules of Section 7, as the snapshot or the declaration it commits states them, with evaluation.evaluated_at as the evaluation instant. Where a snapshot, the evaluator, or an input cannot be obtained, a recomputed digest does not match, a binding does not hold, or the replay reaches a different outcome, the evaluation is not re-checked. A re-check does not re-authenticate an assertion: the record carries an assertion's authentication context (Section 5.3), not the authentication itself. 11. Portable Approval-Binding Check A Relying Auditor that holds a record and an authenticated Mission reference, but not the Mission Record or the evaluation's inputs, can run the portable approval-binding check. It establishes that the record and the reference agree on the approval event and the Mission anchors. It is a separate procedure from verifying the record against the Mission Record (Section 9) and from re-checking the evaluation (Section 10), and replaces neither; a Relying Auditor MUST NOT report its success as either. A Mission reference is an artifact, authenticated under its own rules, that discloses the Mission's approval_event_id, issuer, intent_hash, and authority_hash. A Mandate that carries approval_event_id is one ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate]). A verifier running the check MUST complete these steps: 1. Authenticate both artifacts. For the record, complete steps 1 to 4 of Section 9; for the reference, apply its own artifact rules. The verifier MUST establish trust in the key material of the expected Mission Issuer for both: an issuer the artifact asserts for itself, with a valid signature, is not thereby trusted. The record's mission.issuer MUST be that expected Mission Issuer, since the issuer the record names is the one that signs it (Section 9). 2. Require the event and the anchors. The authenticated reference MUST disclose approval_event_id, the Mission issuer, intent_hash, and authority_hash, and each MUST equal the record's approval_event_id or the member of the same name in the record's mission binding. The reference's own consistency rules still apply; a Mandate's iss equals its mission.issuer. Matching intent_hash and authority_hash never suffice without a matching approval-event identifier, since two Missions can share both. 3. Compare the Approval Context Commitment. Each approval_context_commitment an artifact carries MUST be well- formed, whether or not the other artifact carries one. When both carry it, the two values MUST be equal. When one or neither carries it, the check can succeed, and its result MUST state that commitment agreement was not established. Equality establishes agreement on the commitment value only; recomputing it from the Mission's creation facts is a separate check (Section 15.3). A value the check compares, each anchor and each disclosed commitment, is well-formed only in the encoded form Section 2 fixes: a recognized algorithm prefix, then the unpadded base64url encoding of a digest of that algorithm's length, whose text re-encodes to exactly the same characters. A value that decodes but does not re- encode to itself, for example one with nonzero padding bits, is malformed. The check has three outcomes: * Success: every step completes. * Failure: an authentication failure, a malformed required value or disclosed commitment, or a mismatch in step 1, step 2, or step 3. * Insufficient evidence: an absent artifact, or a value step 2 requires that the reference does not disclose. When the evidence both fails a step and is insufficient for another, the outcome is failure: a disclosed mismatch or malformed value is definitive, whatever else is undisclosed. A verifier MUST NOT report a successful portable binding on failure or on insufficient evidence. A success establishes only this: the trusted Mission Issuer authenticated this record, and its approval-event identifier and Mission anchors match those the supplied Mission reference authenticates. It does not establish: * that the evaluation was correct, or that its assertions are independently true (Section 10); * that the retained Mission Record matches either artifact (Section 9); * that an individual action under the Mission was approved, was within its authority, or was executed; * that the Mission is still active; * that either artifact existed at a claimed earlier time, or that the issuer showed every Relying Auditor a consistent view; or * that the presented record is the one another party retained earlier: pinning exact record bytes in a portable artifact is a separate mechanism. 11.1. Example A company approves a Mission to purchase office supplies within set limits. The approval event creates the Mission. The Mission Issuer signs an Approval Governance Record for that event, recording the governance assertions and the approval outcome, and later mints a Mandate that identifies the Mission and approval event and carries the same intent_hash and authority_hash. The purchasing agent then submits a purchase order, and the company's ERP records its own business decision for that order, naming the order, the policy version it applied, the decision, and its time. The ERP's decision record is illustrative; this document defines no format for it. An auditor receives the governance record and the Mandate through an authorized evidence export (Section 18), without the Mission Record or the evaluation's inputs. The check connects the governance record to the approval event the Mandate identifies. It does not show that the purchase order was individually approved, within authority, or executed: relating the ERP's decision to the order takes separate action evidence. A Mission scoped to approving one particular order could itself carry that business decision, but the auditor has to establish that scope, for example from the Authority Set; an approval-event match never implies it. 11.2. Example: An Approver's Transfer Continuing the example above, the purchasing officer who approved the Mission transfers to another role before the purchase order is placed. The governance record records her approval in every deployment below; what her transfer changes depends on each deployment's policy: * *An organizational decision.* The Mission commits the company to the approved purchasing. It stays effective until fulfillment, expiry, or withdrawal, and her transfer changes nothing the agent relies on. * *A personal delegation.* The Mission delegates the officer's own purchasing authority, and the deployment declares a dependency on her holding it. When the authoritative directory records her transfer, the dependency is withdrawn at its source; within the deployment's declared bound, further orders under the Mission are refused. * *A required accountable owner.* The deployment requires an eligible owner for the work. Her transfer suspends the Mission until a successor accepts responsibility through an authorized process, recorded separately from the governance record. That acceptance permits an authorized resumption, subject to the remaining checks; the successor does not become the approver of the original approval event. 12. Governed Policy Approval This document defines the governed_policy standing-consent basis on the issuance profile's extension point for named standing-consent bases ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Standing- Consent Bases"). An accountable human approves a bounded policy version once; that policy then activates eligible Mission proposals with no fresh human decision per instance. Every activation under this basis MUST record an Approval Governance Record, committed with the Mission (Section 8). 12.1. Consented Root The consented root is the retained approval_policy snapshot that a human approved (Section 5.4). It commits: * the clients, Subjects, and authority sources that can activate under it; * the authority ceiling and the lifetime limits of each activated Mission; * the deterministic rules that decide an activation; * the recency ceilings, the clock-skew allowance, and any class- named exceptions of Section 7; and * where a separate policy artifact decides instances, that artifact's activation policy reference ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Activation Policy Commitment"). The root decides whether an instance activates. It is distinct from an organizational authority source's authority_source.policy, which bounds whose authority the Mission draws on ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). The issuer MUST establish the standing consent, the consenting human, and that human's approval of the exact root version from retained, authenticated governance state, never from the activating request: a submitted proposal cannot supply its own standing consent. The root and a separate evaluator keep distinct digest domains: approval_policy.digest commits the root under typ mission-approval- policy (Section 5.4), and the activation policy reference commits the evaluator under typ mission-activation-policy. The issuer MUST NOT accept either digest in place of the other. 12.2. Instance Record A Mission activated under this basis records these approval_basis members ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), each REQUIRED: type: governed_policy. consent_principal: The human who approved the exact root version. approved_at: The instant of that approval, verified against retained, authenticated state as the issuance profile requires of every standing-consent basis. root_commitment: The root's approval_policy.digest; the record's own approval_policy is that root. activation: An object of approval_event_id, equal to the Mission's own approval_event_id, and policy, an object of the deciding policy's id, version, and digest. activation_actor: The authenticated client that requested this activation, distinct from consent_principal. adjudication: kind policy, with policy naming the deciding policy's id and version, and governance_record true. The deciding policy is the root itself or the separate evaluator the root commits, never another policy. Its digest in activation.policy is approval_policy.digest when the root decides, and the evaluator's mission-activation-policy digest when the evaluator decides. The instance's approval_event_id identifies this activation's approval event, never the human's approval of the root. The issuer allocates one per proposal it activates, so a retried or concurrent activation of the same proposal resolves to one Mission and one record, and each distinct activation creates its own Mission. The record's accountable assertion (Section 6) MUST be a policy assertion whose principal is consent_principal and whose authority names the deciding policy's id and version with approved_at equal to approval_basis.approved_at. Like every contributing assertion, it is authenticated and bound to this approval event. It records the policy's decision under that human's standing authorization, not a fresh human action. 12.3. Activation At the atomic creation commit (Section 8), the issuer MUST, before it creates the Mission active: 1. Resolve the standing consent from retained, authenticated state and confirm that it still admits new activations. 2. Verify that the consenting human was authorized to approve the exact root version and approved it at approved_at, and recompute approval_policy.digest over the retained snapshot. 3. Where the root commits a separate evaluator, recompute that evaluator's digest over the exact snapshot evaluated ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Activation Policy Commitment"). 4. Establish the Subject and the authority source as the issuance profile requires, and verify that the requesting client, the Subject, and the source are ones the root admits. 5. Derive the Authority Set under the issuance profile's derivation and authority-proposal rules, within the source's ceiling and the root's authority ceiling, and bound the effective expiry by the Mission Intent and the root's lifetime limits. 6. Evaluate the deciding policy, at its exact version, over recorded inputs. 7. Apply the policy-approval recency rules (Section 7) across the whole derived Mission, including any consumption bound, so a high-risk class activates only under a committed, class-named exception. 8. Bind every assertion and the record to this instance's approval_event_id, intent_hash, and authority_hash (Section 6.1, Section 5.1), except that a model output binds to the authority_hash of the set it evaluated. 9. Sign the record and commit it with the active Mission (Section 8). A failure at any step creates no Mission and issues no credential. A model's output enters only as a recorded input at step 6: it can refuse an activation or narrow the authority activated, and never supplies authority or decides the approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Principals and Approval Basis"). Withdrawing the standing consent stops every later activation under it (step 1). A Mission already activated keeps its ordinary lifecycle: withdrawal does not revoke it. 12.4. Example The following example shows an excerpt, other members omitted, of the Mission Record of msn_UDgovqrOTIZyJgTEp0DjopwF2gRseSfT, activated under governed_policy. Alice approved the policy q3-close-agent version 3 at 2026-10-30T16:00:00Z. The client s6BhdRkqt3 later proposed the issuance profile's Worked Example task, and the policy activated it at 2026-11-02T08:00:00Z with no fresh human decision. The Mission shares the Worked Example Mission's Intent and Authority Set, and so its anchors. The policy digest stands for a policy snapshot this example does not display. { "id": "msn_UDgovqrOTIZyJgTEp0DjopwF2gRseSfT", "issuer": "https://as.example.com", "subject": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "approval_basis": { "type": "governed_policy", "consent_principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "approved_at": "2026-10-30T16:00:00Z", "root_commitment": "sha-256:nw0FRGuMWUqNMS9BwKpEpqcvZwwO9DGrrujtlMNTAJU", "activation": { "approval_event_id": "ape_7d2sUfnZmgimG0bc67hu", "policy": { "id": "q3-close-agent", "version": "3", "digest": "sha-256:nw0FRGuMWUqNMS9BwKpEpqcvZwwO9DGrrujtlMNTAJU" } }, "activation_actor": { "iss": "https://as.example.com", "sub": "s6BhdRkqt3" }, "adjudication": { "kind": "policy", "policy": { "id": "q3-close-agent", "version": "3" }, "governance_record": true } }, "authority_source": { "type": "user_delegated" }, "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3", "approval_event_id": "ape_7d2sUfnZmgimG0bc67hu", "created_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z" } The following is an example of the Approval Governance Record committed with that Mission: { "approval_event_id": "ape_7d2sUfnZmgimG0bc67hu", "mission": { "issuer": "https://as.example.com", "intent_hash": "sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r0", "authority_hash": "sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM" }, "approval_policy": { "id": "q3-close-agent", "version": "3", "digest": "sha-256:nw0FRGuMWUqNMS9BwKpEpqcvZwwO9DGrrujtlMNTAJU" }, "assertions": [ { "assertion_id": "ast_1", "principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "kind": "policy", "decision": "approve", "decided_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z", "authority": { "policy_id": "q3-close-agent", "version": "3", "approved_at": "2026-10-30T16:00:00Z" } } ], "evaluation": { "decision": "approved", "evaluated_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z", "contributing": ["ast_1"] }, "envelope": { "format": "jws-compact", "value": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImFzLWtleS0y..." } } In this example: * The root decides activations itself, with no separate evaluator, so root_commitment, activation.policy.digest, and approval_policy.digest carry one value (Section 12.2). * The client s6BhdRkqt3 requested the activation. It is the activation_actor, distinct from the consent_principal, Alice. * ast_1 is the accountable assertion: a policy assertion whose principal is Alice and whose approved_at equals approval_basis.approved_at (Section 12.2). Because a non-human assertion contributes, the third recording trigger also holds (Section 4). * The root declares a 30-day recency ceiling for every consequence class, a 60-second clock-skew allowance, and an exception that admits a policy accountable assertion for irreversible actions, with a maximum age of 7 days (Section 7.1). The issuer classifies journal-entries.write as an irreversible action and finds no other high-risk class, so the exception applies and the strictest applicable maximum is 7 days (Section 7.2). * At evaluated_at, ast_1 is 2 days and 16 hours old, and approved_at <= decided_at <= evaluated_at holds, so the issuer counts it. Without the exception, the accountable assertion would have to be kind: human, and the policy could not activate this Mission (Section 7.3). 13. Consent Evidence Relationship Where both are recorded, the AGR is authoritative for approval- governance facts, and consent evidence presents a deliberately partial view of it ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]). Agreement is testable, member by member: * Each co_approvals entry MUST correspond to exactly one human assertion in the record with the same principal, the entry's decision equal to the assertion's decision, and the entry's timestamp equal to the assertion's decided_at. Omitting an assertion is permitted; an entry with no corresponding assertion, or one that alters a decision or time, is an integrity failure. Assertions of kind service or policy are governance inputs, never consent events, and are never presented as co-approvals. * The consent evidence approver MUST equal the principal of the record's accountable assertion (Section 6.2); for a standing- consent Mission whose accountable-approver rule is satisfied by approval_basis rather than an assertion, it MUST equal approval_basis.consent_principal instead. * approval_authority, when present, MUST equal approval_policy.id; approval_policy_version, when present, MUST equal approval_policy.version. * approval_governance_digest, when present, MUST equal the record digest (Section 9). The AGR governs on any disagreement. The following example shows the members of a Consent Evidence object that correspond to the record in Section 5.5, other members omitted: { "approver": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "approval_authority": "dlg-matrix", "approval_policy_version": "v7", "approval_governance_digest": "sha-256:j6eaQoHcHpH-fntRE1DkZgCDjBZZLxXrCwpHfTWCWnQ" } The approver member is the principal of the accountable assertion, ast_1. There is no co_approvals member: the record's only other assertion, ast_2, is a policy assertion, which is never presented as a co-approval. The approval_governance_digest value stands for the record digest of the complete record, whose envelope value that example abbreviates. Where a deferred approval revises under Mission Approval Revision ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval-revision]) and the deployment records consent evidence, each revision_required outcome produces a narrowed consent-evidence decision with no corresponding record: no Mission yet exists for the atomic commitment rule (Section 8) to attach to. This is a deliberate artifact separation, not an authority conflict: * where consent evidence is recorded, it owns the narrowing history, through its narrowed entries and predecessor_intent_hashes; and * where an AGR is recorded for the final approval, it owns the final approval-governance facts. 14. Mission Evidence The AGR is registrable Mission evidence under the audit transparency profile's evidence-type pattern ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]), with: * canonical bytes: the JCS canonical bytes of the complete record, envelope included, which are the record-digest preimage (Section 9); * payload-preimage-content-type: application/mission-approval- governance+json; and * authoritative producer: the Mission issuer. Registration is optional transparency hardening; retention and immutability do not depend on it. 15. Approval Context Commitment This section defines an OPTIONAL profile: one commitment over a Mission's immutable creation facts, so an artifact that authenticates a reference to it can be checked against another authenticated artifact's reference to the same Mission without either re-deriving the other's fields. Adopting this profile is independent of whether a deployment records an Approval Governance Record for a given Mission. 15.1. Manifest The *Approval Context Manifest* is a closed, enumerated v1 object built from Mission Record members ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Each member copies the Mission Record member of the same name, verbatim, except: * approver copies the Mission Record's approval_basis.consent_principal; and * submission_evidence_commitment is computed from the Mission Record's submission_evidence (Section 15.2). A conditional member is present if and only if its condition holds: +================================+=============================+ | Member | Presence | +================================+=============================+ | issuer | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | id | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | intent_hash | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | proposal_hash | when the Mission Record | | | carries proposal_hash | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | authority_hash | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | ceiling_hash | when the Mission Record | | | carries ceiling_hash | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | subject | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | approver | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | client_id | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | created_at | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | expires_at | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | approval_basis | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | authority_source | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | policy_version | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | approval_event_id | always | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | submission_evidence_commitment | when the Mission Record | | | carries submission_evidence | +--------------------------------+-----------------------------+ Table 2: Approval Context Manifest v1 members The presence of every conditional member MUST be a deterministic function of the Mission Record alone, never of which companion profiles a deployment runs: two parties holding the same record compute the same manifest. The ceiling_hash member is the manifest's fourth anchor alongside intent_hash, proposal_hash, and authority_hash: the manifest MUST include ceiling_hash when the Mission Record carries one and MUST omit it when the Mission Record carries none. The manifest copies the recorded value verbatim, as it copies every other member, so computing or verifying the manifest never computes ceiling_hash. Its construction and semantics belong to the Progressive profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]), and adopting this Approval Context Commitment profile does not require adopting Progressive. The manifest excludes the Mission Record's mutable members, state and termination, and every value that is not itself a member of the immutable record: a running derivation count, and a containment or discharge state a companion profile tracks outside the record. This is not a separate exclusion rule; it follows from building the manifest from Mission Record members only. 15.2. Construction The manifest is an envelope anchor under the issuance profile's commitment mechanisms, which this document imports normatively ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): typ is mission-approval- context-v1, iss is the Mission issuer, and value is the manifest object of Section 15.1. The result, approval_context_commitment, is one sha-256:-prefixed string. submission_evidence_commitment is a second envelope anchor under the same mechanism, present only when the Mission Record carries submission_evidence: typ is mission-submission-evidence-v1, iss is the Mission issuer, and value is the recorded submission_evidence array exactly as retained, preserving its canonical element order ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). 15.3. Computation and Versioning An issuer computes approval_context_commitment on demand from the Mission's immutable creation facts, fixed at the approval event ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). This document adds no Mission Record member for it; an Approval Governance Record MAY carry it as a member of its own signed record (Section 5), which is a disclosure of the computed value, not a second place the Mission Record holds it. A deployment MAY cache the computed value; a cached value is derived state and MUST NOT be treated as authoritative where it disagrees with a fresh computation from the record. A verifier that recomputes approval_context_commitment from the Mission's immutable creation facts and obtains a value different from the one an artifact discloses MUST reject that artifact's reference as invalid. The recompute always uses this document's fixed typ, mission-approval-context-v1; a value some other party committed under a different typ recomputes to a different digest under this rule and is rejected the same way (Appendix A, vector 6). The member list of Section 15.1 is closed for mission-approval- context-v1. Adding, removing, or redefining a member, or changing how submission_evidence_commitment is constructed, MUST use a new typ, never a silent reinterpretation of this one. 15.4. Limits Reusing the issuance profile's commitment mechanisms supplies canonicalization and algorithm identification and agility. It supplies nothing else: * No authenticity. The commitment is an unkeyed digest over Mission Record fields held under the same trust as the record itself. An issuer that can rewrite the record can recompute a matching commitment; authentication comes entirely from the signature of whichever artifact discloses the commitment, never from the digest construction. * No approval-time existence. A matching commitment shows the disclosed facts are internally consistent with the retained record. It does not show the facts were true, or that an approval occurred, at the time claimed. * No selective disclosure. The commitment is a flat digest over the complete manifest object; proving anything about one member requires disclosing the whole object. 15.5. Carriage approval_context_commitment MAY appear as a signed member of an artifact that already authenticates a reference to the Mission, for example this document's own Approval Governance Record (Section 5) or a Consent Evidence object ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]), or under an introspection caller's member-scoped disclosure privilege, the same privilege that already gates proposal_hash ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). approval_context_commitment MUST NOT be carried on a Mission-bound access token's baseline mission claim ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) or on a credential-bound Mission descriptor a companion profile mints for correlation, for example the Mission Authority Server's Join Assertion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]): each already fixes its own minimal member set, and this commitment is correlation and evidence metadata, never authority. 16. Conformance A Recording Issuer MUST: * authenticate, event-bind, and policy-authorize every contributing assertion (Section 6.1); * record denials (Section 6.1); * satisfy the accountable-approver rule for the Mission's approval basis: exactly one matching human assertion under direct, exactly one matching policy assertion under governed_policy, and the authenticated approval_basis under any other standing-consent basis (Section 6.2); * evaluate under the retained policy version (Section 8); * enforce the strictest applicable policy-approval maximum age across the consequence classes the committed Mission's derived Authority Set and Mission Intent carry, from a committed ceiling and any committed exception (Section 7); * where the committed Mission's derived Authority Set or Mission Intent carries a high-risk class, require a human accountable assertion unless a committed class-named exception applies, and require such an exception for a basis without an accountable assertion (Section 7.3); * under governed_policy, record the members of Section 12.2 and complete the activation checks of Section 12.3; * commit the record atomically with Mission creation and let failure prevent activation (Section 8); * sign the evaluated record before it is committed, and keep the committed record immutable (Section 8, Section 9); and * retain the record and the referenced policy for the Mission's audit horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A Relying Auditor MUST verify the envelope by byte equality, MUST validate the mission binding, and MUST obtain the retained policy version before treating the evaluation as re-checked (Section 9, Section 5.4, Section 10). A Relying Auditor that holds no Mission Record can run the portable approval-binding check instead, under its own rules and with its narrower result (Section 11). 17. Security Considerations The security considerations of the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) apply. The following considerations are specific to the Approval Governance Record. 17.1. Forged or Padded Assertions A forged or padded assertion is an authorization attack before commitment, not an audit defect: the assertion requirements of Section 6 are the control, and a deployment that records assertions without authenticating them has built an approval bypass rather than an evidence trail. 17.2. Policy Substitution Without approval_policy.digest and its retention, a later reading cannot prove which policy governed the evaluation. The digest and the audit-horizon retention of Section 5.4 are the control. 17.3. Manufactured Accountability The accountable-approver rule of Section 6.2 prevents a set of service and policy assertions from claiming a Mission whose named Approver never asserted anything. Because that assertion is never service, a model-backed service cannot become the accountable approver: no human-approved policy stands behind its decision, so it contributes only as a governance input. 17.4. Stale Policy Approval Without Section 7, a policy assertion could rely on a human approval far in the past, or stand in for the accountable approver on a high- risk consequence with no human assertion at all. The recency ceiling, its ordering checks, and the human-by-default consequence- class rule are the control. 17.5. Immutability Witness The issuer-signed envelope of Section 9 makes post-commit tampering detectable. Audit registration (Section 14) additionally bounds issuer-side substitution, since a registered record's later alteration diverges from its receipt. The Approval Context Commitment extends this to the Mission Record's creation facts, approval basis included. A verifier that recomputes it and gets a value different from the one an artifact discloses rejects that artifact's reference (Section 15.3). A mismatch shows only that the artifact and the current record disagree. The artifact's signature authenticates the value it discloses, not when it was made, since the issuer can backdate a signed artifact. Where an audit receipt (Section 14) independently shows that the artifact existed before the record changed, and the disclosed value matches a recomputation from the approval event as registered, the mismatch is evidence that the record was altered afterwards. 17.6. Issuer Key Compromise This document inherits the issuance profile's key-material considerations. A compromised Mission Issuer signing key can mint a plausible record; audit registration ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]) is the existence bound, not a substitute for key custody. 18. Privacy Considerations The privacy considerations of the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) apply. Assertion principals and decision times are personal data about reviewers. The record is control-plane state retained by the issuer, never disclosed on a protocol wire surface. Access to a retained record, including an authorized evidence export or an evidence bundle supplied to a Relying Auditor (Section 11), follows the issuer's audit-log discipline for approval-event records ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); this document defines no endpoint and no default disclosure for it. The approval_context_commitment value is the same in every artifact that discloses it, so it correlates those artifacts (Section 15.5). A service assertion's authority discloses the identifiers and versions of the logic and model that took part in a decision (Section 5.3). 19. IANA Considerations 19.1. Media Type Registration IANA is requested to register two media types per [RFC6838]: * application/mission-approval-governance+jws, the JWS-secured representation that a record's envelope carries, using the +jws structured syntax suffix; and * application/mission-approval-governance+json, the Approval Governance Record object. 19.1.1. application/mission-approval-governance+jws * Type name: application * Subtype name: mission-approval-governance+jws * Required parameters: none * Optional parameters: none * Encoding considerations: binary; a JWS Compact Serialization: base64url-encoded values separated by period characters. The secured payload's media type travels in the JWS protected cty (Section 9). * Security considerations: see Section 17 * Interoperability considerations: see this document (Section 9) * Published specification: this document * Applications that use this media type: Mission-Bound Authorization approval governance * Fragment identifier considerations: N/A * Additional information: - Deprecated alias names for this type: none - Magic number(s): none - File extension(s): none - Macintosh file type code(s): N/A * Person & email address to contact for further information: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com (mailto:public@karlmcguinness.com) * Intended usage: COMMON * Restrictions on usage: none * Author: IETF * Change controller: IETF 19.1.2. application/mission-approval-governance+json * Type name: application * Subtype name: mission-approval-governance+json * Required parameters: none * Optional parameters: none * Encoding considerations: binary; JSON encoded in UTF-8 * Security considerations: see Section 17 * Interoperability considerations: see this document * Published specification: this document * Applications that use this media type: Mission-Bound Authorization issuers and audit deployments * Fragment identifier considerations: same as for application/json * Additional information: - Deprecated alias names for this type: none - Magic number(s): none - File extension(s): .json - Macintosh file type code(s): TEXT * Person & email address to contact for further information: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com (mailto:public@karlmcguinness.com) * Intended usage: COMMON * Restrictions on usage: none * Author: IETF * Change controller: IETF 20. References 20.1. Normative References [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-substrate] McGuinness, K., "Mission Substrate Requirements", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, . [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, . [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, . [RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020, . 20.2. Informative References [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit] McGuinness, K., "Mission Audit Transparency", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server] McGuinness, K., "Mission Authority Server", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate] McGuinness, K., "Mission Mandate", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering] McGuinness, K., "Mission Consumption Metering", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval] McGuinness, K., "Mission Deferred Approval for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval-revision] McGuinness, K., "Mission Approval Revision for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence] McGuinness, K., "Mission Consent Evidence for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive] McGuinness, K., "Mission Progressive Authorization for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template] McGuinness, K., "Mission Template for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020, . [RFC9396] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023, . Appendix A. Approval Context Commitment Test Vectors These non-normative vectors let an implementation verify its manifest and commitment computation byte for byte, the same discipline as the issuance profile's own Integrity Anchor Test Vectors ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). All use the issuer https://as.example.com. Every canonical-bytes block is the exact JCS [RFC8785] output, shown wrapped only for layout; remove the layout line breaks, adding no characters, to recover the single-line canonical form. Vector 2 below reuses, byte-exact, the always-present manifest members from the issuance profile's own canonical Worked Example Mission Record ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), including its proposal_hash, per that document's rule that an extending example must either reproduce the recorded objects byte-exactly or state its divergence. Vectors 1, 3, and 4 are hypothetical variants of that same Mission (same id, intent_hash, and authority_hash) that diverge in exactly one respect each, stated at each vector: this lets three different approval_context_commitment values legitimately exist for the one Mission id across the set, each correct for the variant it names, never for the others. The always-present members, reused unchanged across every vector: { "issuer": "https://as.example.com", "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-", "intent_hash": "sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r0", "authority_hash": "sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM", "subject": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "approver": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3", "created_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z", "expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z", "approval_basis": { "type": "direct", "consent_principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "activation": { "approval_event_id": "ape_8K2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z" }, "activation_actor": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }, "adjudication": { "kind": "human" }, "root_commitment": "sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM" }, "authority_source": { "type": "user_delegated" }, "policy_version": "deploy-policy:v17", "approval_event_id": "ape_8K2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z" } *Vector 1: base manifest.* Diverges from the canonical Mission by carrying no proposal_hash: this variant never recorded a proposed_authority distinct from its Authority Set. typ is mission- approval-context-v1; value is the object above with no conditional member added. {"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-approval-context-v1", "value":{"approval_basis":{"activation":{"approval_event_id":"ape_8K 2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z"},"activation_actor":{"iss":"https://idp.example.c om","sub":"user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"adjudication":{"kind":"human"},"c onsent_principal":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8 mN1a0kV7tR"},"root_commitment":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcVi I5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","type":"direct"},"approval_event_id":"ape_8K2nP4qV9 rL3tY6sB1z","approver":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_ 3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"authority_hash":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbykl NcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","authority_source":{"type":"user_delegated"},"c lient_id":"s6BhdRkqt3","created_at":"2026-11-02T08:00:00Z","expires_ at":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","id":"msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9 -","intent_hash":"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r 0","issuer":"https://as.example.com","policy_version":"deploy-policy :v17","subject":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8mN 1a0kV7tR"}}} approval_context_commitment = sha-256:dPaMl8eUhPExoiVA2zHbz4wPzmDLVs fZnHDxCYHDGos *Vector 2: conditional proposal_hash.* This is the canonical Mission unchanged: the always-present members above plus "proposal_hash": "sha-256:p-s-EzdNQTn6RoPHXESkwVtGdk8yL1PxryNyMwroKGo". {"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-approval-context-v1", "value":{"approval_basis":{"activation":{"approval_event_id":"ape_8K 2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z"},"activation_actor":{"iss":"https://idp.example.c om","sub":"user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"adjudication":{"kind":"human"},"c onsent_principal":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8 mN1a0kV7tR"},"root_commitment":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcVi I5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","type":"direct"},"approval_event_id":"ape_8K2nP4qV9 rL3tY6sB1z","approver":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_ 3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"authority_hash":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbykl NcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","authority_source":{"type":"user_delegated"},"c lient_id":"s6BhdRkqt3","created_at":"2026-11-02T08:00:00Z","expires_ at":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","id":"msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9 -","intent_hash":"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r 0","issuer":"https://as.example.com","policy_version":"deploy-policy :v17","proposal_hash":"sha-256:p-s-EzdNQTn6RoPHXESkwVtGdk8yL1PxryNyM wroKGo","subject":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8 mN1a0kV7tR"}}} approval_context_commitment = sha-256:pGxfIDuyBPfgpyox3J6GP477CQfUE6 FS9CfHirjwwvU *Vector 3: conditional ceiling_hash.* Diverges from the canonical Mission by adding a Progressive ceiling and carrying no proposal_hash (isolating the ceiling_hash case). The ceiling_hash value is derived first, per the Progressive profile's own construction ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]): typ mission- authority-ceiling, value a two-member object of authority_ceiling and drawdown_policy. The ceiling covers the Authority Set, its read entry's delegation grant included, with the write actions in a separate entry that grants no delegation, and drawdown_policy is an activation policy reference whose digest stands for a policy snapshot this example does not display. { "authority_ceiling": [ { "type": "mission_resource_access", "resource": "https://erp.example.com", "actions": ["invoices.read"], "delegation": { "max_depth": 2, "allowed_delegates": [{ "sub_profile": "ai_agent" }] } }, { "type": "mission_resource_access", "resource": "https://erp.example.com", "actions": ["invoices.write", "journal-entries.write"] } ], "drawdown_policy": { "id": "erp-drawdown", "version": "1", "digest": "sha-256:_hLEAl_ir1vxnex2tgbS6eRR99lyL1r6yyeB4RrC184" } } {"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-authority-ceiling","v alue":{"authority_ceiling":[{"actions":["invoices.read"],"delegation ":{"allowed_delegates":[{"sub_profile":"ai_agent"}],"max_depth":2}," resource":"https://erp.example.com","type":"mission_resource_access" },{"actions":["invoices.write","journal-entries.write"],"resource":" https://erp.example.com","type":"mission_resource_access"}],"drawdow n_policy":{"digest":"sha-256:_hLEAl_ir1vxnex2tgbS6eRR99lyL1r6yyeB4Rr C184","id":"erp-drawdown","version":"1"}}} ceiling_hash = sha-256:I0TgJBsdSkkmaHt4EayPfIjs8uoYiuQvP_O5b9Tlec8 The manifest is the always-present members above plus this ceiling_hash: {"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-approval-context-v1", "value":{"approval_basis":{"activation":{"approval_event_id":"ape_8K 2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z"},"activation_actor":{"iss":"https://idp.example.c om","sub":"user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"adjudication":{"kind":"human"},"c onsent_principal":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8 mN1a0kV7tR"},"root_commitment":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcVi I5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","type":"direct"},"approval_event_id":"ape_8K2nP4qV9 rL3tY6sB1z","approver":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_ 3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"authority_hash":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbykl NcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","authority_source":{"type":"user_delegated"},"c eiling_hash":"sha-256:I0TgJBsdSkkmaHt4EayPfIjs8uoYiuQvP_O5b9Tlec8"," client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3","created_at":"2026-11-02T08:00:00Z","expires _at":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","id":"msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc 9-","intent_hash":"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4 r0","issuer":"https://as.example.com","policy_version":"deploy-polic y:v17","subject":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8m N1a0kV7tR"}}} approval_context_commitment = sha-256:85y0i-t8pwRsM-SwHgZ9EaBIQFbnWj YDjBNEO1TTQWA *Vector 4: conditional submission_evidence_commitment.* Diverges from the canonical Mission by recording one verified Intent Submission Evidence entry and carrying no proposal_hash (isolating the submission_evidence_commitment case). The artifact_hash value is derived first, over the entry exactly as presented ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): typ mission-intent-evidence. =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 =============== { "type": "mission-intent-admission-assertion", "assertion": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2FkbWlzc2\ lvbi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9.MEUCIQDx7vector" } {"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-intent-evidence","val ue":{"assertion":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2FkbWlzc 2lvbi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9.MEUCIQDx7vector","type":"mission-intent-admi ssion-assertion"}} artifact_hash = sha-256:EwtVufH4c6btTaI55w-3mDJaNg0miFuC6-T7jXU2-R8 The recorded submission_evidence array carries this one element; submission_evidence_commitment is a second envelope anchor, typ mission-submission-evidence-v1, value the array exactly as retained: [ { "type": "mission-intent-admission-assertion", "artifact_hash": "sha-256:EwtVufH4c6btTaI55w-3mDJaNg0miFuC6-T7jXU2-R8", "verified_at": "2026-11-02T07:59:39Z", "facts": { "admission_issuer": "https://admission.example.com", "status": "active" } } ] {"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-submission-evidence-v 1","value":[{"artifact_hash":"sha-256:EwtVufH4c6btTaI55w-3mDJaNg0miF uC6-T7jXU2-R8","facts":{"admission_issuer":"https://admission.exampl e.com","status":"active"},"type":"mission-intent-admission-assertion ","verified_at":"2026-11-02T07:59:39Z"}]} submission_evidence_commitment = sha-256:jnXhfVteWUHvc1-wyJOMLaVFj-d 8ewQWE4R7f0t5otY The manifest is the always-present members above plus this submission_evidence_commitment: {"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-approval-context-v1", "value":{"approval_basis":{"activation":{"approval_event_id":"ape_8K 2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z"},"activation_actor":{"iss":"https://idp.example.c om","sub":"user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"adjudication":{"kind":"human"},"c onsent_principal":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8 mN1a0kV7tR"},"root_commitment":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcVi I5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","type":"direct"},"approval_event_id":"ape_8K2nP4qV9 rL3tY6sB1z","approver":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_ 3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"authority_hash":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbykl NcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","authority_source":{"type":"user_delegated"},"c lient_id":"s6BhdRkqt3","created_at":"2026-11-02T08:00:00Z","expires_ at":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","id":"msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9 -","intent_hash":"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r 0","issuer":"https://as.example.com","policy_version":"deploy-policy :v17","subject":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8mN 1a0kV7tR"},"submission_evidence_commitment":"sha-256:jnXhfVteWUHvc1- wyJOMLaVFj-d8ewQWE4R7f0t5otY"}} approval_context_commitment = sha-256:iYBvYGC_LpEQkhpPiIE3S1OFINjH2d K0jYMrCwWHvKE *Vector 5: mutated-member rejection.* Vector 2's manifest with one member changed, approval_event_id from ape_8K2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z to ape_9K2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z, illustrating what Section 15.3 requires a verifier to do when a recomputed digest disagrees with a disclosed one: recomputed = sha-256:4Ev4vJSv_VYjxB48tuJTsYKTSU81jfQRD48pOjazBf0 disclosed = sha-256:pGxfIDuyBPfgpyox3J6GP477CQfUE6FS9CfHirjwwvU The two differ, so a verifier holding the mutated record and this disclosed vector-2 value MUST reject the reference. *Vector 6: wrong-typ rejection.* Vector 2's value object, unchanged, committed under typ mission-approval-context-v2 instead of mission- approval-context-v1: correct typ (v1) = sha-256:pGxfIDuyBPfgpyox3J6GP477CQfUE6FS9CfHirjww vU wrong typ (v2) = sha-256:Al8UIKy7q4_WlWem_O_6kInpGUoOp_NvPQj_YNO4z AY The two differ. A verifier's recompute is always fixed to mission- approval-context-v1; presented with the wrong-typ value as if it were vector 2's approval_context_commitment, it recomputes vector 2's correct digest, finds a mismatch, and rejects under the same rule as vector 5. Appendix B. Portable Approval-Binding Check Vectors These non-normative vectors exercise the comparisons and outcomes of Section 11. Each case starts from a base pair: the record of Section 5.5, which authenticates under a key trusted for the expected Mission Issuer https://as.example.com, and a Mission reference that authenticates under its own rules and discloses that record's approval_event_id (ape_hON9D0svLKQAMyy-uug), issuer, intent_hash, and authority_hash. Where a case says both artifacts carry a commitment, each carries approval_context_commitment; the check compares the two strings and never recomputes them. Each case changes one thing from the base, except case 19, which tests the precedence of failure over insufficient evidence. +======+===================================+=====================+ | Case | Change from the base pair | Outcome | +======+===================================+=====================+ | 1 | Both carry an equal commitment | Success; commitment | | | | agreement | | | | established | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 2 | Only the record carries a | Success; commitment | | | commitment | agreement not | | | | established | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 3 | Neither carries a commitment | Success; commitment | | | | agreement not | | | | established | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 4 | Both carry a commitment, with | Failure | | | different values | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 5 | The reference's issuer is | Failure | | | https://as2.example.com | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 6 | The reference's approval_event_id | Failure | | | differs | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 7 | The reference's intent_hash | Failure | | | differs | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 8 | The reference's authority_hash | Failure | | | differs | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 9 | The reference does not disclose | Insufficient | | | approval_event_id | evidence | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 10 | The record's signature does not | Failure | | | verify | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 11 | The record verifies under a key | Failure | | | not trusted for the expected | | | | issuer | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 12 | The reference is a Mandate whose | Failure | | | iss differs from its | | | | mission.issuer | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 13 | No record is supplied | Insufficient | | | | evidence | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 14 | The reference's intent_hash | Failure | | | carries an unrecognized algorithm | | | | prefix | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 15 | The record carries a malformed | Failure | | | commitment; the reference carries | | | | none | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 16 | The reference carries a malformed | Failure | | | commitment; the record carries | | | | none | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 17 | Both intent_hash values are equal | Failure | | | but noncanonical: they decode, | | | | with nonzero padding bits, but do | | | | not re-encode to themselves | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 18 | The record names the Mission | Failure | | | Issuer https://as2.example.com | | | | and verifies under the expected | | | | issuer's key | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ | 19 | The reference's authority_hash | Failure | | | differs, and it does not disclose | | | | approval_event_id | | +------+-----------------------------------+---------------------+ Table 3: Portable approval-binding check cases Cases 6 to 8 succeed on every other comparison, which is why the check compares each anchor rather than any one of them. Case 9 matches intent_hash and authority_hash, which two Missions can share, and still cannot succeed. Cases 15 and 16 fail although the other artifact carries no commitment: a disclosed value is validated on its own. Case 19 reports failure, not insufficient evidence, because a disclosed mismatch is definitive. Appendix C. Document History [[ To be removed from the final specification ]] * Scope of the Recency Rules says the record is historical evidence and that the effect of a later change to an Approver's role, a delegation, or the governing policy on an existing Mission is deployment policy, declared and enforced through the lifecycle operations or the runtime profile; a new example contrasts an organizational decision, a personal delegation, and a required accountable owner when the approver transfers. No requirement changed (#830). * The portable-binding example and the approver-transfer example name each record by its role (the approval event, the Mission, the governance record, the Mandate, the purchase order, the ERP's decision) in place of identifiers such as E42 and M17. No requirement changed. * A separately named portable approval-binding check lets a Relying Auditor without the Mission Record establish that an authenticated record and an authenticated Mission reference agree on the approval event and the Mission anchors, with explicit commitment handling, distinct failure and insufficient-evidence outcomes, stated limits, a procurement example and vectors. Privacy Considerations relate the record's retention to an authorized evidence export or evidence bundle. The existing verification and re-check procedures are unchanged (#1572). * Immutability Witness: a mismatch between a recomputed Approval Context Commitment and the value an artifact disclosed shows that the two disagree. It is evidence that the Mission Record was altered only where an audit receipt independently shows the artifact predates the change and the disclosed value matches the registered approval event; a signature alone does not establish when an artifact was made. No requirement changed. * An assertion that can narrow the authority, such as a model output, is bound to the authority_hash of the set it evaluated, which the issuer records with the activation's inputs, rather than to the narrowed result; Activation step 8 and the re-check follow (#1436 item 16). * Resolutions of the remaining #1436 questions. An assertion binds to the approval event's intent_hash as well. Policy-authorization says what it checks for a policy assertion. contributing lists what the satisfied rule counted, so a deny assertion never appears in it. An exception never lengthens its class's recency ceiling. The members of evaluation are marked as required. Evaluating Recency points at the one approved_at verification rule. Conventions names both digest sources. Re-checking an Evaluation defines the Relying Auditor's re-check. Privacy Considerations name two correlators. A policy version that several humans approved names its one accountable human as the principal. * Four rulings on the #1436 questions (D568), each a change in requirements. The recording triggers bind only under a profile that adopts them, and a record kept voluntarily meets every requirement on a record. The accountable-approver rule is stated per approval basis: one human approval under direct, one policy approval naming the deciding policy under governed_policy, and the authenticated approval_basis under any other standing-consent basis. Only assertions of the basis's kind (under governed_policy, only those naming the deciding policy) count toward "exactly one"; other assertions in the consent principal's name contribute. Assertion Authority types authority for each assertion kind, and a policy assertion's principal is the human who approved the policy version. The JWS typ and cty are emitted with application/ omitted and compared as media types. * Editorial restructure, with no change to any requirement: Recording Triggers precedes the record; the record, Assertion Requirements and Policy-Approval Recency are split into subsections; Boundaries is folded into the sections it qualified; Conformance precedes Security Considerations; and the Approval Context Commitment test vectors are an appendix. Security and Privacy Considerations open with a pointer to the issuance profile's. Conventions defines the accountable assertion, the record digest, the Recording Issuer and the Relying Auditor. New examples show one approval per recording trigger, the decoded JWS protected header, a governed_policy activation with its recency computation, and the matching Consent Evidence members. * Recording Triggers states that a Mission whose Approver differs from its Subject holds the first trigger, so the Enterprise Mission Authority Profile always records the record for it; the triggers are unchanged (#1196). * Governed Policy Approval defines the governed_policy standing- consent basis: a human-approved approval_policy snapshot is the consented root, a policy assertion in that human's name is the accountable assertion, and each activation passes nine checks at the atomic creation commit. Assertion Requirements states the accountable assertion each basis requires: human for direct, policy for governed_policy, and the approval_basis record for the other standing-consent bases. Where the governed Mission populates adjudication, the accountable assertion's kind equals adjudication.kind; this document, not the OAuth binding, holds both rules (#1185). * The accountable principal is the Mission Record's approval_basis.consent_principal. The Approval Context Manifest keeps its approver member, sourced from that value, so mission- approval-context-v1 and vectors 1 to 6 are unchanged; the manifest excludes both mutable record members, state and termination (#705). * Assertion Requirements and the authority member name a policy assertion's policy as the decision mechanism; the principal it matches stays the accountable approver. The policy assertion path, provenance and recency checks are unchanged (#1084). * The accountable approver's assertion is human or policy, never service, and authority is defined for a service assertion, naming the model's identifier and version where a model produced the decision. A model-backed judge contributes as a governance input and never becomes the accountable approver. This adds a requirement. * The Approval Context Manifest copies a recorded ceiling_hash verbatim, so the Progressive profile is an informative reference, meeting the maturity bound of the reference classification convention (a Standards-Track draft never lists an Experimental draft as normative). The manifest's members and both ceiling_hash presence requirements are unchanged. * Clarified that the direct-human degenerate case presumes resolution by that human, not agent-invokable approval on the human's behalf (#759). Acknowledgments The Approval Governance Record began as an approval-provenance sketch in Mission Deferred Approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]). The author thanks the Mission-Bound Authorization implementer community for feedback. Author's Address Karl McGuinness Independent Email: public@karlmcguinness.com