| Internet-Draft | OAuth Mission Status | October 2026 |
| McGuinness | Expires 30 April 2027 | [Page] |
The Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 profile binds issued
authority to a durable, human-approved Mission and gates issuance on
Mission state, but it observes Mission state only through token lifetime
and optional token introspection. This document
defines the Mission state-management surfaces it defers: the Mission
Status operation (keyed by mission_id) with signed responses, a
freshness member and signing for the issuance profile's token
introspection projection, the Mission Lifecycle
endpoint with revoke, suspend, resume, and complete
operations, the suspended state and the completed termination
reason with the transitions between the lifecycle states, and
revocation-propagation guidance. Companion profiles can extend the
mission object and the Lifecycle endpoint's operations without
altering these surfaces.
Each capability is independently optional; an implementation can adopt
any subset, and one that adopts none remains a conforming issuance
profile.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 April 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], the
OAuth binding of Mission-Bound Authorization, makes a
Mission a first-class OAuth artifact: a structured, human-approved,
integrity-bound task whose authority bounds and outlives every token
an agent derives. It is, by design, a minimum-viable issuance layer.
It gates derivation on Mission state, carries the mission claim on
every derived token, and offers only OPTIONAL token introspection
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission State via
Token Introspection") as a way for a resource server to observe
Mission state. It names this document for the canonical Mission Status
surface (keyed by mission_id) and its signed status evidence, and
defers a standardized management endpoint for lifecycle transitions to
this document.¶
This document specifies those surfaces as optional extensions that build on the issuance profile. The capabilities are:¶
A dedicated Mission Status operation
(Section 3), which an authenticated, authorized consumer
holding a mission_id resolves, with responses signed as a JWS
[RFC7515].¶
A freshness member for the issuance profile's Mission projection on token introspection, which a deployment can return as a [RFC9701]-signed response (Section 4).¶
A Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5)
for explicit revoke, suspend, resume, and complete
operations, distinct from [RFC7009] token revocation, with an
extension point through which a companion profile MAY register a
further operation value (Section 5.1).¶
Revocation propagation guidance
(Section 6): the mission_max_stale_seconds
ceiling on reliance on an observation of Mission state, and how to
size token lifetimes to the propagation mechanisms in use.¶
authorization server metadata members (Section 8) advertising the endpoints above.¶
Each capability is independently optional. An implementation states which it supports through the metadata of Section 8 and the conformance language of Section 9. An implementation that supports none of them is unaffected and remains a conforming issuance profile.¶
This document does not restate the issuance profile. The Mission Intent,
authority derivation, the mission claim, the integrity anchors,
Mission-bound token issuance, the subset rule, and lifecycle gating are
all defined in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]; the
mission_resource_access authorization details type is defined in its
Mission Resource Access Profile
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]); both are
referenced, not re-specified, here.¶
The OpenID Shared Signals Framework [OIDC-SSF] and its Continuous Access Evaluation Profile [OIDC-CAEP] push events to a receiver, and a companion profile can carry Mission transitions that way (Section 6). An event reports that state changed; a Mission Status Response reports the state and how long a consumer may rely on it, so a push speeds learning of transitions without replacing the Status operation (Section 7). OAuth token revocation [RFC7009] acts on a token, not a Mission; the Lifecycle endpoint standardizes the means to revoke a Mission that the issuance profile requires.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terms defined in the issuance profile
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], in particular Mission,
Mission Issuer (the Mission issuer: in the OAuth binding the
authorization server; another binding's Mission Issuer that serves
these surfaces does so with the same semantics), Authority Set, the
mission claim, and mission_id; and the mission_resource_access
authorization details type defined in its Mission Resource Access
Profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). It
additionally uses:¶
A signed payload returned by the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3), reporting a Mission's current state and the audience-scoped evidence a consumer needs.¶
The approved Authority Set after applying every issuer-held, monotonic narrowing mechanism the deployment runs, each narrowing profile defining its own subtraction. No narrowing mechanism adds or restores authority. Membership in this set is necessary, never sufficient, for an action to proceed.¶
A committed change to a Mission that leaves its state and
termination unchanged: a schedule replacement (Section 5.6),
or a change a companion profile defines as one.¶
The lifecycle event a state-distribution companion defines for a committed transition or metadata-only change ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"). To emit one is to make the committed change available to that companion; this document defines no event or channel.¶
All JSON shown in this document is non-normative and illustrative; the member definitions in the surrounding text are authoritative. HTTP message examples follow the conventions of [RFC9110]; long URLs and form parameters are wrapped for display. JWT and JWS examples are shown as decoded JSON with separate header objects; on the wire the JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] applies.¶
This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile's stateless baseline needs no dedicated status surface ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation"); a deployment that does not stand up this operation, and a consumer that does not use it, are unaffected.¶
The dedicated Mission Status operation is the canonical status surface
the issuance profile defers. Unlike token introspection
(Section 4), which answers "is this
token's authorization still good," the Mission Status operation answers
"what is the state of this Mission" keyed by the mission_id alone.
An authenticated, authorized consumer holding a mission_id
(including an auditor or an authorization server in another trust
domain) resolves it without holding a token the authorization server
(AS) issued.¶
The Mission Issuer serves the operation at its Mission Status
endpoint, whose URL it publishes in authorization server metadata
(Section 8) as mission_status_endpoint. A consumer resolves
it from the expected issuer, which comes from its own issuer trust
or configuration, never from the response under verification: for a
resource server, the mission.issuer of an access token it accepted
under the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Resource Server Enforcement"). It retrieves that issuer's
metadata, validated as Section 3.3 of [RFC8414] requires (the
metadata's issuer equals the issuer identifier used to retrieve
it), and verifies responses with keys from that issuer's jwks_uri.
The endpoint MUST be served over TLS
1.2 or later (TLS 1.3 RECOMMENDED), following the recommendations of
[RFC9325].¶
The request is an HTTPS POST with an
application/x-www-form-urlencoded body containing:¶
mission_id:REQUIRED. A string. The canonical Mission Identifier, named per the issuance profile's external-surface convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
audience:CONDITIONAL. A string. The audience for which the consumer requests
authority, one the Mission Issuer's configuration authorizes that
consumer to request (below). An authorized consumer
that is not a resource
server (for example an auditor or an authorization server in
another trust domain) that
needs only Mission state,
not audience-scoped authority, MAY omit audience; the response is
then state-only and carries no authorization_details
(Section 3.5). A resource server resolving authority
for a specific audience MUST send it.¶
nonce:REQUIRED. A string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. A
client-generated nonce binding the
response to this request. It MUST be unique per request within the
response lifetime. A consumer MUST reject a response whose nonce
does not equal the one it sent. This is a standard client challenge:
echoing it in the signed response anti-replay-binds that response to
this specific request.¶
The request also carries the client authentication parameters of the
mechanism it uses (Section 3.2): client_id,
REQUIRED with mTLS client authentication (Section 2 of [RFC8705]),
and client_assertion_type and client_assertion, REQUIRED with
private-key-JWT client authentication [RFC7523]. A sender-constrained
access token travels in the Authorization header instead.¶
The Mission Issuer's configuration states which audiences each
authenticated caller may request: a resource server is typically
configured for its own audience identifiers, and a consuming
authorization server for each resource it issues tokens for. The
Mission Issuer MUST honor a
request's audience only where that configuration authorizes the
authenticated caller for it, and MUST otherwise refuse the request
with the not-found response of Section 3.10. Entitlement
to an audience comes only from that configuration, never from string
equality between audience and the caller's client_id or
certificate subject. The response's aud is the requested audience
(Section 3.5).¶
The request MUST be authenticated. The AS MUST support at least one of the following mechanisms. The client MUST use exactly one of them per request:¶
mTLS client authentication [RFC8705]. The AS validates the
client's X.509 certificate against its configured trust anchors and
the client's registered tls_client_auth metadata.¶
Sender-constrained access token. The client presents a
mission_status-scoped access token (see the authorization
requirement below) in the Authorization header, sender-constrained
either by DPoP [RFC9449] (the DPoP scheme with a DPoP proof
header, the token's cnf.jkt matching the proof key thumbprint) or
by mTLS [RFC8705] (a certificate-bound token, the Bearer scheme,
whose cnf.x5t#S256 matches the presented client certificate). The
token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's
protected-resource identifier (below).¶
Private-key-JWT client authentication [RFC7523]. The client
presents client_assertion_type with the exact value
urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer and a signed
JWT as client_assertion. The assertion's aud MUST be the AS's
issuer identifier [RFC8414] as its sole value, the client
authentication audience of [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis];
the AS MUST reject an assertion with any other aud. The client
SHOULD set the JWS typ header to client-authentication+jwt.
The AS accepts only the JWS
[RFC7515] algorithms it advertises for that endpoint
(Section 8); none MUST NOT be used.¶
Plain Basic or POST client authentication MUST NOT be used for this
endpoint. The AS MUST refuse a request not authenticated by one of the
three mechanisms, with the outcome Section 3.3
assigns: unauthorized (HTTP 401) or invalid_client (HTTP 400). The
mechanism is
determined by wire evidence in order: a request presenting an access
token in Authorization is mechanism 2, and any client certificate is
then evaluated only as that token's mTLS sender constraint; otherwise a
request presenting client_assertion is mechanism 3, and any client
certificate is not treated as client authentication; otherwise a request
presenting only a client certificate is mechanism 1. This order keeps
"exactly one mechanism" satisfiable when mTLS terminates at the edge.
The parameters of a mechanism the order does not select, such as a
client_assertion beside an access token, are not evaluated as
client authentication. A
request whose selected mechanism the endpoint does not advertise, or
whose only credential is of a kind no mechanism uses (HTTP Basic, a
client secret), is answered as one that presented no credential
(Section 3.3).¶
An authenticated caller MUST additionally carry an explicit read
authorization: a mission_status scope on the presented access token,
or a deployment-defined equivalent grant bound to the authenticated
client. The mission_status scope authorizes the Mission Status read
operation and mirrors the mission_lifecycle scope of the Mission
Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5). The token-less
path is preserved: a consumer that holds only a mission_id and
authenticates directly as a client (mechanism 1 or 3) carries the
deployment-defined equivalent grant, not a scope, and so resolves
Mission state without holding an access token the AS issued. A caller
carrying no such authorization is refused with the not-found response
of Section 3.10 (Section 3.8). This
includes an authenticated caller presenting an otherwise-valid access
token without the mission_status scope: it receives the not-found
response, not the insufficient_scope error of
Section 3.1 of [RFC6750]. An expired token, a token for another
audience, or a failed sender constraint is instead an access-token
authentication failure (Section 3.3).¶
Read authorization identifies the Missions the caller may inspect
under deployment policy: all Missions at the issuer, those of a
tenant, or a narrower set. Possession of the mission_status scope
alone does not establish which Missions it covers. That
authorization, with the audience entitlement of
Section 3.1 when the request names an audience, is
the authorization for the mission_id and audience that
Section 3.8 requires, and a Mission it does not
cover receives the not-found response.¶
A presented access token (mechanism 2) MUST be audience-restricted to
this endpoint's protected-resource identifier: the resource value the
AS publishes for this endpoint in its Protected Resource Metadata
[RFC9728]. For these surfaces that identifier is the endpoint's own URL
(the mission_status_endpoint or mission_lifecycle_endpoint), not
the issuer identifier that a private-key-JWT assertion's aud names
(mechanism 3). The AS MUST reject a token whose audience does
not name that identifier. This token audience is distinct from the request body's
audience parameter (Section 3.1): the token audience
authorizes the call at this endpoint, whereas the request audience
carries no authentication weight and only selects the
Resource-Server-specific authority projection the response returns
(Section 3.5).¶
Which mechanisms and authorization this endpoint accepts are
discoverable per endpoint, not inferred from the token endpoint's
metadata. The AS advertises the methods this endpoint accepts in
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported (Section 8).¶
For
the sender-constrained access-token path, this endpoint is an OAuth
protected resource: the AS publishes, in its Protected Resource Metadata
for this resource [RFC9728], the resource identifier the token's
audience MUST name, the mission_status scope it requires
(scopes_supported), and the presentation and sender constraints it
accepts (bearer_methods_supported, dpop_bound_access_tokens_required,
tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens). For the retained
direct-client-authentication path (mTLS [RFC8705] or private-key JWT
[RFC7523]), the accepted methods and, for private_key_jwt, the
accepted client-assertion signing algorithms are advertised for this
endpoint (Section 8), not read from the token endpoint's
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported [RFC8414]. Both paths are
therefore discoverable.¶
A request that fails authentication receives the outcome for the credential it presented:¶
A request whose presented access token fails authentication receives
HTTP 401 unauthorized with a WWW-Authenticate challenge in the
scheme it used: Bearer with the error attributes of
Section 3 of [RFC6750], or DPoP under
Section 7.1 of [RFC9449], including its algs parameter and error
codes.¶
A request whose mTLS or private-key-JWT client authentication fails
at the HTTP layer receives HTTP 400 with the invalid_client error
code, as Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] answers a failed client
authentication carried outside the Authorization header. It carries
no WWW-Authenticate challenge and is not reported as an
access-token failure. A client certificate rejected during the TLS
handshake fails at the TLS layer, before any HTTP response.¶
A request that presented no credential receives, where the endpoint
accepts an access-token scheme, HTTP 401 unauthorized with one
challenge for each access-token scheme the endpoint accepts and no
error attribute (Section 3.1 of [RFC6750]); where it accepts
none, it receives HTTP 400 invalid_client.¶
Every challenge carries the resource_metadata parameter naming the
endpoint's Protected Resource Metadata (Section 5.1 of [RFC9728]).
A 401 response carries the challenge or challenges and a JSON body
(Section 3.10): a challenge's error attribute, when
present, follows its scheme as above and is distinct from the body's
error, which is unauthorized.
An authenticated caller not authorized for the referenced Mission
receives not_found (404) with no challenge
(Section 3.8).¶
On success the AS returns a JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515]
signed with a key published in the AS's jwks_uri. The JWS header
carries typ of mission-status-response+jwt and a kid identifying
the signing key. Per Section 4.1.9 of [RFC7515], the typ header
omits the application/ prefix; the full media type
application/mission-status-response+jwt
(Section 12.3) is used as the HTTP Content-Type.
Exact validation of the protected
typ value, together with mutually exclusive validation rules for
the other JWTs the AS signs, implements the substitution defense of
Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] and Section 3.12 of [RFC8725].¶
A Mission Status Response is evidence of Mission state for the
consumer that requested it, not a bearer credential, an access token,
or an authorization grant: presenting one authorizes nothing, and a
resource server validating access tokens under Section 4 of [RFC9068]
rejects it by its typ.¶
[RFC9701] signed introspection responses are scoped to token
introspection and do not apply to a lookup keyed by mission_id; the
dedicated Mission Status operation therefore uses a new media type and a
JWS, not [RFC9701] (see Section 10.4). Implementations
MUST NOT use [RFC9701] for the dedicated Mission Status operation.¶
In the ERP examples in this document, the operation contract identifies
https://erp.example.com as the operation target
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). Actions and
constraints determine the permitted operations within that service.
In the audience-scoped Mission Status example below, the consumer is
the ERP resource server, client erp-rs, which the Mission Issuer's
configuration authorizes for that audience; its client identifier is
the response's sub.¶
The signed payload reports the Mission's current state and the audience-scoped evidence the consumer needs.¶
Decoded JWS header:¶
{
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "as-key-2026-q3",
"typ": "mission-status-response+jwt"
}
¶
Decoded JWS payload:¶
{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"aud": "https://erp.example.com",
"sub": "erp-rs",
"nonce": "nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ",
"iat": 1793606400,
"exp": 1793606460,
"mission": {
"id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"state": "active",
"version": 1,
"expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
"fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:00:45Z"
},
"authorization_details": [
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["invoices.read"],
"constraints": {
"resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
"resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
},
"delegation": {
"max_depth": 2,
"allowed_delegates": [{ "sub_profile": "ai_agent" }]
} },
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
"constraints": {
"max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" }
} }
]
}
¶
The members are:¶
The signed JWT envelope iss, aud, sub, nonce, iat, exp.
The aud, a single string, is the response's audience binding and
the nonce its request binding. On a response to the Mission Status
operation or a base lifecycle operation, the AS MUST set sub to
the authenticated client's identifier: the presented access token's
client_id, or the client that authenticated directly. When the
request omitted audience
(Section 3.1), the response is state-only and the AS
MUST set aud to the authenticated client's client_id, as the
Lifecycle endpoint does (Section 5); the
consumer's aud verification below then checks that identifier. exp bounds the validity of the signed response
itself; how long the consumer MAY rely on the reported state is
given separately by mission.fresh_until below.¶
mission: the mission object, the same shape as the mission
claim of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission
Claim") with status members added. It carries:¶
id, issuer: the subject Mission's identifier and issuer.¶
authority_hash: OPTIONAL. The issuance profile's consent
commitment over the Authority Set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Integrity Anchors"), disclosed at the AS's discretion to
a caller it authorizes for audit or correlation use, on the same
minimization footing as the issuance profile's introspection
disclosure privilege ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Caller Authorization and Minimization"). Not carried on
the issuance profile's baseline mission claim.¶
state: REQUIRED. The current Mission lifecycle state. The
authoritative
state space is the issuance profile's
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Lifecycle"): active and terminated, this document's suspended
when the Mission Lifecycle endpoint's suspend operation
(Section 5.1) is deployed, and any further state a
companion profile defines and
the deployment runs. A consumer applies the issuance profile's
forward-compatibility rule: only active permits reliance, and
every other value, recognized or not, is non-active. This
document's reliance behavior does not depend on recognizing a
companion-defined state; the fail-safe rule above governs. A
non-active state gates new authorization decisions only: it
does not establish that work already accepted under the Mission has
stopped, or that completed effects were undone.¶
termination: CONDITIONAL. Present exactly when state is
terminated: the Mission's termination
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Termination"), with its reason (revoked or expired from the
issuance profile, this document's completed, or a reason a
companion profile defines), its terminated_at, the members its
reason defines, and version: the state version (below) of the
transition that committed the termination. version is REQUIRED
in every termination the Mission Issuer commits, and absent while
a termination that takes effect without a request, such as
expired, is observed but not yet committed; once committed it
does not change, so a metadata-only change committed later leaves
it lower than the response's version. It is the audit reference
for revoked and completed.¶
expires_at: REQUIRED. The point at which the Mission itself
expires, the
Mission record's expires_at
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
fresh_until: REQUIRED. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time giving
the point
until which the consumer MAY rely on the reported state without
re-checking, governing caching (Section 3.6). It is
report-freshness metadata, carried in mission so it travels with
state even on the introspection projection, which has no signed
envelope to carry it (Section 4).¶
suspend_until, on_expiry: CONDITIONAL. Present only while the
Mission is suspended under a deadline
(Section 5): the RFC 3339 [RFC3339]
deadline, and the transition (resume or revoke) the AS applies
when it passes.¶
version: REQUIRED. A positive integer, the Mission's
state version: a strictly
monotonic per-Mission counter the Mission Issuer maintains,
incremented on each committed lifecycle transition (the approval
event is version 1) and each committed metadata-only change,
current as of the reported state. A deadline's or expiry's
transition, which takes effect without a request, advances
version only when committed; until then a response reports the
last committed value. It orders observations of one
Mission across every surface that reports it, and a lifecycle
request can guard on it with expected_version (Section 5.6).¶
Extension members: a companion profile MAY add further members to this object.¶
authorization_details: the Effective Authority Set entries of every
AS-supported authorization_details type
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization
Details Types") relevant to the requesting audience, audience
relevance determined per each entry's own type specification (for
the general-purpose mission_resource_access type, by its
resource member,
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]), carried at
the top level as a sibling of mission (as on the token and in the
introspection response). Entries addressed to other audiences MUST NOT be disclosed. When the request names an audience, the response
MUST carry authorization_details, as an empty array when no entry
is relevant to that audience. The entries are carried whatever the
Mission's state; a non-active state permits no reliance on them
(Section 3.7). When the request omits audience
(Section 3.1), there is no requesting audience: the
response is state-only and MUST NOT carry authorization_details.¶
A consumer MUST verify, before honoring a response:¶
the JWS header typ is mission-status-response+jwt;¶
the JWS header alg is one the AS advertises in
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported (Section 8),
rejecting none and any algorithm not listed;¶
the JWS signature against a current jwks_uri entry for the
issuer AS that the consumer's trusted configuration authorizes for
that AS's Mission Status responses; a key's presence in the
jwks_uri does not authorize it (Section 8.1);¶
iss equals the expected AS issuer URL, and mission.issuer
equals iss;¶
aud equals the audience the request named or, for a
state-only response, the requesting client's client_id
(Section 3.1);¶
sub equals the requesting client's identifier;¶
nonce equals the request's nonce;¶
mission.id equals the requested mission_id;¶
iat is not in the future and exp is not in the past, with up to
30 seconds clock-skew tolerance; and¶
mission.fresh_until is not later than exp.¶
Caching follows these rules:¶
Cache key. Consumers SHOULD cache a response keyed on
(mission_id, audience), or on (mission_id, client_id) for a
state-only response, until its reliance bound (below).¶
Freshness cap. The AS MUST NOT set mission.fresh_until later
than the response's exp, nor, when it advertises
mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 8), later than the
response's iat plus that value.¶
Reliance bound. A response's reliance bound is the earliest of
mission.fresh_until, the response's exp, and, when the AS
advertises mission_max_stale_seconds, the response's iat plus
that value. Consumers MUST NOT use a response after its reliance
bound, subject only to the skew tolerance below, and MUST NOT rely
on a reported active state at or after mission.expires_at. In
particular, a consumer MUST NOT extend reliance on a cached
suspended (or any non-active) response beyond its reliance
bound.¶
Skew tolerance. When comparing the current time to
mission.fresh_until, a consumer MAY allow up to 30 seconds of
tolerance for the active state only, and no tolerance for any
other state. The tolerance MUST NOT extend reliance past the
response's exp, mission.expires_at, or the response's iat plus
the advertised mission_max_stale_seconds.¶
The freshness cap keeps report freshness within the signed response's
own validity and the deployment's advertised revocation-propagation
tolerance. The skew tolerance is a clock-skew allowance on the
mission.fresh_until comparison only, bounding the disagreement
between the AS's and the consumer's clocks, not a property of state
reversibility: the response's exp, the Mission's expiry and the
advertised ceiling are hard bounds that no allowance extends. The
clock-skew tolerance of the response checks
(Section 3.5) decides only whether a response is
accepted, never how long it is relied on, so a response accepted
after its exp supports no decision (Section 3.7).
The reliance bound holds for non-active states too, so a consumer
re-reads a suspended Mission, which can be resumed, rather than
refusing on an outdated observation.¶
A decision that requires Mission Status proceeds only on a response
that passed every check of Section 3.5, is within its
reliance bound (Section 3.6), and reports active.
Without one, the decision MUST NOT proceed, whatever the cause: an
error response such as unavailable, rate_limited or not_found, a
failed check, a network failure, or a lapsed reliance bound. For
example, a resource server refuses the request it is deciding, and a
consuming Authorization Server issues no token.¶
That outcome establishes only that the decision cannot proceed; it is
not evidence that the Mission terminated. A transient failure, such as
unavailable, rate_limited or a network failure, leaves a response
the consumer already holds usable within that response's original
reliance bound; a failed request never refreshes or extends that
bound.¶
A mission_id is never a bearer capability. The AS MUST authenticate
the requester and authorize it for the requested mission_id and
audience.¶
Unknown mission_id values and known-but-unauthorized references MUST
produce indistinguishable responses (HTTP 404 with a generic
not-found body; see Section 3.10). The AS MUST return an
identical HTTP status code, response body, and headers for the two
cases. The AS SHOULD NOT vary response timing in a way that
distinguishes the two cases. It SHOULD mitigate timing side channels
(for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform lookup
path for both the unknown and the unauthorized case).¶
The AS MUST process a Mission Status request in this order, refusing it at the first step that fails:¶
Authenticate the caller (Section 3.2),
parsing the request body only as far as authentication and the
nonce echo of Section 3.10 need. A
body that cannot be parsed is refused invalid_request, whatever
credential the request presents; a client authentication parameter
included more than once fails authentication, and no occurrence of
it is used. Every authentication failure is answered as
Section 3.3 assigns.¶
Validate the request syntax (Section 3.1). A
malformed request is refused invalid_request; a request that
includes a parameter more than once is malformed, as at the token
endpoint (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]).¶
Authorize the request: the caller's read authorization, the Mission
the mission_id names, and any requested audience
(Section 3.1). An unknown Mission and every failed
authorization are refused alike with the not-found response.¶
Read the Mission's current state and return the signed response (Section 3.5).¶
No response that depends on the Mission's existence or state precedes step 3.¶
Mission Status outcomes are of two kinds. A success outcome is a found,
visible, authorized Mission: the AS returns HTTP 200 with a signed
Mission Status Response, and the outcome is described by mission.state
in that response, not by a separate symbol. A wire error is a hard
failure: the AS returns the matching HTTP status with a JSON object
[RFC8259] body whose error member carries the symbol below.¶
Success outcomes (HTTP 200, signed Mission Status Response, described by
mission.state):¶
| mission.state | Description |
|---|---|
active
|
Mission is active and permits reliance. |
suspended
|
Mission is suspended (non-terminal). |
terminated
|
Mission has ended; mission.termination gives the reason. |
A terminated Mission's mission.termination.reason names how it
ended, and the set of reasons is not closed: a deployment reports
whichever reason its profiles define, and a consumer's reliance
decision never depends on recognizing it. The issuance profile defines
revoked and expired ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), this
document defines completed, and a companion profile can define
further reasons. The governing rule is the issuance profile's
forward-compatibility rule:
every state other than active is non-active, whether or not the
consumer recognizes it.¶
Wire error codes (carried in the error member of a JSON body):¶
| error | HTTP | Description |
|---|---|---|
invalid_request
|
400 | Malformed request: an unparseable body, a required member missing or malformed, an invalid member combination, a Lifecycle operation the AS does not serve (Section 5), or a retransmitted nonce whose operation members differ from the original's, present or absent alike (Section 5.6). |
invalid_client
|
400 | Direct client authentication (mTLS or private-key JWT) failed, or no credential was presented where no access-token scheme is accepted (Section 3.3). |
unauthorized
|
401 | Access-token authentication failed, or no credential was presented where an access-token scheme is accepted; the response carries the challenges of Section 3.3. |
not_found
|
404 | Reference does not exist OR is not visible. |
conflict
|
409 | Lifecycle operation not legal from the current state (Section 5.6). |
stale_version
|
409 |
expected_version differs from the current state version (Section 5.6). |
rate_limited
|
429 | Consumer is rate-limited. |
unavailable
|
503 | AS temporarily cannot serve status. |
Note the distinction between the access failures: unauthorized
(401) and invalid_client (400) mean the request carried no valid
authentication, whereas a request that is authenticated but not
authorized for the referenced Mission returns not_found (404), never
an authentication failure, so that an unauthorized reference is
indistinguishable from an unknown one
(Section 3.8). The error body is:¶
The body MUST contain error and error_description, and MUST
additionally contain nonce when the request carried a well-formed
nonce. A request whose nonce is absent or malformed is refused
invalid_request with no nonce member echoed. The body MUST NOT
contain any member that would let a caller distinguish unknown from
unauthorized references. For rate_limited, the response SHOULD
include a Retry-After header [RFC9110] and a retry_after body
member in seconds.¶
The body is application/json with Cache-Control:
no-store. error_description is diagnostic and is never
authorization input. nonce correlates the response to the request in
support of the signed-response and retry model of Section 5.6 and
is not, by itself, replay protection, per the absent-or-malformed-nonce
rule above. These endpoints use this OAuth error-response shape, not
RFC 9457 [RFC9457] problem details.¶
This section is OPTIONAL and is a thin delta over the OAuth 2.0 Token
Introspection [RFC7662] projection of
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission State via
Token Introspection"). That section already
defines a mission member on the introspection response carrying
id and issuer, and (from the Mission's issuer) the lifecycle
state, with authority_hash disclosed only to a caller holding
that member's disclosure privilege, together with the
caller-authorization, minimization, and issuer-only-reports-state
rules. This document does not restate those rules.¶
This extension adds the following to that projection:¶
An introspection response that carries a Mission projection is
protected by TLS, as for token introspection generally
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission State via
Token Introspection"). Where the projection's integrity and provenance
need to be verifiable independently of the transport (for example
when the response transits intermediaries or is retained for audit),
the AS SHOULD return it as a [RFC9701]-signed response, advertised
through the introspection_signing_alg_values_supported metadata
that [RFC9701] registers in the [RFC8414] registry.¶
When the responding AS is the Mission's issuer, the projection MAY
additionally carry fresh_until, an RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time
giving the point until which the consumer MAY rely on the reported
state without re-checking. The caching rule of
Section 3.6 applies with the response-level terms
the response carries, and a term it does not carry drops out: an
[RFC9701] response's top-level iat dates it, and a top-level
exp, which [RFC9701] discourages but permits, bounds reliance
where present; an unsigned response carries neither. The iat and
exp members of the [RFC7662] introspection response describe
the token, not the observation of Mission state, and are not these
terms. The AS sets fresh_until no later than the time of the
response plus any advertised mission_max_stale_seconds. When
fresh_until is absent (for example a non-issuer projection), the
issuance profile's per-use rule governs: the consumer MUST NOT reuse
the reported state for a later decision.¶
This projection and the dedicated Mission Status Response
(Section 3.5) carry Mission facts in a mission object
of the same shape: the open mission claim object of
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission Claim")
with status members (state, termination, fresh_until, any
companion-defined extension member, and, on the dedicated response,
expires_at and version) added. This
projection populates the subset a token-holding consumer needs; the
dedicated response populates more. Either way a consumer reads the
same fact from the same place.¶
Example [RFC9701]-signed introspection response (decoded payload),
for a token whose Mission is active:¶
{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"aud": "https://erp.example.com",
"iat": 1793606410,
"token_introspection": {
"active": true,
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR",
"mission": {
"id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"state": "active",
"fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:00:55Z"
}
}
}
¶
Per [RFC9701], the signed response is a JWT of typ
token-introspection+jwt whose [RFC7662] members, including the
mission projection, ride in the token_introspection claim, beside
the top-level iss, aud, and iat the JWT always carries.¶
A consumer holding only a mission_id, or one that needs signed
evidence independent of a specific token (an auditor or an
authorization server in another trust domain), uses the dedicated
Mission Status operation
(Section 3); the introspection projection is purely a
same-call convenience for token-holding consumers and is never the
sole Mission Status path.¶
This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile requires an
authenticated, deployment-defined means to revoke a Mission and defers
a standardized management API and the richer suspend, resume, and
complete operations ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Sections "Revocation" and "Mission Lifecycle"). This section
standardizes that management surface; who may perform each operation
is governed by Section 5.4.¶
The AS publishes its Mission Lifecycle endpoint URL in authorization
server metadata (Section 8) as mission_lifecycle_endpoint,
distinct from [RFC7009] token revocation. The endpoint MUST be
served over TLS 1.2 or later (TLS 1.3 RECOMMENDED), following the
recommendations of [RFC9325].¶
This endpoint's operations extend the issuance profile's lifecycle
state space ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Lifecycle"), each value arriving with the operation that introduces
it (Section 9): suspend adds one state, suspended (a paused
Mission that derives no tokens until resumed), and complete adds
one termination reason, completed (the Mission completed
successfully).
Issuance gating treats any state other than active as
non-deriving, exactly as the issuance profile gates on active.¶
A transition to suspended, or to terminated with reason
completed, gates new derivation only.
Tokens already derived under the Mission remain valid until their own
exp, exactly as in the issuance profile's revocation model. A
deployment that
needs a prompt cutoff on outstanding tokens uses the propagation
mechanisms of Section 6.¶
Suspension is reversible. Consuming or invalidating a refresh token
solely because of suspension can prevent refresh after a resume.
After validating a
refresh request and before consuming or rotating its refresh token,
the AS SHOULD check whether the Mission, or another Mission whose
state a companion profile makes gate its derivation, is suspended.
When this check detects suspension, the AS SHOULD
refuse the request without consuming the refresh token or invalidating
its otherwise-valid grant solely because of that suspension. This
check does not replace issuance-time state validation. A concurrent
suspension can still cause issuance to be refused after the
preliminary check, and preserving refresh capability across that
interval requires coordination with the issuance commit. The check
leaves refresh-token rotation and reuse detection intact, and a
resume does not revive a credential that expired or was revoked
independently.¶
An error code alone does not tell a client whether a resume can
lift a refusal. When the issuance profile's gating refuses a
derivation because the Mission is suspended, or terminated with
reason completed, the AS SHOULD include, alongside error, the
mission_error token-error-response member
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Issuance Gating")
with the value suspended or completed, respectively. The issuance
profile's rules for that member apply: it is diagnostic only, it grants nothing, an
unrecognized value is ignored, and it is returned only to the
authenticated client presenting the Mission's grant.
suspended reports a refusal that a resume can lift; completed
reports a terminal one.¶
The endpoint accepts authenticated POST requests with a form-urlencoded body:¶
mission_id:REQUIRED. A string. The canonical Mission Identifier, named per the issuance profile's external-surface convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
operation:REQUIRED. A string. One of revoke, suspend, resume,
complete, or a further value a companion profile registers as an
extension operation on this endpoint (below).¶
reason:OPTIONAL. A string of at most 1024 Unicode code points, a longer one being malformed. A human-readable reason recorded in audit. Not used by an extension operation that records its own request members in audit.¶
suspend_until:OPTIONAL. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time. Valid only on the
suspend operation. When present, it sets a deadline after which the
AS applies on_expiry.¶
on_expiry:CONDITIONAL. A string, one of resume or revoke. REQUIRED when
suspend_until is present; otherwise MUST NOT be sent. It selects the
transition the AS applies when suspend_until passes.¶
expected_version:OPTIONAL. A string, the canonical decimal form of a positive state version (Section 3.5): ASCII digits with no leading zero, and no sign, whitespace, fraction or exponent. It is the version the caller last observed, compared exactly, never rounded. Any other form is malformed. The AS applies it as Section 5.6 describes.¶
nonce:REQUIRED. A string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. A
client-generated nonce, the request's idempotency key
(Section 5.6), not a fresh challenge per transmission as at the
Mission Status endpoint: a client MUST use a fresh nonce for each
new operation it requests on a Mission, unique among its nonce
values for that Mission within the deduplication window, and repeat
it only to retransmit that request.¶
The request also carries the client authentication parameters of the mechanism it uses, as at the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.1).¶
A companion-registered extension operation carries additional REQUIRED and OPTIONAL members of its own, defined completely by the companion that registers it.¶
The base operations are:¶
revoke: terminate the Mission; transition to terminated with
reason revoked.¶
suspend: pause the Mission; transition to suspended.¶
resume: return a suspended Mission to active.¶
complete: mark the Mission completed; transition to terminated
with reason completed.¶
The AS MUST refuse an operation value it does not serve, a base
operation its conformance claim omits (Section 9) or an extension
operation it has not adopted, with invalid_request
(Section 3.10) before looking up the Mission, leaving the
Mission unchanged, so the refusal discloses nothing about it.¶
A companion profile MAY register a further operation value on this
endpoint that changes no Mission-level state, provided it defines the
value's request members, authorization, anti-oracle behavior,
idempotency and outcome vocabulary, result shape, and conformance
requirements completely. It registers the value by defining it in
its own specification; no IANA registry holds operation values
(Section 12).¶
A suspend MAY carry suspend_until with a REQUIRED on_expiry; the
pair is the Mission's schedule. When the suspend_until of a current
schedule passes, the AS MUST apply on_expiry (transition to
active for resume, or to terminated with reason revoked for
revoke) and emit the corresponding transition, without a further
request, unless expiry governs (below). While the Mission
is suspended under a deadline, both suspend_until and on_expiry
surface in the signed Mission Status Response (Section 3.5)
so a consumer sees the pending outcome.¶
The AS authorizes a schedule when it commits it
(Section 5.4) and does not re-authorize it at the
deadline: a later expiry or withdrawal of the committing party's grant
does not by itself cancel it. A schedule is current until its
suspension ends or an authorized replacement supersedes it
(Section 5.6). The AS MUST NOT apply a schedule that is no longer
current, so an earlier deadline never acts on a later suspension. A
deadline applies only a transition legal from the Mission's current
state (Section 5.2) and never changes a terminated Mission.¶
From a current schedule's deadline, every decision treats the Mission
as in the state its on_expiry produces, whether or not that
transition is persisted, so a request the AS decides after the
deadline is decided against that state. If the first decision after
the deadline comes at or after the Mission's expires_at, expiry
governs instead and the Mission is terminated with reason expired
(Section 5.2); a revocation committed at its deadline before
expires_at keeps reason revoked. For on_expiry revoke, the
termination's terminated_at is the schedule's suspend_until. A new
suspend whose suspend_until is not later than the time the AS
processes it is refused invalid_request; a retransmit of an accepted
request still replays its original response after the deadline passes
(Section 5.6).¶
Figure 1 shows the Mission lifecycle states and the
transitions this document defines. An approval event creates a Mission
in active ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Lifecycle"), and only active permits derivation. A deadline is a
schedule's suspend_until (Section 5.1). A companion
profile can define further transitions to terminated, each
recording a termination reason of its own.¶
approval
|
v
+-----------+ suspend +-----------+
| active |-------------->| suspended |
| |<--------------| |
+-----------+ resume, +-----------+
| or deadline |
| (on_expiry=resume) |
| revoke, complete, | revoke, complete, expiry,
| expiry | deadline (on_expiry=revoke)
v v
+-------------------------------------------+
| terminated |
| reason: revoked, completed or expired |
+-------------------------------------------+
An operation is legal only from the source states below. The
terminated state admits no transition, whatever its termination
reason. Section 5.6 decides an operation not legal from the
current state as idempotent success or a conflict. This table
governs Mission-level state; an extension operation that changes no
Mission state is not a row of it.¶
| Operation | Legal from | Resulting state | Termination reason |
|---|---|---|---|
revoke
|
active, suspended
|
terminated
|
revoked
|
suspend
|
active
|
suspended
|
|
resume
|
suspended
|
active
|
|
complete
|
active, suspended
|
terminated
|
completed
|
complete is legal from suspended as well as active: completion is
a monotonic narrowing to terminated and needs no derivation
window, so a suspended Mission need not first be resumed to be
completed.¶
A Mission
that reaches its expires_at from active or suspended is
terminated with reason expired independently of this endpoint, at
every decision whether or not the transition is persisted. When a
schedule's suspend_until is at or after the Mission's expires_at,
expiry governs: the Mission is terminated with reason expired at
expires_at, and the AS MUST NOT apply that schedule's on_expiry.¶
The lifecycle endpoint uses the same authentication mechanisms as the
Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.2): mTLS client
authentication, a sender-constrained access token (DPoP- or mTLS-bound),
or private-key JWT. Its discovery mirrors that endpoint: the accepted
methods in mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported and, for
private_key_jwt, the accepted client-assertion algorithms in
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
(Section 8). Its authentication failures follow
Section 3.3.¶
For the sender-constrained access-token path, this
endpoint is an OAuth protected resource exactly as the Mission Status
endpoint is: the AS publishes, in its Protected Resource Metadata for
this resource [RFC9728], the resource identifier the token's
audience MUST name and the scopes it requires (scopes_supported):
mission_lifecycle for revoke, suspend, resume, and complete
(Section 5), and any scope an adopted extension
operation defines. A private-key JWT
client_assertion names the AS's issuer identifier in aud, and a
presented access token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's
protected-resource identifier, exactly as at the Mission Status
endpoint. Direct mTLS or private-key-JWT callers carry the
deployment-defined equivalent grant, never a scope.¶
Revoke request:¶
Revoke success response: the AS returns the updated status as a signed
Mission Status Response (Section 3.5). Because the
Lifecycle request carries no audience, the response is state-only: the
AS sets aud to the authenticated client's client_id and omits
authorization_details (a lifecycle confirmation reports state, not
audience-scoped authority). Here the response envelope's sub,
distinct from any access token's sub, carries the acting party: the
calling client identified by client_id. The AS records that acting
party and reflects it in this signed response as well as in its audit
log.¶
Decoded JWS payload:¶
{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"sub": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "nonce_8Y3vN0sM6tP1xR9bQ5",
"iat": 1793609600,
"exp": 1793609660,
"mission": {
"id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"state": "terminated",
"termination": {
"reason": "revoked",
"terminated_at": "2026-11-02T08:53:20Z",
"version": 4
},
"version": 4,
"expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
"fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:54:05Z"
}
}
¶
The AS records the operation, actor, time, and any reason in its
audit log; the response confirms the outcome through the updated
state.¶
The next two examples use another Mission.¶
Suspend request with a deadline, here also carrying the OPTIONAL
expected_version guard against deciding over stale state
(Section 5.6):¶
Suspend success response: the signed Mission Status Response reports
suspended and surfaces the pending outcome, carrying suspend_until
and on_expiry in mission alongside state. Decoded JWS payload:¶
{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"sub": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "nonce_4Dq2mV8kX1sB7nR3tW",
"iat": 1793607600,
"exp": 1793607660,
"mission": {
"id": "msn_TaLyTFRdyHq4zLDxwrwkEbj062oXcTX5",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"state": "suspended",
"version": 2,
"suspend_until": "2026-11-09T08:15:00Z",
"on_expiry": "revoke",
"expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
"fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:20:45Z"
}
}
¶
When suspend_until passes without a resume, the AS applies
on_expiry and transitions the Mission to terminated with reason
revoked without a further request.¶
The request nonce (Section 5.1) is
the idempotency key: an opaque string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points.
The AS
treats an absent, empty, longer, or non-string nonce as malformed
(invalid_request, with no nonce echoed).¶
The AS MUST deduplicate
lifecycle requests by the
triple (client, mission_id, nonce) for a bounded window, the
client being the acting party (Section 5.4), whose
authorization, delegation context included, is checked before every
replay (Section 5.7). On a
retransmit carrying a nonce already seen for that client and
mission_id, together with request members identical to the
original's, the AS MUST replay the original response rather than
re-execute the operation, once the retransmit has passed
authorization (Section 5.7). The comparison covers the
operation's request members (operation, reason, suspend_until,
on_expiry, expected_version, and any member an extension operation
defines), present or absent alike, and excludes client authentication
parameters and HTTP headers, which a retry regenerates. Members are
compared as decoded values, character for character, in any order,
so two spellings of one instant differ. The same
nonce paired with request members that differ from the original's
MUST be refused invalid_request (Section 3.10); the AS
MUST NOT answer it with the unrelated original response. A retransmit
whose original response was rate_limited, or was unavailable or
another 5xx response, is processed as a new request, not replayed. A
request refused before deduplication (Section 5.7) claims
no nonce: the AS retains nothing for the refusal and leaves any
response already retained under that nonce unchanged, so the rules
above apply to a later request carrying it as though the refused
request had never arrived.¶
A retransmit that arrives while the original is still being
processed never commits the operation a second time: the AS answers
it with the original response once that is retained, or with
unavailable until then, so every answer reports the one committed
operation's outcome. A replay is the original response unchanged,
with its original iat and exp.¶
A Lifecycle client verifies a response by the checks of
Section 3.5, with keys from the AS's jwks_uri and
never a key the AS has published as compromised. A replay whose exp
has passed fails check 9, except that the client MAY accept it as
confirmation of its original operation's outcome when it correlates
the response to that retained request (its mission_id and nonce)
and every other check passes. Such a replay confirms that outcome
only: it refreshes no cached state, authorizes no action, and does
not establish the Mission's current state, for which the client
obtains a fresh Mission Status Response.¶
The window MUST be at least the validity
span of the signed response the AS would replay (its iat to exp,
Section 3.5), so any retransmit that could still
present a live response is deduplicated. A deployment MAY use a longer
window. Within the window a retransmit is safe against reordering: a
delayed suspend retry that arrives after a resume is recognized as
a duplicate and replays the original suspend response, so it cannot
re-suspend an already-resumed Mission. A retransmit that arrives after
the window is processed as a new request; past that point only an
expected_version the client supplied (below) keeps it from acting on
state its sender has not observed.¶
Deduplication guards a retransmitted request; it does not guard a
valid request decided over stale state, a fresh suspend issued from
a console that has not yet seen a newer resume. For that a
lifecycle request MAY carry expected_version, the state version
(Section 3.5) the caller last observed: when present,
the AS MUST refuse the operation with HTTP 409 and error symbol
stale_version, leaving the Mission unchanged, when the Mission's
current state version differs. The AS applies this check before the
transition rule below, so a stale expected_version is refused even
where the operation would otherwise be idempotent success. A
deployment SHOULD require
expected_version on the operations it classifies high-risk. The
nonce remains the replay key; the two guards are independent, one
against duplicate delivery, one against stale decisions.¶
Lifecycle operations that change Mission state follow one rule. An
operation whose resulting state (Section 5.2) and, for
terminated, termination reason equal the Mission's current ones is
idempotent success: the AS returns the current Mission Status
Response, with no state change and, except for the schedule
replacement below, no event emitted. Any other
operation not legal from the current state (for example suspend
against a terminated Mission, or revoke against one terminated
with reason completed) is a conflict: the AS MUST refuse it with
HTTP 409 and a JSON body whose error symbol is conflict, leaving
the Mission state unchanged. The nonce replay and request-mismatch
handling above applies independently of this rule. An extension
operation that changes no Mission state is not bound by this rule;
the companion that registers it defines its idempotency and outcome
vocabulary (Section 5.1).¶
resume is the sole exception to the idempotent-success arm. It is
legal only from suspended, and its resulting state active is also
the baseline a Mission holds before any suspension, so resume on an
active Mission (one never suspended, or already resumed) or on a
terminated Mission is not idempotent success but a conflict.¶
A suspend against a suspended Mission leaves its state unchanged
but can change its schedule. One that carries a suspend_until and
on_expiry
pair differing from the recorded schedule, or where none is recorded,
replaces the schedule once authorized (Section 5.4):
the AS MUST update the recorded values and their committing party,
emitting the corresponding transition-metadata change and reporting
the updated values in the response; silent acceptance without effect
is not conforming. A suspend that omits both members leaves the
recorded schedule, if any, and its committing party unchanged:
omission never clears a deadline. A suspend carrying only one of
the two remains invalid (Section 5.1)
and changes nothing.¶
The AS MUST process a lifecycle request in this order, refusing it at the first step that fails:¶
Authenticate the caller (Section 3.2),
parsing the request body only as far as authentication needs. A
body that cannot be parsed is refused invalid_request, whatever
credential the request presents; a client authentication parameter
included more than once fails authentication, and no occurrence of
it is used. Every authentication failure is answered as
Section 3.3 assigns.¶
Validate the request syntax and the operation
(Section 5.1). A malformed request, or an operation
the AS does not serve, is refused invalid_request; a request that
includes a parameter more than once is malformed, as at the token
endpoint (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]).¶
Authorize the request. For a base operation this is the lifecycle authorization of Section 5.4 for the acting party, the operation and the Mission, together with the authorization for any transition the request schedules; for an extension operation it is the authorization its companion defines. An unknown Mission and every failed authorization are refused alike with the not-found response.¶
Apply deduplication (Section 5.6): replay the original response
to a retransmit, or refuse a reused nonce whose request members
differ.¶
Refuse invalid_request a suspend whose suspend_until is not
later than the time the AS processes it
(Section 5.1), then check expected_version, when
present (Section 5.6).¶
Apply the transition rules (Section 5.6) and commit the transition.¶
Authorization therefore precedes every replayed or state-dependent
response: a caller not authorized for the Mission receives the
not-found response, never a replay, stale_version or conflict.¶
The AS MUST durably commit a transition, with the state version it produces, before it sends any response that acknowledges it; a transition whose commit fails is never answered as a success. The issuance profile's refusal of a derivation answered after an acknowledged revocation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Issuance Gating") is not extended to suspension: a suspension refuses later derivations at their gate, and a derivation already past its gate when the suspension commits can complete.¶
A Mission revocation through this endpoint reaches credentials
already derived from the Mission through the AS's advertised
revocation propagation (Section 6);
otherwise they remain valid until their own exp. The AS MAY
additionally revoke specific outstanding tokens it knows by jti,
with the same effect as [RFC7009] revocation of each token. An
[RFC7009] revocation does not by itself revoke a Mission: Mission
state changes only by a lifecycle transition (Section 5.2),
such as a request to this endpoint, a deadline, expiry, or the
coupling below.¶
Where a deployment's revocation policy treats revoking a Mission's
refresh token as revoking the Mission
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation"), the
AS MUST commit that revocation as the same revoke transition this
endpoint applies: decided by that policy for the revoking party and
the Mission, recorded with a new state version, and emitting the same
transition event (Section 5.6). The coupling requires neither a
request to this endpoint nor an additional scope.¶
This endpoint operates on one Mission at a time. Mission enumeration and bulk lifecycle operations for incident response, such as revoking every Mission for a compromised Subject, client, or tenant, are left to companion profiles; this document does not require them.¶
The following capabilities remain deferred to future work:¶
This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile bounds outstanding self-contained tokens by their lifetime and OPTIONAL token introspection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation"). A deployment that needs a Mission state change to take effect faster than token lifetime alone combines the propagation mechanisms below and sizes token lifetimes to match.¶
The mechanisms are each discovered from their own metadata, not from a separate posture list:¶
consulting Mission state at each derivation event (the token endpoint, refresh, Token Exchange), the issuance profile's always-present baseline, which does not invalidate already-issued self-contained tokens;¶
token introspection (Section 4), which returns
active: false for a token whose Mission state disallows use even
before the token expires, discovered from introspection_endpoint
and introspection_signing_alg_values_supported;¶
the Mission Status operation (Section 3) for per-request
state checks by high-assurance resource servers, discovered from
mission_status_endpoint; and¶
any further mechanism a companion profile defines, such as event-driven propagation of state changes, discovered from that profile's own metadata.¶
A deployment advertises mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 8),
the ceiling, in seconds, on reliance on an observation of Mission
state: the freshness cap of Section 3.6 applies it to a
Mission Status response, and the issuer applies it to an introspection
projection's fresh_until (Section 4). It does
not bound a self-contained token, which a consumer relies on for its
lifetime unless that lifetime is sized to the bound (below). When the
member is absent, no such ceiling is declared: a consumer relies
on a self-contained token for its lifetime, and on a Mission Status
response within the reliance bound of Section 3.6. A
fresh observation bounds only how stale the consumer's view of
Mission state is; it does not bound reconciliation delay upstream of
the issuer or effects already underway.¶
Where the member is present, a status response's mission.fresh_until
MUST NOT exceed the response's issuance time plus the advertised
bound (Section 3.6). The 60-second value in this
document's
examples is a tight deployment's choice, not a floor.¶
Where a deployment needs Mission revocation to take effect but only
the baseline derivation-time check is in use, Mission-bound access
tokens SHOULD use
TTLs no longer than the declared mission_max_stale_seconds.
Deployments where revocation propagates out of band (token
introspection, per-request status checks, or a companion profile's
push mechanism) MAY use longer TTLs.¶
Sizing to the bound is itself a propagation mechanism: expiry performs the state check, and the consumer integrates nothing. Introspection and per-request status checks tighten specific paths; they are upgrades, not prerequisites.¶
A deployment declaring revocation propagation SHOULD publish the recovery
objective considered when choosing mission_max_stale_seconds and the
availability consequence when recovery takes longer than that bound.
The documentation its service_documentation metadata [RFC8414]
names is one place to publish them.¶
The security ceiling governs the choice: an operational recovery objective
never authorizes extending a reliance bound
(Section 3.6) or the advertised
mission_max_stale_seconds during an incident.
An existing observation's remaining validity is not reset when an outage is
detected. An issuer outage and a state-source outage are distinct where the
topology provides an independently available authoritative source.¶
The deployment describes its distribution posture per surface: Status responses are reused only within their reliance bound (Section 3.6), and a companion mechanism follows its own freshness rules. A push mechanism accelerates learning of transitions over a correctly bounded state source; it does not replace that source after confidence is lost.¶
Operators watch observation age and remaining validity, failed refreshes, stream gaps, fallback availability, clock health, and catch-up after recovery. A recovery check reconciles committed state and versions before publishing newly fresh observations. A successful HTTP response or a new signature alone does not establish that reconciliation. No new endpoint, metadata member, availability target, or replication protocol is defined here.¶
This section is OPTIONAL and applies only to a deployment that adopts
one or more of the extensions above. An AS advertises the surfaces it
supports through the following members of its authorization server
metadata document [RFC8414], in addition to the issuance profile's
mission_bound_authorization_supported
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization Server
Metadata"). Unlike the issuance profile, which advertises only that
boolean, this document defines OAuth AS metadata members for the
surfaces it introduces, so a consumer discovers them
through standard [RFC8414] discovery.¶
mission_status_endpoint:OPTIONAL. A string containing a URL. The URL of the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3). Present when the AS supports it.¶
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings naming the authentication methods
the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3) accepts. Its value
space is a closed set defined by this document, not the OAuth Token
Endpoint Authentication Methods registry: tls_client_auth
(mutual-TLS client authentication [RFC8705]), private_key_jwt
(private-key JWT client authentication [RFC7523]), and access_token
(a mission_status-scoped, sender-constrained access token, whose
presentation and DPoP or mTLS binding are described by this endpoint's
Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728]). The first two values are
spelled identically to registered token-endpoint authentication
methods by intent; this member describes this endpoint, not the token
endpoint. REQUIRED when the AS serves the Mission Status endpoint.¶
mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings, the JWS [RFC7515] algorithm
values the AS accepts for the private_key_jwt client-assertion JWT
(Section 3.2) at the Mission Status endpoint.
This is the client-assertion verification set, not the response-signing
algorithms of mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported below.
none MUST NOT be used. REQUIRED when
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists
private_key_jwt.¶
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings. The JWS [RFC7515] algorithm
values the AS uses to sign the Mission Status Response shape
(Section 3.5), on every surface that returns it
(the dedicated Mission Status operation, the Lifecycle endpoint, and
any companion surface that reuses that response), mirroring
introspection_signing_alg_values_supported. These are the
response-signing algorithms, not the algorithms the AS accepts on
private_key_jwt client assertions (the endpoint auth-signing
members). REQUIRED when the AS serves any such surface, since a
consumer rejects a response signed with an algorithm not listed
(Section 3.5).¶
mission_lifecycle_endpoint:OPTIONAL. A string containing a URL. The URL of the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5). Present when the AS supports it.¶
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings naming the authentication methods
the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5)
accepts, from the same closed value space as
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported (with access_token
naming a mission_lifecycle-scoped access token). REQUIRED when the
AS serves the Mission Lifecycle endpoint.¶
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings, the JWS [RFC7515] algorithm
values the AS accepts for the private_key_jwt client-assertion JWT
(Section 3.2) at the Mission Lifecycle endpoint.
This is the client-assertion verification set, not the response-signing
algorithms of mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported.
none MUST NOT be used. REQUIRED when
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists
private_key_jwt.¶
mission_max_stale_seconds:OPTIONAL. An integer. The ceiling, in seconds, on reliance on an observation of Mission state (Section 6). When absent, no such ceiling is declared.¶
mission_historical_jwks_uri:CONDITIONAL. A string containing an https URL. The URL of the AS's
historical key set (Section 8.1). REQUIRED while that set
lists a key.¶
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported [RFC8414] describes the
token endpoint alone and is never read in place of an endpoint's
*_auth_methods_supported member.¶
DPoP and mTLS support for issued credentials are read from the
standard dpop_signing_alg_values_supported [RFC9449] and
tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens [RFC8705] metadata;
this document defines no separate sender-constraint member. When the
introspection projection (Section 4) is signed, the
signing is discovered through the standard
introspection_signing_alg_values_supported metadata.¶
A discovery response from
https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server,
showing the issuance profile members plus the extension members of
this document:¶
The historical key set holds the public keys the AS has withdrawn as
compromised (Section 10.5), so that responses signed
under them stay verifiable for audit. It is a JWT [RFC7519] with
typ jwk-set+jwt, served at mission_historical_jwks_uri, which a
consumer takes only from authorization server metadata it has
validated (Section 3.3 of [RFC8414]). Its claims are iss (the AS's
issuer identifier), iat, and keys: a JWK Set's keys array
[RFC7517] holding each such key's public JWK, under its original
kid, for at least the audit horizon of every Mission whose responses
it signed.¶
The AS signs the set under its active Mission Status signing key, the
key it currently signs Mission Status responses under, and never under
a key the set lists or a key of another role. When that key is itself
compromised, the AS signs the set under its replacement and never
under another published key. A consumer identifies the authorized
signer through its trusted configuration, not by its presence in the
jwks_uri, since the jwks_uri also carries other roles' keys and
retired keys; it accepts a replacement only once that configuration
authorizes it. A consumer MUST NOT accept a historical key set whose
signature does not verify under the key its trusted configuration
authorizes.¶
Each listed JWK carries the revoked member [OpenID.Federation]
(Section 8.7.2) with reason compromised and these times:¶
revoked_at: the time the AS revoked the key; and¶
compromised_at: an added member of revoked, the established
compromise time, the earliest time from which a signature under the
key is not trusted. It is absent when no compromise time is
established.¶
Both are NumericDate values [RFC7519]. The set reuses OpenID
Federation's revoked encoding only; this document defines no
OpenID Federation endpoint and claims no conformance to it.¶
An implementation conforms to the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] or implements the Mission Issuer role of another binding that serves these surfaces. Each extension in this document is independently OPTIONAL; an implementation names the ones it supports (for example, "issuance profile with Mission Status and Mission Lifecycle"), and an implementation that supports none of them is still a conforming issuance profile.¶
An implementation claiming an extension MUST meet its requirements:¶
Mission Status: serve the dedicated Mission Status operation
(Section 3) with JWS-signed responses
(application/mission-status-response+jwt), the authentication and
read authorization of Section 3.2, the
anti-oracle property
(Section 3.8), and the error shape of
Section 3.10; and advertise mission_status_endpoint,
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported,
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported, and, when it lists
private_key_jwt,
mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported.¶
Introspection projection: carry the Mission projection on the introspection response (Section 4), signing it with [RFC9701] as that section provides.¶
Mission Lifecycle: serve the Mission Lifecycle endpoint
(Section 5) with its four base operations,
gate the suspended state and the
completed termination it introduces exactly as the issuance profile
gates on non-active state, and advertise mission_lifecycle_endpoint,
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported,
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported, and, when it lists
private_key_jwt,
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported.¶
Mission Lifecycle, revoke only: serve the Mission Lifecycle endpoint
(Section 5) with the revoke operation, under
its authentication, its explicit lifecycle authorization
(Section 5.4), the idempotency and conflict rules of
Section 5.6, and the not-found refusal of an unauthorized
request; answer each revoke with the signed, state-only Mission
Status Response, whose aud is the authenticated client's
client_id and whose
nonce is the request's (Section 3.5); refuse any
operation the implementation has not adopted
(Section 5.1); and advertise
mission_lifecycle_endpoint,
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported,
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported, and, when it lists
private_key_jwt,
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported. The
class requires no other operation and not the Mission Status
operation; an implementation that also serves another base operation
or the Mission Status operation meets that operation's requirements,
and one that serves suspend serves resume, without widening who
may perform either (Section 5.4); and
the suspended state and completed termination arrive only with
the operations that introduce them. An implementation claiming
Mission Lifecycle meets this class.¶
Revocation propagation: advertise mission_max_stale_seconds
and size Mission-bound access-token TTLs as
Section 6 provides.¶
A Mission Issuer that claims any extension above meets the following requirement, whichever companion profiles it adopts. Every issuer-held narrowing mechanism a deployment runs, including any a companion profile defines, MUST feed the single Effective Authority Set computation. Every derivation and every authority-reporting surface MUST use that same computation, so no surface reports authority the computation has not reduced.¶
The security considerations of the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] apply in full. This section covers threats specific to the extensions defined here.¶
Per the anti-oracle property (Section 3.8), an
unknown mission_id and a known-but-unauthorized one receive an
identical HTTP status, body and headers at the Status and Lifecycle
endpoints (Section 5.4, Section 5.7),
and the AS SHOULD additionally suppress timing side channels
(for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform lookup
path). An implementation that leaks the distinction exposes the Mission
space to enumeration.¶
A Mission Status Response is bound to (caller sub, audience,
nonce, issuance time). Replay against a different caller, audience
or request fails the sub, aud and nonce checks, which the
signature protects, and replay after the reliance bound fails the
caching rule (Section 3.6); a consumer MUST verify all
the checks of Section 3.5 before honoring a response. A
response cached and replayed by the same caller within its reliance
bound (Section 3.6) is equivalent to a fresh response; a
consumer MUST NOT use a cached response after that bound.¶
The Mission Status operation is on the consumption path of every
Mission-bound credential validation in deployments where consumers query
Mission Status per request.
The AS MUST implement per-consumer rate limiting (returning
rate_limited, Section 3.10) and SHOULD encourage
consumer-side caching (Section 3.6) to reduce traffic.¶
When the introspection projection is signed
(Section 4), it uses [RFC9701], which is scoped to
token introspection. The dedicated Mission Status operation uses a new
media type (application/mission-status-response+jwt, Section 12) and a
JWS [RFC7515], because [RFC9701] does not apply to a lookup keyed by
mission_id. Implementations MUST NOT use [RFC9701] for the
dedicated Mission Status operation, and MUST NOT accept an unsigned
response from the dedicated Mission Status operation in place of the
signed form it requires.¶
The AS signs Mission Status and Lifecycle responses with a key from
its jwks_uri. The AS MUST keep the public JWK for every kid it
has signed such a response under resolvable for at least the Mission's
audit horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so an archived
application/mission-status-response+jwt remains verifiable for
audit and dispute: a retired key in its jwks_uri, and a compromised
key in its historical key set (Section 8.1). This is the
issuance profile's retired-key rule
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Signing and Key
Rotation"), with the audit horizon as the bound.¶
A key known or suspected compromised follows the issuance profile's
compromise rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section
"Signing and Key Rotation"). Rather than only rotating it out, the AS
stops signing with it and removes it from its jwks_uri, and
publishes it as revoked in its historical key set. Retention keeps an
archived response verifiable for audit; it is not trust. A consumer
MUST NOT accept, for a current reliance decision, a response signed
under a key the AS has published as compromised. A consumer MUST NOT
use a key from the historical key set to verify a response for a
current reliance decision. A consumer MUST NOT rely on a cached copy
of the AS's jwks_uri beyond the freshness lifetime its response
explicitly declares (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9111]). A response without
valid explicit freshness information is stale when received, and is
never given a heuristic lifetime (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC9111]): the
consumer revalidates it before reuse. The consumer replaces its cached
key set with each one it fetches rather than adding to it, so a
removed key stops verifying within that lifetime. When the cached set
is stale and revalidation fails, the consumer MUST NOT accept a Status
or Lifecycle response for a current reliance decision until a fetch or
revalidation succeeds.
An auditor examining an archived response signed under a compromised
key classifies it by the published compromise information,
compromised_at or its absence.¶
This document inherits OAuth 2.0 Best Current Practice [RFC9700] for the OAuth surfaces it composes with, and implementers MUST follow it.¶
A private-key JWT client assertion names the AS's issuer identifier
as its audience (Section 3.2), so it is
acceptable at every AS endpoint that accepts that method.
Section 3 of [RFC7523] makes jti replay protection optional; an
AS that applies it across those endpoints, with short assertion
lifetimes, keeps an assertion captured at one endpoint from
authenticating at another.¶
The privacy considerations of the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] apply in full. This section covers privacy specific to the extensions here.¶
The Mission Status operation (Section 3) and the
introspection projection (Section 4) disclose
Mission state and the audience-scoped authorization_details to the
authenticated, authorized requester, and MAY additionally disclose
authority_hash to a requester authorized for it. A deployment MUST
treat both as Mission information-disclosure surfaces,
audience-filtering the disclosed authority so a consumer never sees
entries addressed to audiences it is not authorized to request
(Section 3.1, Section 3.5). A Mission
Status Response also discloses version, expires_at, any schedule
and the termination reason to every holder of the read
authorization; a deployment can narrow that authorization
(Section 3.2) where they are sensitive.¶
The AS records Status and Lifecycle requests (containing
mission_id, audience, caller, and timing) in audit logs.
Deployments MUST treat these logs as PII sinks per the issuance
profile's privacy considerations.¶
This document requests IANA actions for OAuth AS metadata members,
OAuth extensions error codes, a media type, and one entry in each of
two issuance-profile registries. It defines no new registry of its
own: the endpoint
authentication-method value space is a closed set defined inline
(Section 8), and Mission Lifecycle operation values have no
IANA registry; a companion profile registers an extension operation
by defining it in its own specification
(Section 5). The mission_error values
suspended and completed (Section 5) need no
registration, because the issuance profile's mission_error member
has no registry of values; their registrations as a lifecycle state
and a termination reason are in Section 12.4.¶
This document registers no new Well-Known URI: the metadata members of
Section 8 are published in the OAuth Authorization Server Metadata
document at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server [RFC8414].¶
IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Extensions
Error Registry" [RFC6749]. not_found is already registered for
another usage location; its entry here adds the usage locations of
this document.¶
Error Name: unauthorized¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: not_found¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: conflict¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: stale_version¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: rate_limited¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: unavailable¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
IANA is requested to register the following media type per [RFC6838]:¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: mission-status-response+jwt¶
Required parameters: none¶
Optional parameters: none¶
Encoding considerations: binary; JWS Compact Serialization¶
Security considerations: see Section 10¶
Interoperability considerations: see this document¶
Published specification: this document¶
Applications that use this media type: OAuth Mission-Bound consumers¶
Fragment identifier considerations: not applicable¶
Deprecated alias names for this type: none¶
Restrictions on usage: none¶
Provisional registration: no¶
Magic number(s): none¶
File extension(s): none¶
Macintosh file type code(s): none¶
Person & email address to contact: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Author: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com¶
Change controller: IETF¶
This document requests registration of one state in the issuance profile's Mission Lifecycle States registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), under that registry's Specification Required policy:¶
| Value | Terminal | Semantics | Change Controller | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
suspended
|
no | A paused Mission that derives no tokens until resumed. | IETF | this document, Section 5 |
It also requests registration of one reason in the issuance profile's Mission Termination Reasons registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), under the same policy:¶
| Value | Semantics | Members | Change Controller | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
completed
|
The Mission completed successfully. | none | IETF | this document, Section 5 |
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
-00¶
Initial individual draft.¶
The author thanks the implementers and reviewers of the Mission-Bound Authorization work for feedback that shaped these extensions.¶