Internet-Draft OAuth Mission Status October 2026
McGuinness Expires 30 April 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Web Authorization Protocol
Internet-Draft:
draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status-latest
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
K. McGuinness
Independent

Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0

Abstract

The Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 profile binds issued authority to a durable, human-approved Mission and gates issuance on Mission state, but it observes Mission state only through token lifetime and optional token introspection. This document defines the Mission state-management surfaces it defers: the Mission Status operation (keyed by mission_id) with signed responses, a freshness member and signing for the issuance profile's token introspection projection, the Mission Lifecycle endpoint with revoke, suspend, resume, and complete operations, the suspended state and the completed termination reason with the transitions between the lifecycle states, and revocation-propagation guidance. Companion profiles can extend the mission object and the Lifecycle endpoint's operations without altering these surfaces. Each capability is independently optional; an implementation can adopt any subset, and one that adopts none remains a conforming issuance profile.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 April 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], the OAuth binding of Mission-Bound Authorization, makes a Mission a first-class OAuth artifact: a structured, human-approved, integrity-bound task whose authority bounds and outlives every token an agent derives. It is, by design, a minimum-viable issuance layer. It gates derivation on Mission state, carries the mission claim on every derived token, and offers only OPTIONAL token introspection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission State via Token Introspection") as a way for a resource server to observe Mission state. It names this document for the canonical Mission Status surface (keyed by mission_id) and its signed status evidence, and defers a standardized management endpoint for lifecycle transitions to this document.

This document specifies those surfaces as optional extensions that build on the issuance profile. The capabilities are:

Each capability is independently optional. An implementation states which it supports through the metadata of Section 8 and the conformance language of Section 9. An implementation that supports none of them is unaffected and remains a conforming issuance profile.

This document does not restate the issuance profile. The Mission Intent, authority derivation, the mission claim, the integrity anchors, Mission-bound token issuance, the subset rule, and lifecycle gating are all defined in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]; the mission_resource_access authorization details type is defined in its Mission Resource Access Profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]); both are referenced, not re-specified, here.

The OpenID Shared Signals Framework [OIDC-SSF] and its Continuous Access Evaluation Profile [OIDC-CAEP] push events to a receiver, and a companion profile can carry Mission transitions that way (Section 6). An event reports that state changed; a Mission Status Response reports the state and how long a consumer may rely on it, so a push speeds learning of transitions without replacing the Status operation (Section 7). OAuth token revocation [RFC7009] acts on a token, not a Mission; the Lifecycle endpoint standardizes the means to revoke a Mission that the issuance profile requires.

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This document uses the terms defined in the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], in particular Mission, Mission Issuer (the Mission issuer: in the OAuth binding the authorization server; another binding's Mission Issuer that serves these surfaces does so with the same semantics), Authority Set, the mission claim, and mission_id; and the mission_resource_access authorization details type defined in its Mission Resource Access Profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). It additionally uses:

Mission Status Response:

A signed payload returned by the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3), reporting a Mission's current state and the audience-scoped evidence a consumer needs.

Effective Authority Set:

The approved Authority Set after applying every issuer-held, monotonic narrowing mechanism the deployment runs, each narrowing profile defining its own subtraction. No narrowing mechanism adds or restores authority. Membership in this set is necessary, never sufficient, for an action to proceed.

Metadata-only change:

A committed change to a Mission that leaves its state and termination unchanged: a schedule replacement (Section 5.6), or a change a companion profile defines as one.

Transition event:

The lifecycle event a state-distribution companion defines for a committed transition or metadata-only change ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"). To emit one is to make the committed change available to that companion; this document defines no event or channel.

All JSON shown in this document is non-normative and illustrative; the member definitions in the surrounding text are authoritative. HTTP message examples follow the conventions of [RFC9110]; long URLs and form parameters are wrapped for display. JWT and JWS examples are shown as decoded JSON with separate header objects; on the wire the JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] applies.

3. Mission Status Operation

This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile's stateless baseline needs no dedicated status surface ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation"); a deployment that does not stand up this operation, and a consumer that does not use it, are unaffected.

The dedicated Mission Status operation is the canonical status surface the issuance profile defers. Unlike token introspection (Section 4), which answers "is this token's authorization still good," the Mission Status operation answers "what is the state of this Mission" keyed by the mission_id alone. An authenticated, authorized consumer holding a mission_id (including an auditor or an authorization server in another trust domain) resolves it without holding a token the authorization server (AS) issued.

The Mission Issuer serves the operation at its Mission Status endpoint, whose URL it publishes in authorization server metadata (Section 8) as mission_status_endpoint. A consumer resolves it from the expected issuer, which comes from its own issuer trust or configuration, never from the response under verification: for a resource server, the mission.issuer of an access token it accepted under the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Resource Server Enforcement"). It retrieves that issuer's metadata, validated as Section 3.3 of [RFC8414] requires (the metadata's issuer equals the issuer identifier used to retrieve it), and verifies responses with keys from that issuer's jwks_uri. The endpoint MUST be served over TLS 1.2 or later (TLS 1.3 RECOMMENDED), following the recommendations of [RFC9325].

3.1. Request

The request is an HTTPS POST with an application/x-www-form-urlencoded body containing:

mission_id:

REQUIRED. A string. The canonical Mission Identifier, named per the issuance profile's external-surface convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).

audience:

CONDITIONAL. A string. The audience for which the consumer requests authority, one the Mission Issuer's configuration authorizes that consumer to request (below). An authorized consumer that is not a resource server (for example an auditor or an authorization server in another trust domain) that needs only Mission state, not audience-scoped authority, MAY omit audience; the response is then state-only and carries no authorization_details (Section 3.5). A resource server resolving authority for a specific audience MUST send it.

nonce:

REQUIRED. A string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. A client-generated nonce binding the response to this request. It MUST be unique per request within the response lifetime. A consumer MUST reject a response whose nonce does not equal the one it sent. This is a standard client challenge: echoing it in the signed response anti-replay-binds that response to this specific request.

The request also carries the client authentication parameters of the mechanism it uses (Section 3.2): client_id, REQUIRED with mTLS client authentication (Section 2 of [RFC8705]), and client_assertion_type and client_assertion, REQUIRED with private-key-JWT client authentication [RFC7523]. A sender-constrained access token travels in the Authorization header instead.

The Mission Issuer's configuration states which audiences each authenticated caller may request: a resource server is typically configured for its own audience identifiers, and a consuming authorization server for each resource it issues tokens for. The Mission Issuer MUST honor a request's audience only where that configuration authorizes the authenticated caller for it, and MUST otherwise refuse the request with the not-found response of Section 3.10. Entitlement to an audience comes only from that configuration, never from string equality between audience and the caller's client_id or certificate subject. The response's aud is the requested audience (Section 3.5).

3.2. Authentication

The request MUST be authenticated. The AS MUST support at least one of the following mechanisms. The client MUST use exactly one of them per request:

  1. mTLS client authentication [RFC8705]. The AS validates the client's X.509 certificate against its configured trust anchors and the client's registered tls_client_auth metadata.

  2. Sender-constrained access token. The client presents a mission_status-scoped access token (see the authorization requirement below) in the Authorization header, sender-constrained either by DPoP [RFC9449] (the DPoP scheme with a DPoP proof header, the token's cnf.jkt matching the proof key thumbprint) or by mTLS [RFC8705] (a certificate-bound token, the Bearer scheme, whose cnf.x5t#S256 matches the presented client certificate). The token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's protected-resource identifier (below).

  3. Private-key-JWT client authentication [RFC7523]. The client presents client_assertion_type with the exact value urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer and a signed JWT as client_assertion. The assertion's aud MUST be the AS's issuer identifier [RFC8414] as its sole value, the client authentication audience of [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis]; the AS MUST reject an assertion with any other aud. The client SHOULD set the JWS typ header to client-authentication+jwt. The AS accepts only the JWS [RFC7515] algorithms it advertises for that endpoint (Section 8); none MUST NOT be used.

Plain Basic or POST client authentication MUST NOT be used for this endpoint. The AS MUST refuse a request not authenticated by one of the three mechanisms, with the outcome Section 3.3 assigns: unauthorized (HTTP 401) or invalid_client (HTTP 400). The mechanism is determined by wire evidence in order: a request presenting an access token in Authorization is mechanism 2, and any client certificate is then evaluated only as that token's mTLS sender constraint; otherwise a request presenting client_assertion is mechanism 3, and any client certificate is not treated as client authentication; otherwise a request presenting only a client certificate is mechanism 1. This order keeps "exactly one mechanism" satisfiable when mTLS terminates at the edge. The parameters of a mechanism the order does not select, such as a client_assertion beside an access token, are not evaluated as client authentication. A request whose selected mechanism the endpoint does not advertise, or whose only credential is of a kind no mechanism uses (HTTP Basic, a client secret), is answered as one that presented no credential (Section 3.3).

An authenticated caller MUST additionally carry an explicit read authorization: a mission_status scope on the presented access token, or a deployment-defined equivalent grant bound to the authenticated client. The mission_status scope authorizes the Mission Status read operation and mirrors the mission_lifecycle scope of the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5). The token-less path is preserved: a consumer that holds only a mission_id and authenticates directly as a client (mechanism 1 or 3) carries the deployment-defined equivalent grant, not a scope, and so resolves Mission state without holding an access token the AS issued. A caller carrying no such authorization is refused with the not-found response of Section 3.10 (Section 3.8). This includes an authenticated caller presenting an otherwise-valid access token without the mission_status scope: it receives the not-found response, not the insufficient_scope error of Section 3.1 of [RFC6750]. An expired token, a token for another audience, or a failed sender constraint is instead an access-token authentication failure (Section 3.3).

Read authorization identifies the Missions the caller may inspect under deployment policy: all Missions at the issuer, those of a tenant, or a narrower set. Possession of the mission_status scope alone does not establish which Missions it covers. That authorization, with the audience entitlement of Section 3.1 when the request names an audience, is the authorization for the mission_id and audience that Section 3.8 requires, and a Mission it does not cover receives the not-found response.

A presented access token (mechanism 2) MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's protected-resource identifier: the resource value the AS publishes for this endpoint in its Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728]. For these surfaces that identifier is the endpoint's own URL (the mission_status_endpoint or mission_lifecycle_endpoint), not the issuer identifier that a private-key-JWT assertion's aud names (mechanism 3). The AS MUST reject a token whose audience does not name that identifier. This token audience is distinct from the request body's audience parameter (Section 3.1): the token audience authorizes the call at this endpoint, whereas the request audience carries no authentication weight and only selects the Resource-Server-specific authority projection the response returns (Section 3.5).

Which mechanisms and authorization this endpoint accepts are discoverable per endpoint, not inferred from the token endpoint's metadata. The AS advertises the methods this endpoint accepts in mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported (Section 8).

For the sender-constrained access-token path, this endpoint is an OAuth protected resource: the AS publishes, in its Protected Resource Metadata for this resource [RFC9728], the resource identifier the token's audience MUST name, the mission_status scope it requires (scopes_supported), and the presentation and sender constraints it accepts (bearer_methods_supported, dpop_bound_access_tokens_required, tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens). For the retained direct-client-authentication path (mTLS [RFC8705] or private-key JWT [RFC7523]), the accepted methods and, for private_key_jwt, the accepted client-assertion signing algorithms are advertised for this endpoint (Section 8), not read from the token endpoint's token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported [RFC8414]. Both paths are therefore discoverable.

3.3. Authentication Failures

A request that fails authentication receives the outcome for the credential it presented:

  • A request whose presented access token fails authentication receives HTTP 401 unauthorized with a WWW-Authenticate challenge in the scheme it used: Bearer with the error attributes of Section 3 of [RFC6750], or DPoP under Section 7.1 of [RFC9449], including its algs parameter and error codes.

  • A request whose mTLS or private-key-JWT client authentication fails at the HTTP layer receives HTTP 400 with the invalid_client error code, as Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] answers a failed client authentication carried outside the Authorization header. It carries no WWW-Authenticate challenge and is not reported as an access-token failure. A client certificate rejected during the TLS handshake fails at the TLS layer, before any HTTP response.

  • A request that presented no credential receives, where the endpoint accepts an access-token scheme, HTTP 401 unauthorized with one challenge for each access-token scheme the endpoint accepts and no error attribute (Section 3.1 of [RFC6750]); where it accepts none, it receives HTTP 400 invalid_client.

Every challenge carries the resource_metadata parameter naming the endpoint's Protected Resource Metadata (Section 5.1 of [RFC9728]). A 401 response carries the challenge or challenges and a JSON body (Section 3.10): a challenge's error attribute, when present, follows its scheme as above and is distinct from the body's error, which is unauthorized. An authenticated caller not authorized for the referenced Mission receives not_found (404) with no challenge (Section 3.8).

3.4. Request Example

POST /as/mission/status HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6...
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

mission_id=msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-
&audience=https%3A%2F%2Ferp.example.com
&nonce=nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ

3.5. Response

On success the AS returns a JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] signed with a key published in the AS's jwks_uri. The JWS header carries typ of mission-status-response+jwt and a kid identifying the signing key. Per Section 4.1.9 of [RFC7515], the typ header omits the application/ prefix; the full media type application/mission-status-response+jwt (Section 12.3) is used as the HTTP Content-Type. Exact validation of the protected typ value, together with mutually exclusive validation rules for the other JWTs the AS signs, implements the substitution defense of Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] and Section 3.12 of [RFC8725].

A Mission Status Response is evidence of Mission state for the consumer that requested it, not a bearer credential, an access token, or an authorization grant: presenting one authorizes nothing, and a resource server validating access tokens under Section 4 of [RFC9068] rejects it by its typ.

[RFC9701] signed introspection responses are scoped to token introspection and do not apply to a lookup keyed by mission_id; the dedicated Mission Status operation therefore uses a new media type and a JWS, not [RFC9701] (see Section 10.4). Implementations MUST NOT use [RFC9701] for the dedicated Mission Status operation.

In the ERP examples in this document, the operation contract identifies https://erp.example.com as the operation target ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). Actions and constraints determine the permitted operations within that service. In the audience-scoped Mission Status example below, the consumer is the ERP resource server, client erp-rs, which the Mission Issuer's configuration authorizes for that audience; its client identifier is the response's sub.

The signed payload reports the Mission's current state and the audience-scoped evidence the consumer needs.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/mission-status-response+jwt
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImFzLWtleS0yMDI2LXEzIi...

Decoded JWS header:

{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "kid": "as-key-2026-q3",
  "typ": "mission-status-response+jwt"
}

Decoded JWS payload:

{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "https://erp.example.com",
  "sub": "erp-rs",
  "nonce": "nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ",
  "iat": 1793606400,
  "exp": 1793606460,
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "state": "active",
    "version": 1,
    "expires_at":  "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
    "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:00:45Z"
  },
  "authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"],
      "constraints": {
        "resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
        "resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
      },
      "delegation": {
        "max_depth": 2,
        "allowed_delegates": [{ "sub_profile": "ai_agent" }]
      } },
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
      "constraints": {
        "max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" }
      } }
  ]
}

The members are:

  • The signed JWT envelope iss, aud, sub, nonce, iat, exp. The aud, a single string, is the response's audience binding and the nonce its request binding. On a response to the Mission Status operation or a base lifecycle operation, the AS MUST set sub to the authenticated client's identifier: the presented access token's client_id, or the client that authenticated directly. When the request omitted audience (Section 3.1), the response is state-only and the AS MUST set aud to the authenticated client's client_id, as the Lifecycle endpoint does (Section 5); the consumer's aud verification below then checks that identifier. exp bounds the validity of the signed response itself; how long the consumer MAY rely on the reported state is given separately by mission.fresh_until below.

  • mission: the mission object, the same shape as the mission claim of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission Claim") with status members added. It carries:

    • id, issuer: the subject Mission's identifier and issuer.

    • authority_hash: OPTIONAL. The issuance profile's consent commitment over the Authority Set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Integrity Anchors"), disclosed at the AS's discretion to a caller it authorizes for audit or correlation use, on the same minimization footing as the issuance profile's introspection disclosure privilege ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Caller Authorization and Minimization"). Not carried on the issuance profile's baseline mission claim.

    • state: REQUIRED. The current Mission lifecycle state. The authoritative state space is the issuance profile's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"): active and terminated, this document's suspended when the Mission Lifecycle endpoint's suspend operation (Section 5.1) is deployed, and any further state a companion profile defines and the deployment runs. A consumer applies the issuance profile's forward-compatibility rule: only active permits reliance, and every other value, recognized or not, is non-active. This document's reliance behavior does not depend on recognizing a companion-defined state; the fail-safe rule above governs. A non-active state gates new authorization decisions only: it does not establish that work already accepted under the Mission has stopped, or that completed effects were undone.

    • termination: CONDITIONAL. Present exactly when state is terminated: the Mission's termination ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Termination"), with its reason (revoked or expired from the issuance profile, this document's completed, or a reason a companion profile defines), its terminated_at, the members its reason defines, and version: the state version (below) of the transition that committed the termination. version is REQUIRED in every termination the Mission Issuer commits, and absent while a termination that takes effect without a request, such as expired, is observed but not yet committed; once committed it does not change, so a metadata-only change committed later leaves it lower than the response's version. It is the audit reference for revoked and completed.

    • expires_at: REQUIRED. The point at which the Mission itself expires, the Mission record's expires_at ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).

    • fresh_until: REQUIRED. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time giving the point until which the consumer MAY rely on the reported state without re-checking, governing caching (Section 3.6). It is report-freshness metadata, carried in mission so it travels with state even on the introspection projection, which has no signed envelope to carry it (Section 4).

    • suspend_until, on_expiry: CONDITIONAL. Present only while the Mission is suspended under a deadline (Section 5): the RFC 3339 [RFC3339] deadline, and the transition (resume or revoke) the AS applies when it passes.

    • version: REQUIRED. A positive integer, the Mission's state version: a strictly monotonic per-Mission counter the Mission Issuer maintains, incremented on each committed lifecycle transition (the approval event is version 1) and each committed metadata-only change, current as of the reported state. A deadline's or expiry's transition, which takes effect without a request, advances version only when committed; until then a response reports the last committed value. It orders observations of one Mission across every surface that reports it, and a lifecycle request can guard on it with expected_version (Section 5.6).

    • Extension members: a companion profile MAY add further members to this object.

  • authorization_details: the Effective Authority Set entries of every AS-supported authorization_details type ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization Details Types") relevant to the requesting audience, audience relevance determined per each entry's own type specification (for the general-purpose mission_resource_access type, by its resource member, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]), carried at the top level as a sibling of mission (as on the token and in the introspection response). Entries addressed to other audiences MUST NOT be disclosed. When the request names an audience, the response MUST carry authorization_details, as an empty array when no entry is relevant to that audience. The entries are carried whatever the Mission's state; a non-active state permits no reliance on them (Section 3.7). When the request omits audience (Section 3.1), there is no requesting audience: the response is state-only and MUST NOT carry authorization_details.

A consumer MUST verify, before honoring a response:

  1. the JWS header typ is mission-status-response+jwt;

  2. the JWS header alg is one the AS advertises in mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported (Section 8), rejecting none and any algorithm not listed;

  3. the JWS signature against a current jwks_uri entry for the issuer AS that the consumer's trusted configuration authorizes for that AS's Mission Status responses; a key's presence in the jwks_uri does not authorize it (Section 8.1);

  4. iss equals the expected AS issuer URL, and mission.issuer equals iss;

  5. aud equals the audience the request named or, for a state-only response, the requesting client's client_id (Section 3.1);

  6. sub equals the requesting client's identifier;

  7. nonce equals the request's nonce;

  8. mission.id equals the requested mission_id;

  9. iat is not in the future and exp is not in the past, with up to 30 seconds clock-skew tolerance; and

  10. mission.fresh_until is not later than exp.

3.6. Caching

Caching follows these rules:

  • Cache key. Consumers SHOULD cache a response keyed on (mission_id, audience), or on (mission_id, client_id) for a state-only response, until its reliance bound (below).

  • Freshness cap. The AS MUST NOT set mission.fresh_until later than the response's exp, nor, when it advertises mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 8), later than the response's iat plus that value.

  • Reliance bound. A response's reliance bound is the earliest of mission.fresh_until, the response's exp, and, when the AS advertises mission_max_stale_seconds, the response's iat plus that value. Consumers MUST NOT use a response after its reliance bound, subject only to the skew tolerance below, and MUST NOT rely on a reported active state at or after mission.expires_at. In particular, a consumer MUST NOT extend reliance on a cached suspended (or any non-active) response beyond its reliance bound.

  • Skew tolerance. When comparing the current time to mission.fresh_until, a consumer MAY allow up to 30 seconds of tolerance for the active state only, and no tolerance for any other state. The tolerance MUST NOT extend reliance past the response's exp, mission.expires_at, or the response's iat plus the advertised mission_max_stale_seconds.

The freshness cap keeps report freshness within the signed response's own validity and the deployment's advertised revocation-propagation tolerance. The skew tolerance is a clock-skew allowance on the mission.fresh_until comparison only, bounding the disagreement between the AS's and the consumer's clocks, not a property of state reversibility: the response's exp, the Mission's expiry and the advertised ceiling are hard bounds that no allowance extends. The clock-skew tolerance of the response checks (Section 3.5) decides only whether a response is accepted, never how long it is relied on, so a response accepted after its exp supports no decision (Section 3.7). The reliance bound holds for non-active states too, so a consumer re-reads a suspended Mission, which can be resumed, rather than refusing on an outdated observation.

3.7. Failed Status Checks

A decision that requires Mission Status proceeds only on a response that passed every check of Section 3.5, is within its reliance bound (Section 3.6), and reports active. Without one, the decision MUST NOT proceed, whatever the cause: an error response such as unavailable, rate_limited or not_found, a failed check, a network failure, or a lapsed reliance bound. For example, a resource server refuses the request it is deciding, and a consuming Authorization Server issues no token.

That outcome establishes only that the decision cannot proceed; it is not evidence that the Mission terminated. A transient failure, such as unavailable, rate_limited or a network failure, leaves a response the consumer already holds usable within that response's original reliance bound; a failed request never refreshes or extends that bound.

3.8. Anti-Oracle Property

A mission_id is never a bearer capability. The AS MUST authenticate the requester and authorize it for the requested mission_id and audience.

Unknown mission_id values and known-but-unauthorized references MUST produce indistinguishable responses (HTTP 404 with a generic not-found body; see Section 3.10). The AS MUST return an identical HTTP status code, response body, and headers for the two cases. The AS SHOULD NOT vary response timing in a way that distinguishes the two cases. It SHOULD mitigate timing side channels (for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform lookup path for both the unknown and the unauthorized case).

3.9. Processing Order

The AS MUST process a Mission Status request in this order, refusing it at the first step that fails:

  1. Authenticate the caller (Section 3.2), parsing the request body only as far as authentication and the nonce echo of Section 3.10 need. A body that cannot be parsed is refused invalid_request, whatever credential the request presents; a client authentication parameter included more than once fails authentication, and no occurrence of it is used. Every authentication failure is answered as Section 3.3 assigns.

  2. Validate the request syntax (Section 3.1). A malformed request is refused invalid_request; a request that includes a parameter more than once is malformed, as at the token endpoint (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]).

  3. Authorize the request: the caller's read authorization, the Mission the mission_id names, and any requested audience (Section 3.1). An unknown Mission and every failed authorization are refused alike with the not-found response.

  4. Read the Mission's current state and return the signed response (Section 3.5).

No response that depends on the Mission's existence or state precedes step 3.

3.10. Error Responses

Mission Status outcomes are of two kinds. A success outcome is a found, visible, authorized Mission: the AS returns HTTP 200 with a signed Mission Status Response, and the outcome is described by mission.state in that response, not by a separate symbol. A wire error is a hard failure: the AS returns the matching HTTP status with a JSON object [RFC8259] body whose error member carries the symbol below.

Success outcomes (HTTP 200, signed Mission Status Response, described by mission.state):

Table 1: Success outcomes by Mission state
mission.state Description
active Mission is active and permits reliance.
suspended Mission is suspended (non-terminal).
terminated Mission has ended; mission.termination gives the reason.

A terminated Mission's mission.termination.reason names how it ended, and the set of reasons is not closed: a deployment reports whichever reason its profiles define, and a consumer's reliance decision never depends on recognizing it. The issuance profile defines revoked and expired ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), this document defines completed, and a companion profile can define further reasons. The governing rule is the issuance profile's forward-compatibility rule: every state other than active is non-active, whether or not the consumer recognizes it.

Wire error codes (carried in the error member of a JSON body):

Table 2: Error codes
error HTTP Description
invalid_request 400 Malformed request: an unparseable body, a required member missing or malformed, an invalid member combination, a Lifecycle operation the AS does not serve (Section 5), or a retransmitted nonce whose operation members differ from the original's, present or absent alike (Section 5.6).
invalid_client 400 Direct client authentication (mTLS or private-key JWT) failed, or no credential was presented where no access-token scheme is accepted (Section 3.3).
unauthorized 401 Access-token authentication failed, or no credential was presented where an access-token scheme is accepted; the response carries the challenges of Section 3.3.
not_found 404 Reference does not exist OR is not visible.
conflict 409 Lifecycle operation not legal from the current state (Section 5.6).
stale_version 409 expected_version differs from the current state version (Section 5.6).
rate_limited 429 Consumer is rate-limited.
unavailable 503 AS temporarily cannot serve status.

Note the distinction between the access failures: unauthorized (401) and invalid_client (400) mean the request carried no valid authentication, whereas a request that is authenticated but not authorized for the referenced Mission returns not_found (404), never an authentication failure, so that an unauthorized reference is indistinguishable from an unknown one (Section 3.8). The error body is:

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "not_found",
  "error_description":
    "Mission reference is not found or not visible.",
  "nonce": "nonce_zsPy4APqVNO96xAT"
}

The body MUST contain error and error_description, and MUST additionally contain nonce when the request carried a well-formed nonce. A request whose nonce is absent or malformed is refused invalid_request with no nonce member echoed. The body MUST NOT contain any member that would let a caller distinguish unknown from unauthorized references. For rate_limited, the response SHOULD include a Retry-After header [RFC9110] and a retry_after body member in seconds.

The body is application/json with Cache-Control: no-store. error_description is diagnostic and is never authorization input. nonce correlates the response to the request in support of the signed-response and retry model of Section 5.6 and is not, by itself, replay protection, per the absent-or-malformed-nonce rule above. These endpoints use this OAuth error-response shape, not RFC 9457 [RFC9457] problem details.

4. Token Introspection Mission Projection

This section is OPTIONAL and is a thin delta over the OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] projection of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission State via Token Introspection"). That section already defines a mission member on the introspection response carrying id and issuer, and (from the Mission's issuer) the lifecycle state, with authority_hash disclosed only to a caller holding that member's disclosure privilege, together with the caller-authorization, minimization, and issuer-only-reports-state rules. This document does not restate those rules.

This extension adds the following to that projection:

This projection and the dedicated Mission Status Response (Section 3.5) carry Mission facts in a mission object of the same shape: the open mission claim object of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission Claim") with status members (state, termination, fresh_until, any companion-defined extension member, and, on the dedicated response, expires_at and version) added. This projection populates the subset a token-holding consumer needs; the dedicated response populates more. Either way a consumer reads the same fact from the same place.

Example [RFC9701]-signed introspection response (decoded payload), for a token whose Mission is active:

{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "https://erp.example.com",
  "iat": 1793606410,
  "token_introspection": {
    "active":  true,
    "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
    "sub":     "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR",
    "mission": {
      "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
      "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
      "state":   "active",
      "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:00:55Z"
    }
  }
}

Per [RFC9701], the signed response is a JWT of typ token-introspection+jwt whose [RFC7662] members, including the mission projection, ride in the token_introspection claim, beside the top-level iss, aud, and iat the JWT always carries.

A consumer holding only a mission_id, or one that needs signed evidence independent of a specific token (an auditor or an authorization server in another trust domain), uses the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3); the introspection projection is purely a same-call convenience for token-holding consumers and is never the sole Mission Status path.

5. Mission Lifecycle Endpoint

This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile requires an authenticated, deployment-defined means to revoke a Mission and defers a standardized management API and the richer suspend, resume, and complete operations ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Sections "Revocation" and "Mission Lifecycle"). This section standardizes that management surface; who may perform each operation is governed by Section 5.4.

The AS publishes its Mission Lifecycle endpoint URL in authorization server metadata (Section 8) as mission_lifecycle_endpoint, distinct from [RFC7009] token revocation. The endpoint MUST be served over TLS 1.2 or later (TLS 1.3 RECOMMENDED), following the recommendations of [RFC9325].

This endpoint's operations extend the issuance profile's lifecycle state space ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"), each value arriving with the operation that introduces it (Section 9): suspend adds one state, suspended (a paused Mission that derives no tokens until resumed), and complete adds one termination reason, completed (the Mission completed successfully). Issuance gating treats any state other than active as non-deriving, exactly as the issuance profile gates on active.

A transition to suspended, or to terminated with reason completed, gates new derivation only. Tokens already derived under the Mission remain valid until their own exp, exactly as in the issuance profile's revocation model. A deployment that needs a prompt cutoff on outstanding tokens uses the propagation mechanisms of Section 6.

Suspension is reversible. Consuming or invalidating a refresh token solely because of suspension can prevent refresh after a resume. After validating a refresh request and before consuming or rotating its refresh token, the AS SHOULD check whether the Mission, or another Mission whose state a companion profile makes gate its derivation, is suspended. When this check detects suspension, the AS SHOULD refuse the request without consuming the refresh token or invalidating its otherwise-valid grant solely because of that suspension. This check does not replace issuance-time state validation. A concurrent suspension can still cause issuance to be refused after the preliminary check, and preserving refresh capability across that interval requires coordination with the issuance commit. The check leaves refresh-token rotation and reuse detection intact, and a resume does not revive a credential that expired or was revoked independently.

An error code alone does not tell a client whether a resume can lift a refusal. When the issuance profile's gating refuses a derivation because the Mission is suspended, or terminated with reason completed, the AS SHOULD include, alongside error, the mission_error token-error-response member ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Issuance Gating") with the value suspended or completed, respectively. The issuance profile's rules for that member apply: it is diagnostic only, it grants nothing, an unrecognized value is ignored, and it is returned only to the authenticated client presenting the Mission's grant. suspended reports a refusal that a resume can lift; completed reports a terminal one.

5.1. Operations

The endpoint accepts authenticated POST requests with a form-urlencoded body:

mission_id:

REQUIRED. A string. The canonical Mission Identifier, named per the issuance profile's external-surface convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).

operation:

REQUIRED. A string. One of revoke, suspend, resume, complete, or a further value a companion profile registers as an extension operation on this endpoint (below).

reason:

OPTIONAL. A string of at most 1024 Unicode code points, a longer one being malformed. A human-readable reason recorded in audit. Not used by an extension operation that records its own request members in audit.

suspend_until:

OPTIONAL. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time. Valid only on the suspend operation. When present, it sets a deadline after which the AS applies on_expiry.

on_expiry:

CONDITIONAL. A string, one of resume or revoke. REQUIRED when suspend_until is present; otherwise MUST NOT be sent. It selects the transition the AS applies when suspend_until passes.

expected_version:

OPTIONAL. A string, the canonical decimal form of a positive state version (Section 3.5): ASCII digits with no leading zero, and no sign, whitespace, fraction or exponent. It is the version the caller last observed, compared exactly, never rounded. Any other form is malformed. The AS applies it as Section 5.6 describes.

nonce:

REQUIRED. A string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. A client-generated nonce, the request's idempotency key (Section 5.6), not a fresh challenge per transmission as at the Mission Status endpoint: a client MUST use a fresh nonce for each new operation it requests on a Mission, unique among its nonce values for that Mission within the deduplication window, and repeat it only to retransmit that request.

The request also carries the client authentication parameters of the mechanism it uses, as at the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.1).

A companion-registered extension operation carries additional REQUIRED and OPTIONAL members of its own, defined completely by the companion that registers it.

The base operations are:

  • revoke: terminate the Mission; transition to terminated with reason revoked.

  • suspend: pause the Mission; transition to suspended.

  • resume: return a suspended Mission to active.

  • complete: mark the Mission completed; transition to terminated with reason completed.

The AS MUST refuse an operation value it does not serve, a base operation its conformance claim omits (Section 9) or an extension operation it has not adopted, with invalid_request (Section 3.10) before looking up the Mission, leaving the Mission unchanged, so the refusal discloses nothing about it.

A companion profile MAY register a further operation value on this endpoint that changes no Mission-level state, provided it defines the value's request members, authorization, anti-oracle behavior, idempotency and outcome vocabulary, result shape, and conformance requirements completely. It registers the value by defining it in its own specification; no IANA registry holds operation values (Section 12).

A suspend MAY carry suspend_until with a REQUIRED on_expiry; the pair is the Mission's schedule. When the suspend_until of a current schedule passes, the AS MUST apply on_expiry (transition to active for resume, or to terminated with reason revoked for revoke) and emit the corresponding transition, without a further request, unless expiry governs (below). While the Mission is suspended under a deadline, both suspend_until and on_expiry surface in the signed Mission Status Response (Section 3.5) so a consumer sees the pending outcome.

The AS authorizes a schedule when it commits it (Section 5.4) and does not re-authorize it at the deadline: a later expiry or withdrawal of the committing party's grant does not by itself cancel it. A schedule is current until its suspension ends or an authorized replacement supersedes it (Section 5.6). The AS MUST NOT apply a schedule that is no longer current, so an earlier deadline never acts on a later suspension. A deadline applies only a transition legal from the Mission's current state (Section 5.2) and never changes a terminated Mission.

From a current schedule's deadline, every decision treats the Mission as in the state its on_expiry produces, whether or not that transition is persisted, so a request the AS decides after the deadline is decided against that state. If the first decision after the deadline comes at or after the Mission's expires_at, expiry governs instead and the Mission is terminated with reason expired (Section 5.2); a revocation committed at its deadline before expires_at keeps reason revoked. For on_expiry revoke, the termination's terminated_at is the schedule's suspend_until. A new suspend whose suspend_until is not later than the time the AS processes it is refused invalid_request; a retransmit of an accepted request still replays its original response after the deadline passes (Section 5.6).

5.3. Authentication

The lifecycle endpoint uses the same authentication mechanisms as the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.2): mTLS client authentication, a sender-constrained access token (DPoP- or mTLS-bound), or private-key JWT. Its discovery mirrors that endpoint: the accepted methods in mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported and, for private_key_jwt, the accepted client-assertion algorithms in mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported (Section 8). Its authentication failures follow Section 3.3.

For the sender-constrained access-token path, this endpoint is an OAuth protected resource exactly as the Mission Status endpoint is: the AS publishes, in its Protected Resource Metadata for this resource [RFC9728], the resource identifier the token's audience MUST name and the scopes it requires (scopes_supported): mission_lifecycle for revoke, suspend, resume, and complete (Section 5), and any scope an adopted extension operation defines. A private-key JWT client_assertion names the AS's issuer identifier in aud, and a presented access token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's protected-resource identifier, exactly as at the Mission Status endpoint. Direct mTLS or private-key-JWT callers carry the deployment-defined equivalent grant, never a scope.

5.4. Authorization

This section governs revoke, suspend, resume, and complete. An extension operation has the authority model its companion defines, which a mission_lifecycle grant under this section MUST NOT imply.

The AS authorizes lifecycle operations against deployment policy. This document sets the minimum authorization semantics and leaves finer policy deployment-defined. Every authenticated caller, whatever its authentication mechanism (Section 3.2), MUST be governed by an explicit lifecycle authorization: a mission_lifecycle scope or a deployment-defined equivalent grant that names who may perform the transition. The AS MUST refuse a caller that carries no such authorization.

A lifecycle authorization is necessary but not sufficient. The AS MUST authorize each request for its acting party (below), its operation, and the specific Mission it names, under the deployment's policy for that Mission, including the deployment or tenant boundary the Mission belongs to: authorization for one Mission, or within one tenant, authorizes nothing on another. The AS evaluates the acting party's validated identity and any validated delegation context; an act claim identifies the parties to a delegation and is never by itself a grant of lifecycle authority.

The acting party, and where the AS checks the lifecycle authorization, follow from the authentication case:

  1. When an access token authenticates the call, the token identifies the parties per the issuance profile's access-token model ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): for a delegated access token its sub denotes the resource owner (the represented party), matching the [RFC9068] access-token sub model; the calling party is identified by client_id ([RFC8693] Section 4.3); and, where a delegation chain is present, the immediate actor is identified by the act claim ([RFC8693], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A DPoP [RFC9449] or mTLS [RFC8705] sender constraint binds the presenter to a key; it does not change what sub denotes. The acting party is the calling party so identified, and the presented token MUST carry the lifecycle authorization the AS checks against it.

  2. When the caller authenticates directly as a client (mTLS client authentication [RFC8705] or private-key JWT [RFC7523]), the authenticated client is the acting party. The AS MUST check the deployment-defined lifecycle grant bound to that client.

In every case the AS MUST record the acting party, and the response envelope's sub carries it (Section 3.5), distinct from any access token's sub. A deployment-defined audit member of the Mission Status Response MAY carry it as well. For a delegated access token, the represented party its sub denotes is part of the delegation context the AS evaluates, which a policy authorizing the Mission's Subject or Approver matches.

Which parties may perform which operation on which Missions is deployment-defined. Typical deployments authorize revoke to the Mission's Subject or Approver and to administrators; suspend and resume to administrators; and complete to the Mission's client or an administrator.

Because resume returns a suspended Mission to active and so undoes the containment a suspend established, a deployment SHOULD require a distinct or elevated authorization for resume.

A suspend that carries on_expiry schedules a later resume or revoke. The AS MUST authorize it against both the caller's authorization for suspend and the authorization the deployment requires for a direct operation of the scheduled kind (resume or revoke) on that Mission, including when it sets or replaces the schedule of a Mission already suspended, whoever suspended it. The AS checks both before any change and refuses a caller lacking either as an unauthorized lifecycle request (below), leaving the Mission's state and schedule unchanged.

The AS MUST record with each committed schedule its committing party, the acting party of the request that committed it; an authorized replacement records its own.

The AS MUST refuse an unauthorized lifecycle request with the not-found response shape of Section 3.10, so the endpoint does not act as a Mission enumeration oracle.

5.5. Lifecycle Examples

Revoke request:

POST /as/mission/lifecycle HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6...
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

mission_id=msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-
&operation=revoke
&reason=Quarterly+reconcile+cancelled
&nonce=nonce_8Y3vN0sM6tP1xR9bQ5

Revoke success response: the AS returns the updated status as a signed Mission Status Response (Section 3.5). Because the Lifecycle request carries no audience, the response is state-only: the AS sets aud to the authenticated client's client_id and omits authorization_details (a lifecycle confirmation reports state, not audience-scoped authority). Here the response envelope's sub, distinct from any access token's sub, carries the acting party: the calling client identified by client_id. The AS records that acting party and reflects it in this signed response as well as in its audit log.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/mission-status-response+jwt
Cache-Control: no-store

eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImFzLWtleS0yMDI2LXEzIi...

Decoded JWS payload:

{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "sub": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "nonce": "nonce_8Y3vN0sM6tP1xR9bQ5",
  "iat": 1793609600,
  "exp": 1793609660,
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "state": "terminated",
    "termination": {
      "reason": "revoked",
      "terminated_at": "2026-11-02T08:53:20Z",
      "version": 4
    },
    "version": 4,
    "expires_at":  "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
    "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:54:05Z"
  }
}

The AS records the operation, actor, time, and any reason in its audit log; the response confirms the outcome through the updated state.

The next two examples use another Mission.

Suspend request with a deadline, here also carrying the OPTIONAL expected_version guard against deciding over stale state (Section 5.6):

POST /as/mission/lifecycle HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6...
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

mission_id=msn_TaLyTFRdyHq4zLDxwrwkEbj062oXcTX5
&operation=suspend
&suspend_until=2026-11-09T08%3A15%3A00Z
&on_expiry=revoke
&expected_version=1
&reason=Pending+quarterly+access+review
&nonce=nonce_4Dq2mV8kX1sB7nR3tW

Suspend success response: the signed Mission Status Response reports suspended and surfaces the pending outcome, carrying suspend_until and on_expiry in mission alongside state. Decoded JWS payload:

{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "sub": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "nonce": "nonce_4Dq2mV8kX1sB7nR3tW",
  "iat": 1793607600,
  "exp": 1793607660,
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_TaLyTFRdyHq4zLDxwrwkEbj062oXcTX5",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "state": "suspended",
    "version": 2,
    "suspend_until": "2026-11-09T08:15:00Z",
    "on_expiry": "revoke",
    "expires_at":  "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
    "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:20:45Z"
  }
}

When suspend_until passes without a resume, the AS applies on_expiry and transitions the Mission to terminated with reason revoked without a further request.

5.6. Idempotency and Conflicts

The request nonce (Section 5.1) is the idempotency key: an opaque string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. The AS treats an absent, empty, longer, or non-string nonce as malformed (invalid_request, with no nonce echoed).

The AS MUST deduplicate lifecycle requests by the triple (client, mission_id, nonce) for a bounded window, the client being the acting party (Section 5.4), whose authorization, delegation context included, is checked before every replay (Section 5.7). On a retransmit carrying a nonce already seen for that client and mission_id, together with request members identical to the original's, the AS MUST replay the original response rather than re-execute the operation, once the retransmit has passed authorization (Section 5.7). The comparison covers the operation's request members (operation, reason, suspend_until, on_expiry, expected_version, and any member an extension operation defines), present or absent alike, and excludes client authentication parameters and HTTP headers, which a retry regenerates. Members are compared as decoded values, character for character, in any order, so two spellings of one instant differ. The same nonce paired with request members that differ from the original's MUST be refused invalid_request (Section 3.10); the AS MUST NOT answer it with the unrelated original response. A retransmit whose original response was rate_limited, or was unavailable or another 5xx response, is processed as a new request, not replayed. A request refused before deduplication (Section 5.7) claims no nonce: the AS retains nothing for the refusal and leaves any response already retained under that nonce unchanged, so the rules above apply to a later request carrying it as though the refused request had never arrived.

A retransmit that arrives while the original is still being processed never commits the operation a second time: the AS answers it with the original response once that is retained, or with unavailable until then, so every answer reports the one committed operation's outcome. A replay is the original response unchanged, with its original iat and exp.

A Lifecycle client verifies a response by the checks of Section 3.5, with keys from the AS's jwks_uri and never a key the AS has published as compromised. A replay whose exp has passed fails check 9, except that the client MAY accept it as confirmation of its original operation's outcome when it correlates the response to that retained request (its mission_id and nonce) and every other check passes. Such a replay confirms that outcome only: it refreshes no cached state, authorizes no action, and does not establish the Mission's current state, for which the client obtains a fresh Mission Status Response.

The window MUST be at least the validity span of the signed response the AS would replay (its iat to exp, Section 3.5), so any retransmit that could still present a live response is deduplicated. A deployment MAY use a longer window. Within the window a retransmit is safe against reordering: a delayed suspend retry that arrives after a resume is recognized as a duplicate and replays the original suspend response, so it cannot re-suspend an already-resumed Mission. A retransmit that arrives after the window is processed as a new request; past that point only an expected_version the client supplied (below) keeps it from acting on state its sender has not observed.

Deduplication guards a retransmitted request; it does not guard a valid request decided over stale state, a fresh suspend issued from a console that has not yet seen a newer resume. For that a lifecycle request MAY carry expected_version, the state version (Section 3.5) the caller last observed: when present, the AS MUST refuse the operation with HTTP 409 and error symbol stale_version, leaving the Mission unchanged, when the Mission's current state version differs. The AS applies this check before the transition rule below, so a stale expected_version is refused even where the operation would otherwise be idempotent success. A deployment SHOULD require expected_version on the operations it classifies high-risk. The nonce remains the replay key; the two guards are independent, one against duplicate delivery, one against stale decisions.

Lifecycle operations that change Mission state follow one rule. An operation whose resulting state (Section 5.2) and, for terminated, termination reason equal the Mission's current ones is idempotent success: the AS returns the current Mission Status Response, with no state change and, except for the schedule replacement below, no event emitted. Any other operation not legal from the current state (for example suspend against a terminated Mission, or revoke against one terminated with reason completed) is a conflict: the AS MUST refuse it with HTTP 409 and a JSON body whose error symbol is conflict, leaving the Mission state unchanged. The nonce replay and request-mismatch handling above applies independently of this rule. An extension operation that changes no Mission state is not bound by this rule; the companion that registers it defines its idempotency and outcome vocabulary (Section 5.1).

resume is the sole exception to the idempotent-success arm. It is legal only from suspended, and its resulting state active is also the baseline a Mission holds before any suspension, so resume on an active Mission (one never suspended, or already resumed) or on a terminated Mission is not idempotent success but a conflict.

A suspend against a suspended Mission leaves its state unchanged but can change its schedule. One that carries a suspend_until and on_expiry pair differing from the recorded schedule, or where none is recorded, replaces the schedule once authorized (Section 5.4): the AS MUST update the recorded values and their committing party, emitting the corresponding transition-metadata change and reporting the updated values in the response; silent acceptance without effect is not conforming. A suspend that omits both members leaves the recorded schedule, if any, and its committing party unchanged: omission never clears a deadline. A suspend carrying only one of the two remains invalid (Section 5.1) and changes nothing.

5.7. Processing Order

The AS MUST process a lifecycle request in this order, refusing it at the first step that fails:

  1. Authenticate the caller (Section 3.2), parsing the request body only as far as authentication needs. A body that cannot be parsed is refused invalid_request, whatever credential the request presents; a client authentication parameter included more than once fails authentication, and no occurrence of it is used. Every authentication failure is answered as Section 3.3 assigns.

  2. Validate the request syntax and the operation (Section 5.1). A malformed request, or an operation the AS does not serve, is refused invalid_request; a request that includes a parameter more than once is malformed, as at the token endpoint (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]).

  3. Authorize the request. For a base operation this is the lifecycle authorization of Section 5.4 for the acting party, the operation and the Mission, together with the authorization for any transition the request schedules; for an extension operation it is the authorization its companion defines. An unknown Mission and every failed authorization are refused alike with the not-found response.

  4. Apply deduplication (Section 5.6): replay the original response to a retransmit, or refuse a reused nonce whose request members differ.

  5. Refuse invalid_request a suspend whose suspend_until is not later than the time the AS processes it (Section 5.1), then check expected_version, when present (Section 5.6).

  6. Apply the transition rules (Section 5.6) and commit the transition.

Authorization therefore precedes every replayed or state-dependent response: a caller not authorized for the Mission receives the not-found response, never a replay, stale_version or conflict.

The AS MUST durably commit a transition, with the state version it produces, before it sends any response that acknowledges it; a transition whose commit fails is never answered as a success. The issuance profile's refusal of a derivation answered after an acknowledged revocation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Issuance Gating") is not extended to suspension: a suspension refuses later derivations at their gate, and a derivation already past its gate when the suspension commits can complete.

5.8. Relationship to RFC 7009

A Mission revocation through this endpoint reaches credentials already derived from the Mission through the AS's advertised revocation propagation (Section 6); otherwise they remain valid until their own exp. The AS MAY additionally revoke specific outstanding tokens it knows by jti, with the same effect as [RFC7009] revocation of each token. An [RFC7009] revocation does not by itself revoke a Mission: Mission state changes only by a lifecycle transition (Section 5.2), such as a request to this endpoint, a deadline, expiry, or the coupling below.

Where a deployment's revocation policy treats revoking a Mission's refresh token as revoking the Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation"), the AS MUST commit that revocation as the same revoke transition this endpoint applies: decided by that policy for the revoking party and the Mission, recorded with a new state version, and emitting the same transition event (Section 5.6). The coupling requires neither a request to this endpoint nor an additional scope.

5.9. Deferred Lifecycle Capabilities

This endpoint operates on one Mission at a time. Mission enumeration and bulk lifecycle operations for incident response, such as revoking every Mission for a compromised Subject, client, or tenant, are left to companion profiles; this document does not require them.

The following capabilities remain deferred to future work:

  • Approver transfer or re-anchoring, changing the party that anchors a Mission's consent, is not defined here.

  • Administrative monotonic narrowing, such as shortening a Mission's expires_at, is not defined here.

6. Revocation Propagation

This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile bounds outstanding self-contained tokens by their lifetime and OPTIONAL token introspection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation"). A deployment that needs a Mission state change to take effect faster than token lifetime alone combines the propagation mechanisms below and sizes token lifetimes to match.

The mechanisms are each discovered from their own metadata, not from a separate posture list:

A deployment advertises mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 8), the ceiling, in seconds, on reliance on an observation of Mission state: the freshness cap of Section 3.6 applies it to a Mission Status response, and the issuer applies it to an introspection projection's fresh_until (Section 4). It does not bound a self-contained token, which a consumer relies on for its lifetime unless that lifetime is sized to the bound (below). When the member is absent, no such ceiling is declared: a consumer relies on a self-contained token for its lifetime, and on a Mission Status response within the reliance bound of Section 3.6. A fresh observation bounds only how stale the consumer's view of Mission state is; it does not bound reconciliation delay upstream of the issuer or effects already underway.

Where the member is present, a status response's mission.fresh_until MUST NOT exceed the response's issuance time plus the advertised bound (Section 3.6). The 60-second value in this document's examples is a tight deployment's choice, not a floor.

Where a deployment needs Mission revocation to take effect but only the baseline derivation-time check is in use, Mission-bound access tokens SHOULD use TTLs no longer than the declared mission_max_stale_seconds. Deployments where revocation propagates out of band (token introspection, per-request status checks, or a companion profile's push mechanism) MAY use longer TTLs.

Sizing to the bound is itself a propagation mechanism: expiry performs the state check, and the consumer integrates nothing. Introspection and per-request status checks tighten specific paths; they are upgrades, not prerequisites.

7. Operational Considerations

A deployment declaring revocation propagation SHOULD publish the recovery objective considered when choosing mission_max_stale_seconds and the availability consequence when recovery takes longer than that bound. The documentation its service_documentation metadata [RFC8414] names is one place to publish them.

The security ceiling governs the choice: an operational recovery objective never authorizes extending a reliance bound (Section 3.6) or the advertised mission_max_stale_seconds during an incident. An existing observation's remaining validity is not reset when an outage is detected. An issuer outage and a state-source outage are distinct where the topology provides an independently available authoritative source.

The deployment describes its distribution posture per surface: Status responses are reused only within their reliance bound (Section 3.6), and a companion mechanism follows its own freshness rules. A push mechanism accelerates learning of transitions over a correctly bounded state source; it does not replace that source after confidence is lost.

Operators watch observation age and remaining validity, failed refreshes, stream gaps, fallback availability, clock health, and catch-up after recovery. A recovery check reconciles committed state and versions before publishing newly fresh observations. A successful HTTP response or a new signature alone does not establish that reconciliation. No new endpoint, metadata member, availability target, or replication protocol is defined here.

8. Authorization Server Metadata

This section is OPTIONAL and applies only to a deployment that adopts one or more of the extensions above. An AS advertises the surfaces it supports through the following members of its authorization server metadata document [RFC8414], in addition to the issuance profile's mission_bound_authorization_supported ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization Server Metadata"). Unlike the issuance profile, which advertises only that boolean, this document defines OAuth AS metadata members for the surfaces it introduces, so a consumer discovers them through standard [RFC8414] discovery.

mission_status_endpoint:

OPTIONAL. A string containing a URL. The URL of the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3). Present when the AS supports it.

mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:

CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings naming the authentication methods the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3) accepts. Its value space is a closed set defined by this document, not the OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry: tls_client_auth (mutual-TLS client authentication [RFC8705]), private_key_jwt (private-key JWT client authentication [RFC7523]), and access_token (a mission_status-scoped, sender-constrained access token, whose presentation and DPoP or mTLS binding are described by this endpoint's Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728]). The first two values are spelled identically to registered token-endpoint authentication methods by intent; this member describes this endpoint, not the token endpoint. REQUIRED when the AS serves the Mission Status endpoint.

mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported:

CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings, the JWS [RFC7515] algorithm values the AS accepts for the private_key_jwt client-assertion JWT (Section 3.2) at the Mission Status endpoint. This is the client-assertion verification set, not the response-signing algorithms of mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported below. none MUST NOT be used. REQUIRED when mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists private_key_jwt.

mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported:

CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings. The JWS [RFC7515] algorithm values the AS uses to sign the Mission Status Response shape (Section 3.5), on every surface that returns it (the dedicated Mission Status operation, the Lifecycle endpoint, and any companion surface that reuses that response), mirroring introspection_signing_alg_values_supported. These are the response-signing algorithms, not the algorithms the AS accepts on private_key_jwt client assertions (the endpoint auth-signing members). REQUIRED when the AS serves any such surface, since a consumer rejects a response signed with an algorithm not listed (Section 3.5).

mission_lifecycle_endpoint:

OPTIONAL. A string containing a URL. The URL of the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5). Present when the AS supports it.

mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:

CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings naming the authentication methods the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5) accepts, from the same closed value space as mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported (with access_token naming a mission_lifecycle-scoped access token). REQUIRED when the AS serves the Mission Lifecycle endpoint.

mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported:

CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings, the JWS [RFC7515] algorithm values the AS accepts for the private_key_jwt client-assertion JWT (Section 3.2) at the Mission Lifecycle endpoint. This is the client-assertion verification set, not the response-signing algorithms of mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported. none MUST NOT be used. REQUIRED when mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists private_key_jwt.

mission_max_stale_seconds:

OPTIONAL. An integer. The ceiling, in seconds, on reliance on an observation of Mission state (Section 6). When absent, no such ceiling is declared.

mission_historical_jwks_uri:

CONDITIONAL. A string containing an https URL. The URL of the AS's historical key set (Section 8.1). REQUIRED while that set lists a key.

token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported [RFC8414] describes the token endpoint alone and is never read in place of an endpoint's *_auth_methods_supported member.

DPoP and mTLS support for issued credentials are read from the standard dpop_signing_alg_values_supported [RFC9449] and tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens [RFC8705] metadata; this document defines no separate sender-constraint member. When the introspection projection (Section 4) is signed, the signing is discovered through the standard introspection_signing_alg_values_supported metadata.

A discovery response from https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, showing the issuance profile members plus the extension members of this document:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: max-age=3600

{
  "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
  "token_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/as/token",
  "introspection_endpoint":
    "https://as.example.com/as/introspect",
  "jwks_uri":
    "https://as.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
  "introspection_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"],
  "mission_bound_authorization_supported": true,

  "mission_status_endpoint":
    "https://as.example.com/as/mission/status",
  "mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":
    ["tls_client_auth", "private_key_jwt", "access_token"],
  "mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported":
    ["ES256"],
  "mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"],
  "mission_lifecycle_endpoint":
    "https://as.example.com/as/mission/lifecycle",
  "mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":
    ["tls_client_auth", "private_key_jwt", "access_token"],
  "mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported":
    ["ES256"],
  "mission_max_stale_seconds": 60
}

8.1. Historical Key Set

The historical key set holds the public keys the AS has withdrawn as compromised (Section 10.5), so that responses signed under them stay verifiable for audit. It is a JWT [RFC7519] with typ jwk-set+jwt, served at mission_historical_jwks_uri, which a consumer takes only from authorization server metadata it has validated (Section 3.3 of [RFC8414]). Its claims are iss (the AS's issuer identifier), iat, and keys: a JWK Set's keys array [RFC7517] holding each such key's public JWK, under its original kid, for at least the audit horizon of every Mission whose responses it signed.

The AS signs the set under its active Mission Status signing key, the key it currently signs Mission Status responses under, and never under a key the set lists or a key of another role. When that key is itself compromised, the AS signs the set under its replacement and never under another published key. A consumer identifies the authorized signer through its trusted configuration, not by its presence in the jwks_uri, since the jwks_uri also carries other roles' keys and retired keys; it accepts a replacement only once that configuration authorizes it. A consumer MUST NOT accept a historical key set whose signature does not verify under the key its trusted configuration authorizes.

Each listed JWK carries the revoked member [OpenID.Federation] (Section 8.7.2) with reason compromised and these times:

  • revoked_at: the time the AS revoked the key; and

  • compromised_at: an added member of revoked, the established compromise time, the earliest time from which a signature under the key is not trusted. It is absent when no compromise time is established.

Both are NumericDate values [RFC7519]. The set reuses OpenID Federation's revoked encoding only; this document defines no OpenID Federation endpoint and claims no conformance to it.

9. Conformance

An implementation conforms to the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] or implements the Mission Issuer role of another binding that serves these surfaces. Each extension in this document is independently OPTIONAL; an implementation names the ones it supports (for example, "issuance profile with Mission Status and Mission Lifecycle"), and an implementation that supports none of them is still a conforming issuance profile.

An implementation claiming an extension MUST meet its requirements:

A Mission Issuer that claims any extension above meets the following requirement, whichever companion profiles it adopts. Every issuer-held narrowing mechanism a deployment runs, including any a companion profile defines, MUST feed the single Effective Authority Set computation. Every derivation and every authority-reporting surface MUST use that same computation, so no surface reports authority the computation has not reduced.

10. Security Considerations

The security considerations of the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] apply in full. This section covers threats specific to the extensions defined here.

10.1. Mission Status Enumeration

Per the anti-oracle property (Section 3.8), an unknown mission_id and a known-but-unauthorized one receive an identical HTTP status, body and headers at the Status and Lifecycle endpoints (Section 5.4, Section 5.7), and the AS SHOULD additionally suppress timing side channels (for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform lookup path). An implementation that leaks the distinction exposes the Mission space to enumeration.

10.2. Mission Status Response Replay

A Mission Status Response is bound to (caller sub, audience, nonce, issuance time). Replay against a different caller, audience or request fails the sub, aud and nonce checks, which the signature protects, and replay after the reliance bound fails the caching rule (Section 3.6); a consumer MUST verify all the checks of Section 3.5 before honoring a response. A response cached and replayed by the same caller within its reliance bound (Section 3.6) is equivalent to a fresh response; a consumer MUST NOT use a cached response after that bound.

10.3. Mission Status Denial of Service

The Mission Status operation is on the consumption path of every Mission-bound credential validation in deployments where consumers query Mission Status per request. The AS MUST implement per-consumer rate limiting (returning rate_limited, Section 3.10) and SHOULD encourage consumer-side caching (Section 3.6) to reduce traffic.

10.4. Signed Response Format

When the introspection projection is signed (Section 4), it uses [RFC9701], which is scoped to token introspection. The dedicated Mission Status operation uses a new media type (application/mission-status-response+jwt, Section 12) and a JWS [RFC7515], because [RFC9701] does not apply to a lookup keyed by mission_id. Implementations MUST NOT use [RFC9701] for the dedicated Mission Status operation, and MUST NOT accept an unsigned response from the dedicated Mission Status operation in place of the signed form it requires.

10.5. Signing-Key Retention for Audit

The AS signs Mission Status and Lifecycle responses with a key from its jwks_uri. The AS MUST keep the public JWK for every kid it has signed such a response under resolvable for at least the Mission's audit horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so an archived application/mission-status-response+jwt remains verifiable for audit and dispute: a retired key in its jwks_uri, and a compromised key in its historical key set (Section 8.1). This is the issuance profile's retired-key rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Signing and Key Rotation"), with the audit horizon as the bound.

A key known or suspected compromised follows the issuance profile's compromise rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Signing and Key Rotation"). Rather than only rotating it out, the AS stops signing with it and removes it from its jwks_uri, and publishes it as revoked in its historical key set. Retention keeps an archived response verifiable for audit; it is not trust. A consumer MUST NOT accept, for a current reliance decision, a response signed under a key the AS has published as compromised. A consumer MUST NOT use a key from the historical key set to verify a response for a current reliance decision. A consumer MUST NOT rely on a cached copy of the AS's jwks_uri beyond the freshness lifetime its response explicitly declares (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9111]). A response without valid explicit freshness information is stale when received, and is never given a heuristic lifetime (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC9111]): the consumer revalidates it before reuse. The consumer replaces its cached key set with each one it fetches rather than adding to it, so a removed key stops verifying within that lifetime. When the cached set is stale and revalidation fails, the consumer MUST NOT accept a Status or Lifecycle response for a current reliance decision until a fetch or revalidation succeeds. An auditor examining an archived response signed under a compromised key classifies it by the published compromise information, compromised_at or its absence.

10.6. General OAuth Security

This document inherits OAuth 2.0 Best Current Practice [RFC9700] for the OAuth surfaces it composes with, and implementers MUST follow it.

A private-key JWT client assertion names the AS's issuer identifier as its audience (Section 3.2), so it is acceptable at every AS endpoint that accepts that method. Section 3 of [RFC7523] makes jti replay protection optional; an AS that applies it across those endpoints, with short assertion lifetimes, keeps an assertion captured at one endpoint from authenticating at another.

11. Privacy Considerations

The privacy considerations of the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] apply in full. This section covers privacy specific to the extensions here.

11.1. Status and Lifecycle as Disclosure Surfaces

The Mission Status operation (Section 3) and the introspection projection (Section 4) disclose Mission state and the audience-scoped authorization_details to the authenticated, authorized requester, and MAY additionally disclose authority_hash to a requester authorized for it. A deployment MUST treat both as Mission information-disclosure surfaces, audience-filtering the disclosed authority so a consumer never sees entries addressed to audiences it is not authorized to request (Section 3.1, Section 3.5). A Mission Status Response also discloses version, expires_at, any schedule and the termination reason to every holder of the read authorization; a deployment can narrow that authorization (Section 3.2) where they are sensitive.

11.2. Status Audit Logging

The AS records Status and Lifecycle requests (containing mission_id, audience, caller, and timing) in audit logs. Deployments MUST treat these logs as PII sinks per the issuance profile's privacy considerations.

12. IANA Considerations

This document requests IANA actions for OAuth AS metadata members, OAuth extensions error codes, a media type, and one entry in each of two issuance-profile registries. It defines no new registry of its own: the endpoint authentication-method value space is a closed set defined inline (Section 8), and Mission Lifecycle operation values have no IANA registry; a companion profile registers an extension operation by defining it in its own specification (Section 5). The mission_error values suspended and completed (Section 5) need no registration, because the issuance profile's mission_error member has no registry of values; their registrations as a lifecycle state and a termination reason are in Section 12.4.

This document registers no new Well-Known URI: the metadata members of Section 8 are published in the OAuth Authorization Server Metadata document at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server [RFC8414].

12.1. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration

IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry [RFC8414]:

  • Metadata Name: mission_status_endpoint

  • Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's Mission Status endpoint.

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8

  • Metadata Name: mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported

  • Metadata Description: JSON array of the client authentication methods the Mission Status endpoint accepts.

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8

  • Metadata Name: mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported

  • Metadata Description: JSON array of the JWS algorithms the Mission Status endpoint accepts for private-key-JWT client authentication.

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8

  • Metadata Name: mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported

  • Metadata Description: JSON array of the JWS algorithms the authorization server uses to sign Mission Status Responses.

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8

  • Metadata Name: mission_lifecycle_endpoint

  • Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's Mission Lifecycle endpoint.

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8

  • Metadata Name: mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported

  • Metadata Description: JSON array of the client authentication methods the Mission Lifecycle endpoint accepts.

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8

  • Metadata Name: mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported

  • Metadata Description: JSON array of the JWS algorithms the Mission Lifecycle endpoint accepts for private-key-JWT client authentication.

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8

  • Metadata Name: mission_max_stale_seconds

  • Metadata Description: Maximum interval, in seconds, a consumer may rely on an observation of Mission state.

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8

  • Metadata Name: mission_historical_jwks_uri

  • Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's historical key set, the signed set of public keys it has withdrawn as compromised.

  • Change Controller: IESG

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8.1

12.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration

IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Extensions Error Registry" [RFC6749]. not_found is already registered for another usage location; its entry here adds the usage locations of this document.

  • Error Name: unauthorized

  • Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response

  • Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10

  • Error Name: not_found

  • Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response

  • Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10

  • Error Name: conflict

  • Error Usage Location: Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response

  • Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10

  • Error Name: stale_version

  • Error Usage Location: Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response

  • Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10

  • Error Name: rate_limited

  • Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response

  • Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10

  • Error Name: unavailable

  • Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response

  • Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10

12.3. Media Type Registration

IANA is requested to register the following media type per [RFC6838]:

  • Type name: application

  • Subtype name: mission-status-response+jwt

  • Required parameters: none

  • Optional parameters: none

  • Encoding considerations: binary; JWS Compact Serialization

  • Security considerations: see Section 10

  • Interoperability considerations: see this document

  • Published specification: this document

  • Applications that use this media type: OAuth Mission-Bound consumers

  • Fragment identifier considerations: not applicable

  • Deprecated alias names for this type: none

  • Restrictions on usage: none

  • Provisional registration: no

  • Magic number(s): none

  • File extension(s): none

  • Macintosh file type code(s): none

  • Person & email address to contact: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com

  • Intended usage: COMMON

  • Author: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com

  • Change controller: IETF

12.4. Mission Lifecycle Registrations

This document requests registration of one state in the issuance profile's Mission Lifecycle States registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), under that registry's Specification Required policy:

Table 4: Mission Lifecycle States registration
Value Terminal Semantics Change Controller Reference
suspended no A paused Mission that derives no tokens until resumed. IETF this document, Section 5

It also requests registration of one reason in the issuance profile's Mission Termination Reasons registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), under the same policy:

Table 5: Mission Termination Reasons registration
Value Semantics Members Change Controller Reference
completed The Mission completed successfully. none IETF this document, Section 5

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-01>.
[OpenID.Federation]
OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Federation 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-federation-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339]
Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750]
Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6750>.
[RFC6838]
Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
[RFC7009]
Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7009>.
[RFC7515]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC7517]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
[RFC7519]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC7523]
Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7523>.
[RFC7662]
Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259]
Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[RFC8414]
Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.
[RFC8705]
Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T. Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705, DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8705>.
[RFC9068]
Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9068>.
[RFC9110]
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9111]
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111, DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9111>.
[RFC9325]
Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati, "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.
[RFC9700]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett, "Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security", BCP 240, RFC 9700, DOI 10.17487/RFC9700, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700>.
[RFC9701]
Lodderstedt, T., Ed. and V. Dzhuvinov, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Response for OAuth Token Introspection", RFC 9701, DOI 10.17487/RFC9701, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9701>.
[RFC9728]
Jones, M.B., Hunt, P., and A. Parecki, "OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata", RFC 9728, DOI 10.17487/RFC9728, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9728>.

13.2. Informative References

[I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis]
Jones, M. B., Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and F. Skokan, "Updates to OAuth 2.0 JSON Web Token (JWT) Client Authentication and Assertion-Based Authorization Grants", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis-11, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis-11>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Resource Access Profile for OAuth 2.0", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access-00>.
[OIDC-CAEP]
OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Continuous Access Evaluation Profile 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-caep-1_0.html>.
[OIDC-SSF]
OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Shared Signals Framework Specification 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-sharedsignals-framework-1_0.html>.
[RFC8725]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725, DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725>.
[RFC9457]
Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, DOI 10.17487/RFC9457, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457>.

Appendix A. Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

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Acknowledgments

The author thanks the implementers and reviewers of the Mission-Bound Authorization work for feedback that shaped these extensions.

Author's Address

Karl McGuinness
Independent