Network Working Group K. McGuinness Internet-Draft Independent Intended status: Informational 6 July 2026 Expires: 7 January 2027 Mission Security Model draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model-latest Abstract Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 and its companion profiles spread enforcement across several components: a Mission Issuer derives authority and, in the OAuth binding, gates issuance (an OAuth Authorization Server, or a standalone Mission Authority Server that records and serves Missions without issuing tokens); a Policy Enforcement Point and Policy Decision Point evaluate each action; a harness establishes a mediated execution environment; a consent rendering layer discloses authority to an Approver; an orchestrator unwinds in-flight work; and optional services report Mission state, adjudicate requested authority, log evidence, and report completion events. In cross-domain use, a resource-side Authorization Server joins this base. Each profile states its own security considerations, but no single document says which components must be trusted, what each assumes of the others, and how the compromise of each degrades the guarantees. This document provides that consolidated view. It is an Informational security model for the Mission suite: it defines the trusted base, the cross-cutting assumptions, and the consequence of each component's compromise, and it points to the normative security considerations of each profile rather than restating them. About This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft- mcguinness-mission-security-model.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft- mcguinness-mission-security-model/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 January 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Status: An Informational Model 3. Conventions and Terminology 4. Mission Substrate 5. The Untrusted Agent 6. The Trusted Base 7. Cross-Cutting Assumptions 8. What the Model Does and Does Not Guarantee 9. Adversary Model and Coverage 10. Revocation-to-Action Latency 11. Documenting the Trusted Base 12. Retention and the Audit Horizon 13. Security Considerations 14. Privacy Considerations 15. IANA Considerations 16. References 16.1. Normative References 16.2. Informative References Acknowledgments Author's Address 1. Introduction The Mission model treats the agent as part of the attack surface: an agent may be prompt-injected or compromised, and the suite's purpose is to bound what such an agent can do, not to make it trustworthy ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). Bounding the agent means relying on other components: the Mission Issuer that derives authority and, in the OAuth binding, gates issuance (an Authorization Server or a standalone Mission Authority Server), the enforcement points that evaluate each action, the harness that removes unmediated paths, and a set of optional services. Those components are the *trusted base*: the parts that, if compromised, degrade or void the guarantees the suite otherwise provides. Each profile documents the security considerations local to its own mechanism. What no single profile provides, and what a reviewer or a deploying operator needs, is the consolidated picture: the full trusted base in one place, what each component must achieve, what it assumes of the others, and what its compromise costs. This document is that picture. This document defines no new mechanism, claim, or wire format. It is a model that aids review and deployment; the normative requirements live in the profiles it references. 2. Status: An Informational Model This document is Informational. It does not place normative requirements on implementations; the enforcement obligations are defined by the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) and its companions. Where this document uses words like "must," it describes an expectation the consolidated model places on a deployment that claims the suite, realized by the referenced profile, not a new conformance requirement of its own. 3. Conventions and Terminology This document uses Mission, Mission Issuer (the Authorization Server in the OAuth binding; the Mission Authority Server in the standalone binding), Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), Approver, Subject, agent, Authority Set, and Mission state as defined in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] and [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]. 4. Mission Substrate This model describes the components and trust relationships of the Mission model, not of OAuth 2.0 mechanics. Its analysis applies to any substrate that provides the Mission primitives the profiles consume: the identifier and issuer, the state space with its only- active rule, an authority representation with a subset rule, the integrity-anchor envelope, and, where the binding provides one, a Mission-bound credential; a binding without that credential supplies an externally established Mission reference instead, verified under the runtime profile's Mission binding establishment step ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). The issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] is the OAuth 2.0 binding of those primitives and the substrate the profiles' security considerations assume; a different binding re-derives only the substrate-specific entries of this model. 5. The Untrusted Agent The agent is not in the trusted base. The model assumes the agent can be prompt-injected, can be compromised, and can attempt any action its position allows. Every guarantee below is a bound on what such an agent can achieve, and is stated relative to a trusted base that excludes the agent. Two structural choices carry this: * *Authority is fixed by an approval the agent cannot move.* Authority is derived by the Authorization Server and committed at the approval event, which may be asynchronous ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]); the agent proposes but does not grant, and intent fields the agent can influence are inert. * *The credential whose misuse is unacceptable is not held by the agent.* Under mediated execution ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]) the PEP holds the sender- constraint key, so a compromised agent cannot present a high- consequence credential directly. The agent and harness boundary assumes an isolation boundary between them: process, host, or service separation within a single operator. Without that separation, agent compromise and harness compromise are one event, and the harness-compromise degradation (Section 6) applies to a compromised agent. A deployment claiming the runtime profile's agent-compromise-resistant enforcement therefore isolates the mediating PEP and its key custody from agent-facing components; the harness profile requires this separation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness]). 6. The Trusted Base The following components are trusted to varying degrees. For each: what it must achieve, what it assumes of the others, and how its compromise degrades the guarantees. The authoritative security considerations are in the cited profile. Authorization Server (Mission Issuer): The root of trust. It derives the Authority Set, runs the approval event, commits the integrity anchors, and gates issuance on Mission state. It must derive faithfully and gate correctly; it assumes the Approver is authenticated and the agent is untrusted. Its compromise voids the model: a compromised issuer can mint arbitrary authority. This is the strongest trust assumption in the suite ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Resource Authorization Server (cross-domain): When cross-domain access is used, a resource-side Authorization Server mints local Mission-bound tokens that the Mission's issuer cannot observe. It must mint only within the audience and lifetime the cross-domain grant scopes. Its compromise mints arbitrary authority within its own domain under the Mission's name; the damage is bounded by audience scoping, short grant lifetimes, and audit, not by the issuer, which never sees these tokens ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]). Mission Authority Server (standalone binding): When the standalone Mission Authority Server binding is used, a service outside the OAuth Authorization Server implements the Mission Issuer role: it must run the approval ceremony faithfully, keep the Mission record and its anchors intact, and serve accurate Mission state, while the deployment's tokens remain ordinary and carry no Mission binding. Its compromise is equivalent to Mission Issuer compromise (forged approvals, altered records, false state), with one addition: in this mode the PDP's credential-to-Mission join is the only binding between a presented credential and a Mission, so a compromised Mission Authority Server combined with the PDP's trust in it yields arbitrary attribution of authority to any credential the join accepts ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]). Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): Sits at the last controllable boundary before an action and obtains a permit before each consequential action; under mediated execution it holds the sender-constraint key. It must be at the last boundary and must not act without a permit; it assumes the harness leaves no unmediated path. A compromised PEP can decline to consult the PDP or ignore its decision; the suite does not prevent this, and evidence makes it detectable after the fact, not in the moment ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). Policy Decision Point (PDP): Evaluates each action against the Mission and returns a permit or deny. It must evaluate faithfully and fail closed; it assumes the inputs the PEP supplies are authentic. A compromised PDP can return arbitrary decisions; as with the PEP, evidence detects this after the fact but does not prevent it ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). Mission state source: Reports current Mission state for the freshness the runtime layer requires, whether by introspection, the Status surface, or pushed Signals. It must report accurately within the staleness bound and be authenticated and integrity- protected. A compromised or spoofed state source can report active for a Mission that is revoked, defeating the kill switch; the runtime layer fails closed when state cannot be established within the bound ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). Harness: Establishes the execution environment in which governed work has no unmediated path to the actions the PEP mediates, and binds sessions, queues, and caches to Mission state. It must ensure no unmediated egress and must re-check state. A compromised harness can hand the agent an unmediated path, which defeats mediated execution for the classes that path reaches ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness]). Orchestrator: When multi-step unwinding is used, it drives compensation of in-flight work after a Mission stops. It must derive each step's reversibility class from a trusted source, and must compensate only under a documented authority basis: resource policy (resource_policy) or a separate remedial Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-orchestration]). Its compromise converts the kill switch into a channel for unauthorized remedial actions, driving compensating writes under the guise of unwinding. Consent rendering layer: Renders the approved authority to the Approver at the approval event. It must render faithfully what is committed. A compromised renderer can display something other than the committed disclosure; the rendering assurance ladder bounds this by degree, up to an Approver authenticator signing the disclosure commitment, but no server-side commitment proves what a human perceived ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]). Access-request and approval workflow: When requestable denials are used, this workflow adjudicates an agent's request for authority it discovers it needs, integrating the AuthZEN Access Request and Approval Profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]). It must not auto-approve a high-consequence escalation without an independent approver. A compromised approval service can grant escalations the model would otherwise route to a human, so it is in the trusted base wherever the access-request flow is enabled ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). Transparency Service: When audit transparency is used, it is an append-only, non-equivocating log that issues inclusion receipts. It must not equivocate. A single compromised service can present different histories to different auditors; registering with more than one service makes equivocation detectable, but the non- equivocation guarantee is per-service ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]). Event source: When completion or trigger-based discharge is used, it reports whether a completion event has occurred. It must report accurately and be authenticated. A compromised event source can keep a discharged entry derivable or falsely discharge one; the Authorization Server fails closed when it cannot determine the event status ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-completion]). Instance identity is identity substrate, like agent identity generally. The instance issuer or agent attester that mints instance assertions ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-client-instance-assertion], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-ai-agent-instance]) sits outside this model's trusted base, and its compromise forges actor attribution (who executed) without forging Mission authority (what was approved). A deployment that relies on instance-grade joins or instance- attributed evidence extends its documented trust statement (Section 11) to that issuer. 7. Cross-Cutting Assumptions Three assumptions hold across the whole model: * *Sender-constrained credentials.* Mission-bound tokens are sender- constrained ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); a token exfiltrated without its proof-of-possession key is unusable. The model assumes the proof-of-possession mechanism is sound and keys are protected by their holder. * *Fail-closed on uncertainty.* Wherever a trusted component cannot establish the fact it needs (Mission state, a completion event, a verifiable decision), the relying component refuses rather than proceeds. A deployment that fails open at any such point forfeits the guarantee that point protects. * *Authority does not move on inert input.* Intent that the agent or attacker-reachable content can influence (goal, purpose, success_criteria, and disclosure-only audit material) is inert and cannot derive, widen, or gate authority ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). 8. What the Model Does and Does Not Guarantee Given an intact trusted base, the model guarantees that a compromised or injected agent cannot exceed the approved Authority Set and cannot move authority by influencing inert intent; authority grows only by a fresh approval that supersedes the prior Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]), not by agent action. In a deployment that claims the runtime profile's agent- compromise-resistant enforcement ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), the model further guarantees that such an agent cannot unilaterally take a high- consequence action it does not hold a mediated credential for. In the base profiles the mechanisms behind that further guarantee (mediated credential custody, no unmediated path, action-bound approval, and an active-freshness state source) are recommendations, not requirements, and a deployment that leaves them as recommendations does not obtain it. This matches the suite's front- door framing: adopting the profiles does not by itself make a deployment resistant to a compromised agent. The model makes misuse bounded and, where evidence is produced, attributable. It does not make a compromised trusted component safe. The compromise of each component degrades a specific guarantee, as listed in Section 6. It does not verify the agent's reasoning or the truthfulness of its outputs; semantic and intent verification are a non-goal of the suite ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). And it inherits the threat models of the substrates the companions profile (Token Exchange, Attenuating Agent Tokens, SCITT, Deferred Token Response), which those substrates own. Section 9 gives the per- adversary-move detail: what addresses each move, and the residual it leaves. 9. Adversary Model and Coverage The trusted base (Section 6) is the component view; this is the adversary view. The adversary is assumed to control the agent, to reach the content and inputs the agent processes (so it can attempt prompt injection), and to capture tokens in transit. The adversary is assumed not to break the cryptographic primitives, not to forge an authenticated component's signing key, and not to compromise a trusted-base component; those last two are the residuals of Section 6, not adversary moves this table covers. The following maps each adversary move to the mechanism that addresses it and to what is explicitly not stopped. The residual column is the honest part: it is what a deploying party still owns. +==============+================================+==================+ | Adversary | Addressed by | Residual: not | | move | | stopped | +==============+================================+==================+ | Compromised | Authority fixed at the | Misuse within | | or injected | approval event (issuance); | the approved | | agent acts | per-action PDP check (runtime) | scope; low- | | beyond its | | consequence | | task | | authority the | | | | agent | | | | legitimately | | | | holds | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Prompt | Inert intent: goal, purpose, | Injected text | | injection | success_criteria never derive, | can still drive | | tries to | widen, or gate authority | actions already | | widen | | in scope | | authority | | | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Stolen or | Sender-constraint (proof-of- | A token stolen | | exfiltrated | possession); the high- | together with | | token | consequence key is held by the | its key; | | | PEP, not the agent (mediated | soundness of the | | | execution) | PoP mechanism | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Token | Permit bound to audience, | Correct binding | | replayed at | resource, sub, client_id, and | configuration is | | another | action; cross-domain grant | the deployment's | | resource | single-use and audienced | | | (confused | | | | deputy) | | | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Parameters | Parameter binding; the digest | The PEP must sit | | change | is reverified at the executing | at the last | | between | PEP immediately before acting | controllable | | decision and | | boundary | | use (TOCTOU) | | | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Active | Per-action runtime | An issuance-only | | Mission used | enforcement, state re-check, | deployment gets | | as ambient | fail-closed on stale state | audit, not | | standing | | action-time | | authority | | defense | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Revoked or | Issuance gating; runtime state | A window up to | | expired | re-check within the staleness | the staleness | | Mission | bound; short token lifetimes | bound or token | | still acts | | TTL; a spoofed | | (kill | | state source (a | | switch) | | trusted | | | | component) | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Approver | The rendered disclosure is | Comprehension: | | approves | committed; rendering-assurance | no server-side | | more than | ladder up to an authenticator- | commitment | | was shown | signed commitment | proves what a | | | | human perceived | | | | or understood | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Exfiltration | External communication is a | PEP-placement | | of private | gated consequential action; | completeness; no | | data (the | harness leaves no unmediated | information-flow | | third leg of | path; session taint downgrades | control, so a | | the lethal | egress after untrusted input | sequence of in- | | trifecta) | (optional; recommended, not | scope steps can | | | required); least-exposure | launder data | | | context minimization narrows | | | | what an injected agent sees | | | | (runtime, harness) | | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Offline sub- | Capability monotonicity | Fan-out breadth | | agent fan- | (narrow-only) and the runtime | is unobserved by | | out abuse | kill-switch re-check on the | the issuer; | | | carried chain | bounded by depth | | | | and policy, not | | | | by the issuer | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Audit | Transparency: append-only log, | Single-service | | tampered, | inclusion receipts, non- | equivocation | | dropped, or | equivocation | (per-service | | reordered | | only; register | | | | with several); a | | | | producer can | | | | still log a | | | | false record | | | | (accountability, | | | | not prevention) | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | Agent | Not addressed | Full: semantic | | fabricates | | and grounding | | results or | | verification are | | acts on | | a non-goal; pair | | false data | | with a grounding | | | | layer if needed | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ | A trusted- | Not addressed; evidence | Not prevented; | | base | detects it after the fact | degrades the | | component is | | specific | | compromised | | guarantee per | | | | Section 6 | +--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+ Table 1 Four residuals are worth stating on their own, because they are the limits most likely to matter and most often overstated away elsewhere: * *Comprehension.* The suite can commit and bind what an Approver was shown; it cannot prove what the Approver perceived or understood. No electronic-consent scheme can. * *Single-service equivocation.* Transparency is non-equivocating only per service; a deployment that needs that property checked registers with more than one independent service. * *Offline breadth.* Offline attenuation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-attenuation]) bounds each child to a narrowing of its parent, but the issuer does not observe how many children are minted; breadth is bounded by depth and policy, not by the issuer. * *Availability.* The model fails closed everywhere a trusted component cannot establish the fact it needs (Section 7), which trades availability for safety. An attacker who degrades a state source, an event stream, or a PDP does not gain unauthorized action, but converts the attack into work stoppage and, for in- flight work, unwind activity. A deployment provisions state- source, event-stream, and PDP availability accordingly, because under this model their outage stops governed work rather than loosening it. 10. Revocation-to-Action Latency The kill switch is not instantaneous. Between the moment a Mission is revoked and the last possible consequential action under it there is a window, and its size is a composition of the mechanisms a deployment runs. The following non-normative table names the governing parameter at each layer; the end-to-end worst case for an action class is the tightest layer the deployment enforces for that class. +=================+=====================+===========================+ | Configuration | Worst-case window | Governing | | | | parameter | +=================+=====================+===========================+ | Baseline (token | until the token | access-token | | lifetime only) | expires | exp | +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+ | With | one introspection | per-request | | introspection | cycle | introspection | | | | at the issuer | +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+ | With Mission | the staleness bound | published | | Status | of the status view | status | | | | staleness bound | +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+ | With Mission | event delivery | signal delivery | | Lifecycle | latency, bounded by | latency plus | | Signals | the poll fallback | poll interval | +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+ | With runtime | the per-class | published per- | | enforcement | freshness bound | class staleness | | | | bound | +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+ Table 2 The token lifetime and introspection layers are the issuance profile's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); Mission Status ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]), Mission Lifecycle Signals ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals]), and runtime enforcement ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]) each tighten the window as their own profile defines. A deployment reads the row for the mechanism it runs, or the tightest of several, to state how long a revoked Mission can still act. 11. Documenting the Trusted Base A deployment cannot be evaluated against this model without knowing which components it actually trusts. The runtime profile already requires a deployment to document its enforcement scope, including its PEP locations, PDP identities, Mission state source, and the execution paths it mediates ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). This model recommends that a deployment claiming the Mission suite extend that documentation to its full trusted base: which of the components in Section 6 it relies on, which it does not deploy, and, for each consequential action class, which components must be intact for the class's guarantee to hold. This documentation is what lets a relying party or auditor reason about the deployment's actual security posture rather than the model's idealized one. 12. Retention and the Audit Horizon The guarantees this model states at audit time depend on artifacts that several profiles retain independently: Consent Evidence ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]), runtime decision and execution evidence ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), and, where audit transparency is used, the receipts that stand over evidence a deployment may later erase ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]). Each of those profiles anchors its retention on the Mission's audit horizon, the deployment-declared window that runs at least the Mission's lifetime plus a post-terminal period ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A deployment that retains every such artifact for at least the audit horizon can answer, at audit time, how long each artifact was to be kept for the guarantee that rests on it to still hold; an artifact dropped before the horizon forfeits the guarantee that depended on it. 13. Security Considerations This document is itself a security-considerations document. It defines no mechanism and adds no attack surface. Its content is the consolidation above; the authoritative, normative security considerations are those of the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) and each companion it cites. Where this document and a profile appear to differ, the profile governs. 14. Privacy Considerations The trusted components see Mission data: the Authorization Server and PDP see the Authority Set, the consent rendering layer and Approver see the disclosed authority, and the Transparency Service and state sources see the Mission Identifier and its activity over time. The single canonical Mission Identifier is a durable cross-audience correlator the suite acknowledges and does not yet narrow ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); unlinkable or per-audience presentation of Mission-bound authority is out of scope across the suite. Each profile's Privacy Considerations govern the data its own component handles. 15. IANA Considerations This document makes no IANA request. 16. References 16.1. Normative References [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . 16.2. Informative References [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit] McGuinness, K., "Mission Audit Transparency", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server] McGuinness, K., "Mission Authority Server", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement: AuthZEN Profile", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Aware Agent Harnesses", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-orchestration] McGuinness, K., "Mission Orchestration and Unwinding", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-ai-agent-instance] McGuinness, K., "OAuth 2.0 AI Agent Instance Profile", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth- ai-agent-instance-00, 4 July 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-client-instance-assertion] McGuinness, K., "OAuth 2.0 Client Instance Assertion", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth- client-instance-assertion-01, 24 June 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval] McGuinness, K., "Mission Deferred Approval for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-attenuation] McGuinness, K., "Mission Offline Attenuation for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-completion] McGuinness, K., "Mission Completion for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence] McGuinness, K., "Mission Consent Evidence for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain] McGuinness, K., "Mission Cross-Domain Projection for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion] McGuinness, K., "Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals] McGuinness, K., "Mission Lifecycle Signals for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status] McGuinness, K., "Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . Acknowledgments This document is part of the Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 work and consolidates the trusted base and security assumptions that its profiles establish individually. Author's Address Karl McGuinness Independent Email: public@karlmcguinness.com