Internet-Draft OAuth Mission Issuance Grant November 2026
McGuinness Expires 6 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Web Authorization Protocol
Internet-Draft:
draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-issuance-grant-latest
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
K. McGuinness
Independent

Mission Issuance Grant for OAuth 2.0

Abstract

This specification defines the Mission Issuance Grant, a profile of the JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization grant of RFC 7523. A Mission Authority Server, which approves and records Missions without changing an estate's OAuth authorization servers, issues the grant for an active Mission: a short-lived, single-use JWT for one client and one authorization server. The client presents it at that authorization server's token endpoint and receives Mission-bound tokens, which carry the Mission, are bounded by the authority the grant conveys, and expire no later than the Mission. An authorization server that checks Mission state at redemption and at every refresh stops issuing and renewing those tokens once the Mission is no longer active, and narrows them when its authority is narrowed; one that does not issues no refresh tokens. Approval, the Mission record, and its lifecycle stay at the Mission Authority Server.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-issuance-grant.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-issuance-grant/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (the "issuance profile") binds issued authority to a durable, human-approved Mission, with the authorization server (AS) as the Mission Issuer. The Mission Authority Server (MAS, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]) hosts the same Mission without changing the estate's authorization servers: it validates Mission Intents, runs approval, records Missions, and operates their lifecycle. The tokens those authorization servers issue remain ordinary. They do not carry the Mission, and their issuance and refresh do not depend on Mission state; enforcement can relate them to a Mission only at the point of use, through the Mission Join.

This specification defines the issuance join, in which the MAS remains the Mission Issuer and an estate's AS issues Mission-bound tokens. The carrier is the Mission Issuance Grant, a JWT the MAS issues for an active Mission and the client presents to the AS as a JWT authorization grant [RFC7523]. RFC 7523 defines how a client presents a JWT as an authorization grant and how the AS validates it. This profile defines what the grant contains, how the MAS issues it, what the AS issues in return, and how the AS keeps issuance and refresh bounded by the Mission's current state and authority.

Every grant is minted against current Mission state, so a Mission that is not active receives no new grants. An AS with a Mission-state integration (Section 2) also checks the Mission at redemption and at every refresh; one without issues no refresh tokens. Either way, every path to new tokens passes a Mission-state check, an issuance gate a MAS alone does not provide ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]). Where that check is the grant's minting, the grant's remaining lifetime adds to the issued token's (Section 12).

The AS implements none of the issuance profile's intake, approval ceremony, authority derivation, record, or lifecycle surfaces; those stay at the MAS. A deployment can adopt the issuance join at some authorization servers and keep the Mission Join at others (Section 10).

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This document uses Mission, Mission Intent, Authority Set, Mission Issuer, the mission claim, the subset rule, and the integrity anchor authority_hash as the issuance profile defines them; Mission Authority Server (MAS), Mission Join, and the Enterprise Mapping Contract as [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server] defines them; and Effective Authority Set as [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status] defines it. Under this profile the MAS is the Mission Issuer. It additionally uses:

Issuance join:

The integration this document defines: a MAS-approved Mission carried by a grant that an authorization server redeems at its token endpoint.

Mission Issuance Grant (grant):

The signed assertion of Section 4, issued by the MAS and redeemed for Mission-bound tokens.

Consuming Authorization Server (consuming AS):

An OAuth authorization server [RFC6749] that redeems Mission Issuance Grants at its token endpoint; conformance role of Section 11.

Mission-state integration:

A consuming AS's means of resolving the Mission's current state and Effective Authority Set at redemption and at every refresh (Section 6.3.1). A consuming AS either has one and applies Section 6.3, or has none and issues no refresh tokens under a grant (Section 6.4).

Refresh family:

The refresh tokens descended from one redemption of a grant (under the authorization code flow carriage, one code exchange), including every rotation, and the authorization they carry.

Family ceiling:

The remaining authority a consuming AS persists for a refresh family (Section 6.3.4): after each successful issuance, the surviving authority of that issuance (items 1 to 3 of Section 6.3.2). A narrowing the client requests at the token endpoint does not reduce it, and it is not the contents of the last access token issued for one audience.

3. The Issuance Join

3.1. Protocol Flow

The following figure shows the issuance join between the client, the MAS, and a consuming AS:

  Client                     MAS                       Consuming AS
    |                         |                              |
    |-- (A) grant request --->|                              |
    |<-- (B) grant -----------|                              |
    |                         |                              |
    |-- (C) token request with the grant ------------------->|
    |                         |<-- (D) Status, per audience -|
    |                         |--- state and Effective ----->|
    |                         |    Authority Set             |
    |<-- (E) access token (and refresh token) ---------------|
    |                         |                              |
    |-- (F) refresh request -------------------------------->|
    |                         |<-- (D) repeated -------------|
    |<-- (E) new tokens -------------------------------------|

(A) The client requests a grant from the MAS for an active Mission, naming the consuming AS as the audience (Section 5).

(B) The MAS returns a grant bound to that AS and to the client, and carrying a subset of the Mission's current authority (Section 4).

(C) The client presents the grant at the consuming AS's token endpoint as a JWT authorization grant (Section 6).

(D) A consuming AS with a Mission-state integration resolves the Mission's current state and Effective Authority Set, with one Mission Status request per audience the grant's entries are relevant to (Section 6.3).

(E) The consuming AS issues Mission-bound tokens within the grant's authority and that set (Section 6.2).

(F) Each refresh repeats (D) before (E). A consuming AS without a Mission-state integration skips (D) and issues no refresh token (Section 6.4).

3.2. Trust

Trust is pre-established and bilateral. A consuming AS accepts grants only from Mission Issuers its local policy names, resolving their signing keys from the MAS's jwks_uri ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]); a MAS mints grants only for authorization servers its configuration names as audiences. The deployment's mapping policy governs how a grant's (iss, sub) pair and client_id correspond to the consuming AS's accounts; where the Enterprise Mission Authority Profile is claimed, the Enterprise Mapping Contract governs ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]). The audiences the MAS scopes a consuming AS's grants to (Section 5.2) are the audiences it authorizes that AS to request from Mission Status (Section 6.3.1). The issuance join is the same-estate case: a deployment does not use it across domains, where cross-domain projection applies instead (Section 10).

The MAS holds the approval event, the record and its anchors, the lifecycle, and grant minting. The consuming AS holds client authentication, token issuance bounded by the grant, and refresh.

4. The Mission Issuance Grant

A Mission Issuance Grant is a JWT [RFC7519] signed as a JWS [RFC7515] by the Mission Issuer. Its JOSE header MUST carry the typ header parameter with the value mission-issuance-grant+jwt (Section 14) and a kid that resolves in the Mission Issuer's published key material.

Claims:

iss:

REQUIRED. The Mission's issuer: the MAS issuer URL.

sub:

REQUIRED. The Mission's Subject as a MAS-local identifier, which the MAS maps from the recorded (subject.iss, subject.sub) pair before minting (Section 5.2). The consuming AS interprets the (iss, sub) pair under the deployment's mapping policy (Section 3.2).

aud:

REQUIRED. The consuming AS's issuer identifier [RFC8414], as a single string (Section 6.1). This restricts Section 3 of [RFC7523], under which a token endpoint URL can also identify the AS; Section 4 of [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis] keeps both forms for authorization grants.

iat, exp:

REQUIRED. exp MUST NOT be more than 300 seconds after iat.

jti:

REQUIRED. Unique per grant; single use (Section 6.6).

client_id:

REQUIRED. The Mission's recorded agent client identifier as the consuming AS knows it (Section 4.3 of [RFC8693]); the MAS sets it under the deployment's mapping policy (Section 3.2). Only this client can redeem the grant (Section 6).

mission:

REQUIRED. The issuance profile's mission claim object, with the members Section 4.1 requires.

authorization_details:

REQUIRED. Authorization details [RFC9396] that the consuming AS issues against, of the types Section 4.2 admits: a subset of the Mission's Effective Authority Set, limited to the entries this AS serves (Section 5.2).

cnf:

OPTIONAL. A confirmation claim [RFC7800] binding redemption to a key: the jkt member for OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP, Section 6.1 of [RFC9449]), or the x5t#S256 member for mutual TLS (Section 3.1 of [RFC8705]). The MAS sets it as Section 5.2 requires, and the consuming AS verifies it as Section 6.1 requires.

The following is an example of a decoded grant payload for the Mission of the examples in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]. Its entry is a subset of that Mission's invoice-read entry, and its sub is the recorded subject.sub copied verbatim, which Section 5.2 permits where it collides with no other principal's sub. The request example of Section 5.1 presents a DPoP proof, so the grant's cnf carries that key:

{
  "iss": "https://mas.example.com",
  "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR",
  "aud": "https://as.example.com",
  "iat": 1793606400,
  "exp": 1793606580,
  "jti": "mig_7Kq2Rv9Lp4xW1nT8",
  "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "cnf": { "jkt": "0ZcOCORZNYy-DWpqq30jZyJGHTN0d2HglBV3uiguA4I" },
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
    "issuer": "https://mas.example.com",
    "authority_hash":
      "sha-256:rspctkzaH13fMUjC6FxL5npl9HREFVrQIk0WN8O_CGs",
    "expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z"
  },
  "authorization_details": [
    {
      "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"],
      "constraints": {
        "resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
        "resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
      }
    }
  ]
}

4.1. The mission Claim

The grant's mission claim is the issuance profile's mission claim object ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Claim"), with two members that object does not otherwise require:

  • expires_at. REQUIRED here, although OPTIONAL in the issuance profile's claim. The Lifetime rule (Section 6.2) caps every token issued under the grant at this value.

  • authority_hash. The mission object MUST carry authority_hash ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Integrity Anchors"), which the issuance profile's baseline claim omits. It names the approved Authority Set the grant derives from, for a consuming AS that, without a Mission-state integration, has no other channel back to the Mission Issuer. The consuming AS records it with each issuance (Section 8) and does not verify it.

4.2. Entry Types

A grant's authorization_details can carry entries of any type that both the MAS and the consuming AS support ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization Details Types"; the MAS's supported types are those its deployment documentation names); this profile requires no particular type. Each entry's audience relevance, subset relation, and transformations follow its type's specification and the transformation capabilities each party declares for that type, through the carriers that section lists, deployment documentation among them. A consuming AS serves an entry that is relevant to an audience for which that AS issues tokens. An entry's audiences come from its type's specification and the deployment's trusted configuration relating entries to audiences, not from its operation target: the issuance profile keeps an entry's resource, a token request's resource parameter, and a token's aud distinct ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Audience and Token Response"). For example, a mission_resource_access entry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]) whose resource is https://api.example.com/orders/123 can belong to the audience https://api.example.com.

Omitting a whole entry always yields a subset. Narrowing within an entry, or projecting it to scope, needs the corresponding declared capability, and neither party performs a transformation it has not declared for the entry's type. An operation this document calls for that a party cannot perform fails closed:

  • The MAS MUST refuse, with invalid_authorization_details (Section 5.4), a grant request whose requested narrowing it cannot perform.

  • The consuming AS MUST refuse, with invalid_grant, a grant that carries an entry of a type it does not support (Section 6.1).

  • The consuming AS MUST NOT issue an entry it cannot narrow except unchanged, where the current Effective Authority Set and its own policy each contain an entry equal to it under the subset rule; otherwise it omits the entry (Section 6.3.2).

  • The consuming AS MUST refuse a requested narrowing it cannot perform with invalid_authorization_details. It refuses a scope projection it cannot perform as the issuance profile maps that failure (invalid_target, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Error and Challenge Mapping").

5. Obtaining a Grant

A MAS implementing this profile serves a Mission Issuance Grant endpoint, published as mission_issuance_grant_endpoint in its metadata (Section 9).

5.1. Grant Request

The requester sends an HTTP POST request with an application/json body to the endpoint, which has the TLS and client-authentication requirements of the MAS's Mission submission endpoint ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section "Mission Submission") with this endpoint in its place: an access token's audience names this endpoint, and the MAS publishes Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728] for it, naming its resource, required scope, accepted sender constraints, and DPoP algorithms (dpop_signing_alg_values_supported). The MAS ignores body members it does not recognize. The body carries:

mission_id:

REQUIRED. A string. The Mission the grant is minted for; its issuer is this MAS.

audience:

REQUIRED. A string. The issuer identifier of the consuming AS the grant is for. The MAS compares it literally with the issuer identifiers its configuration names and sets the grant's aud to the matching identifier (Section 3.2).

authorization_details:

OPTIONAL. An array. A narrower subset the requester asks the grant to carry, under the issuance profile's subset rule. If it is omitted, the MAS scopes the grant to the entries the named audience serves (Section 5.2); if it is present, it MUST NOT widen beyond that scope.

client_id:

CONDITIONAL. A string, REQUIRED with mutual-TLS client authentication, as Mission Status requires for that mechanism ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section "Authentication").

client_assertion_type:

CONDITIONAL. A string, present exactly when the requester authenticates with a private-key JWT: the value urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer (Section 2.2 of [RFC7523]).

client_assertion:

CONDITIONAL. A string, present exactly when client_assertion_type is: the client-authentication JWT. These two members carry as JSON strings the values Section 2.2 of [RFC7523] defines as form parameters, and the MAS processes them as Mission Status's private-key-JWT mechanism requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section "Authentication"), with the MAS's issuer identifier as the assertion's sole aud.

A requester obtains a key-bound grant by presenting a sender constraint on the request: a DPoP proof (Section 4 of [RFC9449]) in the DPoP header field, with htm POST, htu the endpoint URL, and ath only where a DPoP-bound access token authenticates the request, which the MAS checks as Section 4.3 of [RFC9449] requires; or the client certificate of a mutual-TLS connection [RFC8705]. Neither is client authentication by itself. The MAS MUST verify any DPoP proof presented with the request and refuses a request whose proof fails (Section 5.4). A client that does not want its connection certificate bound presents a DPoP proof, which takes precedence (Section 5.2).

The following is an example of a grant request that authenticates with a private-key JWT in the body and presents a DPoP proof for key binding:

POST /mas/mission/issuance-grant HTTP/1.1
Host: mas.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

{
  "mission_id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
  "audience": "https://as.example.com",
  "authorization_details": [
    {
      "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"],
      "constraints": {
        "resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
        "resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
      }
    }
  ],
  "client_assertion_type":
    "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer",
  "client_assertion": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0..."
}

5.2. Grant Processing

The MAS MUST apply the following rules:

  1. Requester. The MAS authenticates the requester as its Mission submission endpoint does ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section "Mission Submission"), with the client assertion carried in the JSON body where it uses private-key JWT (Section 5.1). The requester MUST be the Mission's recorded client. Any other caller, including a delegate or enforcement point that the Mission Join Assertion endpoint admits, receives not_found (Section 5.4).

  2. State gate. The MAS mints a grant only while its own record shows the Mission active, and otherwise refuses.

  3. Subset and audience. The grant's authorization_details MUST be a subset, under the issuance profile's subset rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Subset Rule"), of the Mission's current Effective Authority Set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]), so a contained capability is absent from it ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment], Section "Derivation Gating"). The grant MUST carry only the entries the named consuming AS serves. The requester MAY request a narrower subset. The MAS MUST refuse a request for a wider one.

  4. Derivation event. Each grant minted is a derivation event. Where the Mission's established derivation_limit is set, the MAS MUST count grants against it atomically and refuse beyond it, as [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits], Section "Mission Issuance Grant Minting", defines; redemption and refresh at a consuming AS are not counted.

  5. Key binding. When the MAS verified a sender constraint on the grant request (Section 5.1), it MUST include cnf with that key: the public key of the request's DPoP proof, as jkt, or, where the request carries no DPoP proof, the certificate of the mutual-TLS connection, as x5t#S256, whether or not that certificate also authenticated the client. When the MAS includes cnf, it MUST take the key from a sender constraint it verified on the grant request. The MAS MUST NOT derive cnf solely from client-assertion authentication: a client assertion authenticates the client, and DPoP is not client authentication (Section 3 of [RFC9449]), so the binding comes only from a sender constraint verified independently on the request, even where its key is the one the assertion used. A request with no verified sender constraint yields a grant without cnf, which a public client cannot redeem (Section 6).

  6. Subject. The MAS MUST derive the grant's sub from the Mission's recorded (subject.iss, subject.sub) pair by an injective mapping established before it mints, as the issuance profile requires of an AS for an external Subject ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Subject Establishment"). Two home issuers can both name a principal alice, and the mapping keeps them apart. The mapping is stable: every grant for one Subject carries the same sub. Copying subject.sub verbatim is valid only where it collides with no other principal's sub at this MAS. Every Mission has a Subject, a service-owned or organizational Mission included ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authority Sources").

5.3. Grant Response

On success the endpoint returns HTTP 200 with an application/json object:

grant:

REQUIRED. A string. The Mission Issuance Grant JWT of Section 4. Its exp bounds redemption (Section 6.1).

expires_in:

REQUIRED. A JSON integer. The number of whole seconds from the generation of the response until the grant's exp, rounded down so that it never indicates a time after exp.

The following is an example of a grant response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "grant": "eyJ0eXAiOiJtaXNzaW9uLWlzc3VhbmNlLWdyYW50K2p3dCIs...",
  "expires_in": 180
}

5.4. Grant Errors

A failure returns the MAS error object ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section "Error Responses") with one of the following error codes, which this document defines for this endpoint. A 401 response carries the WWW-Authenticate challenges that section defines for the MAS's endpoints, naming this endpoint's Protected Resource Metadata.

Table 1
error HTTP Condition
invalid_request 400 A missing or malformed member, or an unparseable body
invalid_client 400 Direct client authentication failed and its method defines no other error, only one of client_assertion_type and client_assertion is present, or no credential was presented where no access-token scheme is accepted
invalid_dpop_proof, use_dpop_nonce 400 A DPoP proof presented for key binding (Section 5.1), with no DPoP-bound access token authenticating the request, fails the checks of Section 4.3 of [RFC9449], carries ath, or lacks a nonce the MAS requires (Section 8 of [RFC9449]); a proof that constrains an authenticating access token fails as unauthorized
unauthorized 401 Access-token authentication failed, or no credential was presented where an access-token scheme is accepted
not_found 404 Unknown mission_id, or the requester is not the Mission's recorded client
invalid_audience 400 audience names no AS this MAS issues grants for
mission_not_active 409 The Mission is not active
invalid_authorization_details 400 The request is wider than the Effective Authority Set or the audience's scope, or asks for a narrowing the MAS cannot perform (Section 4.2)
derivations_exhausted 409 The Mission's derivation_limit is reached
rate_limited 429 The requester is rate-limited
unavailable 503 The MAS temporarily cannot serve the request

not_found covers both an unknown Mission and a requester that is not the recorded client, so the response is not a membership oracle. invalid_audience, mission_not_active, invalid_authorization_details, and derivations_exhausted reach only the authenticated recorded client, to which Mission state is already visible. mission_not_active is returned during a suspension and after termination alike; the Mission's state tells the two apart. derivations_exhausted reports the condition the mission_error value of that name reports at a token endpoint ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits]), and no fresh grant under that Mission cures it.

6. Redemption

The client presents the grant to the consuming AS's token endpoint as a JWT authorization grant [RFC7523]. The following example shows a confidential client that authenticates with a JWT (Section 2.2 of [RFC7523]) and proves possession of the grant's cnf key with a DPoP proof (Section 5 of [RFC9449]); line breaks are for display purposes only:

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Ajwt-bearer
&assertion=eyJ0eXAiOiJtaXNzaW9uLWlzc3VhbmNlLWdyYW50K2p3dCIs...
&client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3A
client-assertion-type%3Ajwt-bearer
&client_assertion=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0...

The grant is an authorization, not a client credential. A confidential client authenticates as Section 3.2.1 of [RFC6749] requires, and possession of a cnf key does not replace that authentication. A public client sends client_id and can redeem only a grant that carries cnf, since proof of possession of that key is then the only binding of the redemption to the grant's client_id.

6.1. Grant Validation

In addition to the processing Section 3 of [RFC7523] requires, the consuming AS MUST validate the following and refuse the request if any check fails:

  1. the typ JOSE header parameter is mission-issuance-grant+jwt, checked first so that no other artifact's validation rules are applied to the grant (Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] and Section 3.12 of [RFC8725]);

  2. the signature, under a kid resolving in the published key material of an iss its local policy trusts for issuance joins; and the mission claim's issuer equals iss;

  3. the mission claim carries id, a string in the Mission Identifier character set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Identifier Format"); expires_at, an RFC 3339 date-time [RFC3339] later than the current time; and authority_hash, in the form of the issuance profile's Section "Integrity Anchors", which the consuming AS does not recompute;

  4. aud is a single string identical to this AS's issuer identifier, compared as a literal string with no normalization, so an array, a token endpoint URL, or another alias fails; exp is no more than 300 seconds after iat, compared exactly; iat is not after the current time and exp is after it, with the clock-skew leeway of Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519] applied to these two comparisons with the current time only; and the jti has not been seen, a seen jti being retained until exp plus that leeway passes (Section 6.6);

  5. the client is the grant's client_id (Section 6): the authenticated client equals it, or, for a public client, the grant carries cnf; and whenever cnf is present, the request proves possession of that key, with a DPoP proof (Section 4.3 of [RFC9449]) whose public key has the jkt thumbprint or a client certificate on the TLS connection whose SHA-256 thumbprint matches the x5t#S256 value, and presents no DPoP proof for any other key (at the PAR endpoint, no dpop_jkt other than the jkt value); a client certificate that only authenticates the client does not conflict with a jkt value;

  6. the (iss, sub) pair maps to a local account under the deployment's mapping policy (Section 3.2), and every entry of the grant's authorization_details is of a type this AS supports and is one it serves (Section 4.2).

6.2. Token Issuance

On success the consuming AS mints tokens under these rules:

  • mission claim. Issued tokens carry the grant's mission object as the issuance profile's mission claim, unchanged except that they need not carry authority_hash; id, issuer, and expires_at always carry over (Section 4.1).

  • Subset. Issued authorization_details MUST be a subset of the grant's. The consuming AS's own policy can only narrow them: it MUST NOT widen, remap, or supplement them. Representing them as scope (below) is not a remapping.

  • Token response. The token response carries the issued authorization_details as the issuance profile requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Audience and Token Response", and Section 7 of [RFC9396]), any projected scope beside them (Section 5.1 of [RFC6749]), and the mission_id and mission_expires_at parameters as the issuance profile recommends ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Binding the Mission to the Grant").

  • Scope projection. Where a target's enforcement path consumes scope, the consuming AS also projects the issued authorization_details to scope as the issuance profile's Scope Projection rule requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Scope Projection"), so it supports [RFC9396] even where its targets consume only scope.

  • Lifetime. The consuming AS MUST NOT issue an access or refresh token under the grant with an expiry later than the mission object's expires_at. That ceiling is the Mission's expiry, not a liveness bound, so access tokens issued under a grant SHOULD be short-lived (Section 12).

  • Key binding. When the grant carries cnf, the consuming AS MUST bind every access token it issues under the grant, at redemption, at code exchange under the PAR carriage, and at each refresh, to that confirmation value: as a DPoP-bound access token with token_type DPoP (Section 5 of [RFC9449]) for jkt, or as a certificate-bound access token (Section 3 of [RFC8705]) for x5t#S256. It MUST NOT issue such a token as a bearer token or bind it to any other key. Refresh tokens follow the issuance profile's rules ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Refresh Tokens"), and every refresh still proves possession of the grant's cnf key (Section 6.3.4).

  • Effective Authority Set projection. A consuming AS with a Mission-state integration also applies Section 6.3.

  • No re-approval. The approval event already occurred at the Mission Issuer. The consuming AS MUST NOT prompt the Subject or any user for consent at redemption.

The following is an example of a successful token response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "access_token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJhdCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9...",
  "token_type": "DPoP",
  "expires_in": 300,
  "authorization_details": [
    {
      "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"],
      "constraints": {
        "resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
        "resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
      }
    }
  ],
  "mission_id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
  "mission_expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z"
}

6.3. Effective Authority Set Projection

A consuming AS with a Mission-state integration applies this section at redemption and at every refresh.

6.3.1. Mission State Source

A consuming AS with a Mission-state integration MUST, at redemption and at every refresh, resolve the Mission's current state and Effective Authority Set through the Mission Status operation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]) or an equivalent state source, and refuse when the Mission is not established active. The consuming AS MUST NOT rely on an equivalent source unless it is authenticated, is audience-scoped to the entries this AS serves, carries the Mission's current authorization_details and a monotonic state version, and answers within a staleness bound the deployment publishes (Section 11).

The consuming AS MUST NOT rely on a response it validated earlier, at a later redemption or refresh, unless all of the following hold:

  • it is within its reliance bound ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section "Caching") and within the staleness bound the deployment publishes, measured from the response's iat, whichever ends first;

  • it is for the same Mission (mission.issuer and mission.id) and the same requested audience; and

  • its version is not below the version the AS has retained for the Mission.

Where a held response meets these conditions, a transient failure of a new request does not refuse the redemption or refresh (Section 6.3.3).

Through the Mission Status operation, the consuming AS resolves authority per entry audience, not for an audience of its own. For each distinct audience the grant's entries are relevant to (on refresh, the family ceiling's entries), resolved as Section 4.2 describes, it sends one request whose audience is that audience identifier; it sends an entry's resource value as the audience only where that resolution establishes the two are equal. The Mission Issuer authorizes each audience separately ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section "Request"). The consuming AS validates each response against the audience it requested, and MUST combine only responses whose mission.issuer, mission.id, and mission.version are identical. A response below the version the AS retained for the Mission before this resolution began is a rollback (Section 6.3.3). Where responses within one resolution differ in version, the AS re-queries each audience whose response is below the highest version collected, without using a cached response, up to a bound the deployment configures. Once all responses report one version, the AS combines them and retains that version; an entry relevant to several audiences survives only where every one of their responses admits it. If it still cannot obtain responses at one version within the bound, the state source has failed (Section 6.3.3). A not-found response for an audience the grant's entries are relevant to means the Mission is not established active: the AS refuses with invalid_grant and carries no mission_error value, since a not-found response establishes only that the AS cannot proceed, not that the Mission terminated ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status], Section "Failed Status Checks").

Lifecycle state alone, such as an active state or a Status List VALID bit, is not enough from any source, and a source that reports only lifecycle state is not a Mission-state integration: containment and discharge narrow an active Mission without changing its lifecycle state, and a Status List bit carries no authorization_details.

6.3.2. Issued Authority

Where the Mission is active, the consuming AS issues the intersection of:

  1. the grant's authorization_details, or on refresh the family ceiling (Section 6.3.4);

  2. the current Effective Authority Set;

  3. the consuming AS's own policy, which narrows only (Section 6.2); and

  4. any narrower authority the client requests at the token endpoint.

Items 1 to 3 give the surviving authority. Without a narrowing requested at the token endpoint (item 4), the AS issues the surviving authority, which can be less than the grant's. This projection precedes scope projection above: an AS that models authority as scope maps the narrowed remainder, never the grant's original set.

An empty intersection is refused by its cause. If items 1 to 3 already intersect to nothing, the authorization itself is exhausted and the AS refuses with invalid_grant (Section 6.7). Where Containment is composed, whether the refusal carries its authority_contained reason is Containment's rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment], Section "The authority_contained Denial Reason"). Where that authorization survives but a narrowing the client requested exceeds it, the request is at fault: the refusal is invalid_scope where the request carried scope, or invalid_authorization_details [RFC9396] where it carried authorization_details. The AS MUST NOT truncate such a request to the surviving authority.

6.3.3. Transient Source Failure

A source that is unavailable or rate-limited (Mission Status's unavailable or rate_limited), fails verification, or reports a state version older than one already observed for this Mission is a transient failure, never authority exhaustion, and is refused in a machine-readable shape: this profile defines a token-endpoint use of the OAuth temporarily_unavailable error code [RFC6749] (Section 14.4), carried with HTTP status 503. The response MAY carry Retry-After per the deployment's declared state-recovery policy, which also governs any value forwarded from a Mission Status Retry-After. A held response that meets the conditions of Section 6.3.1 still satisfies the check, and the failure then refuses nothing. For a per-audience resolution, the version already observed is the one the AS retained before the resolution began (Section 6.3.1). The consuming AS leaves the family ceiling unchanged. On the refresh path a transient source failure MUST NOT consume or rotate the presented refresh token, so the client retries with the credential it already holds. invalid_grant stays for the permanent failures (Section 6.7).

6.3.4. Refresh

A refresh family's ceiling MUST NOT widen across refreshes within the same Mission, and no token issued in the family exceeds it. The consuming AS MUST persist the narrowed family ceiling atomically with each successful issuance, and applies the rollback test of Section 6.3.1 as well: detecting a rollback does not replace the persisted ceiling. A refresh that fails leaves the family ceiling and the presented refresh token unchanged. Concurrent refreshes in one family MUST NOT restore authority that an earlier successful issuance in that family removed.

Where the grant carried cnf, each refresh request MUST prove possession of that key: a DPoP proof whose public key has the jkt thumbprint, or a TLS client certificate whose SHA-256 thumbprint is the x5t#S256 value, and present no DPoP proof for any other key. The consuming AS refuses a refresh request that does not as Section 6.7 specifies.

6.4. Without a Mission-State Integration

A consuming AS without a Mission-state integration MUST NOT issue refresh tokens under a grant, and relies instead on the grant's active-at-minting gate and the short access-token lifetime (Section 6.2). A consuming AS that cannot perform the projection of Section 6.3 MUST NOT claim containment- or discharge-aware issuance.

6.5. Mission-Binding Profile

A token a consuming AS issues under a grant carries the mission claim under this profile, which states the elements the issuance profile's Claim Reservation names for a path whose minter is not the Mission's issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Claim Reservation"):

  1. Grant. The Mission Issuance Grant the MAS mints for the Mission (Section 5.2), validated by the consuming AS and redeemed once (Section 6.1, Section 6.6).

  2. Authority bound. Issued authorization_details are a subset of the grant's; a consuming AS with a Mission-state integration also projects them onto the Effective Authority Set (Section 6.2, Section 6.3).

  3. Mission state. The MAS establishes that the Mission is active when it mints the grant (Section 5.2). A consuming AS with a Mission-state integration also resolves the Mission's state at redemption and at every refresh, within the staleness bound the deployment publishes (Section 6.3.1). One without relies on the minting gate and the short access-token lifetime, issues no refresh token, and claims no containment- or discharge-aware issuance (Section 6.4); its residual is the revocation latency Section 12 declares.

  4. Consumer checks. A resource server applies the issuance profile's resource-server requirements; the token's iss is the consuming AS and its mission.issuer the Mission's issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Resource Server Enforcement").

6.6. Single Use

Consumption is atomic with issuance. The single-use jti check of Section 6.1 refuses a grant already recorded; the record itself is written atomically with successful issuance, after the Mission-state check and the projection of Section 6.3 where they apply. A redemption that fails before issuance, a transient source failure (Section 6.3.3) in particular, therefore leaves the grant unconsumed and retryable, and concurrent redemptions of one grant are resolved by that atomic record: the loser is a replay, refused invalid_grant. Under the authorization code flow carriage, PAR validation is the consuming step instead (Section 7).

6.7. Redemption Errors

The consuming AS responds to a failed redemption or refresh with an error response as defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749]. A grant that fails any check of Section 6.1 is refused with the invalid_grant error code (Section 3.1 of [RFC7523]), except as the next sentence says of DPoP proofs, and failed client authentication with invalid_client. At the PAR endpoint, at redemption, at code exchange, and at refresh alike, a DPoP proof that fails the checks of Section 4.3 of [RFC9449] is refused with invalid_dpop_proof, or with use_dpop_nonce where the AS requires a nonce (Section 8 of [RFC9449]). When the grant carries cnf, a request that proves no key, proves a key other than the cnf key, or presents a DPoP proof for another key is refused with invalid_grant. The other refusals are:

Table 2
Condition Response
The Mission is not active invalid_grant
The authorization is exhausted (Section 6.3.2) invalid_grant
The requested scope exceeds the surviving authority invalid_scope
The requested authorization_details exceeds the surviving authority invalid_authorization_details
The state source fails (Section 6.3.3) temporarily_unavailable, HTTP 503

A client tells four cases apart:

  • Retry. temporarily_unavailable means the authorization is intact and the same credential can be presented again. invalid_scope and invalid_authorization_details name a request the client can narrow and re-send under the same grant.

  • Get a fresh grant. An expired or already redeemed grant is cured by a fresh one (Section 5). The other grant validation failures (an untrusted issuer, a wrong audience, an unmappable subject or authority) are configuration faults that a fresh grant does not cure, and so is a refusal after a Status not-found response.

  • Wait. A suspended Mission refuses until a resume returns it to active ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]); a fresh grant then cures the refusal. A refused refresh leaves its refresh token unchanged (Section 6.3.4), so once the Mission is active again the client may instead present that token while it remains valid, with the client authentication of Section 6 of [RFC6749] and, where the grant carried cnf, a new proof of possession of its key. The consuming AS does not treat that earlier refusal as grounds to refuse the retry. Permission to retry is not a promise of issuance: the consuming AS applies every refresh check to the retry, including its current policy, the family ceiling, and the token's validity, rotation and reuse checks, and a resume restores no authority that an earlier issuance removed.

  • Stop. A terminated Mission, or one whose expires_at has passed, refuses for good: neither a retry nor a fresh grant cures the refusal. The consuming AS refuses every later refresh in a refresh family bound to that Mission. This profile adds no revocation duty and removes none that another specification or the deployment imposes.

The AS SHOULD include the issuance profile's mission_error member when Mission state reports that the Mission is not active, so the client can tell Wait from Stop: suspended for Wait, and for Stop revoked, expired, or superseded ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Issuance Gating") or completed ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]). The MAS's own refusals of a fresh grant request are in Section 5.4.

7. Authorization Code Flow Carriage

Deployments whose clients must traverse the authorization code flow MAY carry the grant in a Pushed Authorization Request [RFC9126] as the request parameter mission_issuance_grant (Section 14).

The AS MUST accept the mission_issuance_grant parameter only in a pushed authorization request, whether sent directly or inside a Request Object [RFC9101] pushed there. It MUST reject, with the invalid_request error code (Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749]), an authorization request that carries the parameter any other way, including in a Request Object passed to the authorization endpoint outside PAR. The front channel then carries only client_id and the request_uri. Direct redemption at the token endpoint (Section 6) is unaffected.

The AS applies the grant validation of Section 6.1 at the PAR endpoint, refusing a grant that fails it with the invalid_grant error code, which Section 2.3 of [RFC9126] permits there, and treats the grant as the authorization already obtained. It MUST NOT re-prompt for consent; at most it renders the Mission reference.

The AS consumes the grant at PAR validation: it records the jti as seen there, the atomic issuance step of Section 6.6 under this carriage, so the grant cannot be replayed into a second authorization request. From then on the request_uri, and then the authorization code, carry the authorization; a flow the user abandons, or the AS refuses, after PAR validation leaves the grant consumed, and the client obtains a fresh grant.

When the grant carries cnf, the authorization code inherits it. The token request at code exchange MUST prove possession of that key, as Section 10 of [RFC9449] binds a code to a DPoP key (for jkt), or arrive over a mutual-TLS connection with that certificate (for x5t#S256, Section 3 of [RFC8705]), and present no DPoP proof for any other key; the AS refuses a code exchange that does not as Section 6.7 specifies.

The grant's window is not re-evaluated at code exchange, since the authorization code carries its own lifetime. The other redemption rules (Section 6.2, Section 6.3 or Section 6.4, and Section 6.7) apply at the token request unchanged. A transient source failure at code exchange refuses temporarily_unavailable and MUST NOT consume the authorization code.

This carriage serves user-delegated Missions ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authority Sources"), where an authenticated resource owner exists to bind. The AS MUST refuse the request unless the resource owner authenticated at the authorization endpoint is the grant's Subject under the deployment's mapping policy (Section 3.2), so the grant cannot mint tokens for another resource owner. It refuses with the access_denied error code (Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749]), redirecting the error to the client only where that section allows. A grant for a service-owned or organizational Mission has no delegating user to authenticate; it is redeemed directly (Section 6), not carried through the authorization code flow.

8. Issuance Records

The MAS MUST record each minting with the Mission record: the jti, audience, requested and granted entries, any cnf, and time. The consuming AS MUST record each issuance under a grant, each refresh included, with the grant's jti, Mission reference, and authority_hash. Only the jti identifies the minting: several grants can share a Mission and an authority_hash, and the single-use record (Section 6.6) expires with the grant's acceptance window. Together the records attribute what was approved to the MAS and what was issued to each consuming AS.

A deployment SHOULD reconcile MAS minting records against consuming-AS redemption records. A deployment SHOULD treat a redemption with no matching minting record as a security event. A deployment states its reconciliation posture in the statement Section 11 describes. A deployment operating under the Enterprise Mission Authority Profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]) MUST reconcile within the window its statement declares.

9. Metadata

A MAS that issues grants publishes the following members in its metadata ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section "Mission Authority Server Metadata"):

mission_issuance_grant_endpoint:

REQUIRED. A string containing the URL of the MAS's Mission Issuance Grant endpoint (Section 5).

mission_issuance_grant_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:

REQUIRED. A JSON array of strings naming the client-authentication methods the Mission Issuance Grant endpoint accepts, with the value space and meaning of mission_submission_endpoint_auth_methods_supported ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]).

mission_issuance_grant_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported:

REQUIRED when mission_issuance_grant_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists private_key_jwt. A JSON array of strings: the client-assertion algorithms this endpoint accepts, with the meaning of mission_submission_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]).

A consuming AS publishes the following members in its Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414]:

mission_issuance_grant_supported:

OPTIONAL. Boolean value indicating whether the AS redeems Mission Issuance Grants at its token endpoint (Section 6). If omitted, the default value is false.

mission_issuance_grant_par_supported:

OPTIONAL. Boolean value indicating whether the AS accepts the mission_issuance_grant parameter in pushed authorization requests (Section 7). If omitted, the default value is false.

10. Relationship to Other Artifacts

The cross-domain grant is this shape across a trust boundary. Cross-domain projection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]) carries a Mission to a Resource AS in another domain, under federation trust and identity chaining. The issuance join is the same-estate case (Section 3.2), with bilateral, pre-configured trust and no identity chaining.

Native Mission-aware issuance replaces this grant. An AS that becomes natively Mission-aware implements the issuance profile and mints without grants for its own resources. It consumes the record, anchors, and lifecycle the MAS already operates, so nothing is re-approved in migration.

The Mission Join remains for other tokens. Runtime enforcement reads the Mission from tokens issued under this profile (credential-carried composition, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), so the Mission Join's limit does not apply to them: the join proves a credential belongs to the Mission's parties, never that it was issued for the Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server], Section "Mission Join"). The estate's other tokens are unchanged and compose through the Mission Join; the two joins coexist per resource and per AS.

11. Conformance

A Mission Authority Server implements Section 5 in full, issues grants exactly as Section 4 requires, and records each minting (Section 8).

A consuming AS implements Section 6 in full, including Section 6.3 when it has a Mission-state integration and Section 6.4 when it has none, and records each issuance (Section 8). The PAR carriage of Section 7 is OPTIONAL.

A deployment claiming this profile MUST publish a deployment statement declaring the following. The declarations are part of its Enforcement Scope Statement ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], Section "Enforcement Scope and Conformance") where it publishes one, and stand alone otherwise; this profile does not require Runtime. The statement declares:

A consuming AS that supports this profile publishes mission_issuance_grant_supported, and one that supports the PAR carriage publishes mission_issuance_grant_par_supported (Section 9).

12. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC7523], [RFC7519], and [RFC8725] apply. This section adds those specific to the issuance join.

Grant theft. A grant authorizes issuance, so its defenses are layered: a 300-second lifetime, a single-use jti, one audience, redemption bound to the Mission's client_id, and cnf key binding whenever the grant request is sender-constrained. A stolen grant is useless to any party that cannot also authenticate as the recorded client, or prove possession of the cnf key, at the named AS within that window. Deployments whose client credentials are weak SHOULD require cnf (DPoP [RFC9449] or mutual TLS [RFC8705]).

Mission Issuer compromise reaches issuance. In a MAS-only deployment, MAS compromise corrupts records and state. Under this profile a compromised MAS also mints grants every consuming AS honors, so compromise reaches token issuance across the estate. The consuming authorization servers' redemption records (Section 8) are the independent record that bounds and exposes such minting; at estate scale, reconciling them against the MAS's minting records is the only check on this compromise class.

Externally derived authority. The consuming AS issues authority derived elsewhere. The grant bounds its exposure: it issues only within the grant's authorization_details, only to the grant's client, and never past the Mission's expires_at (Section 6.2). Its own policy can narrow further or refuse a grant outright; nothing obliges issuance.

Type confusion. Three issuer-signed JWT artifacts describe Missions: the Mission Mandate ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate], evidence), the cross-domain grant (foreign domain), and this grant (same estate). Explicit typing with mutually exclusive validation rules (Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] and Section 3.12 of [RFC8725]) is the defense: every consumer checks typ first, and none accepts another's type.

Revocation latency. New grants stop at the MAS active gate when the state change commits. A grant already minted can still be redeemed within its 300 seconds at a consuming AS without a Mission-state integration. The residual there is the grant's remaining lifetime and clock-skew leeway (Section 6.1), plus the issued token's lifetime, plus that of each further exchange that checks no Mission state, capped by expires_at. Under the PAR carriage the grant is consumed at PAR validation, and the sum then runs through the pending authorization request, bounded by the request_uri lifetime (Section 2.2 of [RFC9126]) and any resource-owner interaction timeout, and through the authorization code's lifetime, before the issued token's; expires_at still caps it. Hence the short-lifetime recommendation (Section 6.2). In either mode, issued access tokens run to their own expiry. With a Mission-state integration, an outstanding refresh token is refused at its next use, and a refresh re-projects through the Effective Authority Set (Section 6.3), so a Mission contained or discharged between issuance and refresh does not renew its original, narrowed authority, within the staleness bound the deployment publishes (Section 11). Where the runtime layer is deployed, the Policy Decision Point's re-check bounds outstanding-token use independently.

Consent integrity. The approval the grant rests on was rendered and committed at the Mission Issuer under the issuance profile's rules. The consuming AS relies on that approval and does not substitute one of its own: its non-prompting duty (Section 6.2, Section 7) prevents consent-surface confusion where the Subject holds accounts at both.

13. Privacy Considerations

The grant carries the Mission reference, the Subject's sub, the client_id, and an authority subset to the consuming AS, which may be operated by a different organizational unit than the MAS. Minimization is structural: the MAS scopes authorization_details to what the audience serves (Section 5), and nothing else of the record (no purpose text, no Intent, no full Authority Set) travels. The Mission identifier is a correlator across MAS and AS logs by design; that correlation is the audit trail, and the issuance profile provides no cross-audience unlinkability ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Identifier Correlation").

14. IANA Considerations

14.1. Media Type Registration

IANA is requested to register one media type per [RFC6838].

14.1.1. application/mission-issuance-grant+jwt

  • Type name: application

  • Subtype name: mission-issuance-grant+jwt

  • Required parameters: none

  • Optional parameters: none

  • Encoding considerations: binary; a Mission Issuance Grant is a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters

  • Security considerations: see Section 12

  • Interoperability considerations: see this document

  • Published specification: this document

  • Applications that use this media type: Mission Authority Servers and OAuth authorization servers implementing this profile

  • Fragment identifier considerations: n/a

  • Additional information: n/a

  • Person and email address to contact for further information: see the Authors' Addresses section

  • Intended usage: COMMON

  • Restrictions on usage: none

  • Author: see the Authors' Addresses section

  • Change controller: IETF

14.2. Mission Authority Server Metadata Registration

IANA is requested to register the following in the "Mission Authority Server Metadata" registry established by [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]:

  • Metadata Name: mission_issuance_grant_endpoint

  • Metadata Description: URL of the MAS's Mission Issuance Grant endpoint

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 9 of this document

  • Metadata Name: mission_issuance_grant_endpoint_auth_methods_supported

  • Metadata Description: Client-authentication methods the Mission Issuance Grant endpoint accepts

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 9 of this document

  • Metadata Name: mission_issuance_grant_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported

  • Metadata Description: Client-assertion signing algorithms the Mission Issuance Grant endpoint accepts

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 9 of this document

14.3. OAuth Authorization Request Parameter Registration

IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Parameters" registry [RFC6749], for the parameter carried in Pushed Authorization Requests (Section 7):

  • Parameter name: mission_issuance_grant

  • Parameter usage location: authorization request

  • Change controller: IETF

  • Specification document(s): Section 7 of this document

14.4. OAuth Extensions Error Registration

IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Extensions Error" registry [RFC6749]. The name is the existing OAuth error code of Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749], registered only for the authorization endpoint; this entry adds its token-endpoint use (Section 6.3.3), as [RFC8628] did for access_denied.

  • Name: temporarily_unavailable

  • Usage Location: token error response

  • Protocol Extension: Mission Issuance Grant

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 6.3.3 of this document

14.5. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration

IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry [RFC8414]:

  • Metadata Name: mission_issuance_grant_supported

  • Metadata Description: Whether the authorization server redeems Mission Issuance Grants at its token endpoint

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 9 of this document

  • Metadata Name: mission_issuance_grant_par_supported

  • Metadata Description: Whether the authorization server accepts the Mission Issuance Grant parameter in Pushed Authorization Requests

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 9 of this document

15. References

15.1. Normative References

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Authority Server", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Derivation Limits for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status.html>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339]
Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC6838]
Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
[RFC7515]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC7523]
Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7523>.
[RFC7800]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8414]
Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.
[RFC8705]
Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T. Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705, DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8705>.
[RFC9101]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT-Secured Authorization Request (JAR)", RFC 9101, DOI 10.17487/RFC9101, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9101>.
[RFC9126]
Lodderstedt, T., Campbell, B., Sakimura, N., Tonge, D., and F. Skokan, "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests", RFC 9126, DOI 10.17487/RFC9126, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9126>.
[RFC9396]
Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.
[RFC9728]
Jones, M.B., Hunt, P., and A. Parecki, "OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata", RFC 9728, DOI 10.17487/RFC9728, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9728>.

15.2. Informative References

[I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis]
Jones, M. B., Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and F. Skokan, "Updates to OAuth 2.0 JSON Web Token (JWT) Client Authentication and Assertion-Based Authorization Grants", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis-11, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis-11>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Mandate", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Containment for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Cross-Domain Projection for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Resource Access Profile for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access.html>.
[RFC8628]
Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628, DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8628>.
[RFC8725]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725, DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725>.

Appendix A. Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

Acknowledgments

The author thanks the implementers and reviewers of the Mission-Bound Authorization work for feedback that shaped this profile.

Author's Address

Karl McGuinness
Independent