Web Authorization Protocol K. McGuinness Internet-Draft Independent Intended status: Experimental 19 November 2026 Expires: 23 May 2027 Mission Continuation for OAuth 2.0 draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation-latest Abstract This document profiles authorization continuity for Mission-Bound Authorization. A Mission is the durable, grant-anchored record of what work remains authorized, under which constraints, on whose approval. Mission Continuation binds that authorization to an identity-continuity transport that re-establishes who is acting, so a Mission's work continues across hops and over time without re- presenting the original credential and without widening authority. The Identity Continuation Assertion, async delegation, and cross- domain projection are the transports; the Mission binds all of them under one invariant: a continuation handle grants nothing. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Conventions and Terminology 3. The Three Continuities 4. Authorization Continuity and the Mission 5. The Grants-Nothing Invariant 6. Continuation Transports 6.1. Identity Continuation Transport 6.2. Async Delegation Transport 6.3. Cross-Domain Projection Transport 7. Execution-Time Evidence 8. Substrate Dispositions 9. Security Considerations 10. Privacy Considerations 11. IANA Considerations 12. References 12.1. Normative References 12.2. Informative References Appendix A. Document History Author's Address 1. Introduction Long-running and multi-hop agentic work conflates three questions that must stay separate: * identity continuity: who is acting, and how that identity legitimately continues, whether across hops within a trust domain or across a trust boundary; * authorization continuity: what work remains authorized, under which constraints, on whose approval; and * execution-time evidence: what was actually done at each continued hop. Identity-continuity mechanisms answer only the first. The Identity Continuation Assertion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]), async delegation ([I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]), and cross-domain projection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]) each carry an acting identity onward, but none of them answers whether the work is still authorized, or within what bounds, beyond whatever a token happens to embed. Mission-Bound Authorization ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) answers the second: the Mission is the approved, constrained, state-gated, revocable record of the work. This document connects the two, and adds the evidence that ties each continued action back to the Mission. It is transport-agnostic: it defines what a Mission requires of any identity-continuity transport, and it profiles the three transports above. It defines no new token type, grant type, or endpoint of its own; it constrains how the transports' existing mechanisms carry a Mission's authorization. Its place in the family is the Continue verb of the architecture ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]). This document is optional and experimental: adopt it for evaluation, not as a stable interface. It is a profile layered between the issuance profile and an identity-continuity transport, not a change to either. A deployment that implements [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] and never continues a Mission across a transport is fully conformant to that profile and is unaffected by this document. It defines no new token type, grant type, or endpoint of its own. No Standards-Track document depends on this one. A Mission Issuer claims conformance to this document only when it continues a Mission across an Identity Continuation, async delegation, or cross-domain projection hop under the requirements of Section 4; otherwise it remains a plain issuance-profile Mission Issuer. Nothing here places a new requirement back on the issuance profile. 2. Conventions and Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses the terms Mission, Authority Set, approval event, Mission state, active, and derivation from [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]. It additionally defines: Continuation: The act of obtaining a fresh credential for a Mission's work after the original credential is unavailable or the acting identity must be re-established, without a new approval and without widening authority. Continuation Transport: An identity-continuity mechanism that carries an acting identity onward and, under this profile, a reference to the Mission whose authorization is continued. This document profiles three (see Section 6). Accepted Hop: A point at which a Mission's authorization has been established and from which a continuation may proceed. Continuation Handle: An opaque reference that names an accepted hop. A continuation handle is not a credential (see Section 5). It differs from the async delegation transport's delegation handle (Section 6.2), an access token that carries authority. Rooting Anchor: The record binding a continuation to exactly one Mission. A rooting anchor is grant-anchored (durable) or session- anchored (see Section 4). Continued Grant: A credential a transport issues for a Mission's work as the result of a continuation. 3. The Three Continuities This profile keeps the three continuities of Section 1 apart and assigns each an owner. Identity continuity is owned by a Continuation Transport, never by this profile. This profile is transport-agnostic and states the requirements a transport MUST meet to carry a Mission continuation (Section 6). Authorization continuity is owned by the Mission (Section 4). Execution-time evidence is owned by the runtime and recorded against the Mission (Section 7). The separation exists to prevent one failure: a transport that embeds authorization detail being treated as self-authorizing, so that possession of a continued credential substitutes for the Mission's live state. The invariant of Section 5 forbids exactly this. 4. Authorization Continuity and the Mission A continuation continues a Mission. The Mission is the durable root; the transport is the carrier. The following requirements bind every Continuation Transport regardless of its wire mechanism. Rooting: A continuation MUST be rooted in exactly one Mission through a rooting anchor. A grant-anchored rooting is durable and MAY outlive the session in which it was established. A session- anchored rooting MUST NOT outlive its session; when the session ends, the anchor and every continuation handle under it cease to resolve. A continuation MUST NOT be rooted in a bare access token; the root is the Mission's grant or an authenticated session bound to it. Subset derivation: The authorization a continued grant conveys MUST be derived as a subset of the Mission's Authority Set at the time of issuance, per the subset rule of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]. A continuation MUST NOT widen: it introduces no resource, no action, and no relaxed constraint the Mission did not already carry. State gating: A continued grant MUST be issued only while the Mission, and every ancestor Mission in its lineage, is active. The state check MUST be atomic with issuance. Issuance under a non-active Mission or ancestor MUST fail. Lifetime: A continued credential's expiry MUST NOT exceed the Mission's expires_at. Where a transport defines its own maximum lifetime, that maximum MUST be clamped to the Mission's expiry. Termination: When a Mission reaches a terminal state, continuation under it MUST cease: subsequent continuation requests MUST fail, and any durable transport state (a continuation handle, a refresh- token family) MUST be invalidated. Termination does not shorten an already-issued credential; a continued credential retains its own expiry, and revocation acts on future issuance, not on tokens already in flight. Continuation is bounded in time by the Mission's expiry; that expiry is the continuity ceiling. The Mission's derivation_limit ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits]), where established, remains a bound on distinct derivations and is not a separate continuity ceiling. A continuation that issues a distinct new grant (for example, an Identity Continuation hop that mints a new audience-scoped credential) counts as one derivation; the successive refreshes of a single async delegation family (Section 6.2) are one delegation and do not each count again. This counts derivations within one Mission; it does not bound how many derivations a subtree of Child Missions performs in aggregate, which the child delegation profile's own local, per-Mission derivation_limit warning addresses ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation], Section "Derivation Budget Is Not Inherited"). 5. The Grants-Nothing Invariant The whole profile rests on one invariant: A continuation handle grants nothing. It names an accepted hop. Every continued grant re-passes the Mission's active gate. Continuity is never authority. Concretely: possession of a continuation handle, a refresh token, or any other transport artifact MUST NOT be treated as evidence that the work is still authorized. Authorization is established only by deriving a subset of the Mission's Authority Set under a live state check (Section 4) at each issuance. A relying party MUST NOT make an authorization decision from the mere existence or contents of a continuation artifact. The family already holds this line elsewhere: the harness binds session continuity to Mission state and never to authority ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness]), and the UMA binding's persisted-claims token is a continuation handle that grants nothing while every requesting-party token re-passes fresh assessment ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-uma]). This profile generalizes the same rule to the OAuth transports. 6. Continuation Transports A Continuation Transport carries an acting identity onward and a reference to the Mission being continued. Each transport MUST identify the accepted hop through a reference that resolves to the Mission's rooting anchor. Possession of that reference alone MUST NOT be treated as evidence that the Mission's work remains authorized. The reference can be a continuation handle, which is not a credential (Section 2), or a credential the transport defines, such as a refresh token (Section 6.2, Section 6.3). Every transport, whatever its wire mechanism, also MUST: * re-establish the acting identity at each hop and bind the continued credential to a confirmed key held by that identity; and * convey no authorization the Mission did not derive under Section 4. This profile defines both cross-workload continuation (a different workload continues the Mission at the next hop) and over-time continuation (the same workload continues after its credential is gone). Neither is a universal mandatory-to-implement capability: a binding realizes the transports its substrate supports (Section 8). The three transports below partition the space this profile addresses. 6.1. Identity Continuation Transport The Identity Continuation Assertion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]) is the multi-hop, cross-workload transport among Resource Authorization Servers that trust a common IdP authorization server (IdP). A Continuation Assertion Issuer attests that a Resource Authorization Server accepted an earlier ID-JAG and that its authorization remains active; the acting workload presents that assertion to the IdP as an [RFC8693] subject token and redeems the onward ID-JAG it receives at the next Resource Authorization Server. Under this profile the assertion's identity_continuation_handle MUST resolve to a Mission rooting anchor; the issued ID-JAG's authorization detail MUST be a subset of that Mission's Authority Set, state-gated, and lifetime- clamped per Section 4; and the ID-JAG MUST be bound ([RFC9449]) to the acting identity's key. The root ID-JAG (Section 5.1.1 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]) and each onward ID-JAG MUST identify the originating Mission by carrying its mission claim ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Claim") with that Mission's id, issuer and expires_at. A Resource Authorization Server MUST refuse with invalid_grant to redeem such an ID-JAG whose mission claim lacks expires_at. A Resource Authorization Server's local access token issued on such an ID-JAG MUST preserve that mission reference, and a local token from which further credentials are issued MUST carry its expires_at. The IdP's hop record is continuation state, not an additional grant lineage ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Binding the Mission to the Grant"). A Resource Authorization Server's association of a continuation handle with the authorization state it establishes is not by itself a Mission grant binding; a redeemable grant lineage that server establishes and maps to the Mission is one. That draft records that the base ID-JAG profile recommends against a Resource Authorization Server issuing a refresh token (Section 6 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]); a refresh- token family such a server creates by exception is a destination-side Mission grant binding, under the Mission's authority, state, expiry and termination rules (Section 4). The ID-JAG's own expiry bounds only its redemption, not that family's lifetime, which the Mission's expires_at bounds. The root exchange can coincide with a cross-domain projection exchange ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]) where both profiles' conditions hold. The two are not the same exchange in general, and where they coincide, both profiles' restrictions apply. The IdP authorizes each continuation under the chain authorization recorded at the root exchange and current policy, and that draft leaves whether a requested action serves the authorized work to deployment policy (Section 5.5.3 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion], Appendix A.5 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]); under this profile the Mission answers it. A chain's lifecycle anchor (Section 6.1 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]) is its rooting anchor: the Mission's grant, which can carry unattended work past logout, or a session bound to it. A Mission's terminal state withdraws permission to continue and ends the chain (Section 6.2 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]). A refusal at this exchange uses that draft's codes (Section 5.5.6 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]), in place of the issuance profile's invalid_request: a terminal Mission is invalid_continuation, a suspended Mission is unauthorized_client, no remaining authority for the audience is invalid_target, and a derivation or hop-count limit is invalid_grant. The issuance profile's requirements for the mission_error diagnostic ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) apply unchanged. The assertion carries no user subject: the IdP resolves the subject for each target from the hop, so continuation preserves the Mission's subject rather than projecting it; the actor is rebound per hop. Mission delegation depth at this exchange, the depth at which the issuance profile's per-entry delegation constraints apply ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Delegation Constraints"), is counted over the selected hop's ancestry as the IdP's hop records hold it, from the root to that hop, followed by the current authenticated actor. Only consecutive entries with equal (iss, sub) merge. The root entry is the Mission's approved client at depth 0, and each remaining entry adds 1, so the chain A, B, B has depth 1 and A, B, A has depth 2. Sibling branches, the presented assertion, and any narrowing of what the onward act discloses do not change the depth (Section 5.5.5 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]). At depth 0 the approved agent continues for itself and no delegation narrowing applies. This transport defines no reset: continuing to another Resource Authorization Server, or returning to an earlier actor, never restarts the count. Where the IdP cannot read a hop's complete ancestry, it issues nothing. The onward ID-JAG conveys each entry's delegation member under the cross-domain projection rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain], Section "Conveyed Delegation Policy"), so a requested authorization detail that keeps an omitted delegation exceeds the grant's authority and is refused. The rule changes only the conveyed copy: the delegation constraints at this exchange apply at the depth counted above, act attributes the same actors, and that profile's depth reset does not apply. The dependency on that profile binds only a deployment that adopts this transport. 6.2. Async Delegation Transport Async delegation ([I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]) is the intra-domain, disconnected, over-time transport, for background jobs, scheduled tasks, agent queues, and multi-stage orchestration. A delegated refresh-token family is established at the accepted hop and redeemed later, after the original credential is gone. Under this profile the family's delegated authorization state MUST be a subset of the Mission's Authority Set; the family's absolute maximum delegation lifetime MUST equal the Mission's expires_at; and the family MUST be invalidated when the Mission reaches a terminal state, reusing that draft's family-revocation and reuse-detection rules with the Mission lifecycle as the trigger. This transport's reference (Section 6) is the presented refresh token. It is bound to its family's delegated authorization state (Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]), through which it resolves to the Mission's rooting anchor, the family's grant binding. Rotation (Section 6 of [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]) preserves that state, and the issuance profile resolves the family, one grant lineage, to the same Mission for its whole lifetime ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Binding the Mission to the Grant"). The refresh token is a credential, not a continuation handle, protected by that draft's client binding (Section 5.2 of [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]). The exchange's subject_token is a delegation handle (Section 4.3 of [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]): an access token whose audience is the acting client's own client_id, sender-constrained to the acting client's key. A Mission Issuer MUST refuse a subject_token whose audience is not the authenticated acting client, including a Mission access token audienced to a resource, and MUST require proof of possession of the subject_token's own confirmation key; client authentication never satisfies that sender constraint. An agent obtains its delegation handle with a Token Exchange that presents its own Mission access token, proves possession of that token's key, and names its own client_id as audience. The delegation handle keeps that key and carries the presented token's authority narrowed by the Mission's current effective authority. The exchange is a no-actor self-exchange under the issuance profile's Self- Exchange Down-Scoping rules ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A dispatched Mission's selected Agent instead redeems the Template profile's Dispatch Handoff for its delegation handle ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template]), unless it is also the Dispatcher (the same authenticated client), which obtains its delegation handle through this exchange from the instance's access token. This is the "scheduled continuation roots in durable authorization" case: the Mission is that durable authorization. Successive refreshes within one family are one delegation and are not counted again against derivation_limit (Section 4). Establishing the family is a delegation-family-creating exchange, and a client that loses the response retries with a fresh, valid proof; without an idempotency identifier that retry mints a second live refresh-token family. The exchange therefore carries creation_request_id, the creation idempotency identifier of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]. The parameter is REQUIRED; a Mission Issuer MUST refuse an exchange missing it with invalid_request. Its syntax, the (client, creation_request_id) key uniqueness, fingerprint comparison, reservation ownership, tombstone retention against the published retry horizon, and the revalidation rules are that profile's, applied by reference and not redefined here. A refresh-token family is not a Mission: its delivery and recovery are defined below, not by that profile's Mission-creation recovery. In the operation fingerprint, op is async-delegation; iss and client are as the expansion profile defines them; source is the mission_id of the base Mission resolved from subject_token, never the raw token; cnf is the acting client's verified confirmation, which is the delegation handle's own key; proposal is the parsed authorization_details array naming the requested confined subset, when present; resource is the target the family is audienced to; and request_refresh_token is the parameter selecting this exchange. A repetition whose fingerprint differs is refused with invalid_request. The operation passes through three states. It is reserved when the (client, creation_request_id) reservation is acquired, before any side effect; family-created once the family and its single derivation count exist, committed atomically, with the family's identity recorded on the reservation; and completed once the response is delivered. A derivation-gate rejection or creation failure invalidates the provisional family and records the refusal, replayed to a matching retry. Recovery is delivery of the recorded family, never a second family and never a second derivation count. A revalidated retry (the same authenticated client proving possession of the recorded cnf, with a matching fingerprint) recovers by state: a reserved operation yields a retryable in-progress result; a family-created operation resumes delivery, issuing the recorded family's initial tokens; a completed operation returns the stored response while the initial refresh token is unissued or unconsumed. Consumption of the initial refresh token proves delivery: the client held the response and rotated on it. Once it is consumed, the operation is delivered and creation recovery MUST be refused with invalid_grant; the client continues on the family's current refresh token. A rotating refresh-token family is a single lineage ([RFC9700]); recovery MUST NOT mint an independent sibling refresh token into it. 6.3. Cross-Domain Projection Transport Cross-domain projection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]) is the cross- boundary transport: a single-hop grant that carries a Mission into a partner trust domain, where a Resource Authorization Server mints a local token bounded by the projected authority. This profile adds nothing to projection's wire. Its reference (Section 6) is the Mission's refresh token, which the projection exchange presents as its subject_token and which resolves to exactly one Mission. The cross-domain grant it yields is the continued grant, and carries the mission claim naming that Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]). It requires that a Mission continued in the partner domain remains subject to this profile there: continuation handles minted in the partner domain grant nothing, and continued grants re-derive a subset of the projected authority under the partner's state view. Projection stays single-hop regardless of intra-domain continuation on either side of the boundary. 7. Execution-Time Evidence Each action taken under a continued credential is a decision point that produces execution evidence and a Mission Receipt ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]), recorded against the Mission. Under this profile that evidence MUST additionally record the continuation hop's identifiers: the continued credential's jti and the Mission lineage it carries (the mission claim's parent lineage or the resolved continuation handle). An action taken through a continuation therefore attributes to both the Mission that authorized it and the specific hop that carried the authorization, so that a reviewer can reconstruct which continuation, of possibly many under one Mission, produced a given effect. 8. Substrate Dispositions This is an OAuth-wire profile, not a substrate requirement. The Mission substrate restates no definition, and the continuity requirements of Section 4 are applications of existing substrate requirements (the Mission identifier, active-gated issuance, the subset rule, revocation, and the anchors) rather than new obligations. A binding therefore realizes continuation through its own surfaces, not through a substrate row. Two non-OAuth bindings dispose of continuation as a composition consequence. AAuth ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]): over-time continuation is native and needs no new transport. The mission reference (the approving Person Server and s256) is a handle that grants nothing, and the Person Server's state-gated, one-hour auth-token issuance and federation is the continuation point, with revocation latency bounded by the auth-token lifetime. The cross-workload transports of this profile have no AAuth substrate (AAuth has no token exchange, no act chain, and no ID-JAG), and AAuth declines cross-hop authority carry-forward by design: a chained hop is a fresh decision at its own decision point. AAuth-native cross- workload continuation is therefore deferred work. AAuth over-time continuation is scoped to the Person-Server-mediated, attributed path; an AAuth federated re-issuance in Reference-only mode, where the Access Server does not carry the Mission members, is a fresh federated decision, not a Mission continuation, and is out of scope for this profile. UMA ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-uma]): the persisted-claims token is the continuation handle and already realizes the grants-nothing invariant, with every requesting-party token re-passing fresh assessment. 9. Security Considerations Continuation handle theft yields no authority. Because a continuation handle grants nothing (Section 5), an attacker who steals one cannot obtain a continued grant without also satisfying the transport's identity re-establishment and key confirmation and passing the Mission's live state gate. This is the property that makes conveying a continuation handle through an intermediary safe: the intermediary gains no ability to act. A delegation handle does carry authority, and its sender constraint (Section 6.2) withholds that authority from a holder without the acting client's key. Neither the handle-theft claim nor the safe-intermediary claim extends to a transport reference that is a credential, such as a refresh token: a stolen refresh token protected only as a bearer credential can mint access tokens until detection, revocation or expiry (Section 11 of [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]). Revocation latency for a continuation is bounded by the shorter of the continued credential's remaining lifetime and the transport's re- issuance interval, and never exceeds the Mission's expiry (Section 4). Terminating a Mission stops future continuation immediately but does not shorten a credential already issued; deployments requiring tighter bounds choose shorter transport lifetimes. Replay is a transport concern this profile does not relax: the Identity Continuation Assertion is single-use, keyed on (iss, jti) (Section 5.5.7 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]), and an async delegation family rotates on each refresh with reuse detection over the family. A continuation MUST NOT widen authority; the subset check of Section 4 is enforced at every issuance, so a compromised transport cannot escalate beyond the Mission's Authority Set. Continued grants are audience-confined by their transport, limiting a confused-deputy hop to the audiences the Mission already reaches. 10. Privacy Considerations Continuation preserves the Mission's subject rather than minting a new one, and the transports resolve audience-local subjects where they resolve a subject at all, so a continued Mission does not become a cross-audience correlation handle. The Identity Continuation Assertion carries no user subject, and its handles are hop-specific, but the IdP and a hop's participants can still correlate a chain (Section 10 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]). Continuation handles are opaque and carry no authorization detail, so their exposure discloses neither the subject nor the granted authority. 11. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. The token types, grant types, and metadata parameters used by the transports are registered by their respective documents ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion], [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]); this profile constrains their use and introduces none of its own. 12. References 12.1. Normative References [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain] McGuinness, K., "Mission Cross-Domain Projection for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion] McGuinness, K., "Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020, . [RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, September 2023, . 12.2. Informative References [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth] McGuinness, K., "Mission Context Binding for AAuth", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture] McGuinness, K., "An Architecture for Mission-Bound Authorization", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement: AuthZEN Profile", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Aware Agent Harnesses", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-uma] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for User- Managed Access (UMA) 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion] McGuinness, K. and A. Parecki, "Identity Continuation Assertion for OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation- assertion-02, 8 September 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation] McGuinness, K., "Mission Child Delegation for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits] McGuinness, K., "Mission Derivation Limits for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template] McGuinness, K., "Mission Template for OAuth 2.0", 2026, . [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation] Zhu, L. and Z. Berg, "Delegated Refresh Tokens for OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation-05, 3 August 2026, . [RFC9700] Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett, "Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security", BCP 240, RFC 9700, DOI 10.17487/RFC9700, January 2025, . Appendix A. Document History [[ To be removed from the final specification ]] * The Identity Continuation Transport requires the root and onward ID-JAGs to identify the originating Mission through the mission claim, expires_at included, refuses a redemption without it, and requires a Resource Authorization Server's local access token to preserve it. It also places the hop record, a Resource Authorization Server's handle association and any refresh family against grant bindings, and says when the root exchange coincides with cross-domain projection (#1589, D726). * Continuation Transports requires each transport to identify the accepted hop through a reference that resolves to the Mission's rooting anchor, and forbids treating possession of that reference alone as evidence that the work remains authorized. The reference no longer has to be a non-credential: the async delegation and cross-domain transports' references are refresh tokens. This is a normative applicability correction; the Grants-Nothing Invariant is unchanged (#1588). Execution-Time Evidence names the continuation hop's identifiers, so the term does not read as that reference. * The async transport's handle is called a delegation handle, an access token carrying authority, distinct from a continuation handle; the Rooting and Termination requirements name the continuation handle; and the document calls itself a profile, not a binding. No requirement changed. * The Identity Continuation Transport's onward ID-JAG conveys delegation under the cross-domain projection rule, so a requested authorization detail that keeps an omitted member exceeds the grant's authority; the transport's depth count and act attribution are unchanged, with no depth reset (#1374). * The Identity Continuation Transport's codes replace the issuance profile's Token Exchange code, now invalid_request; the codes themselves are unchanged (#1154). * Aligned with the published Identity Continuation Assertion (-02): the transport runs among Resource Authorization Servers that trust a common IdP, its assertion issuer is the Continuation Assertion Issuer, the Mission binds the chain authorization, lifecycle anchor, and chain ending, single use is keyed on (iss, jti), and Privacy Considerations notes that a chain remains correlatable (#906). * The Identity Continuation Transport states the refusal codes at that exchange, those of the Identity Continuation Assertion in place of the issuance profile's invalid_grant, as the issuance profile permits for a Token Exchange profile that assigns its own code. The mission_error diagnostic requirements are unchanged (#921). * The Identity Continuation Transport states how Mission delegation depth is counted there: over the hop's IdP-held ancestry plus the current actor, merging only consecutive equal actors, from the approved client at depth 0, with no reset, and with nothing issued when the ancestry is incomplete (#960). * A dispatched Mission enters the async delegation transport through its selected Agent, which redeems the Template profile's Dispatch Handoff for a delegation handle of its own (#1158). * The async delegation transport's subject_token is a delegation handle: its audience is the acting client and possession of its own key is proved at the exchange, as Section 4.3 of the async delegation draft requires, replacing the re-binding to the acting key. An agent obtains its handle with a no-actor self-exchange naming its own client_id as audience (#1157). * A dispatched Mission's selected Agent that is also its Dispatcher obtains its delegation handle through that self-exchange, from the instance's access token, instead of the Dispatch Handoff (#1195). Author's Address Karl McGuinness Independent Email: public@karlmcguinness.com