| Internet-Draft | OAuth Mission Status | November 2026 |
| McGuinness | Expires 21 May 2027 | [Page] |
The Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 profile binds issued
authority to a durable, human-approved Mission and gates issuance on
Mission state, but it observes Mission state only through token lifetime
and optional token introspection. This document
defines the Mission state-management surfaces it defers: the Mission
Status operation (keyed by mission_id) with signed responses, a
freshness member and signing for the issuance profile's token
introspection projection, the Mission Lifecycle
endpoint with revoke, suspend, resume, and complete
operations, the suspended state and the completed termination
reason with the transitions between the lifecycle states, and
revocation-propagation guidance. Companion profiles can extend the
mission object and the Lifecycle endpoint's operations without
altering these surfaces.
Each capability is independently optional; an implementation can adopt
any subset, and one that adopts none remains a conforming issuance
profile.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], the
OAuth binding of Mission-Bound Authorization, makes a
Mission a first-class OAuth artifact: a structured, human-approved,
integrity-bound task whose authority bounds and outlives every token
an agent derives. It is, by design, a minimum-viable issuance layer.
It gates derivation on Mission state, carries the mission claim on
every derived token, and offers only OPTIONAL token introspection
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission State via
Token Introspection") as a way for a resource server to observe
Mission state. It defers to this document the canonical Mission Status
surface, keyed by mission_id, with its signed status evidence, and a
standardized management endpoint for lifecycle transitions.¶
This document specifies the following extensions to the issuance profile:¶
A dedicated Mission Status operation
(Section 3), which an authenticated, authorized consumer
holding a mission_id resolves, with responses signed as a JWS
[RFC7515].¶
A freshness member for the issuance profile's Mission projection on token introspection, which a deployment can return as a [RFC9701]-signed response (Section 4).¶
A Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5)
for explicit revoke, suspend, resume, and complete
operations, distinct from [RFC7009] token revocation, with an
extension point through which a companion profile MAY register a
further operation value (Section 5.1).¶
Revocation propagation guidance
(Section 6): the mission_max_stale_seconds
ceiling on reliance on an observation of Mission state, and how to
size token lifetimes to the propagation mechanisms in use.¶
Each extension is independently optional (Section 9). The authorization server metadata an AS publishes (Section 8) follows from the extensions and authentication paths it supports.¶
This document does not restate the issuance profile: the Mission
Intent, authority derivation, the mission claim, the integrity
anchors, Mission-bound token issuance, the subset rule, and lifecycle
gating are defined in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission].¶
The OpenID Shared Signals Framework [OIDC-SSF] and its Continuous Access Evaluation Profile [OIDC-CAEP] push events to a receiver, and a companion profile can carry Mission transitions that way (Section 6). An event reports that state changed, not how long a consumer may rely on the state, so a push speeds learning of transitions without replacing the Status operation (Section 7).¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terms defined in the issuance profile
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], in particular Mission,
Mission Issuer, Authority Set, the mission claim, and mission_id;
and the mission_resource_access authorization details type defined
in its Mission Resource Access Profile
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). The Mission
Issuer is the Mission issuer: in the OAuth binding, the
authorization server; another binding's Mission Issuer that serves
these surfaces does so with the same semantics. This document
additionally uses:¶
A signed payload returned by the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3), reporting a Mission's current state and the audience-scoped evidence a consumer needs.¶
The approved Authority Set after applying every issuer-held, monotonic narrowing mechanism the deployment runs, each narrowing profile defining its own subtraction. No narrowing mechanism adds or restores authority. Membership in this set is necessary, never sufficient, for an action to proceed.¶
A committed change to issuer-held state associated with a Mission,
outside its Mission Record, that leaves the Mission's state and
termination unchanged: a schedule replacement (Section 5.6),
or a change a companion profile defines as one.¶
The lifecycle event a state-distribution companion defines for a committed transition or metadata-only change ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"). To emit one is to make the committed change available to that companion; this document defines no event or channel.¶
All JSON shown in this document is non-normative and illustrative; the member definitions in the surrounding text are authoritative. HTTP message examples follow the conventions of [RFC9110]; long URLs and form parameters are wrapped for display. JWT and JWS examples are shown as decoded JSON with separate header objects; on the wire the JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] applies.¶
This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile's stateless baseline needs no dedicated status surface ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Sections "Resource Server Enforcement" and "Revocation"), and a consumer that does not use this operation is unaffected.¶
The dedicated Mission Status operation is the canonical status surface
the issuance profile defers. Unlike token introspection
(Section 4), which answers "is this
token's authorization still good," the Mission Status operation answers
"what is the state of this Mission" keyed by the mission_id alone.
An authenticated, authorized consumer holding a mission_id
(including an auditor or an authorization server in another trust
domain) resolves it without holding a token the authorization server
(AS) issued.¶
The AS serves the operation at its Mission Status
endpoint, whose URL it publishes in authorization server metadata
(Section 8) as mission_status_endpoint. A consumer resolves
it from the expected issuer, which comes from its own issuer trust
or configuration, never from the response under verification: for a
resource server, the mission.issuer of an access token it accepted
under the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Resource Server Enforcement"). It retrieves that issuer's
metadata, validated as Section 3.3 of [RFC8414] requires (the
metadata's issuer equals the issuer identifier used to retrieve
it), and verifies responses with keys from that issuer's jwks_uri.
The endpoint MUST be served over TLS
1.2 or later (TLS 1.3 RECOMMENDED), following the recommendations of
[RFC9325].¶
The request is an HTTPS POST with an
application/x-www-form-urlencoded body containing:¶
mission_id:REQUIRED. A string. The canonical Mission Identifier, named per the issuance profile's external-surface convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
audience:CONDITIONAL. A string. The audience for which the consumer requests
authority, one the AS's configuration authorizes that
consumer to request (below). An authorized consumer that is not a
resource server (for example an auditor or an authorization server
in another trust domain) and needs only Mission state, not
audience-scoped authority, MAY omit audience; the response is then
state-only and carries no authorization_details
(Section 3.5). A resource server resolving authority
for a specific audience MUST send it.¶
nonce:REQUIRED. A string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. A
client-generated nonce binding the response to this request. It
MUST be unique per request within the response lifetime. The
consumer checks the response's nonce against it
(Section 3.5).¶
The request also carries the client authentication parameters of the
method it uses (Section 3.2), for example
client_id, REQUIRED with mTLS client authentication
(Section 2 of [RFC8705]), or client_assertion_type and
client_assertion, REQUIRED with private-key-JWT client
authentication [RFC7523]. A method that carries its credentials in
HTTP header fields keeps them there.¶
The AS's configuration states which audiences each
authenticated caller may request: a resource server is typically
configured for its own audience identifiers, and a consuming
authorization server for each resource it issues tokens for. The AS
MUST honor a request's audience only where that configuration authorizes the
authenticated caller for it, and MUST otherwise refuse the request
with the not-found response of Section 3.10. Entitlement
to an audience comes only from that configuration, never from string
equality between audience and the caller's client_id or
certificate subject. The response's aud is the requested audience
(Section 3.5).¶
The request MUST be authenticated. The AS MUST support at least one of the following paths. The client MUST use exactly one of them per request:¶
Client authentication, with a method from the OAuth Token
Endpoint Authentication Methods registry [RFC7591] that the AS
advertises for this endpoint (Section 8). A method that
authenticates with a shared client secret, such as
client_secret_basic, client_secret_post, or client_secret_jwt,
MUST NOT be used, and none is not client authentication. Each
method is processed as its specification defines. With
tls_client_auth [RFC8705], the AS validates the client's X.509
certificate against its configured trust anchors and the client's
registered tls_client_auth metadata. With private_key_jwt
[RFC7523], the
client presents client_assertion_type with the exact value
urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer and a signed
JWT as client_assertion. The assertion's aud MUST be the AS's
issuer identifier [RFC8414] as its sole value, the client
authentication audience of [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis];
the AS MUST reject an assertion with any other aud. The client
SHOULD set the JWS typ header to client-authentication+jwt.
The AS accepts only the JWS
[RFC7515] algorithms it advertises for that endpoint
(Section 8); none MUST NOT be used.¶
Sender-constrained access token. The client presents a
mission_status-scoped access token (see the authorization
requirement below) in the Authorization header, sender-constrained
either by DPoP [RFC9449] (the DPoP scheme with a DPoP proof
header, the token's cnf.jkt matching the proof key thumbprint) or
by mTLS [RFC8705] (a certificate-bound token, the Bearer scheme,
whose cnf.x5t#S256 matches the presented client certificate). The
token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's
protected-resource identifier (below).¶
The AS MUST refuse a request not authenticated on one of the two paths, with the outcome Section 3.3 assigns. Wire evidence selects the path and method, in this order:¶
A request presenting an access token in Authorization takes the
access-token path, and any client certificate is evaluated only as
that token's mTLS sender constraint.¶
Otherwise, a request presenting the parameters of a method other
than mTLS client authentication, such as client_assertion for
private_key_jwt, uses that method, and any client certificate is
not treated as client authentication.¶
Otherwise, a request presenting only a client certificate uses the mTLS client authentication method registered for the client ([RFC8705]).¶
This order keeps "exactly one path" satisfiable when mTLS terminates
at the edge. The parameters of a path or method the order does not
select, such as a client_assertion beside an access token, are not
evaluated as client authentication. A request whose selected method
the endpoint does not advertise, including a shared-secret method such
as HTTP Basic, is answered as one that presented no credential
(Section 3.3).¶
An authenticated caller MUST additionally carry an explicit read
authorization: a mission_status scope on the presented access token,
or a deployment-defined equivalent grant bound to the authenticated
client. The mission_status scope authorizes the Mission Status read
operation and mirrors the mission_lifecycle scope
(Section 5.4). A consumer that holds only a
mission_id and authenticates directly as a client carries the
deployment-defined equivalent grant, not a scope. A caller
carrying no such authorization is refused with the not-found response
of Section 3.10 (Section 3.8). This
includes an authenticated caller presenting an otherwise-valid access
token without the mission_status scope: it receives the not-found
response, not the insufficient_scope error of
Section 3.1 of [RFC6750]. An expired token, a token for another
audience, or a failed sender constraint is instead an access-token
authentication failure (Section 3.3).¶
Read authorization identifies the Missions the caller may inspect
under deployment policy: all Missions at the issuer, those of a
tenant, or a narrower set. Possession of the mission_status scope
alone does not establish which Missions it covers. That
authorization, with the audience entitlement of
Section 3.1 when the request names an audience, is
the authorization for the mission_id and audience that
Section 3.8 requires, and a Mission it does not
cover receives the not-found response.¶
A presented access token MUST be audience-restricted to this
endpoint's protected-resource identifier: the resource value the AS
publishes for this endpoint in its Protected Resource Metadata
[RFC9728]. For these surfaces that identifier is the endpoint's own
URL (the mission_status_endpoint or mission_lifecycle_endpoint),
not the issuer identifier that a private-key-JWT assertion's aud
names. The AS MUST reject a token whose audience does not name that
identifier. This token audience is distinct from the request's
audience parameter (Section 3.1): the token audience
authorizes the call at this endpoint, whereas the request audience
carries no authentication weight and only selects the
resource-server-specific authority projection the response returns
(Section 3.5).¶
For the sender-constrained access-token path, this endpoint is an
OAuth protected resource: the AS publishes, in its Protected Resource
Metadata for this resource [RFC9728], the resource identifier the
token's audience MUST name, the mission_status scope it requires
(scopes_supported), and the presentation and sender constraints it
accepts (bearer_methods_supported,
dpop_bound_access_tokens_required,
tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens). For the
client-authentication path, the AS advertises the accepted methods in
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported and, for
private_key_jwt, the accepted client-assertion signing algorithms
in mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported, not
read from the token endpoint's token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
(Section 8).¶
A request that fails authentication receives the outcome for the credential it presented:¶
A request whose presented access token fails authentication receives
HTTP 401 unauthorized with a WWW-Authenticate challenge in the
scheme it used: Bearer with the error attributes of
Section 3 of [RFC6750], or DPoP under
Section 7.1 of [RFC9449], including its algs parameter and error
codes.¶
A request whose client authentication fails at the HTTP layer
receives the error response that the method's specification defines
for that failure, with any error code, status, and challenge it
requires, such as a method's own error for a missing server-provided
challenge or a stale credential. That response's body is the error
body of Section 3.10, with the method's error code as
its error. Where the method defines none, the request receives HTTP
400 with the invalid_client error code, as
Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] answers a failed client
authentication carried outside the Authorization header, with no
WWW-Authenticate challenge. A failed client authentication is not
reported as an access-token failure. A client certificate rejected
during the TLS handshake fails at the TLS layer, before any HTTP
response.¶
A request that presented no credential receives, where the endpoint
accepts an access-token scheme, HTTP 401 unauthorized with one
challenge for each access-token scheme the endpoint accepts and no
error attribute (Section 3.1 of [RFC6750]); where it accepts
none, it receives HTTP 400 invalid_client.¶
Every challenge carries the resource_metadata parameter naming the
endpoint's Protected Resource Metadata (Section 5.1 of [RFC9728]).
A 401 response this section assigns to an access-token failure or a
missing credential carries the challenge or challenges and a JSON body
(Section 3.10): a challenge's error attribute, when
present, follows its scheme as above and is distinct from the body's
error, which is unauthorized.
An authenticated caller not authorized for the referenced Mission
receives not_found (404) with no challenge
(Section 3.8).¶
On success the AS returns a JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515]
signed with a key published in the AS's jwks_uri. The JWS header
carries typ of mission-status-response+jwt and a kid identifying
the signing key. Per Section 4.1.9 of [RFC7515], the typ header
omits the application/ prefix; the full media type
application/mission-status-response+jwt
(Section 12.3) is the HTTP Content-Type. Exact
validation of the protected typ value, with mutually exclusive
validation rules for the other JWTs the AS signs, implements the
substitution defense of Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] and
Section 3.12 of [RFC8725].¶
A Mission Status Response is evidence of Mission state for the
consumer that requested it, not a bearer credential, an access token,
or an authorization grant: presenting one authorizes nothing, and a
resource server validating access tokens under Section 4 of [RFC9068]
rejects it by its typ.¶
[RFC9701] is scoped to token introspection and does not apply to a
lookup keyed by mission_id (Section 10.4).
Implementations MUST NOT use [RFC9701] for the dedicated Mission
Status operation, and MUST NOT accept an unsigned response from it in
place of the signed form it requires.¶
In this document's ERP examples, the operation contract identifies
https://erp.example.com as the operation target
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). In the
audience-scoped example below, the consumer is the ERP resource
server, client erp-rs, which the AS's configuration
authorizes for that audience; its client identifier is the response's
sub.¶
Decoded JWS header:¶
{
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "as-key-2026-q3",
"typ": "mission-status-response+jwt"
}
¶
Decoded JWS payload:¶
{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"aud": "https://erp.example.com",
"sub": "erp-rs",
"nonce": "nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ",
"iat": 1793606400,
"exp": 1793606460,
"mission": {
"id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"state": "active",
"version": 1,
"expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
"fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:00:45Z"
},
"authorization_details": [
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["invoices.read"],
"constraints": {
"resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
"resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
},
"delegation": {
"max_depth": 2,
"allowed_delegates": [{ "sub_profile": "ai_agent" }]
} },
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
"constraints": {
"max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" }
} }
]
}
¶
The members are:¶
The signed JWT envelope iss, aud, sub, nonce, iat, exp.
The aud, a single string, is the response's audience binding and
the nonce its request binding. On a response to the Mission Status
operation or a base lifecycle operation, the AS MUST set sub to
the authenticated client's identifier: the presented access token's
client_id, or the client that authenticated directly. When the
request omitted audience (Section 3.1), the
response is state-only and the AS MUST set aud to the
authenticated client's client_id, as the Lifecycle endpoint does
(Section 5.1); the consumer's aud verification
below then checks that identifier. exp bounds the validity of the
signed response itself; how long the consumer MAY rely on the
reported state is given separately by mission.fresh_until below.¶
mission: the mission object, the same shape as the mission
claim of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission
Claim") with status members added. It carries:¶
id, issuer: the subject Mission's identifier and issuer.¶
authority_hash: OPTIONAL. The issuance profile's consent
commitment over the Authority Set
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Integrity
Anchors"), disclosed at the AS's discretion to a caller it
authorizes for audit or correlation use, on the same minimization
footing as the issuance profile's introspection disclosure
privilege ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Caller
Authorization and Minimization"). Not carried on the issuance
profile's baseline mission claim.¶
state: REQUIRED. The current Mission lifecycle state. The
authoritative state space is the issuance profile's
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Lifecycle"): active and terminated, this document's suspended
when the Mission Lifecycle endpoint's suspend operation
(Section 5.1) is deployed, and any further state a
companion profile defines and the deployment runs. A consumer
applies the issuance profile's forward-compatibility rule: only
active permits reliance, and every other value, recognized or
not, is non-active. A non-active state gates new authorization
decisions only: it does not establish that work already accepted
under the Mission has stopped, or that completed effects were
undone.¶
termination: CONDITIONAL. Present exactly when state is
terminated: the Mission's termination
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Termination"), with its reason (revoked or expired from the
issuance profile, this document's completed, or a reason a
companion profile defines), its terminated_at, the members its
reason defines, and version: the state version (below) of the
transition that committed the termination. version is REQUIRED
in every termination the AS commits, and absent while
a termination that takes effect without a request, such as
expired, is observed but not yet committed; once committed it
does not change, so a metadata-only change committed later leaves
it lower than the response's version. It is the audit reference
for revoked and completed.¶
expires_at: REQUIRED. The point at which the Mission itself
expires, the
Mission record's expires_at
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
fresh_until: REQUIRED. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time giving
the point until which the consumer MAY rely on the reported state
without re-checking, governing caching (Section 3.6).
It is report-freshness metadata, carried in mission so it travels
with state even on the introspection projection, which can lack a
signed envelope to carry it (Section 4).¶
suspend_until, on_expiry: CONDITIONAL. Present only while the
Mission is suspended under a deadline
(Section 5.1): the RFC 3339 [RFC3339]
deadline, and the transition (resume or revoke) the AS applies
when it passes.¶
version: REQUIRED. A positive integer, the Mission's
state version: a strictly
monotonic per-Mission counter the AS maintains,
incremented on each committed lifecycle transition (the approval
event is version 1) and each committed metadata-only change,
current as of the reported state. A deadline's or expiry's
transition, which takes effect without a request, advances
version only when committed; until then a response reports the
last committed value. It orders observations of one
Mission across every surface that reports it, and a lifecycle
request can guard on it with expected_version (Section 5.6).¶
Extension members: a companion profile MAY add further members to this object.¶
authorization_details: the Effective Authority Set entries of every
AS-supported authorization_details type
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization
Details Types") relevant to the requesting audience, as each entry's
own type specification determines (for the general-purpose
mission_resource_access type, by its resource member,
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). The member
is a top-level sibling of mission, as on the token and in the
introspection response. Entries addressed to other audiences MUST NOT be disclosed. When the request names an audience, the response
MUST carry authorization_details, as an empty array when no entry
is relevant to that audience. The entries are carried whatever the
Mission's state; a non-active state permits no reliance on them
(Section 3.7). When the request omits audience
(Section 3.1), there is no requesting audience: the
response is state-only and MUST NOT carry authorization_details.¶
A consumer MUST verify, before honoring a response:¶
the JWS header typ is mission-status-response+jwt;¶
the JWS header alg is one the AS advertises in
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported (Section 8),
rejecting none and any algorithm not listed;¶
the JWS signature against a current jwks_uri entry for the
issuer AS that the consumer's trusted configuration authorizes for
that AS's Mission Status responses; a key's presence in the
jwks_uri does not authorize it (Section 8.1);¶
iss equals the expected AS issuer URL, and mission.issuer
equals iss;¶
aud equals the audience the request named or, for a
state-only response, the requesting client's client_id
(Section 3.1);¶
sub equals the requesting client's identifier;¶
nonce equals the request's nonce;¶
mission.id equals the requested mission_id;¶
iat is not in the future and exp is not in the past, with up to
30 seconds clock-skew tolerance; and¶
mission.fresh_until is not later than exp.¶
Caching follows these rules:¶
Cache key. Consumers SHOULD cache a response keyed on
(mission_id, audience), or on (mission_id, client_id) for a
state-only response, until its reliance bound (below).¶
Freshness cap. The AS MUST NOT set mission.fresh_until later
than the response's exp, nor, when it advertises
mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 8), later than the
response's iat plus that value.¶
Reliance bound. A response's reliance bound is the earliest of
mission.fresh_until, the response's exp, and, when the AS
advertises mission_max_stale_seconds, the response's iat plus
that value. Consumers MUST NOT use a response after its reliance
bound, subject only to the skew tolerance below, and MUST NOT rely
on a reported active state at or after mission.expires_at. In
particular, a consumer MUST NOT extend reliance on a cached
suspended (or any non-active) response beyond its reliance
bound.¶
Skew tolerance. When comparing the current time to
mission.fresh_until, a consumer MAY allow up to 30 seconds of
tolerance for the active state only, and no tolerance for any
other state. The tolerance MUST NOT extend reliance past the
response's exp, mission.expires_at, or the response's iat plus
the advertised mission_max_stale_seconds.¶
The freshness cap keeps report freshness within the signed response's
own validity and the deployment's advertised revocation-propagation
tolerance. The skew tolerance is a clock-skew allowance on the
mission.fresh_until comparison only, bounding the disagreement
between the AS's and the consumer's clocks, not a property of state
reversibility. By contrast, the clock-skew tolerance of the response
checks (Section 3.5) decides only whether a response is
accepted, never how long it is relied on, so a response accepted
after its exp supports no decision (Section 3.7).
The reliance bound holds for non-active states too, so a consumer
re-reads a suspended Mission, which can be resumed, rather than
refusing on an outdated observation.¶
A decision that requires Mission Status proceeds only on a response
that passed every check of Section 3.5, is within its
reliance bound (Section 3.6), and reports active.
Without one, the decision MUST NOT proceed, whatever the cause: an
error response such as unavailable, rate_limited or not_found, a
failed check, a network failure, or a lapsed reliance bound. For
example, a resource server refuses the request it is deciding, and a
consuming authorization server issues no token.¶
That outcome establishes only that the decision cannot proceed; it is
not evidence that the Mission terminated. A transient failure, such as
unavailable, rate_limited or a network failure, leaves a response
the consumer already holds usable within that response's original
reliance bound; a failed request never refreshes or extends that
bound.¶
A mission_id is never a bearer capability. The AS MUST authenticate
the requester and authorize it for the requested mission_id and
audience.¶
Unknown mission_id values and known-but-unauthorized references MUST
produce indistinguishable responses (HTTP 404 with a generic
not-found body; see Section 3.10). The AS MUST return an
identical HTTP status code, response body, and headers for the two
cases. The AS SHOULD keep response timing from distinguishing the two
cases, for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform
lookup path for both.¶
The AS MUST process a Mission Status request in this order, refusing it at the first step that fails:¶
Authenticate the caller (Section 3.2),
parsing the request body only as far as authentication and the
nonce echo of Section 3.10 need. A
body that cannot be parsed is refused invalid_request, whatever
credential the request presents; a client authentication parameter
included more than once fails authentication, and no occurrence of
it is used. Every authentication failure is answered as
Section 3.3 assigns.¶
Validate the request syntax (Section 3.1). A
malformed request is refused invalid_request; a request that
includes a parameter more than once is malformed, as at the token
endpoint (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]).¶
Authorize the request: the caller's read authorization, the Mission
the mission_id names, and any requested audience
(Section 3.1). An unknown Mission and every failed
authorization are refused alike with the not-found response.¶
Read the Mission's current state and return the signed response (Section 3.5).¶
No response that depends on the Mission's existence or state precedes step 3.¶
Mission Status outcomes are of two kinds. A success outcome is a found,
visible, authorized Mission: the AS returns HTTP 200 with a signed
Mission Status Response, whose mission.state, not a separate error
code, describes the outcome. A wire error is a hard failure: the AS returns
the matching HTTP status with a JSON object [RFC8259] body whose
error member carries the error code below.¶
Success outcomes:¶
| mission.state | Description |
|---|---|
active
|
Mission is active and permits reliance. |
suspended
|
Mission is suspended (non-terminal). |
terminated
|
Mission has ended; mission.termination gives the reason. |
A terminated Mission's mission.termination.reason comes from an
open set (Section 3.5), and a consumer's reliance
decision never depends on recognizing it.¶
Wire error codes:¶
| error | HTTP | Description |
|---|---|---|
invalid_request
|
400 | Malformed request: an unparseable body, a required member missing or malformed, an invalid member combination, a Lifecycle operation the AS does not serve (Section 5), or a retransmitted nonce whose operation members differ from the original's, present or absent alike (Section 5.6). |
invalid_client
|
400 | Direct client authentication failed and its method defines no other error, or no credential was presented where no access-token scheme is accepted (Section 3.3). |
unauthorized
|
401 | Access-token authentication failed, or no credential was presented where an access-token scheme is accepted; the response carries the challenges of Section 3.3. |
not_found
|
404 | The referenced Mission does not exist or is not visible to the caller. |
conflict
|
409 | Lifecycle operation not legal from the current state (Section 5.6). |
stale_version
|
409 |
expected_version differs from the current state version (Section 5.6). |
rate_limited
|
429 | The caller is rate-limited. |
unavailable
|
503 | The AS temporarily cannot answer, including a retransmit of a Lifecycle request still being processed (Section 5.6). |
A client authentication method's own error codes and statuses (Section 3.3) can also appear.¶
unauthorized and invalid_client mean the request carried no valid
authentication; a request authenticated but not authorized for the
referenced Mission receives not_found, never an authentication
failure (Section 3.8). The error body, shown here
for a not-found response:¶
The body MUST contain error and error_description, and MUST
additionally contain nonce when the request carried a well-formed
nonce. A request whose nonce is absent or malformed is refused
invalid_request with no nonce member echoed. The body MUST NOT
contain any member that would let a caller distinguish unknown from
unauthorized references. For rate_limited, the response SHOULD
include a Retry-After header [RFC9110] and a retry_after body
member in seconds.¶
The body is application/json with Cache-Control: no-store.
error_description is diagnostic and is never authorization input.
nonce correlates the response to the request in support of the
signed-response and retry model of Section 5.6 and is not, by
itself, replay protection (see the rule above for an absent or
malformed nonce). These endpoints use this OAuth error-response
shape, not the problem details of [RFC9457].¶
This section is OPTIONAL and is a thin delta over the OAuth 2.0 Token
Introspection [RFC7662] projection of
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission State via
Token Introspection"). That section defines the mission member
(id, issuer, the lifecycle state reported only by the Mission's
issuer, and authority_hash disclosed only to a caller holding its
disclosure privilege) and its caller-authorization and minimization
rules.¶
This section adds to that projection:¶
TLS protects the projection, as it does any introspection response.
Where the projection's integrity and provenance
need to be verifiable independently of the transport (for example
when the response transits intermediaries or is retained for audit),
the AS SHOULD return it as a [RFC9701]-signed response, advertised
through the introspection_signing_alg_values_supported metadata
that [RFC9701] registers in the [RFC8414] registry.¶
When the responding AS is the Mission's issuer, the projection MAY
additionally carry fresh_until, an RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time
giving the point until which the consumer MAY rely on the reported
state without re-checking. The caching rule of
Section 3.6 applies with only the response-level
terms the response carries: an [RFC9701] response's top-level
iat dates it, and a top-level exp (discouraged but permitted by
[RFC9701]) bounds reliance where present; an unsigned response
carries neither. The [RFC7662] iat and exp members describe
the token, not the observation of Mission state, and are not these
terms. The AS sets fresh_until no later than the time of the
response plus any advertised mission_max_stale_seconds. When
fresh_until is absent (for example a non-issuer projection), the
issuance profile's per-use rule governs: the consumer MUST NOT reuse
the reported state for a later decision.¶
This projection and the Mission Status Response
(Section 3.5) share one mission object shape: the
open mission claim object of
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission Claim")
plus status members (state, termination, fresh_until, any
companion-defined extension member, and, on the Mission Status
Response, expires_at and version). The projection populates the
subset a token-holding consumer needs, and a consumer reads each fact
from the same place in either.¶
Example [RFC9701]-signed introspection response (decoded payload),
for a token whose Mission is active:¶
{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"aud": "https://erp.example.com",
"iat": 1793606410,
"token_introspection": {
"active": true,
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR",
"mission": {
"id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"state": "active",
"fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:00:55Z"
}
}
}
¶
Per [RFC9701], the signed response is a JWT of typ
token-introspection+jwt carrying the [RFC7662] members, mission
included, in its token_introspection claim, beside the top-level
iss, aud, and iat it always carries.¶
A consumer holding only a mission_id, or needing signed evidence
independent of a specific token, uses the Mission Status operation
(Section 3); the projection is a same-call convenience for
token-holding consumers and is never the sole Mission Status path.¶
This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile requires an
authenticated, deployment-defined means to revoke a Mission and defers
a standardized management API and the richer suspend, resume, and
complete operations ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Sections "Revocation" and "Mission Lifecycle"). This section
standardizes that management surface; Section 5.4
governs who may perform each operation.¶
The AS publishes its Mission Lifecycle endpoint URL in authorization
server metadata (Section 8) as mission_lifecycle_endpoint,
distinct from [RFC7009] token revocation. The endpoint MUST be
served over TLS as the Mission Status endpoint is (Section 3).¶
This endpoint's operations extend the issuance profile's lifecycle
state space ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Lifecycle"), each value arriving with the operation that introduces
it (Section 9): suspend adds the state suspended (a paused
Mission), and complete adds the termination reason completed (the
Mission completed successfully). Issuance gating treats any state
other than active as non-deriving, exactly as the issuance profile
gates on active.¶
A transition to suspended, or to terminated with reason
completed, gates new derivation only.
Tokens already derived under the Mission remain valid until their own
exp, exactly as in the issuance profile's revocation model. A
deployment that
needs a prompt cutoff on outstanding tokens uses the propagation
mechanisms of Section 6.¶
Suspension is reversible. Consuming or invalidating a refresh token
solely because of suspension can prevent refresh after a resume.
After validating a
refresh request and before consuming or rotating its refresh token,
the AS SHOULD check whether the Mission, or another Mission whose
state a companion profile makes gate its derivation, is suspended.
When this check detects suspension, the AS SHOULD
refuse the request without consuming the refresh token or invalidating
its otherwise-valid grant solely because of that suspension. The
check does not replace issuance-time state validation: a concurrent
suspension can still refuse issuance after the check, and preserving
refresh capability across that interval requires coordination with
the issuance commit. The check leaves refresh-token rotation and
reuse detection intact, and a resume does not revive a credential that
expired or was revoked independently.¶
An error code alone does not tell a client whether a resume can
lift a refusal. When the issuance profile's gating refuses a
derivation because the Mission is suspended, or terminated with
reason completed, the AS SHOULD include, alongside error, the
mission_error token-error-response member
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Issuance Gating") with the value suspended or completed,
respectively. suspended reports a refusal that a resume can lift;
completed reports a terminal one. The issuance profile's rules for
that member apply: it is diagnostic only, it grants nothing, an
unrecognized value is ignored, and it is returned only to the
authenticated client presenting the Mission's grant.¶
The endpoint accepts authenticated POST requests with a form-urlencoded body:¶
mission_id:REQUIRED. A string. The Mission Identifier, as at the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.1).¶
operation:REQUIRED. A string. One of revoke, suspend, resume,
complete, or a further value a companion profile registers as an
extension operation on this endpoint (below).¶
reason:OPTIONAL. A string of at most 1024 Unicode code points, a longer one being malformed. A human-readable reason recorded in audit. Not used by an extension operation that records its own request members in audit.¶
suspend_until:OPTIONAL. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time. Valid only on the
suspend operation. When present, it sets a deadline after which the
AS applies on_expiry.¶
on_expiry:CONDITIONAL. A string, one of resume or revoke. REQUIRED when
suspend_until is present; otherwise MUST NOT be sent. It selects the
transition the AS applies when suspend_until passes.¶
expected_version:OPTIONAL. A string, the canonical decimal form of a positive state version (Section 3.5): ASCII digits with no leading zero, and no sign, whitespace, fraction or exponent. It is the version the caller last observed, compared exactly, never rounded. Any other form is malformed. The AS applies it as Section 5.6 describes.¶
nonce:REQUIRED. A string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. A
client-generated nonce, the request's idempotency key
(Section 5.6), not a fresh challenge per transmission as at the
Mission Status endpoint: a client MUST use a fresh nonce for each
new operation it requests on a Mission, unique among its nonce
values for that Mission within the deduplication window, and repeat
it only to retransmit that request.¶
The request also carries the client authentication parameters of the method it uses, as at the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.1).¶
A companion-registered extension operation carries additional REQUIRED and OPTIONAL members of its own, defined completely by the companion that registers it.¶
The base operations are revoke, suspend, resume, and
complete; Section 5.2 gives the transition each applies.¶
The AS MUST refuse an operation value it does not serve, a base
operation its conformance claim omits (Section 9) or an extension
operation it has not adopted, with invalid_request
(Section 3.10) before looking up the Mission, leaving the
Mission unchanged, so the refusal discloses nothing about it.¶
The AS answers a successful base operation with the signed,
state-only Mission Status Response (Section 3.5),
whose aud is the authenticated client's client_id and whose
nonce is the request's. A retransmit of an accepted request replays
that original response (Section 5.6). An extension operation's
outcome and result shape are those its companion profile defines
(below).¶
A companion profile MAY register a further operation value on this
endpoint that changes no Mission-level state, provided it defines the
value's request members, authorization, anti-oracle behavior,
idempotency and outcome vocabulary, result shape, and conformance
requirements completely. It registers the value by defining it in
its own specification; no IANA registry holds operation values
(Section 12).¶
A suspend MAY carry suspend_until with a REQUIRED on_expiry; the
pair is the Mission's schedule. The schedule is issuer-held state
associated with the Mission, outside its Mission Record
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Record"): an
AS may store it with the record, and a signed or exchanged Mission
Record does not carry it. When the suspend_until of a current
schedule passes, the AS MUST apply on_expiry (transition to
active for resume, or to terminated with reason revoked for
revoke) and emit the corresponding transition event, without a
further request, unless expiry governs (below). While the Mission
is suspended under a deadline, both suspend_until and on_expiry
surface in the signed Mission Status Response
(Section 3.5) so a consumer sees the pending outcome.¶
The AS authorizes a schedule when it commits it
(Section 5.4) and does not re-authorize it at the
deadline: a later expiry or withdrawal of the committing party's grant
does not by itself cancel it. A schedule is current until its
suspension ends or an authorized replacement supersedes it
(Section 5.6). The AS MUST NOT apply a schedule that is no longer
current, so an earlier deadline never acts on a later suspension. A
deadline applies only a transition legal from the Mission's current
state (Section 5.2) and never changes a terminated Mission.¶
From a current schedule's deadline, every decision treats the Mission
as in the state its on_expiry produces, whether or not that
transition is persisted, so a request the AS decides after the
deadline is decided against that state. If the first decision after
the deadline comes at or after the Mission's expires_at, expiry
governs instead and the Mission is terminated with reason expired
(Section 5.2); a revocation committed at its deadline before
expires_at keeps reason revoked. For on_expiry revoke, the
termination's terminated_at is the schedule's suspend_until. A new
suspend whose suspend_until is not later than the time the AS
processes it is refused invalid_request; a retransmit of an accepted
request still replays its original response after the deadline passes
(Section 5.6).¶
Figure 1 shows the Mission lifecycle states and the
transitions this document defines. An approval event creates a Mission
in active ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Lifecycle"). A deadline is a schedule's suspend_until
(Section 5.1). A companion profile can define further
transitions to terminated, each recording a termination reason of
its own.¶
approval
|
v
+-----------+ suspend +-----------+
| active |-------------->| suspended |
| |<--------------| |
+-----------+ resume, +-----------+
| or deadline |
| (on_expiry=resume) |
| revoke, complete, | revoke, complete, expiry,
| expiry | deadline (on_expiry=revoke)
v v
+-------------------------------------------+
| terminated |
| reason: revoked, completed or expired |
+-------------------------------------------+
An operation is legal only from the source states below. The
terminated state admits no transition, whatever its termination
reason. Section 5.6 decides an operation not legal from the
current state as idempotent success or a conflict. This table
governs Mission-level state; an extension operation that changes no
Mission state has no row in it.¶
| Operation | Legal from | Resulting state | Termination reason |
|---|---|---|---|
revoke
|
active, suspended
|
terminated
|
revoked
|
suspend
|
active
|
suspended
|
|
resume
|
suspended
|
active
|
|
complete
|
active, suspended
|
terminated
|
completed
|
A suspended Mission need not first be resumed to be completed:
completion is a monotonic narrowing to terminated and needs no
derivation window.¶
A Mission
that reaches its expires_at from active or suspended is
terminated with reason expired independently of this endpoint, at
every decision whether or not the transition is persisted. When a
schedule's suspend_until is at or after the Mission's expires_at,
expiry governs: the Mission is terminated with reason expired at
expires_at, and the AS MUST NOT apply that schedule's on_expiry.¶
The Lifecycle endpoint uses the same authentication as the Mission
Status endpoint (Section 3.2). Its discovery
mirrors that endpoint: the accepted methods in
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported and, for
private_key_jwt, the accepted client-assertion algorithms in
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
(Section 8). Its authentication failures follow
Section 3.3.¶
Where this endpoint is the deployment's means of revoking a Mission
by mission_id independent of possession of any token, which the
issuance profile requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Revocation"), the AS MUST accept revoke through client
authentication, without requiring an access token or any token issued
under the Mission. Client authentication grants no revocation
authority by itself: the AS still authorizes the caller for revoke
on that Mission (Section 5.4). A freshly signed
private_key_jwt client assertion is authentication proof, not a
token the caller holds. Where another authenticated surface provides
that means, this endpoint can accept only access tokens. The
requirement covers revoke only; the endpoint's other operations keep
whichever paths the AS supports.¶
For the sender-constrained access-token path, this
endpoint is an OAuth protected resource exactly as the Mission Status
endpoint is: the AS publishes, in its Protected Resource Metadata for
this resource [RFC9728], the resource identifier the token's
audience MUST name and the scopes it requires (scopes_supported):
mission_lifecycle for revoke, suspend, resume, and complete
(Section 5.4), and any scope an adopted extension
operation defines. A private-key JWT
client_assertion names the AS's issuer identifier in aud, and a
presented access token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's
protected-resource identifier, exactly as at the Mission Status
endpoint. A caller that authenticates directly as a client carries
the deployment-defined equivalent grant, never a scope.¶
Revoke request:¶
Revoke success response: the signed, state-only Mission Status
Response of Section 5.1, with no authorization_details
(a lifecycle confirmation reports state, not audience-scoped
authority). Here sub carries the acting party
(Section 5.4), the calling client identified by
client_id; the AS records that party in its audit log with the
operation, time, and any reason.¶
Decoded JWS payload:¶
{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"sub": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "nonce_8Y3vN0sM6tP1xR9bQ5",
"iat": 1793609600,
"exp": 1793609660,
"mission": {
"id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"state": "terminated",
"termination": {
"reason": "revoked",
"terminated_at": "2026-11-02T08:53:20Z",
"version": 4
},
"version": 4,
"expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
"fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:54:05Z"
}
}
¶
The Mission's Status version is 4: a suspension and a resumption between the Mission Status example (Section 3.5) and this revocation each advanced it.¶
The next two examples use another Mission.¶
Suspend request with a deadline from admin-console, an
administrator client the deployment authorizes for suspend and
the scheduled revoke (Section 5.4), here also
carrying the OPTIONAL
expected_version guard against deciding over stale state
(Section 5.6):¶
Suspend success response: the signed Mission Status Response reports
suspended with the pending outcome, suspend_until and on_expiry,
in mission. Decoded JWS payload:¶
{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"aud": "admin-console",
"sub": "admin-console",
"nonce": "nonce_4Dq2mV8kX1sB7nR3tW",
"iat": 1793607600,
"exp": 1793607660,
"mission": {
"id": "msn_TaLyTFRdyHq4zLDxwrwkEbj062oXcTX5",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"state": "suspended",
"version": 2,
"suspend_until": "2026-11-09T08:15:00Z",
"on_expiry": "revoke",
"expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
"fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:20:45Z"
}
}
¶
When suspend_until passes without a resume, the AS applies
on_expiry, terminating the Mission with reason revoked.¶
The request nonce (Section 5.1) is
the idempotency key: an opaque string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points.
The AS
treats an absent, empty, longer, or non-string nonce as malformed
(invalid_request, with no nonce echoed).¶
The AS MUST deduplicate lifecycle requests by the triple (client,
mission_id, nonce) for a bounded window, the client being the
acting party (Section 5.4), whose authorization,
delegation context included, is checked before every replay
(Section 5.7). On a retransmit carrying a nonce
already seen for that client and mission_id, together with request
members identical to the original's, the AS MUST replay the original
response rather than re-execute the operation, once the retransmit has
passed authorization (Section 5.7).
The comparison covers the operation's request members (operation,
reason, suspend_until, on_expiry, expected_version, and any
member an extension operation defines), present or absent alike, and
excludes client authentication parameters and HTTP headers, which a
retry regenerates. Members are compared as decoded values, character
for character, in any order, so two spellings of one instant differ.
The same nonce paired with request members that differ from the
original's MUST be refused invalid_request
(Section 3.10); the AS MUST NOT answer it with the
unrelated original response.¶
A retransmit whose original response was rate_limited, or was
unavailable or another 5xx response, is processed as a new request,
not replayed. A request refused before deduplication
(Section 5.7) claims no nonce: the AS retains nothing
for the refusal and leaves any response already retained under that
nonce unchanged, so the rules above apply to a later request
carrying it as though the refused request had never arrived.¶
A retransmit that arrives while the original is still being
processed never commits the operation a second time: the AS answers
it with the original response once that is retained, or with
unavailable until then, so every answer reports the one committed
operation's outcome. A replay is the original response unchanged,
with its original iat and exp.¶
A lifecycle client verifies a response by the checks of
Section 3.5, never with a key the AS has published as
compromised. A replay whose exp
has passed fails check 9, except that the client MAY accept it as
confirmation of its original operation's outcome when it correlates
the response to that retained request (its mission_id and nonce)
and every other check passes. Such a replay confirms that outcome
only: it refreshes no cached state, authorizes no action, and does
not establish the Mission's current state, for which the client
obtains a fresh Mission Status Response.¶
The window MUST be at least the validity
span of the signed response the AS would replay (its iat to exp,
Section 3.5), so any retransmit that could still
present a live response is deduplicated. A deployment MAY use a longer
window. Within the window a retransmit is safe against reordering: a
delayed suspend retry arriving after a resume is a duplicate,
answered with the original suspend response, so it cannot
re-suspend an already-resumed Mission. After the window a retransmit
is processed as a new request, and only an expected_version the
client supplied (below) keeps it from acting on state its sender has
not observed.¶
Deduplication guards a retransmitted request; it does not guard a
valid request decided over stale state, a fresh suspend issued from
a console that has not yet seen a newer resume. For that a
lifecycle request MAY carry expected_version, the state version
(Section 3.5) the caller last observed: when present,
the AS MUST refuse the operation with HTTP 409 and error code
stale_version, leaving the Mission unchanged, when the Mission's
current state version differs. The AS applies this check before the
transition rule below, so a stale expected_version is refused even
where the operation would otherwise be idempotent success. A
deployment SHOULD require expected_version on the operations it
classifies high-risk.¶
Lifecycle operations that change Mission state follow one rule. An
operation whose resulting state (Section 5.2) and, for
terminated, termination reason equal the Mission's current ones is
idempotent success: the AS returns the current Mission Status
Response, with no state change and, except for the schedule
replacement below, no transition event emitted. Any other
operation not legal
from the current state (for example suspend against a terminated
Mission, or revoke against one terminated with reason completed)
is a conflict: the AS MUST refuse it with HTTP 409 and a JSON body
whose error code is conflict, leaving the Mission state
unchanged. Deduplication applies independently of this rule.
An extension operation that changes no Mission state is outside this
rule (Section 5.1).¶
resume is the sole exception to the idempotent-success arm. It is
legal only from suspended, so resume on a terminated Mission, or
on an active one (never suspended, or already resumed) whose state
already equals its result, is a conflict, not idempotent success.¶
A suspend against a suspended Mission leaves its state unchanged
but can change its schedule. One that carries a suspend_until and
on_expiry
pair differing from the recorded schedule, or where none is recorded,
replaces the schedule once authorized (Section 5.4):
the AS MUST update the recorded values and their committing party,
emitting the transition event for that metadata-only change and reporting
the updated values in the response; silent acceptance without effect
is not conforming. A suspend that omits both members leaves the
recorded schedule, if any, and its committing party unchanged:
omission never clears a deadline. A suspend carrying only one of
the two remains invalid (Section 5.1)
and changes nothing.¶
The AS MUST process a lifecycle request in this order, refusing it at the first step that fails:¶
Authenticate the caller (Section 3.2),
parsing the request body only as far as authentication and the
nonce echo of Section 3.10 need. A
body that cannot be parsed is refused invalid_request, whatever
credential the request presents; a client authentication parameter
included more than once fails authentication, and no occurrence of
it is used. Every authentication failure is answered as
Section 3.3 assigns.¶
Validate the request syntax and the operation
(Section 5.1). A malformed request, or an operation
the AS does not serve, is refused invalid_request; a request that
includes a parameter more than once is malformed, as at the token
endpoint (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]).¶
Authorize the request: for a base operation, the lifecycle authorization of Section 5.4 for the acting party, the operation and the Mission, together with that for any transition the request schedules; for an extension operation, the authorization its companion defines. An unknown Mission and every failed authorization are refused alike with the not-found response.¶
Apply deduplication (Section 5.6): replay the original response
to a retransmit, or refuse a reused nonce whose request members
differ.¶
Refuse invalid_request a suspend whose suspend_until is not
later than the time the AS processes it
(Section 5.1), then check expected_version, when
present (Section 5.6).¶
Apply the transition rules (Section 5.6) and commit the transition.¶
Authorization therefore precedes every replayed or state-dependent
response: a caller not authorized for the Mission receives the
not-found response, never a replay, stale_version or conflict.¶
The AS MUST durably commit a transition, with the state version it produces, before it sends any response that acknowledges it; a transition whose commit fails is never answered as a success. The issuance profile's refusal of a derivation answered after an acknowledged revocation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Issuance Gating") is not extended to suspension: a suspension refuses later derivations at their gate, and a derivation already past its gate when the suspension commits can complete.¶
A Mission revocation through this endpoint reaches credentials
already derived from the Mission through the AS's advertised
revocation propagation (Section 6);
otherwise they remain valid until their own exp. The AS MAY
additionally revoke specific outstanding tokens it knows by jti,
with the same effect as [RFC7009] revocation of each token. An
[RFC7009] revocation does not by itself revoke a Mission: Mission
state changes only by a lifecycle transition (Section 5.2),
such as a request to this endpoint, a deadline, expiry, or the
coupling below.¶
Where a deployment's revocation policy treats revoking a Mission's
refresh token as revoking the Mission
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation"), the
AS MUST commit that revocation as the same revoke transition this
endpoint applies: decided by that policy for the revoking party and
the Mission, recorded with a new state version, and emitting the same
transition event. The coupling requires neither a
request to this endpoint nor an additional scope.¶
This endpoint operates on one Mission at a time. Mission enumeration and bulk lifecycle operations for incident response, such as revoking every Mission for a compromised Subject, client, or tenant, are left to companion profiles.¶
Approver transfer or re-anchoring (changing the party that anchors a
Mission's consent) and administrative monotonic narrowing (such as
shortening a Mission's expires_at) remain deferred to future work.¶
This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile bounds outstanding self-contained tokens by their lifetime and OPTIONAL token introspection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Sections "Issuance Gating" and "Mission State via Token Introspection"). A deployment that needs a Mission state change to take effect faster than token lifetime alone combines the propagation mechanisms below and sizes token lifetimes to match.¶
Each mechanism is discovered from its own metadata:¶
consulting Mission state at each derivation event (the token endpoint, refresh, Token Exchange), the issuance profile's always-present baseline, which does not invalidate already-issued self-contained tokens;¶
token introspection (Section 4), which returns
active: false for a token whose Mission state disallows use even
before the token expires, discovered from introspection_endpoint
and introspection_signing_alg_values_supported;¶
the Mission Status operation (Section 3) for per-request
state checks by high-assurance resource servers, discovered from
mission_status_endpoint; and¶
any further mechanism a companion profile defines, such as event-driven propagation, discovered from that profile's own metadata.¶
A deployment that claims revocation propagation (Section 9)
advertises mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 8), the
ceiling, in seconds, on reliance on an observation of Mission state:
the freshness cap of Section 3.6 applies it to a
Mission Status Response, and the issuer applies it to an introspection
projection's fresh_until (Section 4). It does
not bound a self-contained token, which a consumer relies on for its
lifetime unless that lifetime is sized to the bound (below). When the
member is absent, no such ceiling is declared, and a consumer relies
on a Mission Status Response within the reliance bound of
Section 3.6. A fresh observation bounds only how stale
the consumer's view of Mission state is; it does not bound
reconciliation delay upstream of the issuer or effects already
underway. The 60-second value in the examples is a tight deployment's
choice, not a floor.¶
Where a deployment needs Mission revocation to take effect but only
the baseline derivation-time check is in use, Mission-bound access
tokens SHOULD use
TTLs no longer than the declared mission_max_stale_seconds.
Deployments where revocation propagates out of band (token
introspection, per-request status checks, or a companion profile's
push mechanism) MAY use longer TTLs.¶
Sizing token lifetimes to the bound is itself a propagation mechanism: expiry performs the state check, and the consumer integrates nothing. Introspection and per-request status checks tighten specific paths as upgrades, not prerequisites.¶
A deployment declaring revocation propagation SHOULD publish the
recovery objective considered when choosing mission_max_stale_seconds
and the availability consequence when recovery takes longer than that
bound. The documentation its service_documentation metadata
[RFC8414] names is one place to publish them.¶
That bound is a security ceiling: an operational recovery objective
never authorizes extending a reliance bound
(Section 3.6) or the advertised
mission_max_stale_seconds during an incident, and detecting an
outage does not reset an existing observation's remaining validity.
Where the topology provides an authoritative state source available
independently of the issuer, an issuer outage is distinct from a
state-source outage.¶
The deployment describes its distribution posture per surface: Mission Status Responses follow Section 3.6, and a companion mechanism its own freshness rules. A push mechanism accelerates learning of transitions over a correctly bounded state source; it does not replace that source after confidence is lost.¶
Operators watch observation age and remaining validity, failed refreshes, stream gaps, fallback availability, clock health, and catch-up after recovery. A recovery check reconciles committed state and versions before publishing newly fresh observations; a successful HTTP response or a new signature alone does not establish that reconciliation.¶
This section is OPTIONAL and applies only to a deployment that adopts
one or more of the extensions above. An AS advertises the surfaces it
supports through the following authorization server metadata members
[RFC8414], in addition to the issuance profile's
mission_bound_authorization_supported
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization Server
Metadata").¶
mission_status_endpoint:OPTIONAL. A string containing a URL. The URL of the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3). Present when the AS supports it.¶
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings naming the client authentication
methods the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3) accepts,
values of the OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry
[RFC7591] alone, not the OAuth Access Token Types values that
introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported also admits
[RFC8414]. It MUST NOT list a
method that authenticates with a shared client secret, or none
(Section 3.2). The sender-constrained
access-token path is not a client authentication method: this
endpoint's Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728] describes it.
REQUIRED when the Mission Status endpoint accepts client
authentication.¶
mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings, the JWS [RFC7515] algorithm
values the AS accepts for the private_key_jwt client-assertion JWT
(Section 3.2) at the Mission Status endpoint.
none MUST NOT be used. REQUIRED when
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists
private_key_jwt.¶
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings. The JWS [RFC7515] algorithm
values the AS uses to sign the Mission Status Response shape
(Section 3.5), on every surface that returns it
(the dedicated Mission Status operation, the Lifecycle endpoint, and
any companion surface that reuses that response), mirroring
introspection_signing_alg_values_supported. These are the
response-signing algorithms, not the private_key_jwt
client-assertion algorithms of the endpoint auth-signing members.
REQUIRED when the AS serves any such surface, since a
consumer rejects a response signed with an algorithm not listed
(Section 3.5).¶
mission_lifecycle_endpoint:OPTIONAL. A string containing a URL. The URL of the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5). Present when the AS supports it.¶
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings naming the client authentication
methods the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5)
accepts, with the value space and constraints of
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported. REQUIRED when the
Mission Lifecycle endpoint accepts client authentication.¶
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported:CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings, the JWS [RFC7515] algorithm
values the AS accepts for the private_key_jwt client-assertion JWT
(Section 3.2) at the Mission Lifecycle endpoint.
none MUST NOT be used. REQUIRED when
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists
private_key_jwt.¶
mission_max_stale_seconds:OPTIONAL. An integer. The ceiling, in seconds, on reliance on an observation of Mission state (Section 6). A deployment claiming revocation propagation (Section 9) advertises it. When absent, no such ceiling is declared.¶
mission_historical_jwks_uri:CONDITIONAL. A string containing an https URL. The URL of the AS's
historical key set (Section 8.1). REQUIRED while that set
lists a key.¶
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported [RFC8414] describes the
token endpoint alone and is never read in place of an endpoint's
*_auth_methods_supported member.¶
DPoP and mTLS support for issued credentials are read from the
standard dpop_signing_alg_values_supported [RFC9449] and
tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens [RFC8705] metadata;
this document defines no sender-constraint member.¶
A discovery response from
https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server,
showing the issuance profile and extension members:¶
The historical key set holds the public keys the AS has withdrawn as
compromised (Section 10.5), so responses signed under
them stay verifiable for audit. It is a JWT [RFC7519] with
typ jwk-set+jwt, served at mission_historical_jwks_uri, which a
consumer takes only from authorization server metadata it has
validated (Section 3.3 of [RFC8414]). Its claims are iss (the AS's
issuer identifier), iat, and keys: a JWK Set's keys array
[RFC7517] holding each such key's public JWK, under its original
kid, for at least the audit horizon of every Mission whose responses
it signed. The AS serves the set with the media type
application/jwk-set+jwt ([OpenID.Federation], Section 15.6).¶
The AS signs the set under its active Mission Status signing key and
never under a key the set lists or a key of another role. When that
key is itself compromised, the AS signs the set under its replacement
and never under another published key. A consumer identifies the
authorized signer through its trusted configuration, not by its
presence in the jwks_uri, which also carries other roles' keys and
retired keys; it accepts a replacement only once that configuration
authorizes it. A consumer MUST NOT accept a historical key set whose
signature does not verify under the key its trusted configuration
authorizes.¶
Each listed JWK carries the revoked member [OpenID.Federation]
(Section 8.7.2) with reason compromised and these times:¶
revoked_at: the time the AS revoked the key; and¶
compromised_at: an added member of revoked, the established
compromise time, the earliest time from which a signature under the
key is not trusted. It is absent when no compromise time is
established.¶
Both are NumericDate values [RFC7519]. The set reuses OpenID
Federation's revoked encoding only; this document defines no
OpenID Federation endpoint and claims no conformance to it.¶
The AS declares a freshness lifetime for the set with explicit
freshness information (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9111]). A consumer
refetches the set, or revalidates its copy (Section 4.3 of [RFC9111]), once that lifetime ends; a response without valid explicit
freshness information is stale when received (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC9111]). A key a verified set lists stays compromised for the
consumer: a consumer MUST NOT treat it as no longer compromised because
a later set omits it, an earlier set is presented again, or a fetch of
the set fails. While a fetch fails, the consumer keeps refusing the keys
it has learned are compromised; the set's freshness never extends that
of the consumer's cached jwks_uri, which Section 10.5
governs.¶
An implementation conforms to the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] or implements the Mission Issuer role of another binding that serves these surfaces. Each extension in this document is independently OPTIONAL; an implementation names the ones it supports (for example, "issuance profile with Mission Status and Mission Lifecycle"), and an implementation that supports none of them is still a conforming issuance profile.¶
An implementation claiming an extension MUST meet its requirements:¶
Mission Status: serve the dedicated Mission Status operation
(Section 3) with JWS-signed responses
(application/mission-status-response+jwt), the authentication and
read authorization of Section 3.2, the
anti-oracle property
(Section 3.8), and the error shape of
Section 3.10; and advertise mission_status_endpoint,
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported, and the endpoint's
authentication metadata (Section 8):
mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported when the endpoint
accepts client authentication,
mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
when that member lists private_key_jwt, and, when the endpoint
accepts the access-token path, its Protected Resource Metadata
(Section 3.2).¶
Introspection projection: carry the Mission projection on the
introspection response as Section 4 provides,
including when it carries fresh_until and when it is signed with
[RFC9701].¶
Mission Lifecycle: serve the Mission Lifecycle endpoint
(Section 5) with its four base operations,
gate the suspended state and the
completed termination it introduces exactly as the issuance profile
gates on non-active state, and advertise mission_lifecycle_endpoint,
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported, and the endpoint's
authentication metadata (Section 8):
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported when the endpoint
accepts client authentication,
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
when that member lists private_key_jwt, and, when the endpoint
accepts the access-token path, its Protected Resource Metadata
(Section 3.2).¶
Mission Lifecycle, revoke only: serve the Mission Lifecycle endpoint
(Section 5) with the revoke operation, under
its authentication, its explicit lifecycle authorization
(Section 5.4), the idempotency and conflict rules of
Section 5.6, and the not-found refusal of an unauthorized
request; answer each revoke with the signed, state-only Mission
Status Response of Section 5.1; refuse any
operation the implementation has not adopted
(Section 5.1); and advertise
mission_lifecycle_endpoint,
mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported, and the endpoint's
authentication metadata (Section 8):
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported when the endpoint
accepts client authentication,
mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
when that member lists private_key_jwt, and, when the endpoint
accepts the access-token path, its Protected Resource Metadata
(Section 3.2). The class requires
neither another operation nor the Mission Status operation. An
implementation that also serves another base operation or the
Mission Status operation meets that operation's requirements, and
one that serves suspend serves resume, without widening who
may perform either (Section 5.4). The suspended
state and completed termination arrive only with the operations
that introduce them. An implementation claiming Mission Lifecycle
meets this class.¶
Revocation propagation: advertise mission_max_stale_seconds
and size Mission-bound access-token TTLs as
Section 6 provides.¶
A Mission Issuer that claims any extension above meets the following requirement, whichever companion profiles it adopts. Every issuer-held narrowing mechanism a deployment runs, including any a companion profile defines, MUST feed the single Effective Authority Set computation. Every derivation and every authority-reporting surface MUST use that same computation, so no surface reports authority the computation has not reduced.¶
The security considerations of the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] apply in full.¶
Per the anti-oracle property (Section 3.8), an
unknown mission_id and a known-but-unauthorized one receive an
identical HTTP status, body and headers at the Status and Lifecycle
endpoints (Section 5.4, Section 5.7),
and the AS SHOULD additionally suppress timing side channels
(for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform lookup
path). An implementation that leaks the distinction exposes the Mission
space to enumeration.¶
A Mission Status Response is bound to (caller sub, audience,
nonce, issuance time). Replay against a different caller, audience
or request fails the sub, aud and nonce checks of
Section 3.5, which the signature protects, and replay
after the reliance bound fails the caching rule
(Section 3.6). A response cached and replayed by the
same caller within its reliance bound is equivalent to a fresh
response.¶
Where consumers query Mission Status per request, the operation is on
the path of every Mission-bound credential validation.
The AS MUST implement per-consumer rate limiting (returning
rate_limited, Section 3.10) and SHOULD encourage
consumer-side caching (Section 3.6) to reduce traffic.¶
A signed introspection projection (Section 4) uses
[RFC9701], which is scoped to token introspection. The dedicated
Mission Status operation uses its own media type
(application/mission-status-response+jwt, Section 12) and a JWS
[RFC7515], because [RFC9701] does not apply to a lookup keyed by
mission_id (Section 3.5).¶
The AS signs Mission Status and Lifecycle responses with a key from
its jwks_uri. The AS MUST keep the public JWK for every kid it
has signed such a response under resolvable for at least the Mission's
audit horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so an archived
application/mission-status-response+jwt remains verifiable for
audit and dispute: a retired key in its jwks_uri, and a compromised
key in its historical key set (Section 8.1). This is the
issuance profile's retired-key rule
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Signing and Key
Rotation"), with the audit horizon as the bound.¶
A key known or suspected compromised follows the issuance profile's
compromise rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section
"Signing and Key Rotation"): the AS stops signing with it and removes
it from its jwks_uri, and publishes it as revoked in its historical
key set. Retention is for audit, not trust. A consumer
MUST NOT accept, for a current reliance decision, a response signed
under a key the AS has published as compromised. A consumer MUST NOT
use a key from the historical key set to verify a response for a
current reliance decision. A consumer MUST NOT rely on a cached copy
of the AS's jwks_uri beyond the freshness lifetime its response
explicitly declares (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9111]). A jwks_uri
response without valid explicit freshness information is stale when
received and is never given a heuristic lifetime
(Section 4.2.2 of [RFC9111]): the
consumer revalidates it before reuse. The consumer replaces its cached
key set with each one it fetches rather than adding to it, so a
removed key stops verifying within that lifetime. When the cached set
is stale and revalidation fails, the consumer MUST NOT accept a Status
or Lifecycle response for a current reliance decision until a fetch or
revalidation succeeds.¶
An auditor examining an archived response signed under a compromised
key classifies it by the published compromise information,
compromised_at or its absence.¶
This document inherits OAuth 2.0 Best Current Practice [RFC9700] for the OAuth surfaces it composes with, and implementers MUST follow it.¶
A private-key JWT client assertion names the AS's issuer identifier
as its audience (Section 3.2), so it is
acceptable at every AS endpoint that accepts that method.
Section 3 of [RFC7523] makes jti replay protection optional; an
AS that applies it across those endpoints, with short assertion
lifetimes, keeps an assertion captured at one endpoint from
authenticating at another.¶
The privacy considerations of the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] apply in full.¶
The Mission Status operation (Section 3) and the
introspection projection (Section 4) disclose
Mission state and the audience-scoped authorization_details to the
authenticated, authorized requester, and MAY additionally disclose
authority_hash to a requester authorized for it. A deployment MUST
treat both as Mission information-disclosure surfaces,
audience-filtering the disclosed authority so a consumer never sees
entries addressed to audiences it is not authorized to request
(Section 3.1, Section 3.5). A Mission
Status Response also discloses version, expires_at, any schedule
and the termination reason to every holder of the read
authorization; a deployment can narrow that authorization
(Section 3.2) where they are sensitive.¶
The AS records Status and Lifecycle requests (containing
mission_id, audience, caller, and timing) in audit logs.
Deployments MUST treat these logs as PII sinks per the issuance
profile's privacy considerations.¶
This document requests IANA actions for OAuth AS metadata members,
OAuth extensions error codes, a media type, and one entry in each of
two issuance-profile registries. It defines no registry of its own:
endpoint authentication methods are values of the existing OAuth Token
Endpoint Authentication Methods registry [RFC7591]
(Section 8), and Mission Lifecycle operation values have no
IANA registry: a companion profile registers an extension operation
by defining it in its own specification (Section 5.1).
The mission_error values
suspended and completed (Section 5) need no
registration, because the issuance profile's mission_error member
has no registry of values; Section 12.4 requests
their registration as a lifecycle state and a termination reason.¶
This document registers no Well-Known URI: its metadata members
(Section 8) are published at
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server [RFC8414].¶
IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Extensions
Error Registry" [RFC6749]. invalid_request, invalid_client and
not_found are already registered for other usage locations; their
entries here add the usage locations of this document.¶
Error Name: invalid_request¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: invalid_client¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: unauthorized¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: not_found¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: conflict¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: stale_version¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: rate_limited¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
Error Name: unavailable¶
Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response¶
Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10¶
IANA is requested to register the following media type per [RFC6838]:¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: mission-status-response+jwt¶
Required parameters: none¶
Optional parameters: none¶
Encoding considerations: binary; JWS Compact Serialization¶
Security considerations: see Section 10¶
Interoperability considerations: see this document¶
Published specification: this document¶
Applications that use this media type: OAuth Mission-Bound consumers¶
Fragment identifier considerations: not applicable¶
Deprecated alias names for this type: none¶
Restrictions on usage: none¶
Provisional registration: no¶
Magic number(s): none¶
File extension(s): none¶
Macintosh file type code(s): none¶
Person & email address to contact: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Author: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com¶
Change controller: IETF¶
This document requests registration of one state in the issuance profile's Mission Lifecycle States registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), under that registry's Specification Required policy:¶
| Value | Terminal | Semantics | Change Controller | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
suspended
|
no | A paused Mission that derives no tokens until resumed. | IETF | this document, Section 5 |
It also requests registration of one reason in the issuance profile's Mission Termination Reasons registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), under the same policy:¶
| Value | Semantics | Members | Change Controller | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
completed
|
The Mission completed successfully. | none | IETF | this document, Section 5 |
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
-01¶
Mission Status Operation and Revocation Propagation cite the OAuth binding's Resource Server Enforcement, Issuance Gating, and Mission State via Token Introspection sections, where the stateless baseline and the token-lifetime bound are stated, together with or instead of its Revocation section. No requirement changed (#1892).¶
The Mission Status Request gives the client authentication parameters of mTLS and private-key JWT as examples; a method that carries its credentials in HTTP header fields keeps them there.¶
IANA Considerations adds the Mission Status and Mission Lifecycle
endpoints as usage locations for invalid_request and
invalid_client.¶
A metadata-only change and a schedule are issuer-held state associated with the Mission, outside its Mission Record; an AS may store them with the record, and a signed or exchanged Mission Record does not carry them. Authorization, atomicity, versioning and scheduling rules are unchanged (#1879).¶
Each rule that was stated twice has one normative home, and the
other statement points to it: the freshness cap and reliance bound
(Caching), the response checks, the nonce check and the RFC 9701
and unsigned-response prohibitions (Response), and the TLS rule
(Mission Status Operation). The Anti-Oracle timing rule is one
sentence. No requirement changed.¶
The conformance classes name the Protected Resource Metadata of the
access-token path, and the Introspection projection class follows
that section on fresh_until and RFC 9701 signing.¶
Terminology: "transition event" and "error code" throughout, "the
AS" for the body uses of "Mission Issuer", a jwks_uri response in
Signing-Key Retention, and endpoint-neutral error-table
descriptions. The Privacy Considerations disclosure heading names
the Mission Status operation and introspection.¶
The Lifecycle mission_id member and base-operations list point to
the Mission Status request and the Legal Transitions table.¶
Where the Lifecycle endpoint is the issuance profile's
token-independent revocation means, the AS accepts revoke through
client authentication without requiring any token, and still
authorizes the caller (#1895, D1114).¶
-00¶
Initial individual draft.¶
The author thanks the implementers and reviewers of the Mission-Bound Authorization work for feedback that shaped these extensions.¶