Web Authorization Protocol K. McGuinness Internet-Draft Independent Intended status: Standards Track 17 November 2026 Expires: 21 May 2027 Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0 draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status-latest Abstract The Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 profile binds issued authority to a durable, human-approved Mission and gates issuance on Mission state, but it observes Mission state only through token lifetime and optional token introspection. This document defines the Mission state-management surfaces it defers: the Mission Status operation (keyed by mission_id) with signed responses, a freshness member and signing for the issuance profile's token introspection projection, the Mission Lifecycle endpoint with revoke, suspend, resume, and complete operations, the suspended state and the completed termination reason with the transitions between the lifecycle states, and revocation-propagation guidance. Companion profiles can extend the mission object and the Lifecycle endpoint's operations without altering these surfaces. Each capability is independently optional; an implementation can adopt any subset, and one that adopts none remains a conforming issuance profile. About This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft- mcguinness-oauth-mission-status.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft- mcguinness-oauth-mission-status/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Conventions and Terminology 3. Mission Status Operation 3.1. Request 3.2. Authentication 3.3. Authentication Failures 3.4. Request Example 3.5. Response 3.6. Caching 3.7. Failed Status Checks 3.8. Anti-Oracle Property 3.9. Processing Order 3.10. Error Responses 4. Token Introspection Mission Projection 5. Mission Lifecycle Endpoint 5.1. Operations 5.2. Legal Transitions 5.3. Authentication 5.4. Authorization 5.5. Lifecycle Examples 5.6. Idempotency and Conflicts 5.7. Processing Order 5.8. Relationship to RFC 7009 5.9. Deferred Lifecycle Capabilities 6. Revocation Propagation 7. Operational Considerations 8. Authorization Server Metadata 8.1. Historical Key Set 9. Conformance 10. Security Considerations 10.1. Mission Status Enumeration 10.2. Mission Status Response Replay 10.3. Mission Status Denial of Service 10.4. Signed Response Format 10.5. Signing-Key Retention for Audit 10.6. General OAuth Security 11. Privacy Considerations 11.1. Mission Status and Introspection as Disclosure Surfaces 11.2. Status Audit Logging 12. IANA Considerations 12.1. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration 12.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration 12.3. Media Type Registration 12.4. Mission Lifecycle Registrations 13. References 13.1. Normative References 13.2. Informative References Appendix A. Document History Acknowledgments Author's Address 1. Introduction The issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], the OAuth binding of Mission-Bound Authorization, makes a Mission a first-class OAuth artifact: a structured, human-approved, integrity-bound task whose authority bounds and outlives every token an agent derives. It is, by design, a minimum-viable issuance layer. It gates derivation on Mission state, carries the mission claim on every derived token, and offers only OPTIONAL token introspection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission State via Token Introspection") as a way for a resource server to observe Mission state. It defers to this document the canonical Mission Status surface, keyed by mission_id, with its signed status evidence, and a standardized management endpoint for lifecycle transitions. This document specifies the following extensions to the issuance profile: * A dedicated *Mission Status operation* (Section 3), which an authenticated, authorized consumer holding a mission_id resolves, with responses signed as a JWS [RFC7515]. * A freshness member for the issuance profile's Mission projection on token introspection, which a deployment can return as a [RFC9701]-signed response (Section 4). * A *Mission Lifecycle endpoint* (Section 5) for explicit revoke, suspend, resume, and complete operations, distinct from [RFC7009] token revocation, with an extension point through which a companion profile MAY register a further operation value (Section 5.1). * *Revocation propagation* guidance (Section 6): the mission_max_stale_seconds ceiling on reliance on an observation of Mission state, and how to size token lifetimes to the propagation mechanisms in use. Each extension is independently optional (Section 9). The authorization server metadata an AS publishes (Section 8) follows from the extensions and authentication paths it supports. This document does not restate the issuance profile: the Mission Intent, authority derivation, the mission claim, the integrity anchors, Mission-bound token issuance, the subset rule, and lifecycle gating are defined in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]. The OpenID Shared Signals Framework [OIDC-SSF] and its Continuous Access Evaluation Profile [OIDC-CAEP] push events to a receiver, and a companion profile can carry Mission transitions that way (Section 6). An event reports that state changed, not how long a consumer may rely on the state, so a push speeds learning of transitions without replacing the Status operation (Section 7). 2. Conventions and Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses the terms defined in the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], in particular Mission, Mission Issuer, Authority Set, the mission claim, and mission_id; and the mission_resource_access authorization details type defined in its Mission Resource Access Profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). The Mission Issuer is the Mission issuer: in the OAuth binding, the authorization server; another binding's Mission Issuer that serves these surfaces does so with the same semantics. This document additionally uses: Mission Status Response: A signed payload returned by the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3), reporting a Mission's current state and the audience-scoped evidence a consumer needs. Effective Authority Set: The approved Authority Set after applying every issuer-held, monotonic narrowing mechanism the deployment runs, each narrowing profile defining its own subtraction. No narrowing mechanism adds or restores authority. Membership in this set is necessary, never sufficient, for an action to proceed. Metadata-only change: A committed change to issuer-held state associated with a Mission, outside its Mission Record, that leaves the Mission's state and termination unchanged: a schedule replacement (Section 5.6), or a change a companion profile defines as one. Transition event: The lifecycle event a state-distribution companion defines for a committed transition or metadata-only change ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"). To emit one is to make the committed change available to that companion; this document defines no event or channel. All JSON shown in this document is non-normative and illustrative; the member definitions in the surrounding text are authoritative. HTTP message examples follow the conventions of [RFC9110]; long URLs and form parameters are wrapped for display. JWT and JWS examples are shown as decoded JSON with separate header objects; on the wire the JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] applies. 3. Mission Status Operation This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile's stateless baseline needs no dedicated status surface ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Sections "Resource Server Enforcement" and "Revocation"), and a consumer that does not use this operation is unaffected. The dedicated Mission Status operation is the canonical status surface the issuance profile defers. Unlike token introspection (Section 4), which answers "is this token's authorization still good," the Mission Status operation answers "what is the state of this Mission" keyed by the mission_id alone. An authenticated, authorized consumer holding a mission_id (including an auditor or an authorization server in another trust domain) resolves it without holding a token the authorization server (AS) issued. The AS serves the operation at its Mission Status endpoint, whose URL it publishes in authorization server metadata (Section 8) as mission_status_endpoint. A consumer resolves it from the expected issuer, which comes from its own issuer trust or configuration, never from the response under verification: for a resource server, the mission.issuer of an access token it accepted under the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Resource Server Enforcement"). It retrieves that issuer's metadata, validated as Section 3.3 of [RFC8414] requires (the metadata's issuer equals the issuer identifier used to retrieve it), and verifies responses with keys from that issuer's jwks_uri. The endpoint MUST be served over TLS 1.2 or later (TLS 1.3 RECOMMENDED), following the recommendations of [RFC9325]. 3.1. Request The request is an HTTPS POST with an application/x-www-form- urlencoded body containing: mission_id: REQUIRED. A string. The canonical Mission Identifier, named per the issuance profile's external-surface convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). audience: CONDITIONAL. A string. The audience for which the consumer requests authority, one the AS's configuration authorizes that consumer to request (below). An authorized consumer that is not a resource server (for example an auditor or an authorization server in another trust domain) and needs only Mission state, not audience-scoped authority, MAY omit audience; the response is then state-only and carries no authorization_details (Section 3.5). A resource server resolving authority for a specific audience MUST send it. nonce: REQUIRED. A string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. A client-generated nonce binding the response to this request. It MUST be unique per request within the response lifetime. The consumer checks the response's nonce against it (Section 3.5). The request also carries the client authentication parameters of the method it uses (Section 3.2), for example client_id, REQUIRED with mTLS client authentication (Section 2 of [RFC8705]), or client_assertion_type and client_assertion, REQUIRED with private- key-JWT client authentication [RFC7523]. A method that carries its credentials in HTTP header fields keeps them there. The AS's configuration states which audiences each authenticated caller may request: a resource server is typically configured for its own audience identifiers, and a consuming authorization server for each resource it issues tokens for. The AS MUST honor a request's audience only where that configuration authorizes the authenticated caller for it, and MUST otherwise refuse the request with the not- found response of Section 3.10. Entitlement to an audience comes only from that configuration, never from string equality between audience and the caller's client_id or certificate subject. The response's aud is the requested audience (Section 3.5). 3.2. Authentication The request MUST be authenticated. The AS MUST support at least one of the following paths. The client MUST use exactly one of them per request: 1. *Client authentication*, with a method from the OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry [RFC7591] that the AS advertises for this endpoint (Section 8). A method that authenticates with a shared client secret, such as client_secret_basic, client_secret_post, or client_secret_jwt, MUST NOT be used, and none is not client authentication. Each method is processed as its specification defines. With tls_client_auth [RFC8705], the AS validates the client's X.509 certificate against its configured trust anchors and the client's registered tls_client_auth metadata. With private_key_jwt [RFC7523], the client presents client_assertion_type with the exact value urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- bearer and a signed JWT as client_assertion. The assertion's aud MUST be the AS's issuer identifier [RFC8414] as its sole value, the client authentication audience of [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis]; the AS MUST reject an assertion with any other aud. The client SHOULD set the JWS typ header to client-authentication+jwt. The AS accepts only the JWS [RFC7515] algorithms it advertises for that endpoint (Section 8); none MUST NOT be used. 2. *Sender-constrained access token*. The client presents a mission_status-scoped access token (see the authorization requirement below) in the Authorization header, sender- constrained either by DPoP [RFC9449] (the DPoP scheme with a DPoP proof header, the token's cnf.jkt matching the proof key thumbprint) or by mTLS [RFC8705] (a certificate-bound token, the Bearer scheme, whose cnf.x5t#S256 matches the presented client certificate). The token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's protected-resource identifier (below). The AS MUST refuse a request not authenticated on one of the two paths, with the outcome Section 3.3 assigns. Wire evidence selects the path and method, in this order: * A request presenting an access token in Authorization takes the access-token path, and any client certificate is evaluated only as that token's mTLS sender constraint. * Otherwise, a request presenting the parameters of a method other than mTLS client authentication, such as client_assertion for private_key_jwt, uses that method, and any client certificate is not treated as client authentication. * Otherwise, a request presenting only a client certificate uses the mTLS client authentication method registered for the client ([RFC8705]). This order keeps "exactly one path" satisfiable when mTLS terminates at the edge. The parameters of a path or method the order does not select, such as a client_assertion beside an access token, are not evaluated as client authentication. A request whose selected method the endpoint does not advertise, including a shared-secret method such as HTTP Basic, is answered as one that presented no credential (Section 3.3). An authenticated caller MUST additionally carry an explicit read authorization: a mission_status scope on the presented access token, or a deployment-defined equivalent grant bound to the authenticated client. The mission_status scope authorizes the Mission Status read operation and mirrors the mission_lifecycle scope (Section 5.4). A consumer that holds only a mission_id and authenticates directly as a client carries the deployment-defined equivalent grant, not a scope. A caller carrying no such authorization is refused with the not-found response of Section 3.10 (Section 3.8). This includes an authenticated caller presenting an otherwise-valid access token without the mission_status scope: it receives the not-found response, not the insufficient_scope error of Section 3.1 of [RFC6750]. An expired token, a token for another audience, or a failed sender constraint is instead an access-token authentication failure (Section 3.3). Read authorization identifies the Missions the caller may inspect under deployment policy: all Missions at the issuer, those of a tenant, or a narrower set. Possession of the mission_status scope alone does not establish which Missions it covers. That authorization, with the audience entitlement of Section 3.1 when the request names an audience, is the authorization for the mission_id and audience that Section 3.8 requires, and a Mission it does not cover receives the not-found response. A presented access token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's protected-resource identifier: the resource value the AS publishes for this endpoint in its Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728]. For these surfaces that identifier is the endpoint's own URL (the mission_status_endpoint or mission_lifecycle_endpoint), not the issuer identifier that a private-key-JWT assertion's aud names. The AS MUST reject a token whose audience does not name that identifier. This token audience is distinct from the request's audience parameter (Section 3.1): the token audience authorizes the call at this endpoint, whereas the request audience carries no authentication weight and only selects the resource-server-specific authority projection the response returns (Section 3.5). For the sender-constrained access-token path, this endpoint is an OAuth protected resource: the AS publishes, in its Protected Resource Metadata for this resource [RFC9728], the resource identifier the token's audience MUST name, the mission_status scope it requires (scopes_supported), and the presentation and sender constraints it accepts (bearer_methods_supported, dpop_bound_access_tokens_required, tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens). For the client- authentication path, the AS advertises the accepted methods in mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported and, for private_key_jwt, the accepted client-assertion signing algorithms in mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported, not read from the token endpoint's token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported (Section 8). 3.3. Authentication Failures A request that fails authentication receives the outcome for the credential it presented: * A request whose presented access token fails authentication receives HTTP 401 unauthorized with a WWW-Authenticate challenge in the scheme it used: Bearer with the error attributes of Section 3 of [RFC6750], or DPoP under Section 7.1 of [RFC9449], including its algs parameter and error codes. * A request whose client authentication fails at the HTTP layer receives the error response that the method's specification defines for that failure, with any error code, status, and challenge it requires, such as a method's own error for a missing server-provided challenge or a stale credential. That response's body is the error body of Section 3.10, with the method's error code as its error. Where the method defines none, the request receives HTTP 400 with the invalid_client error code, as Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] answers a failed client authentication carried outside the Authorization header, with no WWW-Authenticate challenge. A failed client authentication is not reported as an access-token failure. A client certificate rejected during the TLS handshake fails at the TLS layer, before any HTTP response. * A request that presented no credential receives, where the endpoint accepts an access-token scheme, HTTP 401 unauthorized with one challenge for each access-token scheme the endpoint accepts and no error attribute (Section 3.1 of [RFC6750]); where it accepts none, it receives HTTP 400 invalid_client. Every challenge carries the resource_metadata parameter naming the endpoint's Protected Resource Metadata (Section 5.1 of [RFC9728]). A 401 response this section assigns to an access-token failure or a missing credential carries the challenge or challenges and a JSON body (Section 3.10): a challenge's error attribute, when present, follows its scheme as above and is distinct from the body's error, which is unauthorized. An authenticated caller not authorized for the referenced Mission receives not_found (404) with no challenge (Section 3.8). 3.4. Request Example POST /as/mission/status HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6... DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi... mission_id=msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9- &audience=https%3A%2F%2Ferp.example.com &nonce=nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ 3.5. Response On success the AS returns a JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] signed with a key published in the AS's jwks_uri. The JWS header carries typ of mission-status-response+jwt and a kid identifying the signing key. Per Section 4.1.9 of [RFC7515], the typ header omits the application/ prefix; the full media type application/mission- status-response+jwt (Section 12.3) is the HTTP Content-Type. Exact validation of the protected typ value, with mutually exclusive validation rules for the other JWTs the AS signs, implements the substitution defense of Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] and Section 3.12 of [RFC8725]. A Mission Status Response is evidence of Mission state for the consumer that requested it, not a bearer credential, an access token, or an authorization grant: presenting one authorizes nothing, and a resource server validating access tokens under Section 4 of [RFC9068] rejects it by its typ. [RFC9701] is scoped to token introspection and does not apply to a lookup keyed by mission_id (Section 10.4). Implementations MUST NOT use [RFC9701] for the dedicated Mission Status operation, and MUST NOT accept an unsigned response from it in place of the signed form it requires. In this document's ERP examples, the operation contract identifies https://erp.example.com as the operation target ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). In the audience-scoped example below, the consumer is the ERP resource server, client erp-rs, which the AS's configuration authorizes for that audience; its client identifier is the response's sub. HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/mission-status-response+jwt Cache-Control: no-store Pragma: no-cache eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImFzLWtleS0yMDI2LXEzIi... Decoded JWS header: { "alg": "ES256", "kid": "as-key-2026-q3", "typ": "mission-status-response+jwt" } Decoded JWS payload: { "iss": "https://as.example.com", "aud": "https://erp.example.com", "sub": "erp-rs", "nonce": "nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ", "iat": 1793606400, "exp": 1793606460, "mission": { "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-", "issuer": "https://as.example.com", "state": "active", "version": 1, "expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z", "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:00:45Z" }, "authorization_details": [ { "type": "mission_resource_access", "resource": "https://erp.example.com", "actions": ["invoices.read"], "constraints": { "resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z", "resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z" }, "delegation": { "max_depth": 2, "allowed_delegates": [{ "sub_profile": "ai_agent" }] } }, { "type": "mission_resource_access", "resource": "https://erp.example.com", "actions": ["journal-entries.write"], "constraints": { "max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" } } } ] } The members are: * The signed JWT envelope iss, aud, sub, nonce, iat, exp. The aud, a single string, is the response's audience binding and the nonce its request binding. On a response to the Mission Status operation or a base lifecycle operation, the AS MUST set sub to the authenticated client's identifier: the presented access token's client_id, or the client that authenticated directly. When the request omitted audience (Section 3.1), the response is state-only and the AS MUST set aud to the authenticated client's client_id, as the Lifecycle endpoint does (Section 5.1); the consumer's aud verification below then checks that identifier. exp bounds the validity of the signed response itself; how long the consumer MAY rely on the reported state is given separately by mission.fresh_until below. * mission: the mission object, the same shape as the mission claim of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission Claim") with status members added. It carries: - id, issuer: the subject Mission's identifier and issuer. - authority_hash: OPTIONAL. The issuance profile's consent commitment over the Authority Set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Integrity Anchors"), disclosed at the AS's discretion to a caller it authorizes for audit or correlation use, on the same minimization footing as the issuance profile's introspection disclosure privilege ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Caller Authorization and Minimization"). Not carried on the issuance profile's baseline mission claim. - state: REQUIRED. The current Mission lifecycle state. The authoritative state space is the issuance profile's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"): active and terminated, this document's suspended when the Mission Lifecycle endpoint's suspend operation (Section 5.1) is deployed, and any further state a companion profile defines and the deployment runs. A consumer applies the issuance profile's forward-compatibility rule: only active permits reliance, and every other value, recognized or not, is non-active. A non-active state gates new authorization decisions only: it does not establish that work already accepted under the Mission has stopped, or that completed effects were undone. - termination: CONDITIONAL. Present exactly when state is terminated: the Mission's termination ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Termination"), with its reason (revoked or expired from the issuance profile, this document's completed, or a reason a companion profile defines), its terminated_at, the members its reason defines, and version: the state version (below) of the transition that committed the termination. version is REQUIRED in every termination the AS commits, and absent while a termination that takes effect without a request, such as expired, is observed but not yet committed; once committed it does not change, so a metadata-only change committed later leaves it lower than the response's version. It is the audit reference for revoked and completed. - expires_at: REQUIRED. The point at which the Mission itself expires, the Mission record's expires_at ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). - fresh_until: REQUIRED. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time giving the point until which the consumer MAY rely on the reported state without re-checking, governing caching (Section 3.6). It is report-freshness metadata, carried in mission so it travels with state even on the introspection projection, which can lack a signed envelope to carry it (Section 4). - suspend_until, on_expiry: CONDITIONAL. Present only while the Mission is suspended under a deadline (Section 5.1): the RFC 3339 [RFC3339] deadline, and the transition (resume or revoke) the AS applies when it passes. - version: REQUIRED. A positive integer, the Mission's *state version*: a strictly monotonic per-Mission counter the AS maintains, incremented on each committed lifecycle transition (the approval event is version 1) and each committed metadata- only change, current as of the reported state. A deadline's or expiry's transition, which takes effect without a request, advances version only when committed; until then a response reports the last committed value. It orders observations of one Mission across every surface that reports it, and a lifecycle request can guard on it with expected_version (Section 5.6). - Extension members: a companion profile MAY add further members to this object. * authorization_details: the Effective Authority Set entries of every AS-supported authorization_details type ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization Details Types") relevant to the requesting audience, as each entry's own type specification determines (for the general-purpose mission_resource_access type, by its resource member, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access]). The member is a top-level sibling of mission, as on the token and in the introspection response. Entries addressed to other audiences MUST NOT be disclosed. When the request names an audience, the response MUST carry authorization_details, as an empty array when no entry is relevant to that audience. The entries are carried whatever the Mission's state; a non-active state permits no reliance on them (Section 3.7). When the request omits audience (Section 3.1), there is no requesting audience: the response is state-only and MUST NOT carry authorization_details. A consumer MUST verify, before honoring a response: 1. the JWS header typ is mission-status-response+jwt; 2. the JWS header alg is one the AS advertises in mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported (Section 8), rejecting none and any algorithm not listed; 3. the JWS signature against a current jwks_uri entry for the issuer AS that the consumer's trusted configuration authorizes for that AS's Mission Status responses; a key's presence in the jwks_uri does not authorize it (Section 8.1); 4. iss equals the expected AS issuer URL, and mission.issuer equals iss; 5. aud equals the audience the request named or, for a state-only response, the requesting client's client_id (Section 3.1); 6. sub equals the requesting client's identifier; 7. nonce equals the request's nonce; 8. mission.id equals the requested mission_id; 9. iat is not in the future and exp is not in the past, with up to 30 seconds clock-skew tolerance; and 10. mission.fresh_until is not later than exp. 3.6. Caching Caching follows these rules: * *Cache key.* Consumers SHOULD cache a response keyed on (mission_id, audience), or on (mission_id, client_id) for a state- only response, until its reliance bound (below). * *Freshness cap.* The AS MUST NOT set mission.fresh_until later than the response's exp, nor, when it advertises mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 8), later than the response's iat plus that value. * *Reliance bound.* A response's reliance bound is the earliest of mission.fresh_until, the response's exp, and, when the AS advertises mission_max_stale_seconds, the response's iat plus that value. Consumers MUST NOT use a response after its reliance bound, subject only to the skew tolerance below, and MUST NOT rely on a reported active state at or after mission.expires_at. In particular, a consumer MUST NOT extend reliance on a cached suspended (or any non-active) response beyond its reliance bound. * *Skew tolerance.* When comparing the current time to mission.fresh_until, a consumer MAY allow up to 30 seconds of tolerance for the active state only, and no tolerance for any other state. The tolerance MUST NOT extend reliance past the response's exp, mission.expires_at, or the response's iat plus the advertised mission_max_stale_seconds. The freshness cap keeps report freshness within the signed response's own validity and the deployment's advertised revocation-propagation tolerance. The skew tolerance is a clock-skew allowance on the mission.fresh_until comparison only, bounding the disagreement between the AS's and the consumer's clocks, not a property of state reversibility. By contrast, the clock-skew tolerance of the response checks (Section 3.5) decides only whether a response is accepted, never how long it is relied on, so a response accepted after its exp supports no decision (Section 3.7). The reliance bound holds for non-active states too, so a consumer re-reads a suspended Mission, which can be resumed, rather than refusing on an outdated observation. 3.7. Failed Status Checks A decision that requires Mission Status proceeds only on a response that passed every check of Section 3.5, is within its reliance bound (Section 3.6), and reports active. Without one, the decision MUST NOT proceed, whatever the cause: an error response such as unavailable, rate_limited or not_found, a failed check, a network failure, or a lapsed reliance bound. For example, a resource server refuses the request it is deciding, and a consuming authorization server issues no token. That outcome establishes only that the decision cannot proceed; it is not evidence that the Mission terminated. A transient failure, such as unavailable, rate_limited or a network failure, leaves a response the consumer already holds usable within that response's original reliance bound; a failed request never refreshes or extends that bound. 3.8. Anti-Oracle Property A mission_id is never a bearer capability. The AS MUST authenticate the requester and authorize it for the requested mission_id and audience. Unknown mission_id values and known-but-unauthorized references MUST produce indistinguishable responses (HTTP 404 with a generic not- found body; see Section 3.10). The AS MUST return an identical HTTP status code, response body, and headers for the two cases. The AS SHOULD keep response timing from distinguishing the two cases, for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform lookup path for both. 3.9. Processing Order The AS MUST process a Mission Status request in this order, refusing it at the first step that fails: 1. Authenticate the caller (Section 3.2), parsing the request body only as far as authentication and the nonce echo of Section 3.10 need. A body that cannot be parsed is refused invalid_request, whatever credential the request presents; a client authentication parameter included more than once fails authentication, and no occurrence of it is used. Every authentication failure is answered as Section 3.3 assigns. 2. Validate the request syntax (Section 3.1). A malformed request is refused invalid_request; a request that includes a parameter more than once is malformed, as at the token endpoint (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]). 3. Authorize the request: the caller's read authorization, the Mission the mission_id names, and any requested audience (Section 3.1). An unknown Mission and every failed authorization are refused alike with the not-found response. 4. Read the Mission's current state and return the signed response (Section 3.5). No response that depends on the Mission's existence or state precedes step 3. 3.10. Error Responses Mission Status outcomes are of two kinds. A success outcome is a found, visible, authorized Mission: the AS returns HTTP 200 with a signed Mission Status Response, whose mission.state, not a separate error code, describes the outcome. A wire error is a hard failure: the AS returns the matching HTTP status with a JSON object [RFC8259] body whose error member carries the error code below. Success outcomes: +===============+=========================================+ | mission.state | Description | +===============+=========================================+ | active | Mission is active and permits reliance. | +---------------+-----------------------------------------+ | suspended | Mission is suspended (non-terminal). | +---------------+-----------------------------------------+ | terminated | Mission has ended; mission.termination | | | gives the reason. | +---------------+-----------------------------------------+ Table 1: Success outcomes by Mission state A terminated Mission's mission.termination.reason comes from an open set (Section 3.5), and a consumer's reliance decision never depends on recognizing it. Wire error codes: +=================+======+========================================+ | error | HTTP | Description | +=================+======+========================================+ | invalid_request | 400 | Malformed request: an unparseable | | | | body, a required member missing or | | | | malformed, an invalid member | | | | combination, a Lifecycle operation the | | | | AS does not serve (Section 5), or a | | | | retransmitted nonce whose operation | | | | members differ from the original's, | | | | present or absent alike (Section 5.6). | +-----------------+------+----------------------------------------+ | invalid_client | 400 | Direct client authentication failed | | | | and its method defines no other error, | | | | or no credential was presented where | | | | no access-token scheme is accepted | | | | (Section 3.3). | +-----------------+------+----------------------------------------+ | unauthorized | 401 | Access-token authentication failed, or | | | | no credential was presented where an | | | | access-token scheme is accepted; the | | | | response carries the challenges of | | | | Section 3.3. | +-----------------+------+----------------------------------------+ | not_found | 404 | The referenced Mission does not exist | | | | or is not visible to the caller. | +-----------------+------+----------------------------------------+ | conflict | 409 | Lifecycle operation not legal from the | | | | current state (Section 5.6). | +-----------------+------+----------------------------------------+ | stale_version | 409 | expected_version differs from the | | | | current state version (Section 5.6). | +-----------------+------+----------------------------------------+ | rate_limited | 429 | The caller is rate-limited. | +-----------------+------+----------------------------------------+ | unavailable | 503 | The AS temporarily cannot answer, | | | | including a retransmit of a Lifecycle | | | | request still being processed | | | | (Section 5.6). | +-----------------+------+----------------------------------------+ Table 2: Error codes A client authentication method's own error codes and statuses (Section 3.3) can also appear. unauthorized and invalid_client mean the request carried no valid authentication; a request authenticated but not authorized for the referenced Mission receives not_found, never an authentication failure (Section 3.8). The error body, shown here for a not-found response: HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Content-Type: application/json Cache-Control: no-store { "error": "not_found", "error_description": "Mission reference is not found or not visible.", "nonce": "nonce_zsPy4APqVNO96xAT" } The body MUST contain error and error_description, and MUST additionally contain nonce when the request carried a well-formed nonce. A request whose nonce is absent or malformed is refused invalid_request with no nonce member echoed. The body MUST NOT contain any member that would let a caller distinguish unknown from unauthorized references. For rate_limited, the response SHOULD include a Retry-After header [RFC9110] and a retry_after body member in seconds. The body is application/json with Cache-Control: no-store. error_description is diagnostic and is never authorization input. nonce correlates the response to the request in support of the signed-response and retry model of Section 5.6 and is not, by itself, replay protection (see the rule above for an absent or malformed nonce). These endpoints use this OAuth error-response shape, not the problem details of [RFC9457]. 4. Token Introspection Mission Projection This section is OPTIONAL and is a thin delta over the OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] projection of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission State via Token Introspection"). That section defines the mission member (id, issuer, the lifecycle state reported only by the Mission's issuer, and authority_hash disclosed only to a caller holding its disclosure privilege) and its caller-authorization and minimization rules. This section adds to that projection: * TLS protects the projection, as it does any introspection response. Where the projection's integrity and provenance need to be verifiable independently of the transport (for example when the response transits intermediaries or is retained for audit), the AS SHOULD return it as a [RFC9701]-signed response, advertised through the introspection_signing_alg_values_supported metadata that [RFC9701] registers in the [RFC8414] registry. * When the responding AS is the Mission's issuer, the projection MAY additionally carry fresh_until, an RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time giving the point until which the consumer MAY rely on the reported state without re-checking. The caching rule of Section 3.6 applies with only the response-level terms the response carries: an [RFC9701] response's top-level iat dates it, and a top-level exp (discouraged but permitted by [RFC9701]) bounds reliance where present; an unsigned response carries neither. The [RFC7662] iat and exp members describe the token, not the observation of Mission state, and are not these terms. The AS sets fresh_until no later than the time of the response plus any advertised mission_max_stale_seconds. When fresh_until is absent (for example a non-issuer projection), the issuance profile's per-use rule governs: the consumer MUST NOT reuse the reported state for a later decision. This projection and the Mission Status Response (Section 3.5) share one mission object shape: the open mission claim object of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission Claim") plus status members (state, termination, fresh_until, any companion- defined extension member, and, on the Mission Status Response, expires_at and version). The projection populates the subset a token-holding consumer needs, and a consumer reads each fact from the same place in either. Example [RFC9701]-signed introspection response (decoded payload), for a token whose Mission is active: { "iss": "https://as.example.com", "aud": "https://erp.example.com", "iat": 1793606410, "token_introspection": { "active": true, "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3", "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR", "mission": { "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-", "issuer": "https://as.example.com", "state": "active", "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:00:55Z" } } } Per [RFC9701], the signed response is a JWT of typ token- introspection+jwt carrying the [RFC7662] members, mission included, in its token_introspection claim, beside the top-level iss, aud, and iat it always carries. A consumer holding only a mission_id, or needing signed evidence independent of a specific token, uses the Mission Status operation (Section 3); the projection is a same-call convenience for token- holding consumers and is never the sole Mission Status path. 5. Mission Lifecycle Endpoint This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile requires an authenticated, deployment-defined means to revoke a Mission and defers a standardized management API and the richer suspend, resume, and complete operations ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Sections "Revocation" and "Mission Lifecycle"). This section standardizes that management surface; Section 5.4 governs who may perform each operation. The AS publishes its Mission Lifecycle endpoint URL in authorization server metadata (Section 8) as mission_lifecycle_endpoint, distinct from [RFC7009] token revocation. The endpoint MUST be served over TLS as the Mission Status endpoint is (Section 3). This endpoint's operations extend the issuance profile's lifecycle state space ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"), each value arriving with the operation that introduces it (Section 9): suspend adds the state suspended (a paused Mission), and complete adds the termination reason completed (the Mission completed successfully). Issuance gating treats any state other than active as non-deriving, exactly as the issuance profile gates on active. A transition to suspended, or to terminated with reason completed, gates new derivation only. Tokens already derived under the Mission remain valid until their own exp, exactly as in the issuance profile's revocation model. A deployment that needs a prompt cutoff on outstanding tokens uses the propagation mechanisms of Section 6. Suspension is reversible. Consuming or invalidating a refresh token solely because of suspension can prevent refresh after a resume. After validating a refresh request and before consuming or rotating its refresh token, the AS SHOULD check whether the Mission, or another Mission whose state a companion profile makes gate its derivation, is suspended. When this check detects suspension, the AS SHOULD refuse the request without consuming the refresh token or invalidating its otherwise-valid grant solely because of that suspension. The check does not replace issuance-time state validation: a concurrent suspension can still refuse issuance after the check, and preserving refresh capability across that interval requires coordination with the issuance commit. The check leaves refresh-token rotation and reuse detection intact, and a resume does not revive a credential that expired or was revoked independently. An error code alone does not tell a client whether a resume can lift a refusal. When the issuance profile's gating refuses a derivation because the Mission is suspended, or terminated with reason completed, the AS SHOULD include, alongside error, the mission_error token-error-response member ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Issuance Gating") with the value suspended or completed, respectively. suspended reports a refusal that a resume can lift; completed reports a terminal one. The issuance profile's rules for that member apply: it is diagnostic only, it grants nothing, an unrecognized value is ignored, and it is returned only to the authenticated client presenting the Mission's grant. 5.1. Operations The endpoint accepts authenticated POST requests with a form- urlencoded body: mission_id: REQUIRED. A string. The Mission Identifier, as at the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.1). operation: REQUIRED. A string. One of revoke, suspend, resume, complete, or a further value a companion profile registers as an extension operation on this endpoint (below). reason: OPTIONAL. A string of at most 1024 Unicode code points, a longer one being malformed. A human-readable reason recorded in audit. Not used by an extension operation that records its own request members in audit. suspend_until: OPTIONAL. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time. Valid only on the suspend operation. When present, it sets a deadline after which the AS applies on_expiry. on_expiry: CONDITIONAL. A string, one of resume or revoke. REQUIRED when suspend_until is present; otherwise MUST NOT be sent. It selects the transition the AS applies when suspend_until passes. expected_version: OPTIONAL. A string, the canonical decimal form of a positive state version (Section 3.5): ASCII digits with no leading zero, and no sign, whitespace, fraction or exponent. It is the version the caller last observed, compared exactly, never rounded. Any other form is malformed. The AS applies it as Section 5.6 describes. nonce: REQUIRED. A string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. A client-generated nonce, the request's idempotency key (Section 5.6), not a fresh challenge per transmission as at the Mission Status endpoint: a client MUST use a fresh nonce for each new operation it requests on a Mission, unique among its nonce values for that Mission within the deduplication window, and repeat it only to retransmit that request. The request also carries the client authentication parameters of the method it uses, as at the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.1). A companion-registered extension operation carries additional REQUIRED and OPTIONAL members of its own, defined completely by the companion that registers it. The base operations are revoke, suspend, resume, and complete; Section 5.2 gives the transition each applies. The AS MUST refuse an operation value it does not serve, a base operation its conformance claim omits (Section 9) or an extension operation it has not adopted, with invalid_request (Section 3.10) before looking up the Mission, leaving the Mission unchanged, so the refusal discloses nothing about it. The AS answers a successful base operation with the signed, state- only Mission Status Response (Section 3.5), whose aud is the authenticated client's client_id and whose nonce is the request's. A retransmit of an accepted request replays that original response (Section 5.6). An extension operation's outcome and result shape are those its companion profile defines (below). A companion profile MAY register a further operation value on this endpoint that changes no Mission-level state, provided it defines the value's request members, authorization, anti-oracle behavior, idempotency and outcome vocabulary, result shape, and conformance requirements completely. It registers the value by defining it in its own specification; no IANA registry holds operation values (Section 12). A suspend MAY carry suspend_until with a REQUIRED on_expiry; the pair is the Mission's schedule. The schedule is issuer-held state associated with the Mission, outside its Mission Record ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Record"): an AS may store it with the record, and a signed or exchanged Mission Record does not carry it. When the suspend_until of a current schedule passes, the AS MUST apply on_expiry (transition to active for resume, or to terminated with reason revoked for revoke) and emit the corresponding transition event, without a further request, unless expiry governs (below). While the Mission is suspended under a deadline, both suspend_until and on_expiry surface in the signed Mission Status Response (Section 3.5) so a consumer sees the pending outcome. The AS authorizes a schedule when it commits it (Section 5.4) and does not re-authorize it at the deadline: a later expiry or withdrawal of the committing party's grant does not by itself cancel it. A schedule is current until its suspension ends or an authorized replacement supersedes it (Section 5.6). The AS MUST NOT apply a schedule that is no longer current, so an earlier deadline never acts on a later suspension. A deadline applies only a transition legal from the Mission's current state (Section 5.2) and never changes a terminated Mission. From a current schedule's deadline, every decision treats the Mission as in the state its on_expiry produces, whether or not that transition is persisted, so a request the AS decides after the deadline is decided against that state. If the first decision after the deadline comes at or after the Mission's expires_at, expiry governs instead and the Mission is terminated with reason expired (Section 5.2); a revocation committed at its deadline before expires_at keeps reason revoked. For on_expiry revoke, the termination's terminated_at is the schedule's suspend_until. A new suspend whose suspend_until is not later than the time the AS processes it is refused invalid_request; a retransmit of an accepted request still replays its original response after the deadline passes (Section 5.6). 5.2. Legal Transitions Figure 1 shows the Mission lifecycle states and the transitions this document defines. An approval event creates a Mission in active ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"). A deadline is a schedule's suspend_until (Section 5.1). A companion profile can define further transitions to terminated, each recording a termination reason of its own. approval | v +-----------+ suspend +-----------+ | active |-------------->| suspended | | |<--------------| | +-----------+ resume, +-----------+ | or deadline | | (on_expiry=resume) | | revoke, complete, | revoke, complete, expiry, | expiry | deadline (on_expiry=revoke) v v +-------------------------------------------+ | terminated | | reason: revoked, completed or expired | +-------------------------------------------+ Figure 1: Mission lifecycle states and transitions An operation is legal only from the source states below. The terminated state admits no transition, whatever its termination reason. Section 5.6 decides an operation not legal from the current state as idempotent success or a conflict. This table governs Mission-level state; an extension operation that changes no Mission state has no row in it. +===========+============+=================+====================+ | Operation | Legal from | Resulting state | Termination reason | +===========+============+=================+====================+ | revoke | active, | terminated | revoked | | | suspended | | | +-----------+------------+-----------------+--------------------+ | suspend | active | suspended | | +-----------+------------+-----------------+--------------------+ | resume | suspended | active | | +-----------+------------+-----------------+--------------------+ | complete | active, | terminated | completed | | | suspended | | | +-----------+------------+-----------------+--------------------+ Table 3: Lifecycle operations and legal transitions A suspended Mission need not first be resumed to be completed: completion is a monotonic narrowing to terminated and needs no derivation window. A Mission that reaches its expires_at from active or suspended is terminated with reason expired independently of this endpoint, at every decision whether or not the transition is persisted. When a schedule's suspend_until is at or after the Mission's expires_at, expiry governs: the Mission is terminated with reason expired at expires_at, and the AS MUST NOT apply that schedule's on_expiry. 5.3. Authentication The Lifecycle endpoint uses the same authentication as the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.2). Its discovery mirrors that endpoint: the accepted methods in mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported and, for private_key_jwt, the accepted client-assertion algorithms in mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported (Section 8). Its authentication failures follow Section 3.3. Where this endpoint is the deployment's means of revoking a Mission by mission_id independent of possession of any token, which the issuance profile requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation"), the AS MUST accept revoke through client authentication, without requiring an access token or any token issued under the Mission. Client authentication grants no revocation authority by itself: the AS still authorizes the caller for revoke on that Mission (Section 5.4). A freshly signed private_key_jwt client assertion is authentication proof, not a token the caller holds. Where another authenticated surface provides that means, this endpoint can accept only access tokens. The requirement covers revoke only; the endpoint's other operations keep whichever paths the AS supports. For the sender-constrained access-token path, this endpoint is an OAuth protected resource exactly as the Mission Status endpoint is: the AS publishes, in its Protected Resource Metadata for this resource [RFC9728], the resource identifier the token's audience MUST name and the scopes it requires (scopes_supported): mission_lifecycle for revoke, suspend, resume, and complete (Section 5.4), and any scope an adopted extension operation defines. A private-key JWT client_assertion names the AS's issuer identifier in aud, and a presented access token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's protected-resource identifier, exactly as at the Mission Status endpoint. A caller that authenticates directly as a client carries the deployment-defined equivalent grant, never a scope. 5.4. Authorization This section governs revoke, suspend, resume, and complete. An extension operation has the authority model its companion defines, which a mission_lifecycle grant under this section MUST NOT imply. The AS authorizes lifecycle operations against deployment policy: this section sets the minimum authorization semantics, and finer policy is deployment-defined. Every authenticated caller, whatever its authentication mechanism (Section 3.2), MUST be governed by an explicit lifecycle authorization: a mission_lifecycle scope or a deployment-defined equivalent grant that names who may perform the transition. The AS MUST refuse a caller that carries no such authorization. A lifecycle authorization is necessary but not sufficient. The AS MUST authorize each request for its acting party (below), its operation, and the specific Mission it names, under the deployment's policy for that Mission, including the deployment or tenant boundary the Mission belongs to: authorization for one Mission, or within one tenant, authorizes nothing on another. The AS evaluates the acting party's validated identity and any validated delegation context; an act claim identifies the parties to a delegation and is never by itself a grant of lifecycle authority. The acting party, and where the AS checks the lifecycle authorization, follow from the authentication case: 1. When an access token authenticates the call, the token identifies the parties per the issuance profile's access-token model ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): for a delegated access token its sub denotes the resource owner (the represented party), as in [RFC9068]; client_id identifies the calling party (Section 4.3 of [RFC8693]); and, where a delegation chain is present, the act claim identifies the immediate actor. A DPoP [RFC9449] or mTLS [RFC8705] sender constraint binds the presenter to a key; it does not change what sub denotes. The acting party is the calling party so identified, and the presented token MUST carry the lifecycle authorization the AS checks against it. 2. When the caller authenticates directly as a client (Section 3.2), the authenticated client is the acting party. The AS MUST check the deployment-defined lifecycle grant bound to that client. In every case the AS MUST record the acting party, and the response envelope's sub carries it (Section 3.5), distinct from any access token's sub. A deployment-defined audit member of the Mission Status Response MAY carry it as well. For a delegated access token, the represented party is part of the delegation context the AS evaluates, which a policy authorizing the Mission's Subject or Approver matches. Typical deployments authorize revoke to the Mission's Subject or Approver and to administrators; suspend and resume to administrators; and complete to the Mission's client or an administrator. Because resume returns a suspended Mission to active and so undoes the containment a suspend established, a deployment SHOULD require a distinct or elevated authorization for resume. A suspend that carries on_expiry schedules a later resume or revoke. The AS MUST authorize it against both the caller's authorization for suspend and the authorization the deployment requires for a direct operation of the scheduled kind (resume or revoke) on that Mission, including when it sets or replaces the schedule of a Mission already suspended, whoever suspended it. The AS checks both before any change and refuses a caller lacking either as an unauthorized lifecycle request (below), leaving the Mission's state and schedule unchanged. The AS MUST record with each committed schedule its committing party, the acting party of the request that committed it; an authorized replacement records its own. The AS MUST refuse an unauthorized lifecycle request with the not- found response shape of Section 3.10, so the endpoint does not act as a Mission enumeration oracle. 5.5. Lifecycle Examples Revoke request: POST /as/mission/lifecycle HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6... DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi... mission_id=msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9- &operation=revoke &reason=Quarterly+reconcile+cancelled &nonce=nonce_8Y3vN0sM6tP1xR9bQ5 Revoke success response: the signed, state-only Mission Status Response of Section 5.1, with no authorization_details (a lifecycle confirmation reports state, not audience-scoped authority). Here sub carries the acting party (Section 5.4), the calling client identified by client_id; the AS records that party in its audit log with the operation, time, and any reason. HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/mission-status-response+jwt Cache-Control: no-store eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImFzLWtleS0yMDI2LXEzIi... Decoded JWS payload: { "iss": "https://as.example.com", "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3", "sub": "s6BhdRkqt3", "nonce": "nonce_8Y3vN0sM6tP1xR9bQ5", "iat": 1793609600, "exp": 1793609660, "mission": { "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-", "issuer": "https://as.example.com", "state": "terminated", "termination": { "reason": "revoked", "terminated_at": "2026-11-02T08:53:20Z", "version": 4 }, "version": 4, "expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z", "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:54:05Z" } } The Mission's Status version is 4: a suspension and a resumption between the Mission Status example (Section 3.5) and this revocation each advanced it. The next two examples use another Mission. Suspend request with a deadline from admin-console, an administrator client the deployment authorizes for suspend and the scheduled revoke (Section 5.4), here also carrying the OPTIONAL expected_version guard against deciding over stale state (Section 5.6): POST /as/mission/lifecycle HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6... DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi... mission_id=msn_TaLyTFRdyHq4zLDxwrwkEbj062oXcTX5 &operation=suspend &suspend_until=2026-11-09T08%3A15%3A00Z &on_expiry=revoke &expected_version=1 &reason=Pending+quarterly+access+review &nonce=nonce_4Dq2mV8kX1sB7nR3tW Suspend success response: the signed Mission Status Response reports suspended with the pending outcome, suspend_until and on_expiry, in mission. Decoded JWS payload: { "iss": "https://as.example.com", "aud": "admin-console", "sub": "admin-console", "nonce": "nonce_4Dq2mV8kX1sB7nR3tW", "iat": 1793607600, "exp": 1793607660, "mission": { "id": "msn_TaLyTFRdyHq4zLDxwrwkEbj062oXcTX5", "issuer": "https://as.example.com", "state": "suspended", "version": 2, "suspend_until": "2026-11-09T08:15:00Z", "on_expiry": "revoke", "expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z", "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:20:45Z" } } When suspend_until passes without a resume, the AS applies on_expiry, terminating the Mission with reason revoked. 5.6. Idempotency and Conflicts The request nonce (Section 5.1) is the idempotency key: an opaque string of 1 to 255 Unicode code points. The AS treats an absent, empty, longer, or non-string nonce as malformed (invalid_request, with no nonce echoed). The AS MUST deduplicate lifecycle requests by the triple (client, mission_id, nonce) for a bounded window, the client being the acting party (Section 5.4), whose authorization, delegation context included, is checked before every replay (Section 5.7). On a retransmit carrying a nonce already seen for that client and mission_id, together with request members identical to the original's, the AS MUST replay the original response rather than re- execute the operation, once the retransmit has passed authorization (Section 5.7). The comparison covers the operation's request members (operation, reason, suspend_until, on_expiry, expected_version, and any member an extension operation defines), present or absent alike, and excludes client authentication parameters and HTTP headers, which a retry regenerates. Members are compared as decoded values, character for character, in any order, so two spellings of one instant differ. The same nonce paired with request members that differ from the original's MUST be refused invalid_request (Section 3.10); the AS MUST NOT answer it with the unrelated original response. A retransmit whose original response was rate_limited, or was unavailable or another 5xx response, is processed as a new request, not replayed. A request refused before deduplication (Section 5.7) claims no nonce: the AS retains nothing for the refusal and leaves any response already retained under that nonce unchanged, so the rules above apply to a later request carrying it as though the refused request had never arrived. A retransmit that arrives while the original is still being processed never commits the operation a second time: the AS answers it with the original response once that is retained, or with unavailable until then, so every answer reports the one committed operation's outcome. A replay is the original response unchanged, with its original iat and exp. A lifecycle client verifies a response by the checks of Section 3.5, never with a key the AS has published as compromised. A replay whose exp has passed fails check 9, except that the client MAY accept it as confirmation of its original operation's outcome when it correlates the response to that retained request (its mission_id and nonce) and every other check passes. Such a replay confirms that outcome only: it refreshes no cached state, authorizes no action, and does not establish the Mission's current state, for which the client obtains a fresh Mission Status Response. The window MUST be at least the validity span of the signed response the AS would replay (its iat to exp, Section 3.5), so any retransmit that could still present a live response is deduplicated. A deployment MAY use a longer window. Within the window a retransmit is safe against reordering: a delayed suspend retry arriving after a resume is a duplicate, answered with the original suspend response, so it cannot re-suspend an already-resumed Mission. After the window a retransmit is processed as a new request, and only an expected_version the client supplied (below) keeps it from acting on state its sender has not observed. Deduplication guards a retransmitted request; it does not guard a valid request decided over stale state, a fresh suspend issued from a console that has not yet seen a newer resume. For that a lifecycle request MAY carry expected_version, the state version (Section 3.5) the caller last observed: when present, the AS MUST refuse the operation with HTTP 409 and error code stale_version, leaving the Mission unchanged, when the Mission's current state version differs. The AS applies this check before the transition rule below, so a stale expected_version is refused even where the operation would otherwise be idempotent success. A deployment SHOULD require expected_version on the operations it classifies high-risk. Lifecycle operations that change Mission state follow one rule. An operation whose resulting state (Section 5.2) and, for terminated, termination reason equal the Mission's current ones is idempotent success: the AS returns the current Mission Status Response, with no state change and, except for the schedule replacement below, no transition event emitted. Any other operation not legal from the current state (for example suspend against a terminated Mission, or revoke against one terminated with reason completed) is a conflict: the AS MUST refuse it with HTTP 409 and a JSON body whose error code is conflict, leaving the Mission state unchanged. Deduplication applies independently of this rule. An extension operation that changes no Mission state is outside this rule (Section 5.1). resume is the sole exception to the idempotent-success arm. It is legal only from suspended, so resume on a terminated Mission, or on an active one (never suspended, or already resumed) whose state already equals its result, is a conflict, not idempotent success. A suspend against a suspended Mission leaves its state unchanged but can change its schedule. One that carries a suspend_until and on_expiry pair differing from the recorded schedule, or where none is recorded, replaces the schedule once authorized (Section 5.4): the AS MUST update the recorded values and their committing party, emitting the transition event for that metadata-only change and reporting the updated values in the response; silent acceptance without effect is not conforming. A suspend that omits both members leaves the recorded schedule, if any, and its committing party unchanged: omission never clears a deadline. A suspend carrying only one of the two remains invalid (Section 5.1) and changes nothing. 5.7. Processing Order The AS MUST process a lifecycle request in this order, refusing it at the first step that fails: 1. Authenticate the caller (Section 3.2), parsing the request body only as far as authentication and the nonce echo of Section 3.10 need. A body that cannot be parsed is refused invalid_request, whatever credential the request presents; a client authentication parameter included more than once fails authentication, and no occurrence of it is used. Every authentication failure is answered as Section 3.3 assigns. 2. Validate the request syntax and the operation (Section 5.1). A malformed request, or an operation the AS does not serve, is refused invalid_request; a request that includes a parameter more than once is malformed, as at the token endpoint (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]). 3. Authorize the request: for a base operation, the lifecycle authorization of Section 5.4 for the acting party, the operation and the Mission, together with that for any transition the request schedules; for an extension operation, the authorization its companion defines. An unknown Mission and every failed authorization are refused alike with the not-found response. 4. Apply deduplication (Section 5.6): replay the original response to a retransmit, or refuse a reused nonce whose request members differ. 5. Refuse invalid_request a suspend whose suspend_until is not later than the time the AS processes it (Section 5.1), then check expected_version, when present (Section 5.6). 6. Apply the transition rules (Section 5.6) and commit the transition. Authorization therefore precedes every replayed or state-dependent response: a caller not authorized for the Mission receives the not- found response, never a replay, stale_version or conflict. The AS MUST durably commit a transition, with the state version it produces, before it sends any response that acknowledges it; a transition whose commit fails is never answered as a success. The issuance profile's refusal of a derivation answered after an acknowledged revocation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Issuance Gating") is not extended to suspension: a suspension refuses later derivations at their gate, and a derivation already past its gate when the suspension commits can complete. 5.8. Relationship to RFC 7009 A Mission revocation through this endpoint reaches credentials already derived from the Mission through the AS's advertised revocation propagation (Section 6); otherwise they remain valid until their own exp. The AS MAY additionally revoke specific outstanding tokens it knows by jti, with the same effect as [RFC7009] revocation of each token. An [RFC7009] revocation does not by itself revoke a Mission: Mission state changes only by a lifecycle transition (Section 5.2), such as a request to this endpoint, a deadline, expiry, or the coupling below. Where a deployment's revocation policy treats revoking a Mission's refresh token as revoking the Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation"), the AS MUST commit that revocation as the same revoke transition this endpoint applies: decided by that policy for the revoking party and the Mission, recorded with a new state version, and emitting the same transition event. The coupling requires neither a request to this endpoint nor an additional scope. 5.9. Deferred Lifecycle Capabilities This endpoint operates on one Mission at a time. Mission enumeration and bulk lifecycle operations for incident response, such as revoking every Mission for a compromised Subject, client, or tenant, are left to companion profiles. Approver transfer or re-anchoring (changing the party that anchors a Mission's consent) and administrative monotonic narrowing (such as shortening a Mission's expires_at) remain deferred to future work. 6. Revocation Propagation This section is OPTIONAL. The issuance profile bounds outstanding self-contained tokens by their lifetime and OPTIONAL token introspection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Sections "Issuance Gating" and "Mission State via Token Introspection"). A deployment that needs a Mission state change to take effect faster than token lifetime alone combines the propagation mechanisms below and sizes token lifetimes to match. Each mechanism is discovered from its own metadata: * consulting Mission state at each derivation event (the token endpoint, refresh, Token Exchange), the issuance profile's always- present baseline, which does not invalidate already-issued self- contained tokens; * token introspection (Section 4), which returns active: false for a token whose Mission state disallows use even before the token expires, discovered from introspection_endpoint and introspection_signing_alg_values_supported; * the Mission Status operation (Section 3) for per-request state checks by high-assurance resource servers, discovered from mission_status_endpoint; and * any further mechanism a companion profile defines, such as event- driven propagation, discovered from that profile's own metadata. A deployment that claims revocation propagation (Section 9) advertises mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 8), the ceiling, in seconds, on reliance on an observation of Mission state: the freshness cap of Section 3.6 applies it to a Mission Status Response, and the issuer applies it to an introspection projection's fresh_until (Section 4). It does not bound a self-contained token, which a consumer relies on for its lifetime unless that lifetime is sized to the bound (below). When the member is absent, no such ceiling is declared, and a consumer relies on a Mission Status Response within the reliance bound of Section 3.6. A fresh observation bounds only how stale the consumer's view of Mission state is; it does not bound reconciliation delay upstream of the issuer or effects already underway. The 60-second value in the examples is a tight deployment's choice, not a floor. Where a deployment needs Mission revocation to take effect but only the baseline derivation-time check is in use, Mission-bound access tokens SHOULD use TTLs no longer than the declared mission_max_stale_seconds. Deployments where revocation propagates out of band (token introspection, per-request status checks, or a companion profile's push mechanism) MAY use longer TTLs. Sizing token lifetimes to the bound is itself a propagation mechanism: expiry performs the state check, and the consumer integrates nothing. Introspection and per-request status checks tighten specific paths as upgrades, not prerequisites. 7. Operational Considerations A deployment declaring revocation propagation SHOULD publish the recovery objective considered when choosing mission_max_stale_seconds and the availability consequence when recovery takes longer than that bound. The documentation its service_documentation metadata [RFC8414] names is one place to publish them. That bound is a security ceiling: an operational recovery objective never authorizes extending a reliance bound (Section 3.6) or the advertised mission_max_stale_seconds during an incident, and detecting an outage does not reset an existing observation's remaining validity. Where the topology provides an authoritative state source available independently of the issuer, an issuer outage is distinct from a state-source outage. The deployment describes its distribution posture per surface: Mission Status Responses follow Section 3.6, and a companion mechanism its own freshness rules. A push mechanism accelerates learning of transitions over a correctly bounded state source; it does not replace that source after confidence is lost. Operators watch observation age and remaining validity, failed refreshes, stream gaps, fallback availability, clock health, and catch-up after recovery. A recovery check reconciles committed state and versions before publishing newly fresh observations; a successful HTTP response or a new signature alone does not establish that reconciliation. 8. Authorization Server Metadata This section is OPTIONAL and applies only to a deployment that adopts one or more of the extensions above. An AS advertises the surfaces it supports through the following authorization server metadata members [RFC8414], in addition to the issuance profile's mission_bound_authorization_supported ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization Server Metadata"). mission_status_endpoint: OPTIONAL. A string containing a URL. The URL of the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3). Present when the AS supports it. mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings naming the client authentication methods the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3) accepts, values of the OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry [RFC7591] alone, not the OAuth Access Token Types values that introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported also admits [RFC8414]. It MUST NOT list a method that authenticates with a shared client secret, or none (Section 3.2). The sender- constrained access-token path is not a client authentication method: this endpoint's Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728] describes it. REQUIRED when the Mission Status endpoint accepts client authentication. mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported: CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings, the JWS [RFC7515] algorithm values the AS accepts for the private_key_jwt client-assertion JWT (Section 3.2) at the Mission Status endpoint. none MUST NOT be used. REQUIRED when mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists private_key_jwt. mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported: CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings. The JWS [RFC7515] algorithm values the AS uses to sign the Mission Status Response shape (Section 3.5), on every surface that returns it (the dedicated Mission Status operation, the Lifecycle endpoint, and any companion surface that reuses that response), mirroring introspection_signing_alg_values_supported. These are the response-signing algorithms, not the private_key_jwt client- assertion algorithms of the endpoint auth-signing members. REQUIRED when the AS serves any such surface, since a consumer rejects a response signed with an algorithm not listed (Section 3.5). mission_lifecycle_endpoint: OPTIONAL. A string containing a URL. The URL of the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5). Present when the AS supports it. mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings naming the client authentication methods the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5) accepts, with the value space and constraints of mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported. REQUIRED when the Mission Lifecycle endpoint accepts client authentication. mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported: CONDITIONAL. A JSON array of strings, the JWS [RFC7515] algorithm values the AS accepts for the private_key_jwt client-assertion JWT (Section 3.2) at the Mission Lifecycle endpoint. none MUST NOT be used. REQUIRED when mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported lists private_key_jwt. mission_max_stale_seconds: OPTIONAL. An integer. The ceiling, in seconds, on reliance on an observation of Mission state (Section 6). A deployment claiming revocation propagation (Section 9) advertises it. When absent, no such ceiling is declared. mission_historical_jwks_uri: CONDITIONAL. A string containing an https URL. The URL of the AS's historical key set (Section 8.1). REQUIRED while that set lists a key. token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported [RFC8414] describes the token endpoint alone and is never read in place of an endpoint's *_auth_methods_supported member. DPoP and mTLS support for issued credentials are read from the standard dpop_signing_alg_values_supported [RFC9449] and tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens [RFC8705] metadata; this document defines no sender-constraint member. A discovery response from https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth- authorization-server, showing the issuance profile and extension members: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json Cache-Control: max-age=3600 { "issuer": "https://as.example.com", "token_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/as/token", "introspection_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/as/introspect", "jwks_uri": "https://as.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json", "introspection_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"], "mission_bound_authorization_supported": true, "mission_status_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/as/mission/status", "mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["tls_client_auth", "private_key_jwt"], "mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"], "mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"], "mission_lifecycle_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/as/mission/lifecycle", "mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["tls_client_auth", "private_key_jwt"], "mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"], "mission_max_stale_seconds": 60 } 8.1. Historical Key Set The historical key set holds the public keys the AS has withdrawn as compromised (Section 10.5), so responses signed under them stay verifiable for audit. It is a JWT [RFC7519] with typ jwk-set+jwt, served at mission_historical_jwks_uri, which a consumer takes only from authorization server metadata it has validated (Section 3.3 of [RFC8414]). Its claims are iss (the AS's issuer identifier), iat, and keys: a JWK Set's keys array [RFC7517] holding each such key's public JWK, under its original kid, for at least the audit horizon of every Mission whose responses it signed. The AS serves the set with the media type application/jwk-set+jwt ([OpenID.Federation], Section 15.6). The AS signs the set under its active Mission Status signing key and never under a key the set lists or a key of another role. When that key is itself compromised, the AS signs the set under its replacement and never under another published key. A consumer identifies the authorized signer through its trusted configuration, not by its presence in the jwks_uri, which also carries other roles' keys and retired keys; it accepts a replacement only once that configuration authorizes it. A consumer MUST NOT accept a historical key set whose signature does not verify under the key its trusted configuration authorizes. Each listed JWK carries the revoked member [OpenID.Federation] (Section 8.7.2) with reason compromised and these times: * revoked_at: the time the AS revoked the key; and * compromised_at: an added member of revoked, the established compromise time, the earliest time from which a signature under the key is not trusted. It is absent when no compromise time is established. Both are NumericDate values [RFC7519]. The set reuses OpenID Federation's revoked encoding only; this document defines no OpenID Federation endpoint and claims no conformance to it. The AS declares a freshness lifetime for the set with explicit freshness information (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9111]). A consumer refetches the set, or revalidates its copy (Section 4.3 of [RFC9111]), once that lifetime ends; a response without valid explicit freshness information is stale when received (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC9111]). A key a verified set lists stays compromised for the consumer: a consumer MUST NOT treat it as no longer compromised because a later set omits it, an earlier set is presented again, or a fetch of the set fails. While a fetch fails, the consumer keeps refusing the keys it has learned are compromised; the set's freshness never extends that of the consumer's cached jwks_uri, which Section 10.5 governs. 9. Conformance An implementation conforms to the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] or implements the Mission Issuer role of another binding that serves these surfaces. Each extension in this document is independently OPTIONAL; an implementation names the ones it supports (for example, "issuance profile with Mission Status and Mission Lifecycle"), and an implementation that supports none of them is still a conforming issuance profile. An implementation claiming an extension MUST meet its requirements: * *Mission Status*: serve the dedicated Mission Status operation (Section 3) with JWS-signed responses (application/mission-status- response+jwt), the authentication and read authorization of Section 3.2, the anti-oracle property (Section 3.8), and the error shape of Section 3.10; and advertise mission_status_endpoint, mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported, and the endpoint's authentication metadata (Section 8): mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported when the endpoint accepts client authentication, mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported when that member lists private_key_jwt, and, when the endpoint accepts the access-token path, its Protected Resource Metadata (Section 3.2). * *Introspection projection*: carry the Mission projection on the introspection response as Section 4 provides, including when it carries fresh_until and when it is signed with [RFC9701]. * *Mission Lifecycle*: serve the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5) with its four base operations, gate the suspended state and the completed termination it introduces exactly as the issuance profile gates on non-active state, and advertise mission_lifecycle_endpoint, mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported, and the endpoint's authentication metadata (Section 8): mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported when the endpoint accepts client authentication, mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported when that member lists private_key_jwt, and, when the endpoint accepts the access-token path, its Protected Resource Metadata (Section 3.2). * *Mission Lifecycle, revoke only*: serve the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 5) with the revoke operation, under its authentication, its explicit lifecycle authorization (Section 5.4), the idempotency and conflict rules of Section 5.6, and the not-found refusal of an unauthorized request; answer each revoke with the signed, state-only Mission Status Response of Section 5.1; refuse any operation the implementation has not adopted (Section 5.1); and advertise mission_lifecycle_endpoint, mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported, and the endpoint's authentication metadata (Section 8): mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported when the endpoint accepts client authentication, mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported when that member lists private_key_jwt, and, when the endpoint accepts the access-token path, its Protected Resource Metadata (Section 3.2). The class requires neither another operation nor the Mission Status operation. An implementation that also serves another base operation or the Mission Status operation meets that operation's requirements, and one that serves suspend serves resume, without widening who may perform either (Section 5.4). The suspended state and completed termination arrive only with the operations that introduce them. An implementation claiming Mission Lifecycle meets this class. * *Revocation propagation*: advertise mission_max_stale_seconds and size Mission-bound access-token TTLs as Section 6 provides. A Mission Issuer that claims any extension above meets the following requirement, whichever companion profiles it adopts. Every issuer- held narrowing mechanism a deployment runs, including any a companion profile defines, MUST feed the single Effective Authority Set computation. Every derivation and every authority-reporting surface MUST use that same computation, so no surface reports authority the computation has not reduced. 10. Security Considerations The security considerations of the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] apply in full. 10.1. Mission Status Enumeration Per the anti-oracle property (Section 3.8), an unknown mission_id and a known-but-unauthorized one receive an identical HTTP status, body and headers at the Status and Lifecycle endpoints (Section 5.4, Section 5.7), and the AS SHOULD additionally suppress timing side channels (for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform lookup path). An implementation that leaks the distinction exposes the Mission space to enumeration. 10.2. Mission Status Response Replay A Mission Status Response is bound to (caller sub, audience, nonce, issuance time). Replay against a different caller, audience or request fails the sub, aud and nonce checks of Section 3.5, which the signature protects, and replay after the reliance bound fails the caching rule (Section 3.6). A response cached and replayed by the same caller within its reliance bound is equivalent to a fresh response. 10.3. Mission Status Denial of Service Where consumers query Mission Status per request, the operation is on the path of every Mission-bound credential validation. The AS MUST implement per-consumer rate limiting (returning rate_limited, Section 3.10) and SHOULD encourage consumer-side caching (Section 3.6) to reduce traffic. 10.4. Signed Response Format A signed introspection projection (Section 4) uses [RFC9701], which is scoped to token introspection. The dedicated Mission Status operation uses its own media type (application/mission-status- response+jwt, Section 12) and a JWS [RFC7515], because [RFC9701] does not apply to a lookup keyed by mission_id (Section 3.5). 10.5. Signing-Key Retention for Audit The AS signs Mission Status and Lifecycle responses with a key from its jwks_uri. The AS MUST keep the public JWK for every kid it has signed such a response under resolvable for at least the Mission's audit horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so an archived application/mission-status-response+jwt remains verifiable for audit and dispute: a retired key in its jwks_uri, and a compromised key in its historical key set (Section 8.1). This is the issuance profile's retired-key rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Signing and Key Rotation"), with the audit horizon as the bound. A key known or suspected compromised follows the issuance profile's compromise rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Signing and Key Rotation"): the AS stops signing with it and removes it from its jwks_uri, and publishes it as revoked in its historical key set. Retention is for audit, not trust. A consumer MUST NOT accept, for a current reliance decision, a response signed under a key the AS has published as compromised. A consumer MUST NOT use a key from the historical key set to verify a response for a current reliance decision. A consumer MUST NOT rely on a cached copy of the AS's jwks_uri beyond the freshness lifetime its response explicitly declares (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9111]). A jwks_uri response without valid explicit freshness information is stale when received and is never given a heuristic lifetime (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC9111]): the consumer revalidates it before reuse. The consumer replaces its cached key set with each one it fetches rather than adding to it, so a removed key stops verifying within that lifetime. When the cached set is stale and revalidation fails, the consumer MUST NOT accept a Status or Lifecycle response for a current reliance decision until a fetch or revalidation succeeds. An auditor examining an archived response signed under a compromised key classifies it by the published compromise information, compromised_at or its absence. 10.6. General OAuth Security This document inherits OAuth 2.0 Best Current Practice [RFC9700] for the OAuth surfaces it composes with, and implementers MUST follow it. A private-key JWT client assertion names the AS's issuer identifier as its audience (Section 3.2), so it is acceptable at every AS endpoint that accepts that method. Section 3 of [RFC7523] makes jti replay protection optional; an AS that applies it across those endpoints, with short assertion lifetimes, keeps an assertion captured at one endpoint from authenticating at another. 11. Privacy Considerations The privacy considerations of the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] apply in full. 11.1. Mission Status and Introspection as Disclosure Surfaces The Mission Status operation (Section 3) and the introspection projection (Section 4) disclose Mission state and the audience-scoped authorization_details to the authenticated, authorized requester, and MAY additionally disclose authority_hash to a requester authorized for it. A deployment MUST treat both as Mission information- disclosure surfaces, audience-filtering the disclosed authority so a consumer never sees entries addressed to audiences it is not authorized to request (Section 3.1, Section 3.5). A Mission Status Response also discloses version, expires_at, any schedule and the termination reason to every holder of the read authorization; a deployment can narrow that authorization (Section 3.2) where they are sensitive. 11.2. Status Audit Logging The AS records Status and Lifecycle requests (containing mission_id, audience, caller, and timing) in audit logs. Deployments MUST treat these logs as PII sinks per the issuance profile's privacy considerations. 12. IANA Considerations This document requests IANA actions for OAuth AS metadata members, OAuth extensions error codes, a media type, and one entry in each of two issuance-profile registries. It defines no registry of its own: endpoint authentication methods are values of the existing OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry [RFC7591] (Section 8), and Mission Lifecycle operation values have no IANA registry: a companion profile registers an extension operation by defining it in its own specification (Section 5.1). The mission_error values suspended and completed (Section 5) need no registration, because the issuance profile's mission_error member has no registry of values; Section 12.4 requests their registration as a lifecycle state and a termination reason. This document registers no Well-Known URI: its metadata members (Section 8) are published at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server [RFC8414]. 12.1. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry [RFC8414]: * Metadata Name: mission_status_endpoint * Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's Mission Status endpoint. * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8 * Metadata Name: mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported * Metadata Description: JSON array of the client authentication methods the Mission Status endpoint accepts. * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8 * Metadata Name: mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported * Metadata Description: JSON array of the JWS algorithms the Mission Status endpoint accepts for private-key-JWT client authentication. * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8 * Metadata Name: mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported * Metadata Description: JSON array of the JWS algorithms the authorization server uses to sign Mission Status Responses. * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8 * Metadata Name: mission_lifecycle_endpoint * Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's Mission Lifecycle endpoint. * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8 * Metadata Name: mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported * Metadata Description: JSON array of the client authentication methods the Mission Lifecycle endpoint accepts. * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8 * Metadata Name: mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported * Metadata Description: JSON array of the JWS algorithms the Mission Lifecycle endpoint accepts for private-key-JWT client authentication. * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8 * Metadata Name: mission_max_stale_seconds * Metadata Description: Maximum interval, in seconds, a consumer may rely on an observation of Mission state. * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8 * Metadata Name: mission_historical_jwks_uri * Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's historical key set, the signed set of public keys it has withdrawn as compromised. * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 8.1 12.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Extensions Error Registry" [RFC6749]. invalid_request, invalid_client and not_found are already registered for other usage locations; their entries here add the usage locations of this document. * Error Name: invalid_request * Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response * Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0 * Change Controller: IETF * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10 * Error Name: invalid_client * Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response * Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0 * Change Controller: IETF * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10 * Error Name: unauthorized * Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response * Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0 * Change Controller: IETF * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10 * Error Name: not_found * Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response * Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0 * Change Controller: IETF * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10 * Error Name: conflict * Error Usage Location: Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response * Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0 * Change Controller: IETF * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10 * Error Name: stale_version * Error Usage Location: Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response * Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0 * Change Controller: IETF * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10 * Error Name: rate_limited * Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response * Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0 * Change Controller: IETF * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10 * Error Name: unavailable * Error Usage Location: Mission Status endpoint error response; Mission Lifecycle endpoint error response * Related Protocol Extension: Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0 * Change Controller: IETF * Specification Document(s): this document, Section 3.10 12.3. Media Type Registration IANA is requested to register the following media type per [RFC6838]: * Type name: application * Subtype name: mission-status-response+jwt * Required parameters: none * Optional parameters: none * Encoding considerations: binary; JWS Compact Serialization * Security considerations: see Section 10 * Interoperability considerations: see this document * Published specification: this document * Applications that use this media type: OAuth Mission-Bound consumers * Fragment identifier considerations: not applicable * Deprecated alias names for this type: none * Restrictions on usage: none * Provisional registration: no * Magic number(s): none * File extension(s): none * Macintosh file type code(s): none * Person & email address to contact: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com (mailto:public@karlmcguinness.com) * Intended usage: COMMON * Author: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com (mailto:public@karlmcguinness.com) * Change controller: IETF 12.4. Mission Lifecycle Registrations This document requests registration of one state in the issuance profile's Mission Lifecycle States registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), under that registry's Specification Required policy: +===========+==========+==================+============+===========+ | Value | Terminal | Semantics | Change | Reference | | | | | Controller | | +===========+==========+==================+============+===========+ | suspended | no | A paused Mission | IETF | this | | | | that derives no | | document, | | | | tokens until | | Section 5 | | | | resumed. | | | +-----------+----------+------------------+------------+-----------+ Table 4: Mission Lifecycle States registration It also requests registration of one reason in the issuance profile's Mission Termination Reasons registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), under the same policy: +===========+===============+=========+============+===========+ | Value | Semantics | Members | Change | Reference | | | | | Controller | | +===========+===============+=========+============+===========+ | completed | The Mission | none | IETF | this | | | completed | | | document, | | | successfully. | | | Section 5 | +-----------+---------------+---------+------------+-----------+ Table 5: Mission Termination Reasons registration 13. References 13.1. Normative References [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness- oauth-mission-01, 21 October 2026, . [OpenID.Federation] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Federation 1.0", 17 February 2026, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, . [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, . [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012, . [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, . [RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, August 2013, . [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, . [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, . [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, . [RFC7523] Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, May 2015, . [RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol", RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015, . [RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, . [RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018, . [RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020, . [RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T. Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705, DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020, . [RFC9068] Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October 2021, . [RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022, . [RFC9111] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111, DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022, . [RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati, "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November 2022, . [RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, September 2023, . [RFC9700] Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett, "Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security", BCP 240, RFC 9700, DOI 10.17487/RFC9700, January 2025, . [RFC9701] Lodderstedt, T., Ed. and V. Dzhuvinov, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Response for OAuth Token Introspection", RFC 9701, DOI 10.17487/RFC9701, January 2025, . [RFC9728] Jones, M.B., Hunt, P., and A. Parecki, "OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata", RFC 9728, DOI 10.17487/RFC9728, April 2025, . 13.2. Informative References [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-rfc7523bis] Jones, M. B., Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and F. Skokan, "Updates to OAuth 2.0 JSON Web Token (JWT) Client Authentication and Assertion-Based Authorization Grants", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth- rfc7523bis-11, 28 April 2026, . [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-resource-access] McGuinness, K., "Mission Resource Access Profile for OAuth 2.0", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness- oauth-mission-resource-access-00, 22 October 2026, . [OIDC-CAEP] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Continuous Access Evaluation Profile 1.0", 2025, . [OIDC-SSF] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Shared Signals Framework Specification 1.0", 2025, . [RFC8725] Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725, DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020, . [RFC9457] Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, DOI 10.17487/RFC9457, July 2023, . Appendix A. Document History [[ To be removed from the final specification ]] -01 * Mission Status Operation and Revocation Propagation cite the OAuth binding's Resource Server Enforcement, Issuance Gating, and Mission State via Token Introspection sections, where the stateless baseline and the token-lifetime bound are stated, together with or instead of its Revocation section. No requirement changed (#1892). * The Mission Status Request gives the client authentication parameters of mTLS and private-key JWT as examples; a method that carries its credentials in HTTP header fields keeps them there. * IANA Considerations adds the Mission Status and Mission Lifecycle endpoints as usage locations for invalid_request and invalid_client. * A metadata-only change and a schedule are issuer-held state associated with the Mission, outside its Mission Record; an AS may store them with the record, and a signed or exchanged Mission Record does not carry them. Authorization, atomicity, versioning and scheduling rules are unchanged (#1879). * Each rule that was stated twice has one normative home, and the other statement points to it: the freshness cap and reliance bound (Caching), the response checks, the nonce check and the RFC 9701 and unsigned-response prohibitions (Response), and the TLS rule (Mission Status Operation). The Anti-Oracle timing rule is one sentence. No requirement changed. * The conformance classes name the Protected Resource Metadata of the access-token path, and the Introspection projection class follows that section on fresh_until and RFC 9701 signing. * Terminology: "transition event" and "error code" throughout, "the AS" for the body uses of "Mission Issuer", a jwks_uri response in Signing-Key Retention, and endpoint-neutral error-table descriptions. The Privacy Considerations disclosure heading names the Mission Status operation and introspection. * The Lifecycle mission_id member and base-operations list point to the Mission Status request and the Legal Transitions table. * Where the Lifecycle endpoint is the issuance profile's token- independent revocation means, the AS accepts revoke through client authentication without requiring any token, and still authorizes the caller (#1895, D1114). -00 * Initial individual draft. Acknowledgments The author thanks the implementers and reviewers of the Mission-Bound Authorization work for feedback that shaped these extensions. Author's Address Karl McGuinness Independent Email: public@karlmcguinness.com