Internet-Draft OAuth Mission Expansion November 2026
McGuinness Expires 23 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Web Authorization Protocol
Internet-Draft:
draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion-latest
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
K. McGuinness
Independent

Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0

Abstract

Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 commits a Mission's authority at a single approval event. Enlarging that authority requires a new approval, recorded as a successor Mission. This document defines Mission Expansion, the optional extension that obtains that approval.

A client requests expansion with an OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange that presents the predecessor Mission's sender-constrained access token. A fresh approval creates the successor, whose authority comes only from that approval and which carries a predecessor member linking it to the Mission it replaces. When the successor activates, the predecessor is terminated with reason superseded; an expansion that never completes leaves the predecessor active. A deployment that never expands a Mission is unaffected by this document.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (the "issuance profile") makes a Mission a first-class OAuth artifact: a structured, human-approved, integrity-bound task whose authority bounds and outlives every token an agent derives. The issuance profile commits the Authority Set once, at the approval event, and defines no mid-stream authorization upgrade. Widening authority requires a new approval and a successor Mission, as this document specifies.

An agent's task does not always stay within the authority approved for it. The agent can meet an action that the approved Authority Set does not cover but that the deployment's governance policy would permit under a fresh consent. Expansion is the governed path from that shortfall to a new approval. It does not modify or widen the existing Mission. It creates a new Mission through the issuance profile's own approval event, with its own integrity anchors and Mission Record, linked to the Mission it replaces. The successor's authority comes only from that approval.

The mechanism rests on three additions to the issuance profile:

1.1. Relationship to the Issuance Profile

This document depends normatively on the issuance profile and is not implementable alone. It reuses the following from that profile without restating them:

  • the Mission Intent and its submission via PAR;

  • authority derivation and the subset rule;

  • the approval event and its integrity anchors;

  • the Mission Record and the mission claim; and

  • the lifecycle and issuance gating.

It uses the terms Agent (Client), Subject, Approver, Mission Issuer, Mission Intent, Authority Set, Mission, and derived token as defined there. "The issuance profile" without a section reference means [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] as a whole.

This document is an optional, layered extension and changes nothing in the issuance profile. A deployment that implements the issuance profile and never expands a Mission is fully conformant to that profile and unaffected by this document: it issues no expansion request, records no predecessor member, and never terminates a Mission with reason superseded. The issuance profile's lifecycle (active, and terminated with reason revoked or expired) is complete without expansion. A Mission Issuer claims conformance to this document only under one of the targets of Section 13.

1.2. Scope

This document defines:

  • the expansion request and its binding to the predecessor (Section 4);

  • adjudication, completion, and successor activation (Section 5);

  • the predecessor, related_to, and successor lineage members (Section 6);

  • the predecessor's transition to terminated with reason superseded (Section 7);

  • replacement expansion, the only expansion mode (Section 8);

  • concurrent-expansion reconciliation, with a closed set of reconciliation status codes (Section 10);

  • creation idempotency for Mission-creation exchanges (Section 11); and

  • the expansion denial reasons and the Mission Denial Reasons registry (Section 12).

This document does not define:

  • a way to widen an existing Mission in place; expansion always creates a new Mission;

  • runtime per-action enforcement, or how a denial is classified as expansion-eligible (Section 3.1, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]);

  • branch expansion, in which predecessor and successor both remain active (Section 8);

  • multi-hop or cross-domain expansion: the predecessor's Mission Issuer (its issuer) adjudicates every expansion; or

  • policy-adjudicated expansion within a pre-consented authority ceiling, which the experimental progressive authorization companion defines ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]). Under this document alone, every expansion is adjudicated by a fresh human approval.

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

All JSON shown in this document is non-normative and illustrative; the member definitions in the surrounding text are authoritative.

The following terms apply in addition to those inherited from the issuance profile (Section 1.1).

Predecessor Mission:

The active Mission an expansion enlarges. It is the baseline for the successor and is referenced by the successor's mission.predecessor member (Section 6).

Successor Mission:

The Mission a replacement expansion creates through a fresh approval event. It carries its own Authority Set, integrity anchors, and mission_id, and a predecessor member linking it to the predecessor (Section 6).

Expansion request:

An [RFC8693] token exchange that carries a Mission Intent and presents the predecessor Mission's Mission-bound access token as the subject_token, asking the Mission Issuer to adjudicate a successor (Section 4).

Successor activation:

The single atomic step in which the successor Mission becomes active and the predecessor becomes terminated with reason superseded (Section 5.4).

3. Protocol Overview

 Agent (client)               Mission Issuer (AS)
     |                            |
     | denied: action outside     |
     | active Mission's authority |
     |                            |
     | 1. token exchange -------> | resolve predecessor from
     |    subject_token =         | subject_token; verify
     |    predecessor's Mission-  | possession (subject_token
     |    bound access token;     | cnf); gate predecessor
     |    mission_intent          | active
     |                            |
     |                            | 2. complete, one of:
     |                            |
     |    <-- deferral ---------- | (a) deferred: fresh async
     |    ---- poll ------------> |     approval; token on
     |    <-- access token ------ |     approval
     |                            |
     |    <-- interaction req. -- | (b) interactive: the
     |    ---- PAR + handle ----> |     client pushes the
     |    <-- (front channel) --> |     continuation; approval;
     |    ---- code ------------> |     code redemption
     |    <-- access token ------ |
     |                            |
     |         at activation: successor active,
     |         predecessor superseded (atomic)
     v
Figure 1: Expansion Protocol Flow

Figure 1 shows the protocol:

  1. An action is denied because the requested authority is outside the active Mission's Authority Set (Section 3.1).

  2. The client sends an expansion request: an [RFC8693] token exchange that presents the predecessor's Mission-bound access token and carries the successor's Mission Intent (Section 4). Possession of that token binds the request to one predecessor, so the Mission Issuer adjudicates a successor of that predecessor rather than an unrelated new Mission.

  3. The Mission Issuer verifies the request and derives the successor's Authority Set (Section 5.1). A request that widens nothing is refused.

  4. An expansion always widens authority, so a fresh consent supplies the broader authority, obtained through the deferred token response ([I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response]) or the deployment's interactive approval (Section 5.2). The successor's authority comes only from that consent.

  5. When the successor's authority is issued, the successor activates and the predecessor becomes terminated with reason superseded, atomically (Section 5.4). An expansion that never completes leaves the predecessor active.

3.1. Eligibility

A client initiates expansion after an action is denied because the requested authority is outside the active Mission's Authority Set and the deployment's governance policy permits widening it. The component that denies the action classifies the denial as expansion-eligible; this document does not define that classification.

Denials come from different sources:

  • A Mission-aware resource server enforces the token's authority statelessly and refuses an out-of-bounds action with its usual insufficient-authority error ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).

  • Under the runtime enforcement profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), a deny is terminal for the attempted action, and a request that would broaden the Mission's authority is refused, with expansion out of that profile's scope. This document defines that expansion.

This document does not require any particular denial source: a client that knows, by any means, that an action needs authority the active Mission lacks MAY initiate expansion. An eligible denial is not an authorization in favor of expansion; whether the Mission Issuer adjudicates a successor remains its decision (Section 5).

3.2. Expansion Is Not Step-Up

Expansion is distinct from authentication step-up [RFC9470]:

  • A request denied because an acr or amr constraint requires fresh authentication is satisfied by step-up. The Authority Set does not change.

  • A request denied because the requested authority is not in the active Mission's Authority Set requires expansion. The Authority Set is enlarged only through a new approval event.

A client MUST NOT initiate expansion for a denial that is an authentication shortfall.

Section 14.6 describes the consequence of conflating the two.

4. The Expansion Request

To expand a predecessor Mission, the requester MUST prove possession of the predecessor Mission's authority through a sender-constrained proof, and a reusable bearer refresh credential MUST NOT be the carrier of that proof.

This document binds that requirement to an [RFC8693] token exchange at the token endpoint (Section 4.1): the predecessor's own sender-constrained Mission-bound access token is the subject_token, and possession is proven against that token's confirmation key (Section 4.2). The Mission Authority Server profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]) binds the same requirement to an authenticated-client submission on its token-less surface; the two are peer bindings of one requirement.

4.1. Token Exchange Request

The client sends an [RFC8693] token exchange request to the token endpoint with the following parameters:

grant_type:

REQUIRED. urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange.

requested_token_type:

REQUIRED. urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token. This value selects expansion: the Mission Issuer returns the successor's Mission-bound access token. Child creation, the peer operation on the same grant, is selected by the JWT token type ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]).

subject_token:

REQUIRED. The predecessor Mission's sender-constrained Mission-bound access token. This token, not any identifier, selects the predecessor authoritatively (Section 4.2).

subject_token_type:

REQUIRED. urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token. The Mission Issuer MUST reject any other value with invalid_request. A refresh token MUST NOT be accepted as the subject_token for an expansion: the possession proof is a sender-constrained access token, never a reusable bearer refresh credential.

actor_token:

OPTIONAL. A token identifying the acting agent, per [RFC8693]. Where it is absent, the request's client authentication identifies the acting agent. This document does not restructure any act chain: a successor Mission begins its own act chain afresh under its own approval.

actor_token_type:

REQUIRED when actor_token is present, per [RFC8693].

mission_intent:

REQUIRED. The successor's Mission Intent Submission envelope, per [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]. Its intent is the successor's Mission Intent and describes the broadened task: the goal, target_resources, task_bounds, and any other Mission Intent member the successor needs, including the authority the denied action required. Its OPTIONAL evidence array carries Intent Submission Evidence under that profile's dispatch, refusal, and never-authority rules and those of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-submission-evidence]. The Mission Issuer derives the successor's Authority Set from this Intent and bounds it by policy exactly as for any Mission; this document adds no authority-derivation rule.

authorization_details:

OPTIONAL. The successor's authority proposal, an ordinary [RFC9396] token request parameter. It is this exchange's proposal carriage and replaces the issuance profile's PAR-only carriage rule; that profile's validation, derivation, recording, and hashing semantics apply unchanged ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). It is a proposal, never authority: the Mission Issuer derives and bounds the successor's Authority Set by policy regardless of what was proposed. A successor created from an exchange carrying one records proposed_authority, its proposal_hash recorded or implied.

predecessor:

OPTIONAL. A string: the mission_id of the predecessor, a non-authoritative cross-check and audit value only. The Mission Issuer resolves and selects the predecessor from subject_token (Section 4.2); when predecessor is present the Mission Issuer MUST verify it names that same resolved Mission and refuse a mismatch with invalid_grant. The predecessor parameter does not select or authorize a predecessor: a client MUST NOT be able to expand a Mission merely by naming its mission_id.

creation_request_id:

REQUIRED. The creation idempotency identifier (Section 11): an ASCII string of at most 255 octets, opaque to the Mission Issuer beyond equality, that identifies this one Mission-creation operation across every completion mode. At least 122 bits of client-generated randomness is RECOMMENDED; a version 4 UUID [RFC9562] satisfies this. The identifier is a deduplication handle, not a secret (Section 14.5). The Mission Issuer MUST refuse an exchange missing it with invalid_request.

A mission_intent on a token exchange marks it as a Mission-creation exchange, and its requested_token_type selects the operation: the access-token type selects expansion, and the JWT type selects child creation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]). The Mission Issuer MUST refuse with invalid_request a token exchange that carries both a predecessor cross-check and the child-delegation profile's child_actor, and an expansion exchange that carries child_actor: the operations do not combine.

The possession proof of Section 4.2 is presented only on the token endpoint's authenticated back channel and MUST NOT appear on any front channel. The token exchange establishes the predecessor binding and the possession proof in every completion mode; an interactive completion's front-channel approval ceremony carries only the consent decision (Section 5.3).

The following is an example of an expansion request in the scenario of Appendix A, with client authentication omitted (line breaks for display purposes only). The client also opts in to deferred completion with the deferred token response's completion_mode parameter (Section 4.1 of [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response]):

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange
&requested_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3A
  access_token
&subject_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6ImF0K2p3dCJ9...
&subject_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3A
  access_token
&mission_intent=%7B%22intent%22%3A%7B%22goal%22%3A%22Reconcile...
&predecessor=msn_QBZj5JSIV6tkkb93ZTvbiz_9dOMMXfJS
&creation_request_id=7c9e6679-7425-40de-944b-e07fc1f90ae7
&completion_mode=deferred
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
Figure 2: Expansion Request

The following is an example of the decoded mission_intent value. It raises the journal-entry cap from USD 500 to USD 2,000 and keeps the rest of the predecessor's task:

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===============

{
  "intent": {
    "goal": "Reconcile Q3 invoices and post adjustments of at most \
      USD 2,000 per journal entry.",
    "target_resources": ["https://erp.example.com"],
    "task_bounds": [
      "Read only invoices issued in 2026-Q3.",
      "Post journal entries of at most USD 2,000 each."
    ],
    "purpose": "urn:example:purpose:reconcile",
    "expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z"
  }
}
Figure 3: Decoded Successor Mission Intent

4.2. Proving Possession of the Predecessor

The issuance profile resolves a Mission from the credential the client presents, never from a client-supplied mission_id ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Binding the Mission to the Grant"). An expansion resolves the predecessor from the subject_token the client presents and proves possession against that token's own confirmation:

  1. The Mission Issuer MUST resolve the predecessor Mission from subject_token, applying the issuance profile's token-to-Mission resolution for a Mission-bound access token.

  2. The Mission Issuer MUST verify that the presenter controls the subject_token's own confirmation key: a [RFC9449] DPoP proof whose key matches the token's cnf jkt, or the [RFC8705] mutual-TLS certificate whose thumbprint matches the token's cnf x5t#S256. Possession is proven against the token's confirmation, a sender-constrained proof; it is not read from any Mission-record field. A subject_token that is not sender-constrained cannot carry this proof, so the Mission Issuer MUST refuse it with invalid_request.

  3. Where the proof is a DPoP proof, its jti is single-use per [RFC9449]: the Mission Issuer MUST reject a replayed proof.

  4. When predecessor is present, the Mission Issuer MUST verify the resolved Mission is the one it names (Section 4.1).

The confirmation key, not the identifier, authorizes the expansion. A client that does not hold the predecessor's Mission-bound access token and its sender-constraint key cannot present a valid subject_token, so it cannot expand the predecessor. No expansion ticket or other new bearer credential is needed: the client proves possession of a credential it already holds.

These checks run at the token exchange, before any approval, so the Mission Issuer confirms that the predecessor is real, active, and possessed before it prompts an Approver; expansion cannot drive approval prompts against another party's Mission. The proof gates the proposal channel (who may put an expansion of this predecessor in front of the Approver, and who may trigger the atomic supersession), never the authority: no proof failure can widen anything.

The Mission Issuer MUST record each expansion presentation and count it toward the deployment's anomaly detection, and the rate limit per predecessor and client (Section 14.7) applies unconditionally. The subject_token is consumed only to resolve and bind the predecessor, never to refresh, so presenting it has no interaction with refresh token rotation or replay detection.

Expansion therefore requires a sender-constrained Mission-bound access token. A deployment that issues only bearer tokens for a Mission, or none, forgoes expansion of that Mission, and nothing else:

  • the work can continue under a freshly approved Mission whose disclosure references the work it continues, since a successor's authority comes only from fresh consent in any case (Section 9); and

  • the Subject or an administrator acts on the predecessor at the management plane, whose standing is the authenticated principal, never a token's possession ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]).

4.3. Predecessor Must Be Active

The Mission Issuer MUST resolve the predecessor from subject_token and verify it is in the active state before adjudicating, and MUST re-verify it at completion when adjudication is deferred or interactive (Section 5.5). An expansion request against a predecessor that is not active MUST be refused with invalid_request (Section 2.2.2 of [RFC8693]) and a reconciliation status (Section 10):

  • if the predecessor made a terminal exit from active (it is terminated, with reason revoked, expired, already superseded (Section 7), or another), the status is one of the two terminal-exit codes, chosen by the attribution rule of Section 10;

  • if the predecessor is in a non-terminal non-active state, for example suspended where the Mission Status profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status] is deployed, the status is predecessor_not_active.

This rule extends the issuance profile's issuance gating, which refuses to derive from a non-active Mission, to adjudicating an expansion of one.

5. Adjudication

The Mission Issuer derives the successor's Authority Set from the submitted Mission Intent and bounds it by policy, exactly as for any Mission. The successor's authority is what that derivation and the completion yield, not the predecessor's authority plus a delta; authority the successor keeps from the predecessor is expressed in the expansion Mission Intent (Section 8).

The Mission Issuer evaluates an expansion in the order of Section 5.1, completes it in one of the modes of Section 5.2, and activates the successor as Section 5.4 describes.

5.1. Verification Order

The Mission Issuer MUST evaluate an expansion token exchange in this order, refusing on the first failure:

  1. Parse the exchange, require subject_token with subject_token_type = urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token, rejecting a refresh token, and require creation_request_id (Section 4.1).

  2. Resolve the predecessor Mission from subject_token (Section 4.2).

  3. Verify possession: the presenter controls the subject_token's own confirmation key ([RFC9449] DPoP proof jkt, or [RFC8705] mTLS x5t#S256), and, for a DPoP proof, the proof jti is single-use (Section 4.2).

  4. Verify the acting agent (actor_token, or the request's client authentication) is authorized to request expansion of this predecessor.

  5. Look up the (client, creation_request_id) reservation and, where one exists, recover the recorded operation instead of proceeding (Section 11). The lookup follows client authentication and possession verification and precedes the predecessor lifecycle gate of step 6 (Section 11.4).

  6. Verify the predecessor is active (Section 4.3) and, when predecessor is present, that it names the resolved Mission.

  7. Derive the successor's Authority Set under policy from the submitted Mission Intent (Section 5) and verify that it widens the predecessor: when the derived requested authority is a subset of the predecessor's own Effective Authority Set, refuse the exchange with the nothing_to_expand denial reason, as there is nothing to expand (Section 12).

  8. Complete per Section 5.2; at a deferred or interactive completion, re-verify the predecessor's Mission state before issuing (Section 5.5).

On any failure the Mission Issuer MUST refuse and MUST NOT create a successor. A failure to which this document assigns a code, such as a predecessor mismatch or a denial reason (Section 12), uses that code. Otherwise:

  • a subject_token or actor_token that is invalid, whose sender constraint is not proven, or that is unacceptable for the exchange is refused with invalid_request (Section 2.2.2 of [RFC8693]);

  • a required DPoP proof that is missing, or a DPoP proof that fails its own validation, is refused with invalid_dpop_proof (Section 5 of [RFC9449]); and

  • any other failure is refused with invalid_request or invalid_grant as appropriate (Section 5.2 of [RFC6749]).

An authorization server that requires a DPoP nonce answers a proof lacking its current nonce with use_dpop_nonce and a DPoP-Nonce header (Section 8 of [RFC9449]), not invalid_dpop_proof.

Step 7 compares against the predecessor's Effective Authority Set as [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status] defines it: the approved Authority Set after applying every issuer-held narrowing mechanism the deployment runs, including the containment profile's overlay where deployed ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]).

Authority the predecessor once held but containment or discharge has removed is therefore never nothing_to_expand: a request for it widens the effective set and is expansion-eligible. Such authority returns only through a fresh-consent successor, never by re-deriving under the predecessor. The expansion consent disclosure (Section 5.2) surfaces the predecessor's containment history and the chain's outstanding containment restrictions ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]). An expansion that restores authority under a discharge restriction of the chain MUST authorize that authority explicitly, and its consent disclosure MUST name the discharged entry and the condition that discharged it ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-discharge]).

5.2. Completion Modes

An expansion completes in one of two modes. Both obtain the fresh approval the successor's authority requires, and both rest on the same possession-proven token exchange (Section 4).

Deferred:

When approval is asynchronous and the exchange opts in, the Mission Issuer returns the deferred token response ([I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response], profiled for Missions by [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]): authorization_pending with a deferral_code, its expires_in, and a polling interval. The Approver acts on the deployment's asynchronous review surface. The client polls with the substrate's deferred grant type and the deferral_code; the poll resolves to the successor's access token on approval, or to access_denied or expired_token. This document references that substrate and does not redefine it.

Interactive:

When approval is interactive, the Mission Issuer answers the token exchange with the interaction-required response of Section 5.3. The client pushes an authorization request carrying the continuation, the user agent completes the issuance profile's own approval ceremony ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), and the client redeems the resulting authorization code for the successor's authority.

An exchange opts in to deferred completion when its completion_mode includes deferred, the deferred token response's opt-in. The Mission Issuer MUST NOT return the deferred response to an exchange that does not opt in. It answers such an exchange with the interactive handoff (Section 5.3) or, where it offers no interactive completion, refuses it with invalid_request and records no operation (Section 11.2).

This document defines no synchronous completion for an expansion that takes fresh consent. An expansion response is a successor or a refusal, never a token derived under the predecessor: a request whose derived authority is a subset of the predecessor's own Effective Authority Set is refused with nothing_to_expand (Section 5.1, Section 12).

Policy-adjudicated expansion within a pre-consented authority ceiling belongs to the experimental progressive authorization companion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]). An in-ceiling drawdown that passes that companion's policy-adjudication guards completes synchronously in the token-exchange response, which returns the successor's access token. One that falls back to a fresh human approval completes in one of the two modes above.

Whatever the mode, any grant binding the successor carries is its own, never an extension of the predecessor's: in an interactive completion, the authorization code the client redeems and any refresh-token family that redemption emits; otherwise, a refresh-token family the completing response emits, if any. A deferred completion or synchronous drawdown that returns only an access token establishes no grant binding ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Grant Bindings and Related Mechanisms").

In either mode, obtaining the fresh approval follows the issuance profile's approval event. The Mission Issuer:

  • authenticates the Approver against the published approval-authentication floor;

  • obtains fresh consent for the derived Authority Set;

  • satisfies any requested acr_values or max_age strength; and

  • renders the Subject when the Approver is not the Subject.

The consent disclosure MUST reflect the successor's authority being adjudicated. If the Approver declines, no successor is created and the predecessor is untouched (Section 12).

In either mode, the exchange's creation_request_id reservation (Section 11) makes completion recoverable: a client that loses the response recovers the one committed operation, never a second creation.

The following is an example of a deferred response to the request in Figure 2:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "authorization_pending",
  "deferral_code": "dfc_DK-IqhQDOOy21T3Wu7mQYt",
  "expires_in": 600,
  "interval": 5
}
Figure 4: Deferred Response

The following is an example of the client's poll with the deferred grant type (Section 5.5 of [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response]) and a DPoP proof, with client authentication omitted (line breaks for display purposes only):

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Adeferred
&deferral_code=dfc_DK-IqhQDOOy21T3Wu7mQYt
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
Figure 5: Deferred Poll

The following is an example of the response to the first poll after the Approver approves, which activates the successor (Section 5.4). In this example, the response carries the token exchange's issued_token_type (Section 2.2.1 of [RFC8693]), the successor's mission_id, the effective expiry in mission_expires_at (Section 5.6), and the granted authorization_details:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6ImF0K2p3dCJ9...",
  "issued_token_type":
    "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
  "token_type": "DPoP",
  "expires_in": 300,
  "mission_id": "msn_2Yt7Qv9LqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9RfX",
  "mission_expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
  "authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"],
      "constraints": {
        "resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
                "resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
      } },
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
      "constraints": {
        "max_amount": { "amount": "2000.00", "currency": "USD" }
      } }
  ]
}
Figure 6: Successful Completion

5.3. Interactive Handoff

An [RFC8693] success carries an issued token (Section 2.2.1 of [RFC8693]), so interactive completion cannot use one. The Mission Issuer MUST answer the token exchange with an OAuth error response (Section 5.2 of [RFC6749]), HTTP status 400, carrying:

error:

mission_interaction_required.

mission_continuation:

A string: an opaque, unguessable handle naming the pending creation operation (Section 11), bound to the authenticated client and the operation fingerprint (Section 11.1).

expires_in:

A number: the handle's remaining lifetime in seconds, the approval window of the operation.

The client tells the outcomes apart from the response alone:

  • an issued token is the [RFC8693] success;

  • authorization_pending is deferred completion (Section 5.2); and

  • mission_interaction_required is this handoff.

The following is an example of the interaction-required response:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "mission_interaction_required",
  "mission_continuation": "e8GpKnzx1X8-SzJQ3aVRj7",
  "expires_in": 600
}
Figure 7: Interaction-Required Response

The client then sends a pushed authorization request (Section 2 of [RFC9126]) carrying:

  • mission_continuation;

  • response_type=code, its redirect_uri, and state;

  • the PKCE S256 challenge or DPoP binding the issuance profile requires for an authorization code ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authorization Code Protection"); and

  • optionally, the predecessor cross-check (Section 4.1), which names the recorded predecessor.

It carries no mission_intent and no authorization_details: the token exchange is this operation's carriage (Section 4.1). Client authentication at the pushed authorization request endpoint binds the handle to the client, so the handle alone does not give its holder the operation.

The following is an example of the pushed authorization request, with client authentication omitted (line breaks for display purposes only):

POST /par HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

response_type=code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fagent.example.com%2Fcb
&state=af0ifjsldkj
&code_challenge=E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM
&code_challenge_method=S256
&mission_continuation=e8GpKnzx1X8-SzJQ3aVRj7
Figure 8: Pushed Authorization Request Carrying the Continuation

The Mission Issuer:

  • MUST refuse a pushed request whose mission_continuation is unknown, expired, or bound to another client, with invalid_request;

  • MUST take the predecessor, Intent, proposal, submission evidence, presenter confirmation, and actor context only from the recorded operation, and MUST refuse with invalid_request a pushed request that supplies any of them with a different value, accepting an equal predecessor as a cross-check; and

  • validates the other authorization request parameters as for any pushed request.

The request_uri is a temporary front-channel reference; the continuation names the durable operation, which has one approval ceremony and one outcome. The Mission Issuer MUST serialize adjudication per operation and record at most one approval outcome for it: the first ceremony to conclude records approval or denial, and every other ceremony or pushed request for the continuation resumes from that recorded outcome instead of adjudicating again.

When a request_uri expires, the user agent consumes it, or the authorization response is lost, the client pushes again with the same mission_continuation:

  • before an outcome is recorded, the push starts no second adjudication; it continues the operation's one ceremony;

  • after approval, the Mission Issuer issues a fresh authorization code for the recorded approval, bound to that push's PKCE or DPoP input, without prompting again; and

  • after denial, the operation has failed: the Mission Issuer MUST refuse the push with access_denied, and a creation_request_id retry receives access_denied.

Redemption of an authorization code for the operation:

  1. verifies the PKCE or DPoP binding;

  2. verifies, in the same atomic step as activation, that the continuation has not expired and the recorded outcome is approval; and

  3. activates the successor under the checks of Section 10, atomically with the predecessor's supersession (Section 5.4).

The continuation's expiry is the operation's deadline, a clock separate from the authorization code's own lifetime (Section 4.1.2 of [RFC6749]): the Mission Issuer MUST refuse redemption at or after it with invalid_grant, and nothing activates. subject_token expiry during the window does not gate redemption (Section 5.5).

After activation the Mission Issuer MUST refuse a further pushed request for the continuation with invalid_request, and MUST refuse redemption of any other code issued for the operation with invalid_grant. A lost redemption response is recovered by repeating the token exchange with the same creation_request_id (Section 11.3); an operation whose continuation expired before activation answers that retry with expired_token.

5.4. Successor Activation

A successor activates at the point its authority is issued:

  • the resolving poll, for a deferred completion;

  • the code redemption, for an interactive completion; or

  • the token-exchange response, for a policy-adjudicated drawdown under the progressive authorization companion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]).

At completion the Mission Issuer computes the successor's integrity anchors: intent_hash, authority_hash, and, where the exchange carried an authority proposal, proposal_hash. At activation it creates the successor Mission Record in the active state, with its predecessor member set (Section 6), atomically with the predecessor's transition to terminated with reason superseded (Section 7). The same atomic step applies:

Until the successor activates, the predecessor remains active. An expansion that never completes, whose deferred approval lapses, or whose authorization code is never redeemed or expires, creates no successor and leaves the predecessor active. It therefore never leaves the task without authority or cascade-terminates the predecessor's Child Missions.

5.5. The Deferred Window

A completion can occur later than the request, across a deferred or interactive approval window. Two rules govern that window:

  • The predecessor's Mission state MUST be re-verified at issuance (completion), not only at request time. A predecessor that was terminated during the window, or whose containment or discharge since adjudication restricts authority the successor carries, MUST fail completion, per the compare-and-set of Section 10. This preserves the halt on new derivation that a terminal predecessor state effects: a deferred approval MUST NOT become a bypass of it.

  • Expiry of the subject_token during the window MUST NOT gate completion. The predecessor binding and the possession proof are evaluated and recorded at request time (Section 4.2); the short-lived subject_token expiring while approval is pending does not invalidate the pending exchange. The re-verification above is of the predecessor's Mission state, not of the expired token.

5.6. Successor Expiry

The successor's effective expires_at follows the issuance profile's requested-versus-effective rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), with two bounds:

  • It MUST NOT be later than the expansion submission's intent.expires_at, the requested ceiling.

  • It MUST NOT exceed the predecessor's expires_at unless the Mission Issuer's policy explicitly permits extension and the extension is disclosed to the Approver at the expansion consent event, which records the exact approved extension ceiling.

Expansion adds authority; it does not silently extend lifetime. The issuance profile caps every derived credential's exp at the Mission's expires_at, so a successor that silently outlived its predecessor would carry a longer-lived Mission past the originally approved horizon.

The completing success response, the resolving poll or the code redemption, MUST carry the effective value in the issuance profile's mission_expires_at response member. Completion inherits the issuance profile's atomic creation-time check: where the submission's intent.expires_at passes while the expansion is pending, completion creates no successor Mission. A deferred poll then answers access_denied, a code redemption invalid_grant, and a completion in the token-exchange response invalid_request.

An auditor verifies the successor record by inequalities, never by matching a recomputed minimum:

  • in every case, the effective value is no later than the submission's intent.expires_at;

  • without an approved extension, it is also no later than the predecessor's expires_at; and

  • with one, it MAY be later than the predecessor's expires_at only when the Mission Issuer's policy permits the extension and the exact effective value was rendered and approved at the expansion consent event.

Any further shortening is justified by recorded policy.

An approved successor extension MUST NOT extend a carried child's expiry: carryover remains bounded by the old child and its new parent's effective expiry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]).

5.7. Successor Subject and Authority Source

A successor's subject and authority_source MUST equal the predecessor's, whichever completion mode or approval basis creates it; an approval that would establish another Subject or source creates no successor. Work for another Subject or source continues under a separately approved Mission, outside succession (Section 9).

In the commit that activates the successor, the Mission Issuer MUST verify that the source still applies to the Subject and that the successor Authority Set lies within the source's ceiling as it stands at that commit. On failure it creates no successor and leaves the predecessor active. The same commit rechecks the effective expiry (Section 5.6).

6. Lineage Members

This document defines three lineage members. The issuance profile's mission claim is an open object whose additional members are each defined by the profile that introduces them, are ignored by a consumer that does not understand them, and never grant or widen authority ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); predecessor is one such member.

predecessor:

REQUIRED on a successor Mission; absent otherwise. A string: the mission_id of the Mission this Mission succeeded by expansion. It is carried on the successor's mission claim and recorded on the successor's immutable Mission Record, so the lineage is durable independently of any derived token and the expansion chain is observable in audit.

related_to:

OPTIONAL. A string: the mission_id of a Mission this Mission is related to by lineage without superseding it, used for a non-superseding link such as a branch (Section 8) or an independent continuation (Section 9). Unlike predecessor, its presence does not imply that the referenced Mission was superseded, and it carries no lifecycle consequence. It is a member of the Mission Record and is not carried on the mission claim.

successor:

REQUIRED in the termination of a Mission terminated with reason superseded (Section 7); absent otherwise. A string: the mission_id of the successor that superseded this Mission by expansion, issued by the same Mission Issuer and written into the predecessor's termination at supersession. It appears only inside termination. It is the reverse of the successor's predecessor link, so a consumer that holds a superseded predecessor discovers its successor directly. The Status profile surfaces it in the status response ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]) and the Signals profile in the supersession's lifecycle event ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals]), each inside termination.

All three members are lineage and audit context only. Like the additional members of the mission claim, each of them MUST NOT grant or widen authority, and a consumer that does not understand one MUST ignore it. The successor's authority comes only from its own authority_hash, never from its predecessor.

Each is a bare Mission Identifier string, not an object like the parent member of a Child Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]): same-issuer succession needs only the identifier to resolve the linked Mission at the shared issuer, whereas parentage carries cascade semantics and cross-object integrity that require a structured member.

The lineage members have these properties:

The following is an example of a successor's mission claim (other token claims omitted):

{
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_2Yt7Qv9LqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9RfX",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "predecessor": "msn_QBZj5JSIV6tkkb93ZTvbiz_9dOMMXfJS"
  }
}
Figure 9: Successor Mission Claim

7. The Superseded Termination Reason

This document adds one termination reason to the issuance profile's Mission Termination Reasons registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Termination Reasons Registry"), used only by expansion:

superseded:

The reason a predecessor Mission is terminated when a successor replaces it through a replacement expansion. The predecessor is non-active, and its termination ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Termination") carries the successor member (Section 6).

A deployment that never expands a Mission never produces this reason; the issuance profile's lifecycle is unchanged for it. The transition is:

Table 1: The supersession transition
From Event To Reason
active successor activates when its authority is issued terminated superseded

The transition has these properties:

The following is an example of the predecessor's state and termination after supersession (other Mission Record members omitted):

{
  "state": "terminated",
  "termination": {
    "reason": "superseded",
    "terminated_at": "2026-11-02T09:40:00Z",
    "successor": "msn_2Yt7Qv9LqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9RfX"
  }
}
Figure 10: Superseded Predecessor

The following is an example of a later refresh under the predecessor, refused with the issuance profile's mission_error diagnostic:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "invalid_grant",
  "mission_error": "superseded"
}
Figure 11: Refused Derivation under a Superseded Mission

7.1. Child Missions of the Predecessor

Supersession is a terminal exit from active, so it is a terminal cascade trigger for the predecessor's entire delegation tree under the child delegation profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]). Cascade applies to every non-terminal Child Mission, regardless of whether that child's own Authority Set would still satisfy strict-subset validation against the successor: the successor's Authority Set is freshly derived, not inherited by reference, so a child's creation-time subset check does not carry forward ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation], Section "Cascade Revocation").

A child still needed after the expansion is re-created under the successor through ordinary child creation, in generation order. Each re-creation costs ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation], Section "Cascade Failure"):

  • a fresh assertion conveyed to the child actor that held the terminated child; and

  • an interval, while the replacement is delivered, in which that child actor's outstanding tokens under the terminated child run to the earlier of their own exp and, where the runtime enforcement layer is deployed, the runtime staleness bound.

When the predecessor has non-terminal Child Missions, the expansion consent disclosure SHOULD surface that fact as a material notice: at minimum the count of live Child Missions and that supersession terminates them. Where a deployment provides this notice, the expansion consent event renders the cost above; that consent event is the only point in this document at which a human can witness the cascade before it happens.

Where explicitly approved Child Mission Carryover is selected, the Mission Issuer MUST render and commit its complete manifest and exclusion policy, and recheck that snapshot at completion under the child profile's Carryover rules ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]). Otherwise the ordinary cascade notice and per-child re-creation above remain the minimum.

Carryover completes in the successor's activation step (Section 5.4). When the approved operation includes Child Mission Carryover, the Mission Issuer MUST include replacement records, required old-child cascades, the committed outcome map, and durable recovery work in the same atomic operation. Publication follows commit and is repairable; constructing replacements first does not guarantee external event order ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]).

7.2. No Implicit Rollback

The Mission Issuer MUST NOT implicitly resurrect a superseded predecessor when its successor is later revoked, expired, or itself superseded; terminated is terminal, whatever its reason. A deployment that needs to revert to the predecessor's authority expresses that as a new approval event creating a new Mission that carries the relevant authority, and MAY record its related_to member naming the superseded predecessor to preserve the lineage (Section 9). A rollback is a new governed Mission, not a state reversal.

8. Replacement Expansion

A successful expansion is a replacement: the successor replaces the predecessor, which becomes terminated with reason superseded (Section 7). Replacement is the only mode this document defines. Under replacement:

A deployment that wants the successor to retain the predecessor's authority alongside the new authority expresses the combined authority in the expansion Mission Intent, so the successor's authority_hash commits exactly the authority the Approver saw and approved (Section 5).

A branch mode, in which the predecessor and the successor both remain active after expansion (for example, a separately scoped child task running alongside the original), is not defined here. A deployment that needs a separately scoped task alongside a still-active Mission creates an ordinary new Mission under the issuance profile and MAY set that Mission's related_to member (Section 6) to the original Mission's mission_id to preserve lineage. It does not set predecessor, which would imply a supersession, so the original remains active. An atomic, grant-bound branch expansion that creates such a child within a single expansion approval event is deferred to a future revision of this document.

9. Continuing Under an Independently Approved Mission

A deployment can end one Mission and continue the work under another without this document's expansion protocol: it approves an ordinary new Mission under the issuance profile and explicitly revokes the prior Mission. This is independent continuation, an operational pattern. It is not expansion, succession, or replacement in the protocol sense, and none of this document's predecessor, successor, or superseded semantics apply.

The two commits are independent, with these consequences:

A deployment MAY record the relationship as related_to on the new Mission (Section 6). The related_to member is issuer-recorded correlation metadata, not client-asserted authority:

The Mission Issuer:

An unresolved or unauthorized reference is never recorded: deployment policy either rejects the creation uniformly or proceeds without the relationship, applied consistently across requests, and neither behavior discloses whether the referenced Mission exists. The member asserts related work only, neither mutual recognition nor replacement.

A Mission created this way MUST NOT carry the predecessor member, which asserts the supersession semantics only replacement expansion provides. Independent continuation does not satisfy any profile that requires a successor: containment restoration in particular requires the predecessor link and the disclosed history that expansion's approval renders.

10. Concurrent Expansion Reconciliation

More than one expansion request can be in flight against the same predecessor at once, and more than one can be adjudicated and awaiting its completion. Because replacement produces exactly one successor per predecessor (Section 8) and supersession is deferred to activation (Section 5.4), the Mission Issuer MUST serialize the completions that would activate a successor of the same predecessor, so that concurrent expansions cannot each activate one.

The Mission Issuer MUST apply compare-and-set semantics at successor activation (Section 5.4). This is the completion-side re-verification of the deferred window (Section 5.5). In the same atomic step that would activate the successor and supersede the predecessor, the Mission Issuer MUST verify:

  1. the predecessor is still in the active state;

  2. no other replacement expansion has already activated a successor for this predecessor (equivalently, the predecessor has not already been terminated with reason superseded); and

  3. the successor's complete Authority Set, including authority carried forward from the predecessor, overlaps no authority under a current containment or discharge restriction of the chain ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-discharge]) that the successor's approval did not explicitly restore with that restriction disclosed.

If any check fails, the Mission Issuer MUST refuse the completion with the applicable reconciliation status from the closed set below, alongside the error code of the step that completes it:

The losing or otherwise stale expansion is rejected at completion; it activates no successor.

The third check catches narrowing that occurs between adjudication and activation: authority contained or discharged after the approval returns only through a new expansion, adjudicated against the current restrictions, which require fresh human approval with the restriction disclosed.

The reconciliation status codes are:

superseded_by_concurrent_expansion:

A concurrent replacement expansion has already produced a successor; the predecessor is terminated with reason superseded rather than active. The client SHOULD discover the existing successor and re-evaluate whether a further expansion is still required (an expansion of the successor is a new expansion against the successor as predecessor).

predecessor_state_changed:

The predecessor made a terminal exit from active (to terminated, with reason revoked, expired, superseded, or another) before this expansion could complete, whether caught at request binding (Section 4.3) or at the compare-and-set on successor activation. The client MUST NOT retry the same expansion against this predecessor.

predecessor_not_active:

The predecessor is in a non-terminal non-active state (for example suspended under the Mission Status profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]) and cannot be expanded until it returns to active. The client MAY retry the expansion after the predecessor is active again.

authority_restricted_since_approval:

The successor's Authority Set overlaps authority that came under a containment or discharge restriction of the chain after the successor's approval was adjudicated (check 3 above). The client MAY submit a new expansion, which is adjudicated against the current restrictions.

The two terminal-exit codes overlap in the superseded case: superseded_by_concurrent_expansion is the specific reconciliation outcome when the cause is a concurrent expansion that has already activated a successor, and predecessor_state_changed is the general outcome for any other terminal exit from active. A Mission Issuer SHOULD return the specific code when it can attribute the change to a concurrent expansion. The predecessor_not_active code reports a reversible, non-terminal state, so it invites the retry the terminal codes forbid.

The Mission Issuer conveys the reconciliation status in an OAuth error response member:

mission_expansion_status:

A string carrying one reconciliation status from the closed set above, returned by the step that failed. At the token endpoint (the token exchange response, a deferred token response poll, and an authorization code redemption), it is a member of the JSON error response body, alongside the OAuth error member. On the interactive path's front-channel authorization error response, which carries error parameters rather than a JSON body, it is an error response parameter of the same name. Adjudication denial reasons use the separate mission_denial_reason member (Section 12).

The following is an example of a resolving poll refused because a concurrent expansion of the same predecessor activated first:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "access_denied",
  "mission_expansion_status": "superseded_by_concurrent_expansion"
}
Figure 12: Reconciliation Refusal

11. Creation Idempotency

A creation_request_id identifies one Mission-creation operation across every completion mode. The Mission Issuer MUST durably bind the authenticated client, the identifier, the operation fingerprint (Section 11.1), and the resulting continuation or successor Mission, atomically with the creation decision. Repetition of the exchange recovers that operation (Section 11.3); it MUST NOT repeat Mission creation or any creation-side effect: creation accounting, creation lifecycle events, evidence emission.

The identifier is REQUIRED in every completion mode for two reasons:

The reservation made at initiation, and the single recorded approval outcome of Section 5.3, prevent a retry or a repeated pushed request from starting a second ceremony (Section 11.3).

A creation exchange that its adopter explicitly profiles, whether or not it mints a Mission, adopts these definitions by reference, under its own domain-separating op value and its own binding of the fingerprint's source and other members to what that exchange actually creates (Section 11.1):

11.1. The Operation Fingerprint

The operation fingerprint commits what the operation is, so the Mission Issuer can tell a repeated identifier from a reused one. It is an issuance-profile integrity anchor ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) with:

  • typ mission-creation-fingerprint, under that profile's collision-resistant typ convention; and

  • the fingerprint object below as its committed value.

The anchor envelope is canonicalized with JCS [RFC8785], hashed with SHA-256, and encoded as sha-256: followed by the base64url, no-padding, encoding of the digest, exactly as for the profile's other anchors. It is an envelope anchor under the issuance profile's commitment mechanisms, which this document imports normatively. As a JCS commitment-envelope typ, mission-creation-fingerprint names a hash domain, not a representation crossing a protocol boundary, and is not a media type ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Namespace Taxonomy").

The fingerprint object carries exactly these members:

op:

expansion for this document's exchange; child-creation for the child delegation profile's; dispatch for the template profile's Dispatch ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template]). This member domain-separates the operations that share a creation exchange. An adopting profile (Section 11) declares its own value the same way, as the continuation profile's async-delegation exchange declares async-delegation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]).

iss:

The Mission Issuer's issuer identifier.

client:

The authenticated client identifier.

source:

The mission_id of the source Mission resolved from subject_token (Section 4.2): the predecessor here, the parent under child delegation, and the base Mission under the continuation profile's async-delegation exchange ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]). The resolved identifier is the member, never the raw subject_token, since a legitimate retry may carry a newly issued token for the same Mission, and never the optional cross-check alone, which is non-authoritative. An adopting profile whose exchange has no source Mission or subject_token to resolve binds source to its own profiled source authority instead, stated in its own adoption clause: the template profile's Dispatch binds it to the dispatched Mission Template's id ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template]), never pretending that identifier is a Mission ID.

cnf:

The verified presenter confirmation, as a JSON object with one member as in a cnf claim: jkt, the DPoP proof key's thumbprint, or x5t#S256, the mTLS certificate's thumbprint (Section 4.2).

actor:

The verified acting-agent identity where the exchange carries an actor_token: a JSON object with that token's iss and sub, and any further actor context the Mission Issuer's authorization of the acting agent relies on. Absent where client authentication alone identifies the acting agent.

intent:

The semantic intent object of the parsed mission_intent Submission envelope ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).

evidence:

The parsed evidence array of the Submission envelope, when present. Presented evidence affects admission, derivation, approval, and side effects, so a retry presenting different evidence is a different operation, refused on the fingerprint mismatch below.

proposal:

The parsed authorization_details array, when present.

child_actor:

The parsed child_actor object; child creation only, absent on an expansion.

requested_token_type:

The exchange's requested_token_type value.

cross_check:

The supplied predecessor value (under child delegation, the supplied parent value), when present.

An extension that defines a new parameter affecting the authorization, derivation, approval, output, or side effects of the creation MUST extend the fingerprint object with it. Attempt-specific material is excluded: the DPoP proof serialization and its jti, the client-authentication assertion serialization, the raw subject_token serialization, completion_mode, and creation_request_id itself. The completion mode recorded at initiation governs recovery (Section 11.3).

11.2. The Durable Reservation

A reservation is the durable record binding the authenticated client, the creation_request_id, and the fingerprint. It is created in a reserved state, which covers a pending completion, and moves to completed when the successor activates or to failed when the operation is denied, its deadline passes, or its activation is refused. The (client, creation_request_id) pair is unique, and the store MUST enforce that uniqueness as a constraint; a read-before-insert check without one does not withstand concurrent retries.

The reservation and the created Mission's identifier MUST be committed atomically with Mission creation; credential generation MAY follow the commit. When the Mission commits and the Mission Issuer fails before responding, the retry finds the committed operation and resumes delivery (Section 11.3), never creating again.

A repeated presentation of the same (client, creation_request_id) resolves by fingerprint:

  • same fingerprint, operation completed: recover it (Section 11.3);

  • same fingerprint, operation reserved: return the same continuation or deferral, or a retryable in-progress result;

  • same fingerprint, operation failed: answer with the recorded failure, as below; and

  • different fingerprint: refuse with invalid_request, since the identifier was reused for a different operation.

A retry of a failed operation is answered by the failure and by the surface the retry reaches:

  • An operation in the deferred mode returns its deferral, whose next poll answers as the deferred token response defines: access_denied after a denial or a refused activation, with any reconciliation status, and expired_token once the deferral has expired.

  • Any other operation answers the repeated token exchange directly: access_denied after the Approver's denial and expired_token after its continuation expired before activation (Section 5.3). After a refused activation it answers the error a completion in the token-exchange response answers for the same failure (Section 10, Section 5.6), with any reconciliation status, and a refusal the token exchange response itself carried is repeated.

11.3. Recovery Is Delivery

The Mission Issuer stores the operation's stable outcome, never its serialized response: the completion mode with its continuation handle, or the created Mission's identifier with its delivery-artifact metadata. A revalidated retry (Section 11.4) recovers that outcome:

  • A pending deferred completion returns the same deferral: the same (client, creation_request_id) resolves to the same deferred continuation, scoped to the authenticated client, never to a second deferral.

  • A pending interactive completion returns the same mission_continuation (Section 5.3). The reservation is made at initiation, so a retry cannot start a second approval ceremony.

  • A completed operation whose delivery credential is still valid returns that credential.

  • A completed operation whose delivery credential has expired is recovered by minting a fresh delivery credential for the already-created successor, provided that successor remains active and the requester re-establishes the recorded authorization context (Section 11.4). The fresh credential is a delivery event with ordinary issuance accounting; it MUST NOT repeat creation accounting: no second creation lifecycle event, no second evidence emission, no second count against any creation budget.

Recovery never re-creates. Whatever the outcome tier, a recovered operation yields the Mission the operation already created, or the continuation it already opened, and nothing else.

11.4. Revalidation and Lookup Order

A matching creation_request_id never bypasses authentication or possession. Before recovering anything, the Mission Issuer MUST establish:

  • the same authenticated client;

  • the recorded source Mission;

  • the same authorized acting agent;

  • possession of the recorded sender-constraint identity, the stored cnf of Section 11.1;

  • for an operation in the deferred mode, a completion_mode that includes deferred, the opt-in the deferred response requires (Section 5.2); and

  • fingerprint compatibility (Section 11.2).

A retry of a deferred operation without the opt-in is refused with invalid_request. No key-rotation recovery path is defined: a requester that can no longer prove possession of the recorded cnf does not recover the operation.

The idempotency lookup occurs after client authentication and possession verification and before the predecessor lifecycle gate (Section 5.1). The order matters: the retry worth recovering is exactly the one whose predecessor was terminated with reason superseded when the first attempt succeeded (Section 7), so re-running the predecessor-active gate first would refuse the very recovery this mechanism exists to serve.

11.5. Tombstone Retention

Retention has two tiers:

  • The full delivery-artifact record MAY be retained briefly.

  • The idempotency tombstone, the (client, creation_request_id) binding with its fingerprint and its Mission or continuation reference, MUST survive at least the deployment's published retry horizon, and retention to the source or created Mission's lifetime, or to the deployment's audit horizon, is RECOMMENDED.

The retry horizon is a published deployment bound, like the deployment's other operational bounds. It starts when the Mission Issuer records the identifier's reservation, and the tombstone survives through the instant it ends. The horizon is the one published when the reservation was recorded: a later change to the published value never shortens it. A reservation whose operation is still pending when the horizon ends (a deferral not yet completed, denied or expired) MUST survive until that operation ends, so the identifier never names two operations at once.

A client MUST NOT retry a creation past the published horizon: reuse of an identifier after its tombstone expires is outside the contract and is processed as a new operation. That operation meets every check a new request meets, and a Mission it creates has a new approval_event_id ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Approval Idempotency").

12. Expansion Denial Reasons

An adjudication that completes with the Approver declining, or with the Mission Issuer refusing on policy grounds, denies the expansion: no successor is created, and the predecessor remains active and untouched. The denial surfaces according to the completion mode (Section 5.2):

A denial MAY additionally carry one machine-readable reason code from the Mission Denial Reasons registry (Section 16.2). This document defines four:

out_of_policy:

The Mission Issuer's governance policy refuses the requested authority class for this Mission, independent of who approves.

approver_rejected:

The Approver declined the expansion at the consent step.

out_of_scope_for_purpose:

The requested authority is incompatible with the Mission's recorded purpose; a different Mission, not an expansion of this one, is the appropriate vehicle.

nothing_to_expand:

The derived requested authority is a subset of the predecessor's own Effective Authority Set, so there is nothing to expand: ordinary token derivation under the predecessor already serves the request (Section 5.1). This refusal surfaces on the token exchange response itself, as invalid_request, and MUST carry this reason code; it is never answered with a token derived under the predecessor, so an expansion response is never ambiguously a non-successor.

Companion profiles register further values in the Mission Denial Reasons registry (Section 16.2). For example, the experimental progressive authorization companion registers out_of_ceiling ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]), and the experimental template profile registers out_of_template_ceiling and dispatch_prohibited_class ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template]). A consumer MUST treat an unrecognized reason code as a denial with no further semantics.

A Mission Issuer MUST NOT use a reason code to disclose policy boundaries beyond the adjudicated request (Section 14.7). Omitting the reason code is always permitted, except on a nothing_to_expand refusal, which always carries it (see its definition above). That code reveals only that the requester already holds the requested authority, which the requester can observe from its own token, so the policy-probing rationale for omission does not apply; carrying it keeps a non-widening refusal distinguishable from a policy denial.

When present, a reason code is carried in a mission_denial_reason member:

The following is an example of the refusal of an expansion request that widens nothing:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "invalid_request",
  "mission_denial_reason": "nothing_to_expand"
}
Figure 13: Denial with nothing_to_expand

The mission_denial_reason member is the shared carrier for adjudication denial reasons across the profiles that mint a Mission related to an existing one: the child delegation profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]) carries its own closed denial-reason set in the same member, and further such profiles do likewise. Each profile defines its values by specification; the unrecognized-code rule above applies to the member wherever it appears.

Two failure classes are not denial reasons and use the issuance profile's error vocabulary directly:

13. Conformance

An implementation claims conformance to this document in the Mission Issuer role, under one of two targets (as an expansion-capable Mission Issuer when it adjudicates expansion, or under the optional related_to correlation target below), or in the client role, as an expansion client.

A Mission Issuer that records related_to without adjudicating expansion conforms to the related_to correlation target when it meets every rule of Section 9: authenticated and authorized input, pre-approval resolution, creation-time atomic recording, immutability, consistent non-disclosing failure behavior, and no predecessor member. Nothing else in this section applies to that target.

A conforming expansion-capable Mission Issuer MUST:

An expansion-capable Mission Issuer is also a conforming issuance-profile Mission Issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); this document adds the expansion surface to that role. A resource server requires no new behavior: it enforces a successor's tokens exactly as it enforces any Mission-bound token, and treats the predecessor member, if it reads it at all, as audit context it MUST NOT use to grant authority (Section 6).

A conforming expansion client MUST:

Every expansion this document defines is adjudicated as a fresh approval event (Section 5). The experimental progressive authorization companion defines a further OPTIONAL capability, Expansion with Progressive Authorization, with its own conformance requirements ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]).

14. Security Considerations

The security considerations of the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) apply, including its general OAuth guidance for the underlying credentials. Expansion's central guarantee is the issuance profile's, applied to the successor: a user's fresh approval bounds every token derived for the broadened task. The risks specific to expansion are in the predecessor binding, the predecessor-to-successor handoff, and the lineage link.

14.1. Predecessor Confusion

A client could attempt to expand a Mission it does not control, for example by naming another tenant's or subject's mission_id in the predecessor parameter.

Mitigations:

  • The predecessor is resolved from the subject_token the client presents, not from the predecessor value, and possession is proven against that token's own confirmation key; the Mission Issuer verifies that the resolved Mission matches the named one and refuses a mismatch with invalid_grant (Section 4.2). A client that does not hold the predecessor's Mission-bound access token and its sender-constraint key cannot expand it.

  • The issuance profile's integrity anchors are issuer-bound, so a Mission's governance state cannot be transplanted across Mission Issuers; an expansion is adjudicated only at the predecessor's own issuer.

14.2. Possession Proof

A stolen or exfiltrated predecessor credential could be replayed to request an expansion.

Mitigations:

  • The subject_token is a sender-constrained access token, not a reusable bearer refresh credential, and possession is proven against the token's own confirmation key (Section 4.2): a bearer copy of the token, without its DPoP key or mTLS certificate, cannot carry the proof. A refresh token is never accepted as the subject_token (Section 4.1).

  • The DPoP proof jti is single-use ([RFC9449]), so a captured proof cannot be replayed (Section 5.1).

  • The short-lived subject_token bounds the window in which even a key-holding attacker could act, and the possession proof is bound and recorded at request time, so a legitimate deferred completion is not gated on that lifetime (Section 5.5).

14.4. Race against the Predecessor Lifecycle

Between the moment a client decides to expand and the moment the successor activates, the predecessor may be revoked, expire, or be superseded by a concurrent expansion. A deferred or interactive completion widens this window. Without serialization an expansion could appear to succeed against a predecessor that is no longer authoritative, or two successors could be created.

Mitigations:

  • The Mission Issuer verifies predecessor state and the no-existing-successor condition in the same atomic step that would activate the successor (Section 5.5), and serializes the completions that activate a successor of the same predecessor (Section 10).

  • A failed check refuses with a reconciliation status (Section 10) that tells the client whether to discover an existing successor or stop, without leaking the predecessor's new internal state beyond that.

14.5. Duplicate Creation

To a client, a lost response is indistinguishable from a failed creation. Without idempotency the natural retry after a network fault creates a second Mission: live authority nobody intended and, under the child delegation profile, a consumed fan-out budget ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]). Proof jti single-use does not close this fault: the retry carries a fresh, valid proof.

Mitigations:

  • The required creation_request_id, with its durable reservation and uniqueness constraint, makes the retry recover the one committed operation, concurrent retries included (Section 11, Section 11.2).

  • The identifier is a deduplication handle, not a secret and not a credential: recovery re-establishes client authentication, possession of the recorded confirmation key, and the recorded authorization context, so the recovery path never weakens the possession requirements of Section 4.2 (Section 11.4).

  • Reservations are scoped to the authenticated client, so one client's identifiers cannot interfere with, or replay, another's.

  • Storage is bounded: the tombstone is small, its horizon is published (Section 11.5), and a Mission Issuer MAY cap outstanding reservations per client.

14.6. Expansion versus Step-Up

Conflating expansion with authentication step-up [RFC9470] would route an authentication shortfall through an approval event the Approver did not need to perform, surfacing irrelevant consent and risking approval fatigue, or conversely would treat a genuine authority shortfall as a mere re-authentication and silently widen nothing.

Mitigation: a denial that is an authentication shortfall (acr, amr) is satisfied by step-up, and a client does not route it to expansion; a denial that is an authority shortfall is the one expansion addresses (Section 3.2). The component that classifies the denial (Section 3.1) makes this distinction.

14.7. Policy Probing

A client could submit many expansion requests for the same predecessor to map the Mission Issuer's policy boundary from the denial reasons.

Mitigations:

  • The Mission Issuer MUST rate-limit expansion requests per predecessor per client. The bound is unconditional: it caps both policy probing and the approval prompts a client can drive against an Approver (prompt fatigue). Every expansion presentation is recorded and counted toward anomaly detection (Section 4.2).

  • A denial reason discloses no policy boundary beyond the adjudicated request (Section 12): a denial reports whether the requested authority was approved, not the full surface of what would have been.

14.8. Audit Linkage

The predecessor member makes the expansion chain observable: an authorized auditor can trace a successor back through its predecessors to the original Mission. This is a core governance property of expansion. An implementation that omits the member breaks the chain and defeats it; the member is therefore mandatory on a successor (Section 6).

15. Privacy Considerations

The privacy considerations of the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) apply. The privacy surface expansion adds is the lineage link and the authority detail disclosed when a task is broadened.

15.1. Predecessor-Chain Correlation

The predecessor member that gives audit linkage (Section 14.8) is also a correlation surface. It links a successor to its predecessor across distinct approval events, so a party that can read the chain can correlate the evolving task over time, which is more than any single Mission discloses. Deployments SHOULD scope read access to the predecessor member, and to any Mission-state surface that exposes it, to parties with a governance need, rather than exposing the chain to every credential audience. The issuance profile's Mission Identifier correlation considerations apply to each Mission in the chain.

15.3. Disclosure of the Broadened Task

The expansion Mission Intent and the consent disclosure rendered at the expansion approval event reveal how the approved task is evolving. The Mission Issuer SHOULD render that disclosure only to the Approver and authorized governance consumers, consistent with the issuance profile's treatment of consent disclosure.

16. IANA Considerations

The predecessor member of the mission claim (Section 6) is not registered in a dedicated registry: it is carried inside the already-registered mission claim, an open object for which the issuance profile establishes no member registry. No new claim or token-introspection registration is required for the lineage link; the predecessor request parameter is registered in Section 16.3.

This document defines two sets of symbolic codes: the expansion reconciliation status codes (Section 10), a closed set conveyed in mission_expansion_status, and the expansion denial reasons (Section 12), conveyed in the shared mission_denial_reason member. Both members are registered in the OAuth Parameters registry (Section 16.3) for the token response, where they are members of the JSON error response body, and for the authorization response, where the interactive path carries them as error response parameters.

The reconciliation status codes remain specification-defined: the closed set is small and fully specified in Section 10. A future revision MAY establish a "Mission Expansion Reconciliation Status" registry for it with a Specification Required [RFC8126] policy; until then this document is the value space.

The denial reasons are registry-backed: this document establishes the Mission Denial Reasons registry (Section 16.2) and seeds it with the four values it defines. Each further document that defines a value on the carrier requests its own registration in it.

16.1. Mission Termination Reasons Registration

This document requests registration of one reason in the issuance profile's Mission Termination Reasons registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), under that registry's Specification Required policy:

Table 2
Value Semantics Members Change Controller Reference
superseded A successor Mission replaced the predecessor through a replacement expansion. successor (REQUIRED) IETF this document, Section 7

16.2. Mission Denial Reasons Registry

IANA is requested to create the "Mission Denial Reasons" registry. The registration policy is Specification Required [RFC8126]. Registration does not require IETF review or a Standards Track document; a Specification Required reference that a Designated Expert can review against the criteria below suffices.

A Designated Expert reviews a submission for the discipline Section 12 requires:

  • a Value matching ^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$ not already registered;

  • a Semantics sentence precise enough that a consumer can tell the denial from every other registered value; and

  • a Reference that fixes which specification defines it.

The registry covers values of the mission_denial_reason parameter only (Section 12). The resource server WWW-Authenticate mission_denial attribute ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Resource Server Enforcement") and AuthZEN decision-context denial reasons ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]) are separate specification-defined value spaces, outside this registry's scope. A companion that adds a denial value states whether it adds a row to this carrier's registry or defines a value in a separate space. A shared spelling across carriers is a coincidence, never shared semantics, unless the defining documents state the mapping.

Consumers treat an unrecognized value as a denial with no further semantics (Section 12). A Designated Expert MUST reject a registration whose governing specification attempts to redefine this interaction rather than adding a value bound by it.

Each registration records:

  • Value: the mission_denial_reason symbolic string.

  • Semantics: one sentence stating what the denial means.

  • Change Controller: IETF, or the registrant for any other registration.

  • Reference: the specification defining the value.

This document seeds the registry with the values it defines (Section 12):

Table 3
Value Semantics Change Controller Reference
out_of_policy The Mission Issuer's governance policy refuses the requested authority class for this Mission, independent of who approves. IETF this document, Section 12
approver_rejected The Approver declined the expansion at the consent step. IETF this document, Section 12
out_of_scope_for_purpose The requested authority is incompatible with the Mission's recorded purpose. IETF this document, Section 12
nothing_to_expand The derived requested authority is a subset of the predecessor's own Effective Authority Set, so there is nothing to expand. IETF this document, Section 12

Each further document that defines a value on this carrier requests that value's registration in its own IANA considerations, carrying its Internet-Draft reference as a publication dependency under this registry's policy until it is published.

16.3. OAuth Parameters Registration

The expansion request is an [RFC8693] token exchange carrying the already-registered mission_intent request parameter and the already-registered token-exchange parameters subject_token, subject_token_type, requested_token_type, actor_token, and actor_token_type; none of these needs registration by this document. The deferred completion mode uses the deferred token response ([I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response]) and registers nothing here.

The predecessor cross-check is carried in the token exchange request at the token endpoint and, on the interactive path, in the authorization request. The reconciliation status and denial reason are carried in the token error response and, on the interactive path, in the authorization error response. The creation_request_id identifier is carried in the token exchange request in every completion mode and never appears on a front channel.

This document requests registration of the following parameters in the "OAuth Parameters" registry (Section 11.2 of [RFC6749]):

16.4. OAuth Extensions Error Registration

This document registers the following value in the "OAuth Extensions Error Registry" (Section 11.4 of [RFC6749]):

17. References

17.1. Normative References

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-submission-evidence]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Intent Submission Evidence for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-submission-evidence.html>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.
[RFC8705]
Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T. Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705, DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8705>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.
[RFC9126]
Lodderstedt, T., Campbell, B., Sakimura, N., Tonge, D., and F. Skokan, "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests", RFC 9126, DOI 10.17487/RFC9126, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9126>.
[RFC9396]
Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.

17.2. Informative References

[I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response]
de Oliveira Niero, G. and D. Liu, "Deferred Token Response", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response-01>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Authority Server", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement: AuthZEN Profile", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Aware Agent Harnesses", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-harness.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Deferred Approval for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Child Delegation for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Containment for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Continuation for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-discharge]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Entry Discharge for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-discharge.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Progressive Authorization for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Lifecycle Signals for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Template for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template.html>.
[RFC8126]
Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.
[RFC9470]
Bertocci, V. and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Step Up Authentication Challenge Protocol", RFC 9470, DOI 10.17487/RFC9470, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9470>.
[RFC9562]
Davis, K., Peabody, B., and P. Leach, "Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUIDs)", RFC 9562, DOI 10.17487/RFC9562, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9562>.

Appendix A. End-to-End Example

This appendix follows one expansion through deferred completion. A Q3 reconciliation Mission msn_QBZj5JSIV6tkkb93ZTvbiz_9dOMMXfJS, issued by https://as.example.com to the client s6BhdRkqt3 acting for alice, authorizes reading Q3 invoices and posting journal entries of at most USD 500 each. Mid-task the agent finds an adjustment of USD 1,200, outside the active Mission's authority. It cannot widen the Mission in place.

  1. The agent sends an expansion request (Figure 2). It presents the predecessor's Mission-bound access token as the subject_token, proves possession with a DPoP proof over that token's confirmation key, and carries a Mission Intent that raises the cap to USD 2,000 (Figure 3).

  2. The Mission Issuer resolves the predecessor from subject_token, verifies possession, confirms that the predecessor cross-check names that Mission and that it is active, and derives the successor's Authority Set, which widens the predecessor's (Section 5.1).

  3. The widening requires fresh consent, the deployment approves asynchronously, and the request opted in to deferral, so the Mission Issuer defers (Figure 4) and the client polls (Figure 5).

  4. alice approves the widened cap on the review surface. At 09:40:00 UTC on 2026-11-02 the next poll activates the successor msn_2Yt7Qv9LqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9RfX and supersedes the predecessor in one atomic step, and the response delivers the successor's access token (Figure 6). Until then the predecessor stays active.

  5. The successor's tokens carry the predecessor member (Figure 9), and the predecessor's record names the successor (Figure 10).

  6. The predecessor derives no new tokens (Figure 11). Its already-issued access tokens run out their short lifetimes, and the task continues under the successor.

The widening came only from alice's fresh consent: the successor's authority_hash commits the complete widened Authority Set she approved, not the predecessor's authority plus a delta.

Appendix B. Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

Acknowledgments

The author thanks the reviewers of the Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 profile for feedback on the expansion model and its composition with the issuance flow.

Author's Address

Karl McGuinness
Independent