Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0

3.1. Request

The request is an HTTPS POST with an application/x-www-form-urlencoded body containing:¶

mission_id:

REQUIRED. A string. The canonical Mission Identifier, named per the core's external-surface convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

audience:

CONDITIONAL. A string. The audience identifier of the requesting consumer. An authorized non-RS consumer (for example an auditor or a cross-domain Resource AS) that needs only Mission state, not audience-scoped authority, MAY omit audience; the response is then state-only and carries no authorization_details (Section 3.4). A Resource Server resolving authority for a specific audience MUST send it.¶

nonce:

REQUIRED. A string. A client-generated nonce binding the response to this request. It MUST be unique per request within the response lifetime. A consumer MUST reject a response whose nonce does not equal the one it sent. This is a standard client challenge: echoing it in the signed response anti-replay-binds that response to this specific request.¶

3.2. Authentication

The request MUST be authenticated. The AS MUST support at least one of the following mechanisms. The client MUST use exactly one of them per request:¶

1. mTLS client authentication [RFC8705]. The AS validates the client's X.509 certificate against its configured trust anchors and the client's registered tls_client_auth metadata.¶

2. Sender-constrained access token. The client presents a mission_status-scoped access token (see the authorization requirement below) in the Authorization header, sender-constrained either by DPoP [RFC9449] (the DPoP scheme with a DPoP proof header, the token's cnf.jkt matching the proof key thumbprint) or by mTLS [RFC8705] (a certificate-bound token, the Bearer scheme, whose cnf.x5t#S256 matches the presented client certificate). The token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's protected-resource identifier (below).¶

3. Private-key-JWT client authentication [RFC7523]. The client presents client_assertion_type with the exact value urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer and a signed JWT as client_assertion. The assertion's aud MUST name the URL of the endpoint being invoked (the mission_status_endpoint for a Status request, the mission_lifecycle_endpoint for a Lifecycle request), not the token endpoint; the AS MUST reject an assertion whose aud names no such endpoint. The AS accepts only the JWS [RFC7515] algorithms it advertises for that endpoint (Section 9); none MUST NOT be used.¶

Plain Basic or POST client authentication MUST NOT be used for this endpoint. The AS MUST refuse a request not authenticated by one of the three mechanisms with unauthorized (HTTP 401). The mechanism is determined by wire evidence in order: a request presenting an access token in Authorization is mechanism 2, and any client certificate is then evaluated only as that token's mTLS sender constraint; otherwise a request presenting client_assertion is mechanism 3, and any client certificate is not treated as client authentication; otherwise a request presenting only a client certificate is mechanism 1. This order keeps "exactly one mechanism" satisfiable when mTLS terminates at the edge.¶

An authenticated caller MUST additionally carry an explicit read authorization: a mission_status scope on the presented access token, or a deployment-defined equivalent grant bound to the authenticated client. The mission_status scope authorizes the Mission Status read operation and mirrors the mission_lifecycle scope of the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 6). The token-less path is preserved: a consumer that holds only a mission_id and authenticates directly as a client (mechanism 1 or 3) carries the deployment-defined equivalent grant, not a scope, and so resolves Mission state without holding an access token the AS issued. A caller carrying no such authorization is refused with the not-found response of Section 3.7 (Section 3.6).¶

A presented access token (mechanism 2) MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's protected-resource identifier: the resource value the AS publishes for this endpoint in its Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728]. For these surfaces that identifier is the endpoint's own URL (the mission_status_endpoint or mission_lifecycle_endpoint), so the mechanism-2 access-token audience and the mechanism-3 private-key-JWT aud name the same value. The AS MUST reject a token whose audience does not name that identifier. This token audience is distinct from the request body's audience parameter (Section 3.1): the token audience authorizes the call at this endpoint, whereas the request audience carries no authentication weight and only selects the Resource-Server-specific authority projection the response returns (Section 3.4).¶

Which mechanisms and authorization this endpoint accepts are discoverable per endpoint, not inferred from the token endpoint's metadata. The AS advertises the methods this endpoint accepts in mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported (Section 9). For the sender-constrained access-token path, this endpoint is an OAuth protected resource: the AS publishes, in its Protected Resource Metadata for this resource [RFC9728], the resource identifier the token's audience MUST name, the mission_status scope it requires (scopes_supported), and the presentation and sender constraints it accepts (bearer_methods_supported, dpop_bound_access_tokens_required, tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens). For the retained direct-client-authentication path (mTLS [RFC8705] or private-key JWT [RFC7523]), the accepted methods and, for private_key_jwt, the accepted client-assertion signing algorithms are advertised for this endpoint (Section 9), not read from the token endpoint's token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported [RFC8414]. Both paths are therefore discoverable.¶

3.3. Worked Request Example

POST /as/mission/status HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6...
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

mission_id=msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-
&audience=https%3A%2F%2Ferp.example.com
&nonce=nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ

3.4. Response

On success the AS returns a JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] signed with a key published in the AS's jwks_uri. The JWS header carries typ of mission-status-response+jwt and a kid identifying the signing key. Per [RFC7515] Section 4.1.9 the typ header omits the application/ prefix; the full media type application/mission-status-response+jwt (registered in Section 13) is used as the HTTP Content-Type.¶

[RFC9701] signed introspection responses are scoped to token introspection and do not apply to a lookup keyed by mission_id; the dedicated Mission Status operation therefore uses a new media type and a JWS, not [RFC9701] (see Section 11.4). Implementations MUST NOT use [RFC9701] for the dedicated Mission Status operation.¶

The signed payload reports the Mission's current state and the audience-scoped evidence the consumer needs.¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/mission-status-response+jwt
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6InNhLWtleS0yMDI2LXEzIi...

Decoded JWS header:¶

{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "kid": "sa-key-2026-q3",
  "typ": "mission-status-response+jwt"
}

Decoded JWS payload:¶

{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "https://erp.example.com",
  "sub": "client_erp-recon-agent",
  "nonce": "nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ",
  "iat": 1793606400,
  "exp": 1793606460,
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "authority_hash":
      "sha-256:l3KvZ4mP5x0wQrR6tY2nD9bM7sX1cF8gH2vJ4kE5pNQ",
    "state": "active",
    "version": 4,
    "expires_at":  "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
    "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:00:45Z"
  },
  "authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read", "journal-entries.write"] }
  ]
}

The members are:¶

• The signed JWT envelope iss, aud, sub, nonce, iat, exp. The aud is the response's audience binding and the nonce its request binding. When the request omitted audience (Section 3.1), the response is state-only and the AS MUST set aud to the authenticated requester's identifier, as the Lifecycle endpoint does (Section 6); the consumer's aud verification below then checks that identifier. exp bounds the validity of the signed response itself; how long the consumer MAY rely on the reported state is given separately by mission.fresh_until below.¶

• mission: the mission object, the same shape as the mission claim of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "The Mission Claim") with status members added. It carries:¶

  • id, issuer: the subject Mission's identifier and issuer.¶

  • authority_hash: the issuance profile's consent commitment over the Authority Set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Integrity Anchors").¶

  • state: the current Mission lifecycle state. The authoritative state space is the issuance profile's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle and Gating"): the core states active, revoked, expired, this profile's suspended and completed when the Mission Lifecycle endpoint (Section 6) is deployed, and any further state a companion profile defines and the deployment runs (for example superseded, defined by the Mission Expansion profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]) for an expanded predecessor, or cascaded, defined by the Mission Child Delegation profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]) for a cascade-terminated Child Mission). A consumer applies the issuance profile's forward-compatibility rule: only active permits reliance, and every other value, recognized or not, is non-active. This profile's reliance behavior does not depend on recognizing these companion-defined states; the fail-safe rule above governs.¶

  • expires_at: the point at which the Mission itself expires, the Mission record's expires_at ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

  • fresh_until: an RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time giving the point until which the consumer MAY rely on the reported state without re-checking, governing caching (Section 3.5). It is report-freshness metadata, carried in mission so it travels with state even on the introspection projection, which has no signed envelope to carry it (Section 4).¶

  • suspend_until, on_expiry: CONDITIONAL. Present only while the Mission is suspended under a deadline (Section 6): the RFC 3339 [RFC3339] deadline, and the transition (resume or revoke) the AS applies when it passes.¶

  • successor: OPTIONAL. A string, the successor mission_id. Present only when state is superseded, giving the successor that replaced this Mission, set atomically at supersession on the predecessor's record ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).¶

  • version: REQUIRED. The Mission's state version: a strictly monotonic per-Mission counter the Mission Issuer maintains, incremented on each committed lifecycle transition (the approval event is version 1) and each committed metadata-only change, current as of the reported state. It orders observations of one Mission across every surface: an event consumer that re-established state through this operation re-seats its gap detection on it (the last-applied Signals version becomes this value, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals]), a lifecycle mutation can guard on it (Section 6.7), and a materialized policy view names the value it materialized ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]).¶

  • status_list: OPTIONAL. The referenced-token status object of [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-status-list] (idx and uri), present where the deployment publishes a Mission Status List (Section 5).¶

• authorization_details: the audience-scoped Authority Set entries relevant to the requesting audience, as the mission_resource_access shape of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Mission Authority"), carried at the top level as a sibling of mission (as on the token and in the introspection response). Entries addressed to other audiences MUST NOT be disclosed. When the request omits audience (Section 3.1), there is no requesting audience: the response is state-only and MUST NOT carry authorization_details.¶

A consumer MUST verify, before honoring a response:¶

1. the JWS header typ is mission-status-response+jwt;¶

2. the JWS header alg is one the AS advertises in mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported (Section 9), rejecting none and any algorithm not listed;¶

3. the JWS signature against a current jwks_uri entry for the issuer AS;¶

4. iss equals the expected AS issuer URL;¶

5. aud equals the consumer's own audience identifier;¶

6. sub equals the requesting client's identifier;¶

7. nonce equals the request's nonce;¶

8. mission.id equals the requested mission_id; and¶

9. iat is not in the future and exp is not in the past, with up to 30 seconds clock-skew tolerance.¶

3.5. Caching

Caching follows these rules:¶

• Cache key. Consumers SHOULD cache a response keyed on (mission_id, audience), or on (mission_id, requester identifier) for a state-only response, until mission.fresh_until.¶

• Hard stop. Consumers MUST NOT use a cached response after mission.fresh_until. In particular, a consumer MUST NOT extend reliance on a cached suspended (or any non-active) response beyond mission.fresh_until.¶

• Freshness cap. When the AS advertises mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 9), it MUST NOT set mission.fresh_until later than the response iat plus that value.¶

• Skew tolerance. When comparing the current time to mission.fresh_until, a consumer MAY allow up to 30 seconds of tolerance for the active state only, and no tolerance for any other state. The tolerance MUST NOT exceed the AS's advertised mission_max_stale_seconds (Section 9).¶

The freshness cap keeps report freshness within the deployment's advertised revocation-propagation tolerance. The skew tolerance is a clock-skew allowance on the reliance path, bounding the disagreement between the AS's and the consumer's clocks, not a property of state reversibility. The hard stop is absolute for non-active states because a suspended Mission may be resumed to active.¶

3.6. Anti-Oracle Property

A mission_id is never a bearer capability. The AS MUST authenticate the requester and authorize it for the requested mission_id and audience.¶

Unknown mission_id values and known-but-unauthorized references MUST produce indistinguishable responses (HTTP 404 with a generic not-found body; see Section 3.7). The AS MUST return an identical HTTP status code, response body, and headers for the two cases. The AS SHOULD NOT vary response timing in a way that distinguishes the two cases. It SHOULD mitigate timing side channels (for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform lookup path for both the unknown and the unauthorized case).¶

3.7. Error Responses

Mission Status outcomes are of two kinds. A success outcome is a found, visible, authorized Mission: the AS returns HTTP 200 with a signed Mission Status Response, and the outcome is described by mission.state in that response, not by a separate symbol. A wire error is a hard failure: the AS returns the matching HTTP status with a JSON object [RFC8259] body whose error member carries the symbol below.¶

Success outcomes (HTTP 200, signed Mission Status Response, described by mission.state):¶

This document uses "terminated" in prose for any terminal non-active state; it is not itself a mission.state value, and the terminal set is not closed. The terminal row above and the list that follows enumerate the companion-defined states this suite currently runs, for the reader's reference; a deployment reports whichever it runs, and a consumer's reliance decision never depends on recognizing them. The terminal states currently defined across this suite are revoked and expired ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), completed (this document), superseded ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]), and cascaded ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]). The binding rule is the issuance profile's forward-compatibility rule: every value other than active is non-active, whether or not the consumer recognizes it.¶

Wire error codes (carried in the error member of a JSON body):¶

Note the distinction between the two access failures: unauthorized (401) means the request carried no valid authentication, whereas a request that is authenticated but not authorized for the referenced Mission returns not_found (404), never 401, so that an unauthorized reference is indistinguishable from an unknown one (Section 3.6). The error body is:¶

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "not_found",
  "error_description":
    "Mission reference is not found or not visible.",
  "nonce": "nonce_K9pV4nT2sR7mB1xQ"
}

The body MUST contain error, error_description, and nonce, and MUST NOT contain any member that would let a caller distinguish unknown from unauthorized references. For rate_limited, the response SHOULD include a Retry-After header [RFC9110] and a retry_after body member in seconds.¶

6.1. Operations

The endpoint accepts authenticated POST requests with a form-urlencoded body:¶

mission_id:

REQUIRED. A string. The canonical Mission Identifier, named per the core's external-surface convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

operation:

REQUIRED. A string. One of revoke, suspend, resume, complete.¶

reason:

OPTIONAL. A string. A human-readable reason recorded in audit, maximum 1024 characters.¶

suspend_until:

OPTIONAL. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time. Valid only on the suspend operation. When present, it sets a deadline after which the AS applies on_expiry.¶

on_expiry:

CONDITIONAL. A string, one of resume or revoke. REQUIRED when suspend_until is present; otherwise MUST NOT be sent. It selects the transition the AS applies when suspend_until passes.¶

nonce:

REQUIRED. A string. A client-generated nonce.¶

The operations are:¶

• revoke: terminate the Mission; transition to revoked.¶

• suspend: pause the Mission; transition to suspended.¶

• resume: return a suspended Mission to active.¶

• complete: mark the Mission completed; transition to completed.¶

A suspend MAY carry suspend_until with a REQUIRED on_expiry. When suspend_until passes, the AS MUST apply on_expiry (transition to active for resume, or to revoked for revoke) and emit the corresponding transition, without a further request. While the Mission is suspended under a deadline, both suspend_until and on_expiry surface in the signed Mission Status Response (Section 3.4) so a consumer sees the pending outcome.¶

6.2. Legal Transitions

An operation is legal only from the source states below. A terminal state (revoked, expired, completed, or the companion-defined superseded and cascaded) admits no transition. An operation whose resulting state equals the current state, terminal or not, is idempotent success (Section 6.7).¶

resume is the sole exception: it is legal only from suspended (its resulting state, active, is also the baseline a Mission holds before any suspension), so resume on an active or terminal Mission is a conflict, not idempotent success.¶

complete is legal from suspended as well as active: completion is a monotonic narrowing to a terminal state and needs no derivation window, so a suspended Mission need not first be resumed to be completed.¶

Requests are adjudicated by the single rule of Section 6.7: an operation whose resulting state equals the Mission's current state is idempotent success, with the resume exception above. Any other operation not legal from the current state, including resume on a Mission that is not suspended, is refused as a conflict. A Mission that reaches its expires_at transitions to expired independently of this endpoint, from active or suspended.¶

6.3. Consolidated State Machine

This profile owns the extension of the issuance profile's lifecycle state space ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle and Gating"). The table below is the authoritative view of that space: every state, every transition, and the source of the event that drives it. Event sources are the lifecycle endpoint (an operation of Section 6), the expiry clock (a deadline reached without a request), and companion adjudication (a transition a companion profile commits). The lifecycle-endpoint rows are exactly the operations of Section 6.2. Only active permits derivation; every other state is non-deriving.¶

revoke and the Mission's expires_at both apply in suspended as well as active, so a suspended Mission can still be terminated or expire. The superseded and cascaded rows are companion-defined and shown here for reference: superseded is committed by the expansion profile and requires an active predecessor ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]); cascaded is committed by the child-delegation profile only when a parent reaches a terminal state. A suspended parent holds a dependent Child Mission non-active reversibly rather than driving it to cascaded ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]). Neither companion state is produced by this profile's endpoint.¶

6.4. Authentication

The lifecycle endpoint uses the same authentication mechanisms as the Mission Status endpoint (Section 3.2): mTLS client authentication, a sender-constrained access token (DPoP- or mTLS-bound), or private-key JWT. Its discovery mirrors that endpoint: the accepted methods in mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported and, for private_key_jwt, the accepted client-assertion algorithms in mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported (Section 9); the sender-constrained access-token path through this endpoint's OAuth Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728]. A private-key JWT client_assertion MUST name the mission_lifecycle_endpoint URL in aud, and a presented access token MUST be audience-restricted to this endpoint's protected-resource identifier, exactly as at the Mission Status endpoint.¶

6.5. Authorization

The AS authorizes lifecycle operations against deployment policy. This document sets the minimum authorization semantics and leaves finer policy deployment-defined. Every authenticated caller, whatever its authentication mechanism (Section 3.2), MUST be governed by an explicit lifecycle authorization: a mission_lifecycle scope or a deployment-defined equivalent grant that names who may perform the transition. The AS MUST refuse a caller that carries no such authorization.¶

The acting party, and where the AS checks the lifecycle authorization, follow from the authentication case:¶

1. When an access token authenticates the call, the token identifies the parties per the issuance profile's access-token model ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): for a delegated access token its sub denotes the resource owner (the represented party), matching the [RFC9068] access-token sub model; the calling party is identified by client_id ([RFC8693] Section 4.3); and, where a delegation chain is present, the immediate actor is identified by the act claim ([RFC8693], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A DPoP [RFC9449] or mTLS [RFC8705] sender constraint binds the presenter to a key; it does not change what sub denotes. The acting party is the calling party so identified, and the presented token MUST carry the lifecycle authorization the AS checks against it.¶

2. When the caller authenticates directly as a client (mTLS client authentication [RFC8705] or private-key JWT [RFC7523]), the authenticated client is the acting party. The AS MUST check the deployment-defined lifecycle grant bound to that client.¶

In every case the AS MUST record the acting party and SHOULD reflect it in the signed response's audit surface: the response envelope's sub, distinct from any access token's sub, or a deployment-defined audit member of the Mission Status Response.¶

Which parties may perform which operation is deployment-defined. Typical deployments authorize revoke to the Mission's Subject or Approver and to administrators; suspend and resume to administrators; and complete to the requesting client or an administrator.¶

Because resume returns a suspended Mission to active and so undoes the containment a suspend established, a deployment SHOULD require a distinct or elevated authorization for resume, mirroring the treatment of bulk resume in Mission Management ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-management]).¶

The AS MUST refuse an unauthorized lifecycle request with the not-found response shape of Section 3.7, so the endpoint does not act as a Mission enumeration oracle.¶

6.6. Worked Examples

Revoke request:¶

POST /as/mission/lifecycle HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6...
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

mission_id=msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-
&operation=revoke
&reason=Quarterly+reconcile+completed+early
&nonce=nonce_8Y3vN0sM6tP1xR9bQ5

Revoke success response: the AS returns the updated status as a signed Mission Status Response (Section 3.4). Because the Lifecycle request carries no audience, the response is state-only: the AS sets aud to the authenticated requester and omits authorization_details (a lifecycle confirmation reports state, not audience-scoped authority). Here the response envelope's sub, distinct from any access token's sub, carries the acting party: the calling client identified by client_id. The AS records that acting party and reflects it in this signed response as well as in its audit log.¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/mission-status-response+jwt
Cache-Control: no-store

eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6InNhLWtleS0yMDI2LXEzIi...

Decoded JWS payload:¶

{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "client_erp-recon-agent",
  "sub": "client_erp-recon-agent",
  "nonce": "nonce_8Y3vN0sM6tP1xR9bQ5",
  "iat": 1793609600,
  "exp": 1793609660,
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "authority_hash":
      "sha-256:l3KvZ4mP5x0wQrR6tY2nD9bM7sX1cF8gH2vJ4kE5pNQ",
    "state": "revoked",
    "version": 7,
    "expires_at":  "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
    "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:54:05Z"
  }
}

The AS records the operation, actor, time, and any reason in its audit log; the response confirms the outcome through the updated state.¶

Suspend request with a deadline, here also carrying the OPTIONAL expected_version guard against deciding over stale state (Section 6.7):¶

POST /as/mission/lifecycle HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6...
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

mission_id=msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-
&operation=suspend
&suspend_until=2026-11-09T08%3A15%3A00Z
&on_expiry=revoke
&expected_version=5
&reason=Pending+quarterly+access+review
&nonce=nonce_4Dq2mV8kX1sB7nR3tW

Suspend success response: the signed Mission Status Response reports suspended and surfaces the pending outcome, carrying suspend_until and on_expiry in mission alongside state. Decoded JWS payload:¶

{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "client_erp-recon-agent",
  "sub": "client_erp-recon-agent",
  "nonce": "nonce_4Dq2mV8kX1sB7nR3tW",
  "iat": 1793607600,
  "exp": 1793607660,
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "authority_hash":
      "sha-256:l3KvZ4mP5x0wQrR6tY2nD9bM7sX1cF8gH2vJ4kE5pNQ",
    "state": "suspended",
    "version": 6,
    "suspend_until": "2026-11-09T08:15:00Z",
    "on_expiry": "revoke",
    "expires_at":  "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
    "fresh_until": "2026-11-02T08:20:45Z"
  }
}

When suspend_until passes without a resume, the AS applies on_expiry and transitions the Mission to revoked without a further request.¶

6.7. Idempotency and Conflicts

The request nonce (Section 6, Operations) is the idempotency key. The AS MUST deduplicate lifecycle requests by the triple (client, mission_id, nonce) for a bounded window. On a retransmit carrying a nonce already seen for that client and mission_id, the AS MUST replay the original response rather than re-execute the operation. The window MUST be at least the validity span of the signed response the AS would replay (its iat to exp, Section 3.4), so any retransmit that could still present a live response is deduplicated. A deployment MAY use a longer window. This makes a retransmit safe against reordering: a delayed suspend retry that arrives after a resume is recognized as a duplicate and replays the original suspend response, so it cannot re-suspend an already-resumed Mission.¶

Deduplication guards a retransmitted request; it does not guard a valid request decided over stale state, a fresh suspend issued from a console that has not yet seen a newer resume. For that a lifecycle request MAY carry expected_version, the state version (Section 3.4) the caller last observed: when present, the AS MUST refuse the operation with HTTP 409 and error symbol stale_version, leaving the Mission unchanged, when the Mission's current state version differs. A deployment SHOULD require expected_version on the operations it classifies high-risk. The nonce remains the replay key; the two guards are independent, one against duplicate delivery, one against stale decisions.¶

Lifecycle operations follow one rule. An operation whose resulting state (Section 6.2) equals the Mission's current state is idempotent success, terminal or not: the AS returns the current Mission Status Response, with no state change and no event emitted. Any other operation not legal from the current state (for example suspend against a terminal state) is a conflict: the AS MUST refuse it with HTTP 409 and a JSON body whose error symbol is conflict, leaving the Mission state unchanged.¶

resume is the sole exception to the idempotent-success arm. It is legal only from suspended, and its resulting state active is also the baseline a Mission holds before any suspension, so resume on an active Mission (one never suspended, or already resumed) or on a terminal Mission is not idempotent success but a conflict.¶

One idempotent case carries metadata. A suspend against a suspended Mission whose suspend_until or on_expiry differ from the recorded values MUST update the recorded values, emitting the corresponding transition-metadata change and reporting the updated values in the response; silent acceptance without effect is not conforming.¶

6.8. Relationship to RFC 7009

A Mission revocation through this endpoint cascades to credentials derived from the Mission per the AS's advertised revocation propagation (Section 8). The AS MAY additionally invoke [RFC7009] token revocation for specific outstanding tokens when it knows their jti. [RFC7009] alone does NOT revoke a Mission; the lifecycle endpoint is the authoritative Mission state change.¶

6.9. Deferred Lifecycle Capabilities

This endpoint operates on one Mission at a time. Mission enumeration and bulk lifecycle operations for incident response, such as revoking every Mission for a compromised Subject, client, or tenant, are specified separately by Mission Management [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-management]; this document does not require them. The following capabilities remain deferred to future work. Approver transfer or re-anchoring, changing the party that anchors a Mission's consent, is not defined here. Administrative monotonic narrowing, such as shortening a Mission's expires_at or retiring a single Authority Set entry, is not defined here.¶

7.1. Relationship to the Issuance Profile

The completion capability depends normatively on the issuance profile and is not implementable alone. It reuses, without restating, the issuance profile's Mission, mission_resource_access entry, Authority Set, subset rule, integrity anchors, lifecycle states, and issuance gating, and the inert success_criteria member of the Mission Intent. It uses Mission, Mission Issuer, Authority Set, and derivation as the issuance profile defines them.¶

It extends the issuance profile in one narrow, additive way: it registers terminal_when, an OPTIONAL Common Constraint on a mission_resource_access entry (Section 7.2), whose subset rule the issuance profile's existing subset comparison applies (Section 7.4). It changes no Mission lifecycle state and no meaning of any existing member.¶

7.2. Entry Completion Conditions

This section defines terminal_when, a Common Constraint ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) carried in the constraints object of a mission_resource_access entry. It is a specification-defined Common Constraint under the issuance profile's naming convention (Section 13).¶

terminal_when:

OPTIONAL. An array of completion conditions. When any condition is met, the entry is discharged (Section 7.3). Each condition is an object with these members:¶

event_type:

REQUIRED. A string identifying the completion event. Its semantics are deployment- or registry-defined and opaque to this document, as purpose is ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

event_source:

OPTIONAL. A string. A URI the Authorization Server consults to determine whether the event has occurred (Section 7.3.1).¶

max_staleness:

OPTIONAL. A string. An ISO 8601 duration, matching the duration rule in Appendix A of [RFC3339], bounding how stale the Authorization Server's view of the event MAY be when it gates issuance.¶

The terminal_when array is part of the entry's constraints and so of the Authority Set: it is committed by authority_hash and reproducible under derivation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Whether a condition has fired is evaluated state, not part of authority_hash; folding fired status into the anchor would make the committed authority time-varying.¶

terminal_when is the enforceable counterpart of the inert success_criteria ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), which remains inert: success_criteria describe completion for the Approver, terminal_when acts on it. It is distinct from a cumulative consumption bound, which meters volume; a terminal_when condition is a single external event.¶

7.3. Discharge and Issuance Gating

When a condition in an entry's terminal_when has been met, the entry is discharged. The Authorization Server MUST NOT derive a token carrying a discharged entry, at the token endpoint, on refresh, or on Token Exchange, exactly as issuance is refused for a non-active Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A derivation that would carry only discharged entries MUST fail. A derivation that carries a mix MUST omit the discharged entries.¶

Discharge gates at the entry, not the Mission. The Mission remains active and continues to derive its other entries: a multi-resource Mission therefore completes partially, one entry at a time, as each entry's task finishes. The issuance profile's Mission states are unchanged; a deployment that also tracks Mission-level completion MAY transition a Mission whose entries are all discharged to the completed state the Mission Lifecycle endpoint defines (Section 6), but this section does not require it. Such a transition is performed through the complete operation, as an issuer-initiated lifecycle operation, so the consolidated state machine's event sources remain authoritative (Section 6.3).¶

Discharge gates new derivations only. A token already issued for an entry remains valid until it expires, as with revocation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A deployment that needs prompt cutoff relies on short token lifetimes or on the runtime layer denying a discharged entry at the point of use (Section 7.7).¶

7.4. Subset Rule

Because terminal_when is a Common Constraint, the issuance profile's subset comparison ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) applies its defined subset rule with no new clause: for a key present in the reference entry's constraints, the same key MUST be present in the candidate entry and its value MUST be no broader under the key's defined rule.¶

For terminal_when, a candidate value is no broader than a reference value when the candidate's condition array contains every condition of the reference, compared structurally after the canonicalization of the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); the candidate MAY add further conditions.¶

Conditions are compared structurally, not by event semantics. A child cannot drop or alter a parent's completion condition, only add more, so discharge composes monotonically: an added condition can only make an entry discharge sooner, which is a narrowing. Modifying a parent condition is forbidden because a verifier cannot decide whether the change discharges earlier or later from opaque event_type values.¶

7.5. Forward Compatibility

Because terminal_when is a constraints member, a consumer that does not recognize it fails closed by the issuance profile's Resource Server enforcement rule directly: a consumer MUST fail closed on any constraints key it does not understand, or understands but cannot enforce, refusing the request rather than granting access while ignoring the key ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Discharge is load-bearing narrowing, so ignoring terminal_when would silently widen the grant. That enforcement rule is the honest basis of discharge's safety: an unrecognized terminal_when is refused, never dropped.¶

An Authorization Server that does not implement this capability simply does not emit terminal_when, and is unaffected. The fail-closed rule binds a consumer that encounters the constraint without implementing it.¶

7.6. Derivation Guidance

This guidance is non-normative. When the Authorization Server derives an entry from the Mission Intent, a reviewable rule governs what each element of the Intent becomes:¶

• an action if removing it would leave the task undefined;¶

• an ordinary constraints member if removing it would merely make the task less restrictive; and¶

• a terminal_when completion condition, itself a constraints member, if it defines when the task is satisfied, retiring the entry's authority rather than widening or restricting it.¶

The third case is what this capability adds. A bound that holds throughout the task is an ordinary constraint; an event that ends the task is a terminal_when condition. For example, "only invoices under 500 USD" is a max_amount constraint, while "until the Q3 close is finalized" is a completion condition.¶

7.7. Relationship to Runtime Enforcement

Discharge is an issuance-gating signal and is fully meaningful at the issuance profile alone. It is also a natural input to the runtime layer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]): a runtime Policy Enforcement Point that recognizes terminal_when SHOULD deny a discharged entry at the point of use, closing the window between discharge and token expiry the same way it denies a revoked Mission. A Policy Enforcement Point learns that an entry is discharged from the Mission Status operation or the token introspection projection (Section 7.3.2), the same way it learns a Mission is revoked. A runtime Policy Enforcement Point that does not recognize terminal_when fails closed for the entry per Section 7.5.¶

7.8. Worked Example

A Mission for alice reconciles Q3 payables. Its Authority Set has two entries: a read over the ledger, and a write to post journal entries, bounded to under 500 USD and discharged when the Q3 close is finalized:¶

[
  { "type": "mission_resource_access",
    "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
    "actions": ["invoices.read"] },
  { "type": "mission_resource_access",
    "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
    "actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
    "constraints": {
      "max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" },
      "terminal_when": [
        { "event_type": "accounting-period-closed",
          "event_source": "https://close.example.com/periods/2026-Q3",
          "max_staleness": "PT15M" } ] } }
]

The event_source is on a separate close-management origin the Mission has no write authority to, so the agent cannot drive its own discharge (Section 7.3.1).¶

While the period is open, the Authorization Server derives both entries. When the finance team finalizes the Q3 close, the event_source reports the period closed. From then on the Authorization Server refuses to derive the write entry: a refresh returns a token carrying only the read entry. The Mission stays active, so the agent can still read the ledger to finish its reconciliation report, but it can no longer post journal entries. No revoke and no clock was needed; the write authority retired itself when the task it was granted for completed.¶

If the event_source were unreachable when the agent refreshed, the Authorization Server would treat the write entry as possibly discharged and omit it, rather than risk issuing authority for a task that may have ended (Section 7.3.1).¶

7.9. Completion Conformance

An Authorization Server claiming the completion capability MUST:¶

• treat an entry whose terminal_when has been met as discharged and refuse to derive it (Section 7.3);¶

• refuse to derive an entry whose discharge status it cannot determine (Section 7.3.1);¶

• record an observed discharge as latched state that MUST NOT revert on a later source report (Section 7.3.1);¶

• carry every parent completion condition into a derived entry when narrowing, permitting only added conditions (Section 7.4);¶

• where it offers the Mission Status operation or the token introspection projection, omit a discharged entry from the authorization_details it returns (Section 7.3.2); and¶

• keep the terminal_when condition array committed by authority_hash and keep fired status out of it (Section 7.2).¶

A consumer claiming the completion capability MUST fail closed for an entry carrying a terminal_when constraint it does not understand (Section 7.5).¶

8.1. Recommended Access-Token TTL

Where Mission revocation must take effect but only the baseline derivation-time check is in use, Mission-bound access tokens SHOULD use TTLs no longer than the declared mission_max_stale_seconds. Deployments where revocation propagates out of band (token introspection, per-request status checks, or the event stream) MAY use longer TTLs.¶

Sizing to the bound is itself a propagation mechanism: expiry performs the state check, and the consumer integrates nothing (the runtime profile names this token-lifetime freshness for the classes below its high-consequence floor). Introspection and per-request status checks tighten specific paths; they are upgrades, not prerequisites.¶

9.1. Worked Metadata Example

A discovery response from https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, showing the issuance profile members plus the extension members of this document:¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: max-age=3600

{
  "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
  "token_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/as/token",
  "introspection_endpoint":
    "https://as.example.com/as/introspect",
  "jwks_uri":
    "https://as.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
  "introspection_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"],
  "mission_bound_authorization_supported": true,

  "mission_status_endpoint":
    "https://as.example.com/as/mission/status",
  "mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":
    ["mtls_client_auth", "private_key_jwt", "access_token"],
  "mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"],
  "mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"],
  "mission_lifecycle_endpoint":
    "https://as.example.com/as/mission/lifecycle",
  "mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":
    ["mtls_client_auth", "private_key_jwt", "access_token"],
  "mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported": ["ES256"],
  "mission_max_stale_seconds": 60
}

11.1. Mission Status Enumeration

Per the anti-oracle property (Section 3.6), the AS MUST NOT let a caller readily distinguish an unknown mission_id from a known-but-unauthorized one at the Status or Lifecycle endpoint. The error shape of Section 3.7 requires identical body content, identical HTTP status, and identical headers between the two cases, and the AS SHOULD additionally suppress timing side channels (for example by padding response time or by taking a uniform lookup path). An implementation that leaks the distinction exposes the Mission space to enumeration.¶

11.2. Mission Status Response Replay

A Mission Status Response is bound to (caller sub, audience, nonce, issuance time). Replay against a different caller or audience, or beyond mission.fresh_until, is detectable by signature verification and by verifying the bindings; a consumer MUST verify all the checks of Section 3.4 before honoring a response. A response cached and replayed by the same caller within mission.fresh_until is equivalent to a fresh response; a consumer MUST NOT use a cached response after mission.fresh_until, with the skew tolerance of Section 3.5.¶

11.3. Mission Status Denial of Service

The Mission Status operation is on the consumption path of every Mission-bound credential validation in deployments where consumers query Mission Status per request. The AS MUST implement per-consumer rate limiting (returning rate_limited, Section 3.7) and SHOULD encourage consumer-side caching (Section 3.5) to reduce traffic.¶

11.4. RFC 9701 vs. New Media Type

When the introspection projection is signed (Section 4), it uses [RFC9701], which is scoped to token introspection. The dedicated Mission Status operation uses a new media type (application/mission-status-response+jwt, Section 13) and a JWS [RFC7515], because [RFC9701] does not apply to a lookup keyed by mission_id. Implementations MUST NOT use [RFC9701] for the dedicated Mission Status operation, and MUST NOT accept an unsigned response from the dedicated Mission Status operation in place of the signed form it requires.¶

11.5. Signing-Key Retention for Audit

The AS signs Mission Status and Lifecycle responses with a key from its jwks_uri. The AS MUST keep the public JWK for every kid it has signed such a response under resolvable in its jwks_uri for at least the Mission record retention period, so an archived application/mission-status-response+jwt remains verifiable for audit and dispute. This is the core's retired-key rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), with the record retention period as the bound. A key known or suspected compromised is the exception: the AS removes it, and the Mandate profile's compromise-time rule governs how artifacts signed under it are then classified.¶

11.6. Entry Discharge

The completion capability (Section 7) adds the following:¶

• Monotonic by construction. Discharge only removes an entry's authority, so it is not a path to escalation; a compromised or injected agent cannot use terminal_when to widen authority, and the worst it can do is retire its own authority sooner. That is not an escalation, but a forced premature discharge is a denial-of-service on the task (authority the task still needs is withdrawn) and, where discharge is relied on as a guardrail, retires that guardrail early. The event-source integrity and independence requirements below bound who can force it.¶

• Fail closed on unknown constraint. A consumer that does not understand the terminal_when constraint MUST refuse the entry (Section 7.5); ignoring the constraint would let a discharged entry continue to be narrowed, projected, or enforced, defeating discharge.¶

• Fail closed on unknown status. When discharge status is indeterminate the Authorization Server withholds issuance (Section 7.3.1); a deployment that fails open here defeats the control.¶

• Trusted event source. event_source is a trusted input to issuance: a party that can make the source report "not yet complete" can keep an entry derivable past its true completion, and one that can make it report "complete" can force a premature discharge. The Mission Issuer MUST authenticate and integrity-verify an event source outside its own trust domain (Section 7.3.1), and SHOULD prefer sources within it. The event_source SHOULD lie outside the Mission's own writable authority, so an agent cannot drive or suppress its own discharge; the signed status document verified against the source identity is the interoperable integrity mechanism where it cannot (Section 7.3.1).¶

• Event-source availability. Fail-closed discharge gives issuance an availability dependency on event_source within max_staleness: an unreachable source withholds the entry (Section 7.3.1). Event sources inside the issuer's trust domain are RECOMMENDED, for latency as well as trust.¶

• Already-issued tokens. The window between discharge and the expiry of a token already issued is the same residual revocation carries, bounded the same way (Section 7.3, Section 7.7).¶

11.7. General OAuth Security

This document inherits OAuth 2.0 Best Current Practice [RFC9700] for the OAuth surfaces it composes with; implementers MUST follow current OAuth security guidance.¶

12.1. Status and Lifecycle as Disclosure Surfaces

The Mission Status operation (Section 3) and the introspection projection (Section 4) disclose Mission state, the authority_hash, and the audience-scoped authorization_details to the authenticated, authorized requester. A deployment MUST treat both as Mission information-disclosure surfaces with the same privacy posture, audience-filtering the disclosed authority so a consumer never sees entries addressed to other audiences (Section 3.4).¶

12.2. Status Audit Logging

The AS records Status and Lifecycle requests (containing mission_id, audience, caller, and timing) in audit logs. Deployments MUST treat these logs as PII sinks per the issuance profile's privacy considerations.¶

12.3. Completion Condition Disclosure

A terminal_when condition can reveal task structure: event_type and event_source may name a business event, a case, or a record whose mere existence is sensitive, and they ride the token where the entry is carried. A deployment SHOULD treat them as it treats other authority detail, and SHOULD avoid event identifiers that disclose more than the consuming party needs. Consulting an event_source also reveals the Authorization Server's interest in that event; a deployment SHOULD weigh that exposure when the source is operated by another party.¶

13.1. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration

IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry [RFC8414]. For each: Change Controller IETF; Reference this document, Section 9.¶

• mission_status_endpoint¶

• mission_status_endpoint_auth_methods_supported¶

• mission_status_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported¶

• mission_status_signing_alg_values_supported¶

• mission_lifecycle_endpoint¶

• mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_methods_supported¶

• mission_lifecycle_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported¶

• mission_max_stale_seconds¶

13.2. Media Type Registration

IANA is requested to register one media type per [RFC6838].¶

13.3. Common Constraint Definition: terminal_when

The completion capability (Section 7) defines one Common Constraint by specification, under the issuance profile's Common Constraint convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), which requires a definition to fix the name, value syntax, subset rule, and intersection rule:¶

• Name: terminal_when¶

• Value syntax: a JSON array of completion-condition objects, each with a REQUIRED event_type (string), an OPTIONAL event_source (string, a URI), and an OPTIONAL max_staleness (string, an ISO 8601 duration) (Section 7.2).¶

• Subset rule: a candidate value is no broader than a reference value when the candidate's condition array contains every condition of the reference, compared structurally after the issuance profile's canonicalization; the candidate MAY add further conditions (Section 7.4).¶

• Intersection rule: the union of the two condition arrays.¶

• Change Controller: IETF¶

• Reference: this document, Section 7.2¶

terminal_when is a constraints member of the mission_resource_access authorization details type defined by the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). event_type values are deployment- or registry-defined and opaque to this document, as purpose is, so this document establishes no registry of event types.¶

13.4. Well-Known URI

This document registers no new Well-Known URI. The metadata members of Section 9 are added to the OAuth Authorization Server Metadata document at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server [RFC8414].¶

Normative References

[I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-status-list]

Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21, 21 June 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]

McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission.html>.

[RFC2119]

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

[RFC3339]

Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.

[RFC6838]

Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.

[RFC7009]

Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7009>.

[RFC7515]

Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

[RFC7523]

Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7523>.

[RFC7662]

Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662>.

[RFC8174]

Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

[RFC8259]

Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.

[RFC8414]

Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414>.

[RFC8693]

Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.

[RFC8705]

Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T. Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705, DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8705>.

[RFC9068]

Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9068>.

[RFC9325]

Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati, "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325>.

[RFC9449]

Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.

[RFC9701]

Lodderstedt, T., Ed. and V. Dzhuvinov, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Response for OAuth Token Introspection", RFC 9701, DOI 10.17487/RFC9701, January 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9701>.

[RFC9728]

Jones, M.B., Hunt, P., and A. Parecki, "OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata", RFC 9728, DOI 10.17487/RFC9728, April 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9728>.

Informative References

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Context Binding for AAuth", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Authority Server", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]

McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement: AuthZEN Profile", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Mandate", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]

McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Child Delegation for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Cross-Domain Projection for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-management]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Management for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-management.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Lifecycle Signals for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals.html>.

[RFC9110]

Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.

[RFC9700]

Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett, "Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security", BCP 240, RFC 9700, DOI 10.17487/RFC9700, January 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700>.