| Internet-Draft | Mission Approval Governance | November 2026 |
| McGuinness | Expires 20 May 2027 | [Page] |
Mission-Bound Authorization records one accountable Approver for each Mission and leaves multi-party approval and approval-authority provenance to a governance layer. This document defines that layer's record, the Approval Governance Record: an issuer-signed, issuer-retained record of the policy, assertions, and evaluation behind one approval event. Before the Mission is created, the record is part of the approval decision; afterwards, it is immutable evidence of who approved, under which authority, and why the decision satisfied governance. The record never appears on tokens or protocol messages, and the Mission's single accountable Approver is unchanged.¶
This document also defines the governed_policy approval basis, under
which a policy version that an accountable human approved activates
Mission proposals, and the Approval Context Commitment, a digest over a
Mission's immutable creation facts that lets two authenticated artifacts
be matched to one approval.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
Mission-Bound Authorization records one accountable Approver for each
Mission and leaves multi-party approval and approval-authority
provenance to a governance layer. Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth
2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (the "issuance profile")
states this rule for the OAuth binding, which records the Approver in
approval_basis.consent_principal; this document consumes that
binding's record members.¶
An enterprise review process is often that governance layer. One approval can involve several principals, a threshold or separation-of-duty rule, and a delegation-of-authority policy. An auditor later has to prove not only who approved, but under which authority the approval was valid.¶
The issuance profile answers who is accountable for a Mission. This document answers under which authority that approval was made, and why it satisfied governance. It defines:¶
the Approval Governance Record (AGR), the record of the policy, assertions, and evaluation behind one approval event (Section 5);¶
the governed_policy approval basis (Section 13), under
which an accountable human approves a bounded policy version once, and
that policy then decides eligible Mission proposals, each activation
committing a record; and¶
the Approval Context Commitment (Section 16), an optional digest over a Mission's immutable creation facts that other authenticated artifacts can disclose.¶
The record has two phases:¶
Before commitment, it is part of the approval decision. An assertion that fails authentication, event binding, or policy authorization does not contribute (Section 6), and a record that cannot be evaluated or persisted prevents activation (Section 8).¶
After commitment, it is evidence: immutable, signed (Section 9), and consumed by audit, never by enforcement.¶
This document is optional. A deployment that records nothing beyond the
Mission Record's accountable approval_basis.consent_principal is fully
conformant to its Mission binding and unaffected by this document,
except that a deployment activating Missions under a standing-consent
basis whose defining profile adopts the Approval Basis Contract meets
that Contract (Section 12), which records nothing. A profile can require the record; Section 4
defines the conditions under which one does.¶
The record is independent of the approval ceremony. It applies alike to synchronous approval, to deferred approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]), and to the native asynchronous approval of a standalone Mission Authority Server ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]), and it depends on no deferral substrate.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
All JSON shown in this document is non-normative and illustrative; the member definitions in the surrounding text are authoritative. An example line too long for the page is folded with the single backslash strategy of [RFC8792]; the canonical-bytes blocks of Appendix A are wrapped as that appendix describes.¶
This document uses JSON [RFC8259] as the data model for the Approval Governance Record. JCS canonicalization [RFC8785] applies wherever this document computes a digest or a signing input, under the canonicalization rules of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]; this document does not define a second canonicalization.¶
A digest is encoded in the integrity-anchor encoded form of
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]: the sha-256: prefix followed
by the base64url, no-padding encoding of the digest. This document
defines no digest algorithm of its own. Its digests are constructed with
the issuance profile's commitment mechanisms and classified under the
species of that profile's commitment taxonomy, whose section this
document imports normatively ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Commitment Mechanisms"): approval_policy.digest,
approval_context_commitment, submission_evidence_commitment, and an
activation policy reference's digest (Section 12.3)
are envelope anchors, and the record digest (Section 9) is a
canonical-object digest. That construction instantiates the default
commitment construction of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-substrate],
which is informative here.¶
The terms Mission, Mission Record, Mission Issuer, Approver, Subject,
approval event, Mission Intent, Authority Set, audit horizon,
approval_event_id, intent_hash, and authority_hash are used as
defined in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission].¶
This document defines the following terms:¶
The policy, assertions, and evaluation standing behind one approval event (Section 5).¶
One principal's authenticated decision statement carried in an AGR (Section 5.2).¶
The assertion that satisfies the accountable-approver rule (Section 6.2).¶
The issuer's determination of whether the recorded assertions satisfy the referenced approval policy (Section 8).¶
The digest over a complete record, envelope included, that every
external binding names (Section 9).¶
A condition under which a profile requires this record for an approval event (Section 4).¶
A Mission Issuer that records Approval Governance Records (Section 17).¶
A party that verifies a retained record and can re-check its evaluation (Section 17).¶
The Mission Record carries exactly one accountable principal,
approval_basis.consent_principal, and this document does not change
that. The accountable Approver remains the only principal that any
downstream projection, token, or enforcement point consumes. The record
captures the standing behind that approval, never a second authorization
surface visible outside the issuer.¶
The approval_event_id member joins the record to the approval event
and to the Mission Record it governs
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). The record never appears on
tokens or in any protocol message; it is issuer-retained control-plane
state. OAuth standardizes the authorization data that a client requests
and is granted ([RFC9396] for rich authorization requests), not an
organization's internal approval provenance, so the record also stays
out of enforcement projections, matching the issuance profile's
control-plane discipline.¶
The record governs the Mission approval event. An action-time approval under the runtime profile's re-evaluation surfaces ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]) is a different layer and never joins this record.¶
This document defines one member of the Mission Record's
approval_basis.adjudication object
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Principals and
Approval Basis"):¶
governance_record:OPTIONAL. A boolean. true when an Approval Governance Record is
recorded for this approval event, joined by the Mission's own
approval_event_id.¶
It never changes kind, which follows the basis
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Principals and
Approval Basis"; Section 12.5).¶
This document aligns the record's accountable assertion, where it
carries one, with that kind: a governed decision still names its
mechanism, and the record supplies the fuller assertion set behind
it, including any multi-assertion set, never flattened into it.¶
Where the governed Mission populates approval_basis.adjudication
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Principals and
Approval Basis") and
this record exists:¶
adjudication.governance_record is true;¶
adjudication.kind names the mechanism the approval basis fixes:
human for direct, and policy for a standing-consent basis,
including governed_policy (Section 13). It is never a value
that names this record itself, and never a flattening of its assertion
set into a single principal; and¶
where the record carries an accountable assertion
(Section 6), that assertion's own kind MUST equal
adjudication.kind.¶
An artifact that refers to the record does so by its record digest (Section 9). The record binds a governance evaluation to the Mission's approval event. It does not, by itself, establish a separate business decision for each subsequent action.¶
Authenticating approval evidence does not, by itself, establish that conditions governing later reliance remain satisfied. Whether subsequent changes to an Approver's role, a delegation, or governing policy affect an existing Mission depends on the deployment's policy.¶
A profile MAY require this record; the Enterprise Mission Authority Profile does so under these recording triggers ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]). The triggers are defined here so that a profile cites one list. Under a profile that adopts these recording triggers, the record is REQUIRED for an approval event when any of the following holds:¶
the Mission Record's approval_basis.consent_principal differs
from its subject;¶
more than one principal contributes to the decision;¶
a non-human assertion contributes to the decision;¶
a threshold, veto, or separation-of-duty rule is evaluated; or¶
validating any assertion requires authority standing outside the Mission Record.¶
A deployment that adopts no profile requiring the record has no
obligation to record one merely because a trigger holds. Independently
of any profile, every activation under governed_policy records an
Approval Governance Record (Section 13). Every Approval
Governance Record a deployment records, whether required or not, MUST
satisfy the requirements of this document.¶
The Approver is always approval_basis.consent_principal
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so a Mission whose Approver
differs from its Subject holds the first trigger, and the Enterprise
Mission Authority Profile always records an Approval Governance Record
for it.¶
Direct self-approval by one authenticated human is the degenerate case: the Mission Record already carries it completely, and no record is required. This presumes that the human resolved the approval on the approval surface itself. Where an agent resolves it on its own behalf, there is no human decision for this list to be degenerate about ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]).¶
The following table gives an example approval for each trigger, and for the degenerate case. Each row names one trigger that holds; others can hold too.¶
| Approval | Trigger that holds |
|---|---|
| A manager approves a Mission whose Subject is Alice | The Approver differs from the Subject |
| Alice and a finance co-approver both approve | More than one principal contributes |
| A delegation-of-authority policy asserts alongside Alice (Section 5.5) | A non-human assertion contributes |
| A two-of-three finance rule decides the approval | A threshold rule is evaluated |
| An approver's authority comes from a delegation matrix held outside the Mission Record | Validating an assertion requires outside standing |
| Alice alone approves her own Mission on the approval surface | None; no record is required |
An Approval Governance Record is a JSON object. Section 5.1, Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 define its members. Section 6 and Section 8 define how the issuer builds and commits it, and Section 9 defines its integrity protection.¶
approval_event_id:REQUIRED. A string. The approval event's identifier, equal to the
Mission Record's approval_event_id
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
mission:REQUIRED. An object binding the record to the approved Mission:
issuer (the Mission Issuer), intent_hash, and authority_hash,
each equal to the Mission Record's member of the same name, an
integrity anchor recorded or implied
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A
record whose binding does not match the Mission Record it is retained
with is invalid.¶
approval_policy:REQUIRED. An object identifying the governing delegation-of-authority
policy: id (an identifier), version (a string), and digest (an
integrity anchor over the retained policy snapshot, in the encoded
form Section 2 fixes). Section 5.4
defines the digest and the snapshot's retention.¶
assertions:REQUIRED. An array of one or more decision assertions (Section 5.2).¶
evaluation:REQUIRED. An object recording the outcome, with these members:¶
decision:REQUIRED. A string. The only value a committed record carries is
approved, since a record exists only for an approval that
committed (Section 8).¶
evaluated_at:REQUIRED. An RFC 3339 timestamp.¶
contributing:REQUIRED. An array of the assertion_id values the evaluation
counted toward the rule the approval satisfied. A denial the
policy evaluated that did not block the approval is recorded but
not contributing, and a blocking denial leaves no committed record
(Section 8), so a deny assertion never appears in
contributing.¶
approval_context_commitment:OPTIONAL. A string. The Approval Context Commitment over the governed Mission's immutable creation facts (Section 16), in the encoded form Section 2 fixes. It is a member of this record, never of the Mission Record (Section 16.3). An issuer that records it computes it in the same commit that creates the Mission and persists this record, before the record is signed (Section 8), so the signed payload commits to it. A verifier checks it against the Mission Record (Section 9).¶
envelope:REQUIRED. An object. Integrity protection over the members above, in the form Section 9 defines.¶
Each element of assertions is an object with these members:¶
assertion_id:REQUIRED. A string, unique within the record.¶
principal:REQUIRED. An object with iss and sub: the principal in whose name
the assertion is made.¶
For a human assertion, the authenticated human who decided.¶
For a policy assertion, the human who approved the exact policy
version its authority names (where a consented root commits a
separate evaluator that decides, the human who approved that root),
as the issuer's retained, authenticated governance state records.
Where several humans approved that version together, as under dual
control, it is the one human that state names as accountable for the
approval, as the issuance profile records one accountable Approver
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Single Accountable
Approver"). The policy is the decision mechanism, never the
principal.¶
For a service assertion, the service that produced the decision.¶
kind:REQUIRED. A string, one of human, service, or policy.¶
decision:REQUIRED. A string, one of approve or deny.¶
decided_at:authority:REQUIRED. An object recording the provenance under which the principal
was authorized to decide. Its members depend on kind
(Section 5.3).¶
reason:OPTIONAL. A string.¶
The approval_policy.digest preimage is the issuance profile's
integrity-anchor envelope ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]),
canonicalized with JCS [RFC8785], with these members:¶
typ: mission-approval-policy, which domain-separates this anchor
from every other integrity anchor;¶
iss: the Mission Issuer, which prevents cross-issuer replay; and¶
value: an object of content_type (the snapshot's media type) and
content (the base64url, no-padding encoding of the snapshot bytes).¶
The snapshot bytes and their media type, or the referenced policy version they represent, MUST be retained for the Mission's audit horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so an independent auditor reproduces the digest exactly and re-checks the evaluation against the policy that governed it.¶
Threshold, quorum, veto, and separation-of-duty semantics live in the referenced policy; any human-readable summary of them in deployment tooling is advisory and carries no semantics in this record.¶
The following is an example of an Approval Governance Record. Its
Mission, msn_h8ucQfVYsc9ttvVWaQ2SN6ZKc5KLpUlj, is not the issuance
profile's example Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Mission Record Example"), but it shares that Mission's Intent
and Authority Set, and so its anchors.¶
{
"approval_event_id": "ape_hON9D0svLKQAMyy-uug",
"mission": {
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"intent_hash":
"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r0",
"authority_hash":
"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM"
},
"approval_policy": {
"id": "dlg-matrix",
"version": "v7",
"digest":
"sha-256:OAbEIh2DTYUVP7DjRhHct4aapsT8PybZq2ILdut9UP0"
},
"assertions": [
{ "assertion_id": "ast_1",
"principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"kind": "human", "decision": "approve",
"decided_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z",
"authority": { "acr": "urn:example:acr:phishing-resistant",
"amr": ["pwd", "hwk"],
"auth_time": "2026-11-02T07:59:00Z" } },
{ "assertion_id": "ast_2",
"principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_dC9yqLHPbadQRVw" },
"kind": "policy", "decision": "approve",
"decided_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z",
"authority": { "policy_id": "dlg-matrix", "version": "v7",
"approved_at": "2026-09-15T09:00:00Z" } }
],
"evaluation": {
"decision": "approved",
"evaluated_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z",
"contributing": ["ast_1", "ast_2"]
},
"envelope": {
"format": "jws-compact",
"value": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImFzLWtleS0y..."
}
}
¶
In this example:¶
The Mission Record's accountable approval_basis.consent_principal is
Alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR at https://idp.example.com). ast_1
is her own approve assertion, which satisfies the
accountable-approver rule of Section 6.2 directly.¶
ast_2 is a policy assertion in the name of the human who approved
dlg-matrix version v7 (user_dC9yqLHPbadQRVw). It is recorded
alongside the accountable assertion rather than in place of it.
Because a second principal and a non-human assertion contribute, the
second and third recording triggers hold (Section 4).¶
The envelope member's value is the JWS whose payload is the JCS
canonical bytes of this object with envelope itself removed
(Section 9).¶
These rules govern the assertions the issuer evaluates (Section 8).¶
The following rules apply to the assertions in a record:¶
Every assertion that contributes to the evaluation MUST be
authenticated: a human assertion with the authentication the
issuance profile requires of an Approver at an approval event, a
service or policy assertion through an integrity-protected channel
or signature the issuer verifies.¶
Every assertion MUST be bound to this approval event: an assertion is
made against this approval_event_id, this intent_hash, and this
authority_hash, and an assertion captured for one event MUST NOT be
replayed into another. An assertion that can narrow the authority,
such as a model output an activation consults, is made against the
authority_hash of the set it evaluated rather than of the narrowed
result; the issuer records that set with the activation's inputs, and
the committed Authority Set lies within it.¶
Every contributing assertion MUST be policy-authorized: before
counting it, the issuer verifies that the asserting principal was
eligible to assert under the referenced approval_policy version. For
a policy assertion, that means both that the policy its authority
names was eligible to decide under approval_policy and that its
principal was eligible to approve that policy version (or, where a
consented root commits a separate evaluator that decides, that root).¶
Denials and vetoes MUST be recorded: an assertion set that omits a negative assertion misrepresents the decision.¶
An assertion that fails authentication, event binding, or policy authorization MUST NOT contribute to the evaluation and MUST NOT be counted toward any policy rule.¶
The following example shows the assertions and evaluation members of
a record, other members omitted, whose delegation-of-authority policy
requires one finance approval beside the accountable approver's. Alice
approves directly; one finance approver approves and another denies.
Under that policy a finance denial does not block an approval that
another finance approver supports, so the denial is recorded but not
contributing.¶
{
"assertions": [
{ "assertion_id": "ast_1",
"principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"kind": "human", "decision": "approve",
"decided_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z",
"authority": {
"acr": "urn:example:acr:phishing-resistant",
"amr": ["pwd", "hwk"],
"auth_time": "2026-11-02T07:59:00Z" } },
{ "assertion_id": "ast_2",
"principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_t1yd3CZCLPOis5n" },
"kind": "human", "decision": "approve",
"decided_at": "2026-11-02T07:58:10Z",
"authority": {
"acr": "urn:example:acr:phishing-resistant",
"amr": ["pwd", "hwk"],
"auth_time": "2026-11-02T07:58:00Z" } },
{ "assertion_id": "ast_3",
"principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_Kq-iUUKDYl8jhWF" },
"kind": "human", "decision": "deny",
"decided_at": "2026-11-02T07:57:40Z",
"authority": {
"acr": "urn:example:acr:phishing-resistant",
"amr": ["pwd", "hwk"],
"auth_time": "2026-11-02T07:57:30Z" },
"reason": "Asks for a lower journal-entry cap." }
],
"evaluation": {
"decision": "approved",
"evaluated_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z",
"contributing": ["ast_1", "ast_2"]
}
}
¶
More than one principal contributes and a threshold rule is evaluated, so the second and fourth recording triggers hold (Section 4).¶
The accountable-approver rule ties a record to the Mission's one
accountable principal, the Mission Record's
approval_basis.consent_principal. The Mission's approval_basis.type
fixes how a record satisfies it:¶
For direct, the record MUST carry exactly one human assertion
whose principal is consent_principal and whose decision is
approve: the human decision a direct approval event carries
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Contributing policy and
service assertions do not replace it.¶
For governed_policy, the record MUST carry exactly one policy
assertion whose principal is consent_principal, whose decision
is approve, and whose authority names the deciding policy
(Section 13.2). The policy is the decision mechanism,
and the principal stays the human who approved it.¶
For any other named standing-consent approval_basis
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), the Mission satisfies the
rule through its authenticated approval_basis record, not through an
assertion: consent_principal, root_commitment, and approved_at,
fixed at the approval event and immutable, stand in for an accountable
assertion. The record can still carry contributing policy and
service assertions.¶
A record that does not satisfy the rule for its basis does not commit
(Section 8). The assertion that satisfies it under direct
or governed_policy is the accountable assertion; no other basis has
one. The accountable assertion's kind MUST be human or policy: a
service assertion, including one a model produced, is a contributing
governance input, never the accountable assertion. Under every basis,
the high-risk-class restrictions of Section 7.3 apply.¶
No assertion is fabricated in the name of the activating policy or the requesting actor to stand in for a fresh human decision that did not occur.¶
Where the Mission populates approval_basis.adjudication, the
accountable assertion's kind also equals adjudication.kind
(Section 3).¶
This section bounds staleness on the AGR policy assertion path: it
governs a policy assertion's authority.approved_at and the kind of
the accountable assertion (Section 6.2). It does not apply
to a human assertion, whose decided_at is the approval instant
itself.¶
A Recording Issuer that admits policy assertions MUST declare a
maximum policy-approval age per consequence class (a recency
ceiling) and a bounded clock-skew allowance, and MAY declare, per
class, an exception admitting a policy assertion as the
accountable assertion for that class, each exception carrying its own
maximum age.¶
The ceiling, the skew allowance, and any exception MUST be part of the
retained approval_policy snapshot that approval_policy.digest
commits (Section 5.4), or a separately versioned declaration
committed from that snapshot. A mutable, out-of-band deployment
statement MUST NOT serve this role: it would make the evaluation
impossible to reproduce, contrary to the purpose of the retained policy,
which lets an auditor re-run the decision (Section 5.4).¶
At evaluation, the issuer MUST classify the committed Mission's
consequence classes from the derived Authority Set and from any
consumption bound the Mission Intent carries
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]). The issuer MUST select,
across every class either source carries, the strictest maximum age that
applies, accounting for any declared exception. This is a property of
the whole committed Mission the record's mission.authority_hash and
mission.intent_hash bind to (Section 5.1), never of one
assertion or entry in isolation. For a class with a declared exception,
the maximum that applies is the smaller of that class's recency ceiling
and the exception's maximum age: an exception admits a policy
accountable assertion for its class and never lengthens the ceiling.¶
For each policy assertion the evaluation would count toward the
applicable maximum, the issuer:¶
uses the authority.approved_at it verified under
Section 5.3;¶
MUST measure the assertion's age as evaluation.evaluated_at minus
authority.approved_at, using the atomic-commitment instant
(Section 8);¶
MUST enforce authority.approved_at <= decided_at <=
evaluation.evaluated_at, subject to the declared clock-skew
allowance; and¶
MUST reject the assertion if authority.approved_at or decided_at
is later than the issuer's own clock at evaluation, beyond that
allowance.¶
A policy assertion whose age exceeds the applicable maximum, or whose
ordering the checks above do not admit, fails policy-authorization under
Section 6.1: the issuer MUST NOT count it toward the
evaluation, and by Section 8 the Mission MUST NOT be created
active on an evaluation that depended on it.¶
An evaluation.evaluated_at later than the issuer's own clock, beyond
the declared allowance, is a defect of the record rather than of one
assertion: the evaluation MUST NOT be treated as complete, and by
Section 8 the Mission MUST NOT be created active on it.¶
Four conditions are the high-risk classes the issuance profile defines:
irreversible action, external commitment, privileged administration, and
a consumption bound ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Where the
committed Mission's derived Authority Set or Mission Intent
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]) carries one, the assertion
satisfying the accountable-approver rule of Section 6.2
MUST be kind: human, unless a committed, class-named exception under
Section 7.1 admits kind: policy for that class.¶
Only governed_policy has a policy accountable assertion
(Section 6.2), so a governed policy activates a Mission
carrying one of these classes only under such an exception.¶
The same default binds a Mission whose accountable-approver rule is
satisfied through its own approval_basis record rather than an
assertion (Section 6.2): recording an AGR for such a
Mission carrying one of the four classes requires a committed,
class-named exception under Section 7.1; absent it, the
record MUST NOT be created and, by Section 8, the Mission
MUST NOT be created active.¶
Recency is issuance-time eligibility. It determines whether a Mission
activates and does not reach back into a Mission already active: that
Mission's governing policy approval was measured fresh at its own
approval event, and a later change to the ceiling, the exception, or the
policy's freshness does not narrow or terminate it.¶
An Approval Governance Record is historical evidence: it records who approved, under which policy, at the approval event, not current organizational standing. Whether a later change to an Approver's role, a delegation, or the governing policy affects an existing Mission is deployment policy. A deployment that makes reliance continue to depend on such an authority declares and enforces that dependency through the lifecycle operations or the runtime profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], Section "Authority Dependencies"); the recency rules above still govern only activation eligibility (Section 11.2).¶
Approval Governance is an optional extension (Section 1). The rules of Section 7 are a conservative default of this document, not a guarantee of every Mission-Bound Authorization deployment, and a deployment that records no Approval Governance Record is unbounded by them.¶
The kind: human requirement is not by itself an assurance property:
the authentication-strength, rendering, and accountable-principal
requirements the issuance profile and Section 6
otherwise impose still carry that property; Section 7
only decides which assertion kind MUST be present.¶
Section 7 bounds the AGR policy assertion path and,
by extension, a standing-consent Mission whose approval_basis record
stands in for that assertion (Section 6.2).¶
Standing-consent bases carry their own human-approval instant in
approval_basis.approved_at, traced through consent_principal and a
commitment (Section 12.1). The template profile's
template basis and the progressive profile's ceiling_drawdown basis
both populate it, and each profile declares its own maximum age against
it: review_cadence for template, and the ceiling review cadence for
progressive ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template],
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]).¶
Under governed_policy the two instants coincide:
approval_basis.approved_at equals the accountable policy assertion's
authority.approved_at (Section 13.2). This document's
ceiling therefore bounds that basis, alongside any standing-consent
recency ceiling the deployment declares
(Section 12.4).¶
The two recency paths are analogous, each bounding staleness against a retained human-approval instant, but they gate different things:¶
Where a deployment records the Approval Governance Record for an approval, the record and the Mission are one commit. Within that commit, the issuer:¶
evaluates them under the referenced policy version;¶
where the record carries approval_context_commitment
(Section 5.1), computes it from the Mission Record being
created;¶
persists the signed record in the same commit as the Mission's creation.¶
The only order the commit fixes is evaluate, then sign, then persist,
with approval_context_commitment computed before signing; the other
checks this document requires, including those of
Section 13.3, complete before signing, in whatever
order their inputs allow. A value of approval_context_commitment
computed after the commit is not covered by the record's signature and
MUST NOT be added to a committed record.¶
Where a deployment records the Approval Governance Record for an
approval, the Mission Record MUST NOT be created active unless the
evaluation's decision is approved and the signed record persists
atomically with the Mission's creation. Failure to authenticate the
contributing assertions, to complete the evaluation, or to persist the
record MUST prevent activation; there is no Mission whose governance
record was meant to exist and does not.¶
A governance evaluation that denies creates no Mission and no committed record. Negative assertions retained inside a committed record document dissent (Section 6.1), and a wholly declined approval's evidence surface is consent evidence's declined outcome ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]), which exists without a Mission Record.¶
A committed record is immutable. A subsequent governance action, such as a re-review or an incident finding, is a new record about a new event, never an edit.¶
The envelope member (Section 5.1) is an object with format (a
string, required) and value (a string, required). The default format
is jws-compact: a JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] over the JCS
[RFC8785] canonical bytes of the record with the envelope member
removed, signed by the Mission Issuer under a key resolvable in its
published key material. The signed record, envelope included, is the
retained, registrable form.¶
This document defines only the jws-compact format; an implementation
MUST reject an envelope whose format is unsupported rather than
accepting it unverified.¶
The JWS protected header MUST carry:¶
a kid resolvable in the Mission Issuer's published key material;¶
a typ of mission-approval-governance+jws; and¶
a cty of mission-approval-governance+json.¶
These values are the registered media types
application/mission-approval-governance+jws and
application/mission-approval-governance+json (Section 20) with the
application/ prefix omitted, as Sections 4.1.9 and 4.1.10 of
[RFC7515] recommend.¶
A verifier compares each value as a media type under those sections: it
treats a value that contains no / as if application/ were prepended,
and it compares type and subtype names case-insensitively. Neither media
type defines a parameter, so a value that carries one matches neither. A
verifier MUST accept either form of each value, and MUST reject a JWS
whose protected header lacks typ or cty, or whose typ or cty
does not match this pair. Normalization applies only to the comparison:
a verifier MUST NOT rewrite the signed header, the payload, or the
retained record, so the record digest below covers the record exactly as
signed and retained.¶
The following is the decoded JWS protected header of the envelope
value in Section 5.5:¶
{
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "as-key-2",
"typ": "mission-approval-governance+jws",
"cty": "mission-approval-governance+json"
}
¶
A verifier MUST perform the following steps, in order, and MUST NOT treat a record as verified if any step fails:¶
Resolve the Mission Issuer's signing key from the JWS protected
kid in its published key material.¶
Verify the JWS signature and protected header against that key.¶
Compute the JCS canonical bytes of the outer record with the
envelope member removed.¶
Require byte-for-byte equality between the decoded JWS payload and the canonical bytes of step 3, rejecting the record on any difference. The signature authenticates only its own embedded payload; a record that differs from that payload is unauthenticated regardless of whether the signature itself verifies.¶
Validate the mission binding of Section 5.1 against the Mission Record it is retained with.¶
Where the record carries approval_context_commitment, the mission
member carries no Mission id, so a verifier recomputes the commitment
from the Mission Record this record is retained with, which step 5
resolves, and rejects the reference on a mismatch
(Section 16.3).¶
The record digest is the digest, in the encoded form
Section 2 fixes, over the JCS [RFC8785]
canonical bytes of the complete record, envelope included. It is the
one byte sequence every external reference names:¶
audit registration hashes exactly these bytes (Section 15); and¶
consent evidence's approval_governance_digest equals exactly this
value (Section 14).¶
A Relying Auditor re-checks an evaluation by replaying it from retained evidence: the policy and any evaluator that decided, the inputs they evaluated, and the recorded assertions. Conformance requires it to obtain the retained policy version before treating the evaluation as re-checked (Section 17). The re-check has these steps:¶
Obtain the retained snapshot of the approval_policy version the
record names, and recompute approval_policy.digest over it
(Section 5.4).¶
Where that snapshot commits a separate evaluator that decides, as a
governed_policy root can (Section 13.1), obtain the
retained snapshot of that evaluator and recompute its activation
policy reference digest (Section 12.3).¶
Obtain the inputs the deciding policy or evaluator evaluated, as the
issuer recorded them (Section 12.5). These include each
model output in full, with its verdict and any narrowing, which the
matching service assertion records only by identifier. Confirm that
each input carries this record's approval_event_id, the Mission's
intent_hash, and the authority_hash of the set recorded as
evaluated, and that each contributing service assertion corresponds
to one of them.¶
Re-run the deciding policy or evaluator, at its exact version, over
those inputs and the recorded assertions, and confirm that it
approves, counting exactly the assertions contributing lists
(Section 5.1).¶
Apply the recency rules of Section 7, as the
snapshot or the declaration it commits states them, with
evaluation.evaluated_at as the evaluation instant.¶
Where a snapshot, the evaluator, or an input cannot be obtained, a recomputed digest does not match, a binding does not hold, or the replay reaches a different outcome, the evaluation is not re-checked.¶
A re-check does not re-authenticate an assertion: the record carries an assertion's authentication context (Section 5.3), not the authentication itself.¶
A Relying Auditor that holds a record and an authenticated Mission reference, but not the Mission Record or the evaluation's inputs, can run the portable approval-binding check. It establishes that the record and the reference agree on the approval event and the Mission anchors. It is a separate procedure from verifying the record against the Mission Record (Section 9) and from re-checking the evaluation (Section 10), and replaces neither; a Relying Auditor MUST NOT report its success as either.¶
A Mission reference is an artifact, authenticated under its own rules,
that discloses the Mission's approval_event_id, issuer,
intent_hash, and authority_hash. A Mandate that carries
approval_event_id is one
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate]).¶
A verifier running the check MUST complete these steps:¶
Authenticate both artifacts. For the record, complete steps 1 to 4
of Section 9; for the reference, apply its own artifact rules.
The verifier MUST establish trust in the key material of the
expected Mission Issuer for both: an issuer the artifact asserts
for itself, with a valid signature, is not thereby trusted. The
record's mission.issuer MUST be that expected Mission Issuer,
since the issuer the record names is the one that signs it
(Section 9).¶
Require the event and the anchors. The authenticated reference MUST
disclose approval_event_id, the Mission issuer, intent_hash,
and authority_hash, and each MUST equal the record's
approval_event_id or the member of the same name in the record's
mission binding. The reference's own consistency rules still
apply; a Mandate's iss equals its mission.issuer. Matching
intent_hash and authority_hash never suffice without a matching
approval-event identifier, since two Missions can share both.¶
Compare the Approval Context Commitment. Each
approval_context_commitment an artifact carries MUST be
well-formed, whether or not the other artifact carries one. When
both carry it, the two values MUST be equal. When one or neither
carries it, the check can succeed, and its result MUST state that
commitment agreement was not established. Equality
establishes agreement on the commitment value only; recomputing it
from the Mission's creation facts is a separate check
(Section 16.3).¶
A value the check compares, each anchor and each disclosed commitment, is well-formed only in the encoded form Section 2 fixes: a recognized algorithm prefix, then the unpadded base64url encoding of a digest of that algorithm's length, whose text re-encodes to exactly the same characters. A value that decodes but does not re-encode to itself, for example one with nonzero padding bits, is malformed.¶
The check has three outcomes:¶
Success: every step completes.¶
Failure: an authentication failure, a malformed required value or disclosed commitment, or a mismatch in step 1, step 2, or step 3.¶
Insufficient evidence: an absent artifact, or a value step 2 requires that the reference does not disclose.¶
When the evidence both fails a step and is insufficient for another, the outcome is failure: a disclosed mismatch or malformed value is definitive, whatever else is undisclosed.¶
A verifier MUST NOT report a successful portable binding on failure or on insufficient evidence.¶
A success establishes only this: the trusted Mission Issuer authenticated this record, and its approval-event identifier and Mission anchors match those the supplied Mission reference authenticates. It does not establish:¶
that the evaluation was correct, or that its assertions are independently true (Section 10);¶
that the retained Mission Record matches either artifact (Section 9);¶
that an individual action under the Mission was approved, was within its authority, or was executed;¶
that the Mission is still active;¶
that either artifact existed at a claimed earlier time, or that the issuer showed every Relying Auditor a consistent view; or¶
that the presented record is the one another party retained earlier: pinning exact record bytes in a portable artifact is a separate mechanism.¶
A company approves a Mission to purchase office supplies within set
limits. The approval event creates the Mission. The Mission Issuer
signs an Approval Governance Record for that event, recording the
governance assertions and the approval outcome, and later mints a
Mandate that identifies the Mission and approval event and carries
the same intent_hash and authority_hash.¶
The purchasing agent then submits a purchase order, and the company's ERP records its own business decision for that order, naming the order, the policy version it applied, the decision, and its time. The ERP's decision record is illustrative; this document defines no format for it.¶
An auditor receives the governance record and the Mandate through an authorized evidence export (Section 19), without the Mission Record or the evaluation's inputs. The check connects the governance record to the approval event the Mandate identifies. It does not show that the purchase order was individually approved, within authority, or executed: relating the ERP's decision to the order takes separate action evidence. A Mission scoped to approving one particular order could itself carry that business decision, but the auditor has to establish that scope, for example from the Authority Set; an approval-event match never implies it.¶
Continuing the example above, the purchasing officer who approved the Mission transfers to another role before the purchase order is placed. The governance record records her approval in every deployment below; what her transfer changes depends on each deployment's policy:¶
An organizational decision. The Mission commits the company to the approved purchasing. It stays effective until fulfillment, expiry, or withdrawal, and her transfer changes nothing the agent relies on.¶
A personal delegation. The Mission delegates the officer's own purchasing authority, and the deployment declares a dependency on her holding it. When the authoritative directory records her transfer, the dependency is withdrawn at its source; within the deployment's declared bound, further orders under the Mission are refused.¶
A required accountable owner. The deployment requires an eligible owner for the work. Her transfer suspends the Mission until a successor accepts responsibility through an authorized process, recorded separately from the governance record. That acceptance permits an authorized resumption, subject to the remaining checks; the successor does not become the approver of the original approval event.¶
This section is a contract for standing-consent approval bases: the bases themselves, their instances, the activation policy commitment, standing-consent recency, and policy adjudication. A profile that defines a standing-consent basis for the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) and adopts this Contract conforms to it, and so does an issuer that activates a Mission under such a basis (Section 17). The issuance profile's own requirements on every standing-consent basis ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission-Creating Paths") apply whether or not a profile adopts this Contract. It is adoptable on its own: it neither requires nor implies recording an Approval Governance Record, and none of its requirements depends on one.¶
A companion profile can generalize approval to a named standing-consent
basis. Under it, a template or policy activates Mission instances
against an accountable human's earlier approval, with no fresh human
approval per instance; each instance is still created at its own
approval event ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission
Approval"). The companion profile defines the basis's
approval_basis.type value ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Principals and Approval Basis");
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture] (Section "Mission
Invariants") lists the standing-consent bases that companion profiles
define. The type values form a specification-defined namespace with no
registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Namespace
Taxonomy"): each further basis is defined by the companion profile that
introduces it.¶
An unrecognized type or adjudication.kind is handled as
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Principals and Approval
Basis") states for every record consumer.¶
A companion profile defining a standing-consent type MUST make its
consent_principal and root_commitment trace to an accountable
human's approval of the named standing consent, with no fresh human
approval per instance, MUST carry that approval's instant as
approved_at, and MUST state what the record's approval_event_id
carries for an instance it activates. That value identifies this
instance's approval event, never the standing approval, so a retried
activation deduplicates and each distinct activation creates its own
Mission.¶
A standing-consent basis carries the following approval_basis members
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Principals and
Approval Basis"):¶
activation:REQUIRED for every standing-consent type. An object naming what
activated this Mission instance, in the shape that the basis's
companion profile defines.¶
activation_actor:REQUIRED for every standing-consent type. An object with iss
and sub. Who or what triggered this instance: a dispatching or
requesting party distinct from the consenting human.¶
root_commitment:REQUIRED for every standing-consent type. A string. The
commitment to the consented root: an integrity anchor where the
root is a committed object, otherwise the committed reference that
identifies it.¶
approved_at:REQUIRED for every standing-consent type. An RFC 3339 date-time:
the instant the accountable human approved the exact consented root
that root_commitment commits (the template version, the drawdown
policy version), not the instant this Mission instance was
activated. The activating issuer MUST verify approved_at against
its retained, authenticated record of that standing consent for
that exact version; it MUST NOT accept the value as the activating
request's own uncorroborated assertion.¶
Under a standing-consent basis (Section 12.1), the standing consent and the instance's adjudication supply the human decision that a direct approval event makes in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (Section "Direct Approval Steps"): the Approver's authentication (step 1), the Approver's authorization for the Subject and the authority source (steps 2 and 3), and the consent rendering (step 5). The other creation rules still bind the instance's approval event wherever they apply:¶
the Subject is never taken from unauthenticated client input and is mapped injectively (step 2; [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Subject Establishment");¶
the authority source and its ceiling ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Authority Sources");¶
the effective expiry and its creation-commit check (steps 4 and 7);¶
the integrity anchors (step 6); and¶
atomic creation deduplicated on approval_event_id
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Record").¶
Where a standing-consent basis lets a separate policy artifact
adjudicate activation (a dispatch, drawdown, or child-creation policy,
rather than the consented object itself), the object the accountable
human consented to MUST carry that policy as an activation policy
reference: an object of id (a string), version (a string), and
digest. The digest is an integrity anchor
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Integrity Anchors")
whose typ is mission-activation-policy, whose iss is the
activating issuer, and whose value is an object of content_type, the
media type of the policy snapshot, and content, the base64url,
no-padding [RFC4648] encoding of the snapshot's exact bytes. Before
each activation, the activating issuer MUST compute digest over the
exact snapshot it evaluates, and MUST NOT activate the instance under
that policy when the result differs; the companion profile fixes what
follows, as it does for an activation the policy does not authorize. The
issuer MUST retain each snapshot's bytes and media type for the audit
horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Audit
Horizon") of every Mission it activates under that snapshot, so an
auditor can reproduce the digest. Where no separate policy artifact
exists, as when child creation is adjudicated against the approved
delegation entry itself, this rule does not apply.¶
A deployment can declare a maximum
standing-consent age (a recency ceiling), overall or per
consequence class. Where a declared ceiling applies, the activating
issuer MUST refuse to activate an instance whose approved_at is
older than the ceiling. Where ceilings are declared:¶
The evaluation instant is the atomic Mission-creation commit ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Approval"), including the creation commit of a deferred or relocated flow. Recency is issuance-time eligibility only: a later change to a ceiling, or the passage of time past one, does not terminate an active Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Revocation").¶
The activating issuer MUST refuse an approved_at later than
the evaluation instant by more than the deployment's declared,
bounded clock-skew allowance.¶
Where ceilings are declared per consequence class, the issuer MUST classify the committed Mission from the derived Authority Set and from any consumption bound the Mission Intent carries (for example, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]), and MUST apply the strictest ceiling across every class present.¶
The ceilings and the skew allowance belong to the versioned
policy that policy_version identifies, or to a separately
versioned declaration retained with it, so an auditor can
reproduce the eligibility decision. A deployment declaring ceilings
therefore depends on versioned derivation-policy identification,
which makes policy_version required in its Mission Records
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Provenance and
Expiry").¶
The adjudication member ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Principals and Approval Basis"), where present, follows the
basis. Where a companion profile defining a standing-consent type
populates adjudication, kind MUST be policy, naming the identity
and version of the policy or workflow that adjudicated the instance. A
companion profile MUST NOT flatten a policy's or an Approval Governance
Record's assertion set into a single principal member.¶
For kind: policy, adjudication carries policy, a REQUIRED object
with id and version identifying the deciding policy or workflow.
It decides deterministically over recorded inputs, so re-evaluating
that version over them re-checks the decision. A model's output can
be one such input, recorded with the model's identifier and version:
it can refuse an activation or narrow the authority it activates, and
the AS MUST NOT let it supply or widen authority. A model is never
itself the deciding policy or workflow.¶
This document defines the governed_policy standing-consent basis,
which meets the Approval Basis Contract (Section 12).
An accountable human approves a bounded
policy version once; that policy then activates eligible Mission
proposals with no fresh human decision per instance. Every activation
under this basis MUST record an Approval Governance Record, committed
with the Mission (Section 8).¶
The consented root is the retained approval_policy snapshot that a
human approved (Section 5.4). It commits:¶
the clients, Subjects, and authority sources that can activate under it;¶
the authority ceiling and the lifetime limits of each activated Mission;¶
the deterministic rules that decide an activation;¶
the recency ceilings, the clock-skew allowance, and any class-named exceptions of Section 7; and¶
where a separate policy artifact decides instances, that artifact's activation policy reference (Section 12.3).¶
The root decides whether an instance activates. It is distinct from
an organizational authority source's authority_source.policy,
which bounds whose authority the Mission draws on
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
The issuer MUST establish the standing consent, the consenting human, and that human's approval of the exact root version from retained, authenticated governance state, never from the activating request: a submitted proposal cannot supply its own standing consent.¶
The root and a separate evaluator keep distinct digest domains:
approval_policy.digest commits the root under typ
mission-approval-policy (Section 5.4), and the activation
policy reference commits the evaluator under typ
mission-activation-policy. The issuer MUST NOT accept either digest in
place of the other.¶
A Mission activated under this basis records these approval_basis
members ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), each REQUIRED:¶
type:governed_policy.¶
consent_principal:The human who approved the exact root version.¶
approved_at:The instant of that approval, verified against retained, authenticated state (Section 12.1).¶
root_commitment:The root's approval_policy.digest; the record's own
approval_policy is that root.¶
activation:An object of approval_event_id, equal to the Mission's own
approval_event_id, and policy, an object of the deciding
policy's id, version, and digest.¶
activation_actor:The authenticated client that requested this activation, distinct
from consent_principal.¶
adjudication:kind policy, with policy naming the deciding policy's id
and version, and governance_record true.¶
The deciding policy is the root itself or the separate evaluator the
root commits, never another policy. Its digest in activation.policy
is approval_policy.digest when the root decides, and the
evaluator's mission-activation-policy digest when the evaluator
decides.¶
The instance's approval_event_id identifies this activation's approval
event, never the human's approval of the root. The issuer allocates one
per proposal it activates, so a retried or concurrent activation of the
same proposal resolves to one Mission and one record, and each distinct
activation creates its own Mission.¶
The record's accountable assertion (Section 6) MUST
be a policy assertion whose principal is consent_principal and
whose authority names the deciding policy's id and version with
approved_at equal to approval_basis.approved_at. Like every
contributing assertion, it is authenticated and bound to this
approval event. It records the policy's decision under that human's
standing authorization, not a fresh human action.¶
At the atomic creation commit (Section 8), the issuer
MUST, before it creates the Mission active:¶
Resolve the standing consent from retained, authenticated state and confirm that it still admits new activations.¶
Verify that the consenting human was authorized to approve the
exact root version and approved it at approved_at, and recompute
approval_policy.digest over the retained snapshot.¶
Where the root commits a separate evaluator, recompute that evaluator's digest over the exact snapshot evaluated (Section 12.3).¶
Establish the Subject and the authority source as the issuance profile requires, and verify that the requesting client, the Subject, and the source are ones the root admits.¶
Derive the Authority Set under the issuance profile's derivation and authority-proposal rules, within the source's ceiling and the root's authority ceiling, and bound the effective expiry by the Mission Intent and the root's lifetime limits.¶
Evaluate the deciding policy, at its exact version, over recorded inputs.¶
Apply the policy-approval recency rules (Section 7) across the whole derived Mission, including any consumption bound, so a high-risk class activates only under a committed, class-named exception.¶
Bind every assertion and the record to this instance's
approval_event_id, intent_hash, and authority_hash
(Section 6.1, Section 5.1), except that a model
output binds to the authority_hash of the set it evaluated.¶
Sign the record and commit it with the active Mission
(Section 8).¶
A failure at any step creates no Mission and issues no credential.¶
A model's output enters only as a recorded input at step 6: it can refuse an activation or narrow the authority activated, and never supplies authority or decides the approval (Section 12.5; [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Derivation Modes").¶
Withdrawing the standing consent stops every later activation under it (step 1). A Mission already activated keeps its ordinary lifecycle: withdrawal does not revoke it.¶
The following example shows an excerpt, other members omitted, of the
Mission Record of msn_UDgovqrOTIZyJgTEp0DjopwF2gRseSfT, activated
under governed_policy. Alice approved the policy q3-close-agent
version 3 at 2026-10-30T16:00:00Z. The client s6BhdRkqt3 later
proposed the task of the issuance profile's Mission Record Example, and
the policy activated it at 2026-11-02T08:00:00Z with no fresh human
decision. The Mission shares that example Mission's Intent and Authority
Set, and so its anchors. The policy digest stands for a policy snapshot
this example does not display.¶
{
"id": "msn_UDgovqrOTIZyJgTEp0DjopwF2gRseSfT",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"subject": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"approval_basis": {
"type": "governed_policy",
"consent_principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"approved_at": "2026-10-30T16:00:00Z",
"root_commitment":
"sha-256:nw0FRGuMWUqNMS9BwKpEpqcvZwwO9DGrrujtlMNTAJU",
"activation": {
"approval_event_id": "ape_7d2sUfnZmgimG0bc67hu",
"policy": { "id": "q3-close-agent", "version": "3",
"digest":
"sha-256:nw0FRGuMWUqNMS9BwKpEpqcvZwwO9DGrrujtlMNTAJU" } },
"activation_actor": { "iss": "https://as.example.com",
"sub": "s6BhdRkqt3" },
"adjudication": { "kind": "policy",
"policy": { "id": "q3-close-agent", "version": "3" },
"governance_record": true }
},
"authority_source": { "type": "user_delegated" },
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"approval_event_id": "ape_7d2sUfnZmgimG0bc67hu",
"created_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z"
}
¶
The following is an example of the Approval Governance Record committed with that Mission:¶
{
"approval_event_id": "ape_7d2sUfnZmgimG0bc67hu",
"mission": {
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"intent_hash":
"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r0",
"authority_hash":
"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM"
},
"approval_policy": {
"id": "q3-close-agent",
"version": "3",
"digest":
"sha-256:nw0FRGuMWUqNMS9BwKpEpqcvZwwO9DGrrujtlMNTAJU"
},
"assertions": [
{ "assertion_id": "ast_1",
"principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"kind": "policy", "decision": "approve",
"decided_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z",
"authority": { "policy_id": "q3-close-agent", "version": "3",
"approved_at": "2026-10-30T16:00:00Z" } }
],
"evaluation": {
"decision": "approved",
"evaluated_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z",
"contributing": ["ast_1"]
},
"envelope": {
"format": "jws-compact",
"value": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImFzLWtleS0y..."
}
}
¶
In this example:¶
The root decides activations itself, with no separate evaluator, so
root_commitment, activation.policy.digest, and
approval_policy.digest carry one value (Section 13.2).¶
The client s6BhdRkqt3 requested the activation. It is the
activation_actor, distinct from the consent_principal, Alice.¶
ast_1 is the accountable assertion: a policy assertion whose
principal is Alice and whose approved_at equals
approval_basis.approved_at (Section 13.2). Because a
non-human assertion contributes, the third recording trigger also
holds (Section 4).¶
The root declares a 30-day recency ceiling for every consequence
class, a 60-second clock-skew allowance, and an exception that admits
a policy accountable assertion for irreversible actions, with a
maximum age of 7 days (Section 7.1). The issuer
classifies journal-entries.write as an irreversible action and finds
no other high-risk class, so the exception applies and the strictest
applicable maximum is 7 days (Section 7.2).¶
At evaluated_at, ast_1 is 2 days and 16 hours old, and
approved_at <= decided_at <= evaluated_at holds, so the issuer
counts it. Without the exception, the accountable assertion would have
to be kind: human, and the policy could not activate this Mission
(Section 7.3).¶
Where both are recorded, the AGR is authoritative for approval-governance facts, and consent evidence presents a deliberately partial view of it ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]). Agreement is testable, member by member:¶
Each co_approvals entry MUST correspond to exactly one human
assertion in the record with the same principal, the entry's
decision equal to the assertion's decision, and the entry's
timestamp equal to the assertion's decided_at. Omitting an assertion
is permitted; an entry with no corresponding assertion, or one that
alters a decision or time, is an integrity failure. Assertions of kind
service or policy are governance inputs, never consent events, and
are never presented as co-approvals.¶
The consent evidence approver MUST equal the principal of the
record's accountable assertion (Section 6.2); for a
standing-consent Mission whose accountable-approver rule is
satisfied by approval_basis rather than an assertion, it MUST
equal approval_basis.consent_principal instead.¶
approval_authority, when present, MUST equal
approval_policy.id; approval_policy_version, when present,
MUST equal approval_policy.version.¶
approval_governance_digest, when present, MUST equal the record
digest (Section 9).¶
The AGR governs on any disagreement.¶
The following example shows the members of a Consent Evidence object that correspond to the record in Section 5.5, other members omitted:¶
{
"approver": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"approval_authority": "dlg-matrix",
"approval_policy_version": "v7",
"approval_governance_digest":
"sha-256:j6eaQoHcHpH-fntRE1DkZgCDjBZZLxXrCwpHfTWCWnQ"
}
¶
The approver member is the principal of the accountable assertion,
ast_1. There is no co_approvals member: the record's only other
assertion, ast_2, is a policy assertion, which is never presented as
a co-approval. The approval_governance_digest value stands for the
record digest of the complete record, whose envelope value that
example abbreviates.¶
Where a deferred approval revises under Mission Approval Revision
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval-revision]) and the
deployment records consent evidence, each revision_required outcome
produces a narrowed consent-evidence decision with no corresponding
record: no Mission yet exists for the atomic commitment rule
(Section 8) to attach to. This is a deliberate artifact
separation, not an authority conflict:¶
The AGR is registrable Mission evidence under the audit transparency profile's evidence-type pattern ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]), with:¶
canonical bytes: the JCS canonical bytes of the complete record,
envelope included, which are the record-digest preimage
(Section 9);¶
payload-preimage-content-type:
application/mission-approval-governance+json; and¶
authoritative producer: the Mission issuer.¶
Registration is optional transparency hardening; retention and immutability do not depend on it.¶
This section defines an OPTIONAL profile: one commitment over a Mission's immutable creation facts, so an artifact that authenticates a reference to it can be checked against another authenticated artifact's reference to the same Mission without either re-deriving the other's fields. Adopting this profile is independent of whether a deployment records an Approval Governance Record for a given Mission.¶
The Approval Context Manifest is a closed, enumerated v1 object built from Mission Record members ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Each member copies the Mission Record member of the same name, verbatim, except:¶
approver copies the Mission Record's
approval_basis.consent_principal; and¶
submission_evidence_commitment is computed from the Mission Record's
submission_evidence (Section 16.2); and¶
intent_hash, authority_hash, and proposal_hash take the
Mission Record's integrity anchor of the same name, recorded or
implied ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Approved Content and Commitments"): a recorded anchor is
copied verbatim, and an omitted one is its implied value, the same
bytes.¶
A conditional member is present if and only if its condition holds:¶
| Member | Presence |
|---|---|
issuer
|
always |
id
|
always |
intent_hash
|
always |
proposal_hash
|
when the Mission Record carries proposed_authority
|
authority_hash
|
always |
ceiling_hash
|
when the Mission Record carries ceiling_hash
|
subject
|
always |
approver
|
always |
client_id
|
always |
created_at
|
always |
expires_at
|
always |
approval_basis
|
always |
authority_source
|
always |
policy_version
|
always |
approval_event_id
|
always |
submission_evidence_commitment
|
when the Mission Record carries submission_evidence
|
policy_version is always present because this profile depends on
versioned derivation-policy identification, which makes the member
required in the Mission Record of a deployment that uses it
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Provenance and
Expiry").¶
The presence of every conditional member MUST be a deterministic function of the Mission Record alone, never of which companion profiles a deployment runs: two parties holding the same record compute the same manifest.¶
The ceiling_hash member is the manifest's fourth anchor alongside
intent_hash, proposal_hash, and authority_hash: the manifest MUST
include ceiling_hash when the Mission Record carries one and MUST omit
it when the Mission Record carries none. The manifest copies the
recorded value verbatim, so computing or verifying the manifest never
computes ceiling_hash. Its
construction and semantics belong to the Progressive profile
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]), and adopting this
Approval Context Commitment profile does not require adopting
Progressive.¶
The manifest excludes the Mission Record's mutable members, state
and termination, and every value that is not itself a member of the
immutable record: a running derivation count, and a containment or
discharge state a companion profile tracks outside the record. This
is not a separate exclusion rule; it follows from building the
manifest from Mission Record members only.¶
The manifest is an envelope anchor under the issuance profile's
commitment mechanisms, which this document imports normatively
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): typ is
mission-approval-context-v1, iss is the Mission issuer, and
value is the manifest object of Section 16.1. The
result, approval_context_commitment, is one sha-256:-prefixed
string.¶
submission_evidence_commitment is a second envelope anchor under
the same mechanism, present only when the Mission Record carries
submission_evidence: typ is mission-submission-evidence-v1,
iss is the Mission issuer, and value is the recorded
submission_evidence array exactly as retained, preserving its
canonical element order ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
An issuer computes approval_context_commitment on demand from the
Mission's immutable creation facts, fixed at the approval event
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). This document adds no
Mission Record member for it; an Approval Governance Record MAY carry
it as a member of its own signed record (Section 5), which is a
disclosure of the computed value, not a second place the Mission
Record holds it. A deployment MAY cache the computed
value; a cached value is derived state and MUST NOT be treated as
authoritative where it disagrees with a fresh computation from the
record.¶
A verifier that recomputes approval_context_commitment from the
Mission's immutable creation facts and obtains a value different from
the one an artifact discloses MUST reject that artifact's reference
as invalid. The recompute always uses this document's fixed typ,
mission-approval-context-v1; a value some other party committed
under a different typ recomputes to a different digest under this
rule and is rejected the same way (Appendix A,
vector 6).¶
The member list of Section 16.1 is closed for
mission-approval-context-v1. Adding, removing, or redefining a
member, or changing how submission_evidence_commitment is
constructed, MUST use a new typ, never a silent reinterpretation of
this one. Taking an integrity anchor's implied value
(Section 16.1) yields the bytes the record would
carry and redefines no member.¶
Reusing the issuance profile's commitment mechanisms supplies canonicalization and algorithm identification and agility. It supplies nothing else:¶
No authenticity. The commitment is an unkeyed digest over Mission Record fields held under the same trust as the record itself. An issuer that can rewrite the record can recompute a matching commitment; authentication comes entirely from the signature of whichever artifact discloses the commitment, never from the digest construction.¶
No approval-time existence. A matching commitment shows the disclosed facts are internally consistent with the retained record. It does not show the facts were true, or that an approval occurred, at the time claimed.¶
No selective disclosure. The commitment is a flat digest over the complete manifest object; proving anything about one member requires disclosing the whole object.¶
approval_context_commitment MAY appear as a signed member of an
artifact that already authenticates a reference to the Mission, for
example this document's own Approval Governance Record
(Section 5) or a Consent Evidence object
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]), or under
an introspection caller's member-scoped disclosure privilege, the
same privilege that already gates proposal_hash
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
approval_context_commitment MUST NOT be carried on a Mission-bound
access token's baseline mission claim
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) or on a credential-bound
Mission descriptor a companion profile mints for correlation, for
example the Mission Authority Server's Join Assertion
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]): each already
fixes its own minimal member set, and this commitment is correlation
and evidence metadata, never authority.¶
A Recording Issuer MUST:¶
authenticate, event-bind, and policy-authorize every contributing assertion (Section 6.1);¶
record denials (Section 6.1);¶
satisfy the accountable-approver rule for the Mission's approval
basis: exactly one matching human assertion under direct, exactly
one matching policy assertion under governed_policy, and the
authenticated approval_basis under any other standing-consent basis
(Section 6.2);¶
enforce the strictest applicable policy-approval maximum age across the consequence classes the committed Mission's derived Authority Set and Mission Intent carry, from a committed ceiling and any committed exception (Section 7);¶
where the committed Mission's derived Authority Set or Mission Intent
carries a high-risk class, require a human accountable assertion
unless a committed class-named exception applies, and require such an
exception for a basis without an accountable assertion
(Section 7.3);¶
under governed_policy, record the members of
Section 13.2 and complete the activation checks of
Section 13.3;¶
commit the record atomically with Mission creation and let failure prevent activation (Section 8);¶
sign the evaluated record before it is committed, and keep the committed record immutable (Section 8, Section 9); and¶
retain the record and the referenced policy for the Mission's audit horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
A profile that defines a standing-consent basis and adopts the Approval Basis Contract, and an issuer that activates a Mission under such a basis, conform to that Contract (Section 12). That conformance is independent of the Recording Issuer and Relying Auditor roles: it neither requires nor implies recording an Approval Governance Record.¶
A Relying Auditor MUST verify the envelope by byte equality, MUST validate the mission binding, and MUST obtain the retained policy version before treating the evaluation as re-checked (Section 9, Section 5.4, Section 10). A Relying Auditor that holds no Mission Record can run the portable approval-binding check instead, under its own rules and with its narrower result (Section 11).¶
The security considerations of the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) apply. The following considerations are specific to the Approval Governance Record.¶
A forged or padded assertion is an authorization attack before commitment, not an audit defect: the assertion requirements of Section 6 are the control, and a deployment that records assertions without authenticating them has built an approval bypass rather than an evidence trail.¶
Without approval_policy.digest and its retention, a later reading
cannot prove which policy governed the evaluation. The digest and
the audit-horizon retention of Section 5.4 are the control.¶
The accountable-approver rule of Section 6.2 prevents a
set of service and policy assertions from claiming a Mission whose named
Approver never asserted anything. Because that assertion is never
service, a model-backed service cannot become the accountable
approver: no human-approved policy stands behind its decision, so it
contributes only as a governance input.¶
Without Section 7, a policy assertion could rely
on a human approval far in the past, or stand in for the accountable
approver on a high-risk consequence with no human assertion at all.
The recency ceiling, its ordering checks, and the human-by-default
consequence-class rule are the control.¶
The issuer-signed envelope of Section 9 makes post-commit tampering detectable. Audit registration (Section 15) additionally bounds issuer-side substitution, since a registered record's later alteration diverges from its receipt.¶
The Approval Context Commitment extends this to the Mission Record's creation facts, approval basis included. A verifier that recomputes it and gets a value different from the one an artifact discloses rejects that artifact's reference (Section 16.3). A mismatch shows only that the artifact and the current record disagree. The artifact's signature authenticates the value it discloses, not when it was made, since the issuer can backdate a signed artifact. Where an audit receipt (Section 15) independently shows that the artifact existed before the record changed, and the disclosed value matches a recomputation from the approval event as registered, the mismatch is evidence that the record was altered afterwards.¶
This document inherits the issuance profile's key-material considerations. A compromised Mission Issuer signing key can mint a plausible record; audit registration ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]) is the existence bound, not a substitute for key custody.¶
The privacy considerations of the issuance profile
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) apply. Assertion principals and
decision times are personal data about reviewers. The record is
control-plane state retained by the issuer, never disclosed on a
protocol wire surface. Access to a retained record, including an
authorized evidence export or an evidence bundle supplied to a
Relying Auditor (Section 11), follows the issuer's audit-log
discipline for approval-event records
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); this document defines no
endpoint and no default disclosure for it. The
approval_context_commitment value is the same in every artifact that
discloses it, so it correlates those artifacts
(Section 16.5). A service assertion's authority
discloses the identifiers and versions of the logic and model that took
part in a decision (Section 5.3).¶
IANA is requested to register two media types per [RFC6838]:¶
application/mission-approval-governance+jws, the JWS-secured
representation that a record's envelope carries, using the +jws
structured syntax suffix; and¶
application/mission-approval-governance+json, the Approval
Governance Record object.¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: mission-approval-governance+jws¶
Required parameters: none¶
Optional parameters: none¶
Encoding considerations: binary; a JWS Compact Serialization:
base64url-encoded values separated by period characters. The
secured payload's media type travels in the JWS protected cty
(Section 9).¶
Security considerations: see Section 18¶
Interoperability considerations: see this document (Section 9)¶
Published specification: this document¶
Applications that use this media type: Mission-Bound Authorization approval governance¶
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A¶
Additional information:¶
Person & email address to contact for further information: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage: none¶
Author: IETF¶
Change controller: IETF¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: mission-approval-governance+json¶
Required parameters: none¶
Optional parameters: none¶
Encoding considerations: binary; JSON encoded in UTF-8¶
Security considerations: see Section 18¶
Interoperability considerations: see this document¶
Published specification: this document¶
Applications that use this media type: Mission-Bound Authorization issuers and audit deployments¶
Fragment identifier considerations: same as for application/json¶
Additional information:¶
Person & email address to contact for further information: Karl McGuinness public@karlmcguinness.com¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage: none¶
Author: IETF¶
Change controller: IETF¶
These non-normative vectors let an implementation verify its manifest
and commitment computation byte for byte, the same discipline as the
issuance profile's own Integrity Anchor Test Vectors
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). All use the issuer
https://as.example.com. Every canonical-bytes block is the exact
JCS [RFC8785] output, shown wrapped only for layout; remove the
layout line breaks, adding no characters, to recover the single-line
canonical form.¶
Vector 2 below reuses, byte-exact, the always-present manifest
members from the issuance profile's own canonical example Mission Record
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Record
Example"), including its proposal_hash, per that document's rule that
an extending example must either reproduce the recorded objects
byte-exactly or state its divergence.¶
Vectors 1, 3, and 4 are hypothetical variants
of that same Mission (same id, intent_hash, and authority_hash)
that diverge in exactly one respect each, stated at each vector: this
lets three different approval_context_commitment values legitimately
exist for the one Mission id across the set, each correct for the
variant it names, never for the others.¶
The always-present members, reused unchanged across every vector:¶
{
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"id": "msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9-",
"intent_hash":
"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r0",
"authority_hash":
"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM",
"subject": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"approver": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"created_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z",
"expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
"approval_basis": {
"type": "direct",
"consent_principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"activation": { "approval_event_id": "ape_8K2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z" },
"activation_actor": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"adjudication": { "kind": "human" },
"root_commitment":
"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM"
},
"authority_source": { "type": "user_delegated" },
"policy_version": "deploy-policy:v17",
"approval_event_id": "ape_8K2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z"
}
¶
Vector 1: base manifest. Diverges from the canonical Mission by
carrying no proposal_hash: this variant never recorded a
proposed_authority distinct from its Authority Set. typ is
mission-approval-context-v1; value is the object above with no
conditional member added.¶
{"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-approval-context-v1",
"value":{"approval_basis":{"activation":{"approval_event_id":"ape_8K
2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z"},"activation_actor":{"iss":"https://idp.example.c
om","sub":"user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"adjudication":{"kind":"human"},"c
onsent_principal":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8
mN1a0kV7tR"},"root_commitment":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcVi
I5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","type":"direct"},"approval_event_id":"ape_8K2nP4qV9
rL3tY6sB1z","approver":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_
3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"authority_hash":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbykl
NcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","authority_source":{"type":"user_delegated"},"c
lient_id":"s6BhdRkqt3","created_at":"2026-11-02T08:00:00Z","expires_
at":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","id":"msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9
-","intent_hash":"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r
0","issuer":"https://as.example.com","policy_version":"deploy-policy
:v17","subject":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8mN
1a0kV7tR"}}}
¶
approval_context_commitment = sha-256:dPaMl8eUhPExoiVA2zHbz4wPzmDLVs fZnHDxCYHDGos¶
Vector 2: conditional proposal_hash. This is the canonical Mission
unchanged: the always-present members above plus
"proposal_hash": "sha-256:p-s-EzdNQTn6RoPHXESkwVtGdk8yL1PxryNyMwroKGo".¶
{"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-approval-context-v1",
"value":{"approval_basis":{"activation":{"approval_event_id":"ape_8K
2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z"},"activation_actor":{"iss":"https://idp.example.c
om","sub":"user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"adjudication":{"kind":"human"},"c
onsent_principal":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8
mN1a0kV7tR"},"root_commitment":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcVi
I5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","type":"direct"},"approval_event_id":"ape_8K2nP4qV9
rL3tY6sB1z","approver":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_
3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"authority_hash":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbykl
NcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","authority_source":{"type":"user_delegated"},"c
lient_id":"s6BhdRkqt3","created_at":"2026-11-02T08:00:00Z","expires_
at":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","id":"msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9
-","intent_hash":"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r
0","issuer":"https://as.example.com","policy_version":"deploy-policy
:v17","proposal_hash":"sha-256:p-s-EzdNQTn6RoPHXESkwVtGdk8yL1PxryNyM
wroKGo","subject":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8
mN1a0kV7tR"}}}
¶
approval_context_commitment = sha-256:pGxfIDuyBPfgpyox3J6GP477CQfUE6 FS9CfHirjwwvU¶
Vector 3: conditional ceiling_hash. Diverges from the canonical
Mission by adding a Progressive ceiling and carrying no proposal_hash
(isolating the ceiling_hash case). The ceiling_hash value is derived
first, per the Progressive profile's own construction
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]): typ
mission-authority-ceiling, value a two-member object of
authority_ceiling and drawdown_policy. The ceiling covers the
Authority Set, its read entry's delegation grant included, with the
write actions in a separate entry that grants no delegation, and
drawdown_policy is an activation policy reference whose digest
stands for a policy snapshot this example does not display.¶
{
"authority_ceiling": [
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["invoices.read"],
"delegation": {
"max_depth": 2,
"allowed_delegates": [{ "sub_profile": "ai_agent" }]
} },
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["invoices.write", "journal-entries.write"] }
],
"drawdown_policy": {
"id": "erp-drawdown",
"version": "1",
"digest":
"sha-256:_hLEAl_ir1vxnex2tgbS6eRR99lyL1r6yyeB4RrC184"
}
}
¶
{"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-authority-ceiling","v
alue":{"authority_ceiling":[{"actions":["invoices.read"],"delegation
":{"allowed_delegates":[{"sub_profile":"ai_agent"}],"max_depth":2},"
resource":"https://erp.example.com","type":"mission_resource_access"
},{"actions":["invoices.write","journal-entries.write"],"resource":"
https://erp.example.com","type":"mission_resource_access"}],"drawdow
n_policy":{"digest":"sha-256:_hLEAl_ir1vxnex2tgbS6eRR99lyL1r6yyeB4Rr
C184","id":"erp-drawdown","version":"1"}}}
¶
ceiling_hash = sha-256:I0TgJBsdSkkmaHt4EayPfIjs8uoYiuQvP_O5b9Tlec8¶
The manifest is the always-present members above plus this
ceiling_hash:¶
{"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-approval-context-v1",
"value":{"approval_basis":{"activation":{"approval_event_id":"ape_8K
2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z"},"activation_actor":{"iss":"https://idp.example.c
om","sub":"user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"adjudication":{"kind":"human"},"c
onsent_principal":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8
mN1a0kV7tR"},"root_commitment":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcVi
I5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","type":"direct"},"approval_event_id":"ape_8K2nP4qV9
rL3tY6sB1z","approver":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_
3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"authority_hash":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbykl
NcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","authority_source":{"type":"user_delegated"},"c
eiling_hash":"sha-256:I0TgJBsdSkkmaHt4EayPfIjs8uoYiuQvP_O5b9Tlec8","
client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3","created_at":"2026-11-02T08:00:00Z","expires
_at":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","id":"msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc
9-","intent_hash":"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4
r0","issuer":"https://as.example.com","policy_version":"deploy-polic
y:v17","subject":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8m
N1a0kV7tR"}}}
¶
approval_context_commitment = sha-256:85y0i-t8pwRsM-SwHgZ9EaBIQFbnWj YDjBNEO1TTQWA¶
Vector 4: conditional submission_evidence_commitment. Diverges
from the canonical Mission by recording one verified Intent Submission
Evidence entry and carrying no proposal_hash (isolating the
submission_evidence_commitment case). The artifact_hash value is
derived first, over the entry exactly as presented
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): typ
mission-intent-evidence.¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===============
{
"type": "mission-intent-admission-assertion",
"assertion": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2FkbWlzc2\
lvbi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9.MEUCIQDx7vector"
}
¶
{"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-intent-evidence","val
ue":{"assertion":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2FkbWlzc
2lvbi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSJ9.MEUCIQDx7vector","type":"mission-intent-admi
ssion-assertion"}}
¶
artifact_hash = sha-256:EwtVufH4c6btTaI55w-3mDJaNg0miFuC6-T7jXU2-R8¶
The recorded submission_evidence array carries this one element;
submission_evidence_commitment is a second envelope anchor, typ
mission-submission-evidence-v1, value the array exactly as
retained:¶
[
{ "type": "mission-intent-admission-assertion",
"artifact_hash":
"sha-256:EwtVufH4c6btTaI55w-3mDJaNg0miFuC6-T7jXU2-R8",
"verified_at": "2026-11-02T07:59:39Z",
"facts": {
"admission_issuer": "https://admission.example.com",
"status": "active"
} }
]
¶
{"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-submission-evidence-v
1","value":[{"artifact_hash":"sha-256:EwtVufH4c6btTaI55w-3mDJaNg0miF
uC6-T7jXU2-R8","facts":{"admission_issuer":"https://admission.exampl
e.com","status":"active"},"type":"mission-intent-admission-assertion
","verified_at":"2026-11-02T07:59:39Z"}]}
¶
submission_evidence_commitment = sha-256:jnXhfVteWUHvc1-wyJOMLaVFj-d 8ewQWE4R7f0t5otY¶
The manifest is the always-present members above plus this
submission_evidence_commitment:¶
{"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-approval-context-v1",
"value":{"approval_basis":{"activation":{"approval_event_id":"ape_8K
2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z"},"activation_actor":{"iss":"https://idp.example.c
om","sub":"user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"adjudication":{"kind":"human"},"c
onsent_principal":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8
mN1a0kV7tR"},"root_commitment":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbyklNcVi
I5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","type":"direct"},"approval_event_id":"ape_8K2nP4qV9
rL3tY6sB1z","approver":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_
3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"authority_hash":"sha-256:hjXlwWBY64-RPs1Z-E_gbykl
NcViI5c9jiyMbE4KvFM","authority_source":{"type":"user_delegated"},"c
lient_id":"s6BhdRkqt3","created_at":"2026-11-02T08:00:00Z","expires_
at":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","id":"msn_8RfX2Lqv9TqMv4z7sA2bN1k0YpEdHc9
-","intent_hash":"sha-256:6T-7s_f-mNW9UpfrrZh3r0HRJmU4My_EsNAf1C1U4r
0","issuer":"https://as.example.com","policy_version":"deploy-policy
:v17","subject":{"iss":"https://idp.example.com","sub":"user_3p2q8mN
1a0kV7tR"},"submission_evidence_commitment":"sha-256:jnXhfVteWUHvc1-
wyJOMLaVFj-d8ewQWE4R7f0t5otY"}}
¶
approval_context_commitment = sha-256:iYBvYGC_LpEQkhpPiIE3S1OFINjH2d K0jYMrCwWHvKE¶
Vector 5: mutated-member rejection. Vector 2's manifest with one
member changed, approval_event_id from ape_8K2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z to
ape_9K2nP4qV9rL3tY6sB1z, illustrating what
Section 16.3 requires a verifier to do when a
recomputed digest disagrees with a disclosed one:¶
recomputed = sha-256:4Ev4vJSv_VYjxB48tuJTsYKTSU81jfQRD48pOjazBf0 disclosed = sha-256:pGxfIDuyBPfgpyox3J6GP477CQfUE6FS9CfHirjwwvU¶
The two differ, so a verifier holding the mutated record and this disclosed vector-2 value MUST reject the reference.¶
Vector 6: wrong-typ rejection. Vector 2's value object,
unchanged, committed under typ mission-approval-context-v2
instead of mission-approval-context-v1:¶
correct typ (v1) = sha-256:pGxfIDuyBPfgpyox3J6GP477CQfUE6FS9CfHirjww vU wrong typ (v2) = sha-256:Al8UIKy7q4_WlWem_O_6kInpGUoOp_NvPQj_YNO4z AY¶
The two differ. A verifier's recompute is always fixed to
mission-approval-context-v1; presented with the wrong-typ value
as if it were vector 2's approval_context_commitment, it recomputes
vector 2's correct digest, finds a mismatch, and rejects under the
same rule as vector 5.¶
These non-normative vectors exercise the comparisons and outcomes of
Section 11. Each case starts from a base pair: the record of
Section 5.5, which authenticates under a key trusted for the
expected Mission Issuer https://as.example.com, and a Mission
reference that authenticates under its own rules and discloses that
record's approval_event_id (ape_hON9D0svLKQAMyy-uug), issuer,
intent_hash, and authority_hash. Where a case says both artifacts
carry a commitment, each carries approval_context_commitment; the
check compares the two strings and never recomputes them. Each case
changes one thing from the base, except case 19, which tests the
precedence of failure over insufficient evidence.¶
| Case | Change from the base pair | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Both carry an equal commitment | Success; commitment agreement established |
| 2 | Only the record carries a commitment | Success; commitment agreement not established |
| 3 | Neither carries a commitment | Success; commitment agreement not established |
| 4 | Both carry a commitment, with different values | Failure |
| 5 | The reference's issuer is https://as2.example.com
|
Failure |
| 6 | The reference's approval_event_id differs |
Failure |
| 7 | The reference's intent_hash differs |
Failure |
| 8 | The reference's authority_hash differs |
Failure |
| 9 | The reference does not disclose approval_event_id
|
Insufficient evidence |
| 10 | The record's signature does not verify | Failure |
| 11 | The record verifies under a key not trusted for the expected issuer | Failure |
| 12 | The reference is a Mandate whose iss differs from its mission.issuer
|
Failure |
| 13 | No record is supplied | Insufficient evidence |
| 14 | The reference's intent_hash carries an unrecognized algorithm prefix |
Failure |
| 15 | The record carries a malformed commitment; the reference carries none | Failure |
| 16 | The reference carries a malformed commitment; the record carries none | Failure |
| 17 | Both intent_hash values are equal but noncanonical: they decode, with nonzero padding bits, but do not re-encode to themselves |
Failure |
| 18 | The record names the Mission Issuer https://as2.example.com and verifies under the expected issuer's key |
Failure |
| 19 | The reference's authority_hash differs, and it does not disclose approval_event_id
|
Failure |
Cases 6 to 8 succeed on every other comparison, which is why the check
compares each anchor rather than any one of them. Case 9 matches
intent_hash and authority_hash, which two Missions can share, and
still cannot succeed. Cases 15 and 16 fail although the other artifact
carries no commitment: a disclosed value is validated on its own.
Case 19 reports failure, not insufficient evidence, because a
disclosed mismatch is definitive.¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
The Approval Basis Contract binds a profile that adopts it, and an
issuer activating under such a profile's basis, rather than every
standing-consent basis: the OAuth binding states its own requirements
for every basis and cites this document informatively. The
Contract's requirements are unchanged, and Template, Progressive,
Child Delegation and governed_policy still adopt it. The activation
policy reference's digest, which the OAuth binding no longer lists
among its anchors, is classified here as an envelope anchor, with its
construction unchanged (#1967).¶
The digest classification imports the OAuth binding's Commitment Mechanisms section normatively, in place of the substrate's default commitment construction, which that section instantiates; Mission Substrate Requirements becomes an informative reference. The four classifications and every construction rule are unchanged (#1944).¶
The OAuth binding is cited at its posted -02, and every import is
checked against it. Citations of sections that -02 moved here point
to this document's policy adjudication, Standing-Consent Bases and
Standing-Consent Recency. policy_version, optional in -02, is
stated as the dependency that the binding's own rule makes required
for this profile's adopters (#1944).¶
The record's mission binding and the Approval Context Manifest
take the Mission Record's integrity anchors recorded or implied,
since the OAuth binding makes them implied members. The manifest's
proposal_hash is present when the record carries
proposed_authority, its bytes are unchanged, and it stays
mission-approval-context-v1 (#1917).¶
The Approval Basis Contract states the contract every
standing-consent approval basis meets (Standing-Consent Bases,
Standing-Consent Instances, Activation Policy Commitment,
Standing-Consent Recency and Policy Adjudication), as the OAuth
binding states them, with its own conformance class independent of
the Recording Issuer and Relying Auditor roles and of recording any
record. The governed_policy basis meets it (#1915).¶
Relationship to the Issuance Profile states how an artifact refers to the record, that the record binds a governance evaluation to the approval event rather than to each later action, and that later reliance depends on deployment policy, moved here from the OAuth binding unchanged. No requirement changed (#1914).¶
Relationship to the Issuance Profile defines the governance_record
member of approval_basis.adjudication, which the OAuth binding no
longer defines; its definition and its alignment with the
accountable assertion move here unchanged. No requirement changed
(#1912).¶
Relationship to the Issuance Profile cites the OAuth binding's
Principals and Approval Basis section, which defines
approval_basis.adjudication, since that binding's Role Mapping
appendix moved to the architecture document. No requirement changed
(#1892).¶
Scope of the Recency Rules says the record is historical evidence and that the effect of a later change to an Approver's role, a delegation, or the governing policy on an existing Mission is deployment policy, declared and enforced through the lifecycle operations or the runtime profile; a new example contrasts an organizational decision, a personal delegation, and a required accountable owner when the approver transfers. No requirement changed (#830).¶
The portable-binding example and the approver-transfer example name
each record by its role (the approval event, the Mission, the
governance record, the Mandate, the purchase order, the ERP's
decision) in place of identifiers such as E42 and M17. No
requirement changed.¶
A separately named portable approval-binding check lets a Relying Auditor without the Mission Record establish that an authenticated record and an authenticated Mission reference agree on the approval event and the Mission anchors, with explicit commitment handling, distinct failure and insufficient-evidence outcomes, stated limits, a procurement example and vectors. Privacy Considerations relate the record's retention to an authorized evidence export or evidence bundle. The existing verification and re-check procedures are unchanged (#1572).¶
Immutability Witness: a mismatch between a recomputed Approval Context Commitment and the value an artifact disclosed shows that the two disagree. It is evidence that the Mission Record was altered only where an audit receipt independently shows the artifact predates the change and the disclosed value matches the registered approval event; a signature alone does not establish when an artifact was made. No requirement changed.¶
An assertion that can narrow the authority, such as a model output, is
bound to the authority_hash of the set it evaluated, which the
issuer records with the activation's inputs, rather than to the
narrowed result; Activation step 8 and the re-check follow (#1436 item
16).¶
Resolutions of the remaining #1436 questions. An assertion binds to
the approval event's intent_hash as well. Policy-authorization says
what it checks for a policy assertion. contributing lists what the
satisfied rule counted, so a deny assertion never appears in it. An
exception never lengthens its class's recency ceiling. The members of
evaluation are marked as required. Evaluating Recency points at the
one approved_at verification rule. Conventions names both digest
sources. Re-checking an Evaluation defines the Relying Auditor's
re-check. Privacy Considerations name two correlators. A policy
version that several humans approved names its one accountable human
as the principal.¶
Four rulings on the #1436 questions (D568), each a change in
requirements. The recording triggers bind only under a profile that
adopts them, and a record kept voluntarily meets every requirement on
a record. The accountable-approver rule is stated per approval basis:
one human approval under direct, one policy approval naming the
deciding policy under governed_policy, and the authenticated
approval_basis under any other standing-consent basis. Only
assertions of the basis's kind (under governed_policy, only those
naming the deciding policy) count toward "exactly one"; other
assertions in the consent principal's name contribute. Assertion
Authority types authority for each assertion kind, and a policy
assertion's principal is the human who approved the policy version.
The JWS typ and cty are emitted with application/ omitted and
compared as media types.¶
Editorial restructure, with no change to any requirement: Recording
Triggers precedes the record; the record, Assertion Requirements and
Policy-Approval Recency are split into subsections; Boundaries is
folded into the sections it qualified; Conformance precedes Security
Considerations; and the Approval Context Commitment test vectors are
an appendix. Security and Privacy Considerations open with a pointer
to the issuance profile's. Conventions defines the accountable
assertion, the record digest, the Recording Issuer and the Relying
Auditor. New examples show one approval per recording trigger, the
decoded JWS protected header, a governed_policy activation with its
recency computation, and the matching Consent Evidence members.¶
Recording Triggers states that a Mission whose Approver differs from its Subject holds the first trigger, so the Enterprise Mission Authority Profile always records the record for it; the triggers are unchanged (#1196).¶
Governed Policy Approval defines the governed_policy
standing-consent basis: a human-approved approval_policy snapshot
is the consented root, a policy assertion in that human's name is
the accountable assertion, and each activation passes nine checks
at the atomic creation commit. Assertion Requirements states the
accountable assertion each basis requires: human for direct,
policy for governed_policy, and the approval_basis record for
the other standing-consent bases. Where the governed Mission
populates adjudication, the accountable assertion's kind equals
adjudication.kind; this document, not the OAuth binding, holds
both rules (#1185).¶
The accountable principal is the Mission Record's
approval_basis.consent_principal. The Approval Context Manifest
keeps its approver member, sourced from that value, so
mission-approval-context-v1 and vectors 1 to 6 are unchanged; the
manifest excludes both mutable record members, state and
termination (#705).¶
Assertion Requirements and the authority member name a policy
assertion's policy as the decision mechanism; the principal it
matches stays the accountable approver. The policy assertion path,
provenance and recency checks are unchanged (#1084).¶
The accountable approver's assertion is human or policy, never
service, and authority is defined for a service assertion,
naming the model's identifier and version where a model produced
the decision. A model-backed judge contributes as a governance input
and never becomes the accountable approver. This adds a requirement.¶
The Approval Context Manifest copies a recorded ceiling_hash
verbatim, so the Progressive profile is an informative reference,
meeting the maturity bound of the reference classification
convention (a Standards-Track draft never lists an Experimental
draft as normative). The manifest's members and both ceiling_hash
presence requirements are unchanged.¶
Clarified that the direct-human degenerate case presumes resolution by that human, not agent-invokable approval on the human's behalf (#759).¶
The Approval Governance Record began as an approval-provenance sketch in Mission Deferred Approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]). The author thanks the Mission-Bound Authorization implementer community for feedback.¶