Mission Consent Evidence for OAuth 2.0

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (the "issuance profile") binds a Mission to an approval event and commits two objects: the approved Mission Intent and the approved Authority Set. It deliberately notes a remaining gap: the exact consent disclosure rendered to the Approver is not itself committed.¶

This document narrows that gap. It defines a structured consent disclosure object and a Consent Evidence object. The disclosure object is what the Authorization Server renders or commits to rendering. The evidence object records the approval event, the rendering context, the Mission anchors, and an integrity envelope over the evidence.¶

This profile commits the structured disclosure that the Authorization Server says it rendered, and binds it to the same Mission anchors used for authority. It does not, and cannot, prove that the pixels actually presented to the Approver matched that structured object, that the Approver read or understood it, or that the rendering layer was honest. A faulty or malicious rendering layer that lies about what it displayed remains outside the reach of any server-side commitment. What this profile provides is a durable, integrity-protected record that ties a specific structured disclosure to a specific approval decision and Authority Set, so that divergence between the recorded disclosure and the enforced authority becomes detectable in audit.¶

How much a deployment can narrow the rendering gap is not all-or-nothing. This profile defines a ladder of rendering assurance (Section 6) whose rungs move the trust from an unbounded, unverifiable rendering layer toward the Approver's own authenticator signing the exact disclosure commitment. No rung proves what pixels a human perceived, but the higher rungs shrink the trusted rendering base to a small, attestable one and let the deployment pick the assurance its threat model needs.¶

Consent Evidence does not grant authority. Authority remains the approved Mission and its Authority Set under [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]. Consent Evidence lets auditors verify that the recorded approval surface corresponded to the authority later enforced.¶

2. Scope

This document defines:¶

• the consent disclosure object (Section 4);¶

• the consent_rendering_hash commitment (Section 5);¶

• the Consent Evidence object (Section 7);¶

• binding and recording rules for initial approval, expansion approval, declined, and revision-required events (Section 8);¶

• retention and audit reconstruction requirements (Section 9); and¶

• conformance for a Consent-Evidence-capable Mission Issuer (Section 10).¶

This document does not define user-interface layout, a legal consent standard, or any new OAuth grant. It does not change the Authority Set or Mission lifecycle. Under the standalone Mission Authority Server binding ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]), the Mission Authority Server is the committing Mission Issuer and this profile composes with it unchanged.¶

3. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

This document uses JSON [RFC8259] for the disclosure and evidence objects. JCS [RFC8785] is used when computing consent_rendering_hash.¶

The terms Mission, Mission Intent, Authority Set, Mission Issuer, Approver, and approval event are used as defined in [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission].¶

Consent Disclosure:

A structured object describing the approval surface rendered to the Approver.¶

Consent Evidence:

A durable, integrity-protected record of the consent disclosure and approval event.¶

4. Consent Disclosure Object

A Consent Disclosure object has these members:¶

disclosure_id:

REQUIRED. A string. Unique identifier for this rendered disclosure.¶

source_hashes:

REQUIRED. An object containing the intent_hash and authority_hash values the disclosure corresponds to. The disclosure object carries these two hashes rather than the full mission container (Section 7) because it is constructed before approval commits the Mission: the Mission id and lifecycle do not yet exist, and the disclosure must commit only to the proposed Intent and Authority Set it actually renders. The Consent Evidence object, recorded at or after the decision, carries the resolved mission container with id, issuer, and the same anchors.¶

template_id:

REQUIRED. A string identifying the disclosure template.¶

template_version:

REQUIRED. A string identifying the template version.¶

template_hash:

OPTIONAL. A string committing the disclosure template content bytes, in the integrity-anchor encoded form of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]. REQUIRED for a deployment claiming Rung 1 or above (Section 6), so the template a verifier retrieves is bound to the one used to render this disclosure.¶

locale:

REQUIRED. A string identifying the locale used for presentation.¶

mission_summary:

REQUIRED. An object presenting the task to the Approver. It MUST carry the rendered goal, the rendered expires_at, a display of the Subject, and a display of the Approver. Presentation wording is free.¶

authority_summary:

REQUIRED. An array with exactly one element per mission_resource_access entry of the approved Authority Set. Each element carries the entry's resource, its actions, the rendered form of each constraints key together with its value, the delegation summary when the entry permits delegation, and the consumption bounds when the entry carries them. This is the consent object: per the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), the Approver consents to the derived authority, with mission_summary as context. Presentation wording is free; coverage is normative. An array that omits an entry, a constraint, a delegation right, or a consumption bound is not faithful, and a verifier can check the rendered set against the committed Authority Set. A disclosure that renders mission_summary without a faithful authority_summary does not conform.¶

material_notices:

REQUIRED. An array. Notices that materially affect the Approver's decision. A notice is required for each material-notice condition present, as listed in Section 4.2.¶

risk_summary:

OPTIONAL. An array of objects, each with a dimension and a statement. When present, it MUST cover the risk dimensions the disclosure rules name (irreversibility, spend, delegation, and data access) when the Authority Set carries them, and it MUST identify, as dimensions, the material-notice conditions (Section 4.2) present in the Authority Set. material_notices remains the REQUIRED carrier of material risk; risk_summary is a rendered summary over it.¶

constraint_provenance:

OPTIONAL. An array attributing bounds in the Authority Set to the authority that imposed them (Section 4.1). Each entry has:¶

applies_to:

REQUIRED. An object identifying the bound, by the Authority Set entry's resource and the constraint key or action it concerns.¶

source:

REQUIRED. A string naming the imposing authority. Recommended, non-exhaustive values are subject, delegator, platform, regulatory, and judicial; the value is descriptive and a deployment MAY use another.¶

source_uri:

OPTIONAL. A string. A URI identifying the imposing instrument or policy, including a URN for a non-dereferenceable instrument such as urn:court:order:2026-55.¶

delegation_summary:

REQUIRED when the Authority Set permits delegation. An object describing who may receive delegated authority, maximum depth, and whether child Missions or further delegation are permitted.¶

runtime_summary:

OPTIONAL. An object describing runtime enforcement expectations shown to the Approver, such as per-action checks, status freshness, audit evidence, or human-review steps.¶

subject:

REQUIRED when the Approver is not the Subject. The rendered identification of the Subject on whose behalf authority is granted.¶

approver:

REQUIRED. The rendered identity of the Approver.¶

shaping_evidence_hash:

OPTIONAL. A string. A commitment to Shaping Evidence when shaping was used ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]).¶

predecessor:

OPTIONAL. A string. The predecessor Mission identifier when this disclosure is for an expansion approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).¶

display_context:

REQUIRED. An object containing presentation context, including at least channel (for example, web, device, api, or admin_console) and rendered_at.¶

approver_actions:

OPTIONAL. An array describing explicit approver interactions required by policy, such as checking a high-risk notice or confirming an expansion delta. REQUIRED when material_notices carries a notice of a high-risk class (Section 4.2); it then carries one acknowledgment action per such notice.¶

A Consent Disclosure object MUST NOT omit material authority. If the Authority Set includes delegation, external commitments, irreversible actions, privileged administration, cross-domain authority, or consumption bounds, the disclosure MUST include a material notice or a rendered authority summary entry covering that fact.¶

[
  { "applies_to": { "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "constraint": "max_amount" },
    "source": "delegator",
    "source_uri": "https://corp.example/policy/spend" },
  { "applies_to": { "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "action": "journal-entries.write" },
    "source": "judicial", "source_uri": "urn:court:order:2026-55" }
]

5. The Consent Rendering Hash

consent_rendering_hash is the integrity-anchor encoded form of the SHA-256 [RFC6234] of the JCS [RFC8785] canonical bytes of this envelope:¶

{
  "typ": "mission-consent-disclosure",
  "iss": <mission.issuer>,
  "value": <Consent Disclosure object>
}

The value uses the same integrity-anchor encoding the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] defines for intent_hash and authority_hash: a hash-name prefix and the base64url digest, for example sha-256:.... SHA-256 is the only digest algorithm defined; the sha-256: prefix identifies it, and algorithm agility is future work. A verifier MUST reject a commitment whose algorithm prefix it does not recognize and MUST NOT treat an unrecognized prefix as SHA-256.¶

The hash commits the disclosure object, not pixels or browser state. A deployment MAY additionally retain screenshots or UI telemetry, but the interoperable commitment is the structured disclosure object. A worked disclosure and computed vector are provided in Appendix B.¶

So that the committed object can be related to what a human would see, the rendering SHOULD be a deterministic function of the disclosure object and its template_id, template_version, template_hash, and locale, so an auditor can re-render the recorded disclosure into the form the Approver should have been shown. A deployment that makes this guarantee normative claims Rung 1 (Section 6), which fixes the concrete requirements. This does not prove what was displayed, but it reduces the gap from "the rendering layer showed something unverifiable" to "did the rendering layer execute a published deterministic template," which the higher rungs of Section 6 then address.¶

The Mission Issuer SHOULD record consent_rendering_hash on the Mission record. When the Mission claim is extended to carry the value, it MUST carry the same prefixed integrity-anchor form, and consumers MUST treat it as audit data only; it MUST NOT grant or widen authority.¶

The Consent Disclosure object MUST be constructed after Authority Set derivation and before approval. If any disclosure input changes after the disclosure is constructed and before the decision (the Authority Set, the locale, the template, or the material notices), the Mission Issuer MUST discard the disclosure and construct a new one; it MUST NOT reuse the prior consent_rendering_hash. Rung 1 determinism (Section 6) applies per presentation modality: the same inputs produce the same rendered form within a given modality, not across modalities.¶

6. Rendering Assurance

The commitment of Section 5 records what disclosure the Authorization Server says it rendered; it cannot by itself prove what a human perceived. This is the what-you-see-is-what-you-sign problem. This profile does not close it with a server-side commitment, which is impossible, but defines a ladder a deployment climbs as far as its threat model requires. Each rung shrinks the trusted rendering base; to claim a rung a deployment satisfies it and records the corresponding evidence. The rungs are cumulative: claiming a rung requires satisfying the rungs below it, so a Rung 3 confirmation is over a disclosure that is also deterministically renderable (Rung 1) and an auditor can re-render exactly what the confirmation signed.¶

Rung 0, Recorded disclosure:

The baseline of Section 5: the structured disclosure is committed and bound to the Mission anchors. Proves the AS recorded this disclosure for this authority; proves nothing about what was shown.¶

Rung 1, Deterministic rendering:

An auditor can re-render the intended form, so the open question narrows to whether the rendering layer faithfully executed a published template. A deployment claiming Rung 1 MUST:¶

• render the disclosure as a deterministic function of the disclosure object, template_id, template_version, template_hash, and locale, so the same inputs produce the same rendered form within a presentation modality;¶

• commit the template content bytes in template_hash (Section 4); and¶

• keep the named template retrievable or reconstructable by an authorized auditor for the retention period (Section 9).¶

Rungs above 1 shrink the trusted rendering base further, from any rendering layer to an attested renderer (Rung 2) and to the Approver's own authenticator (Rung 3), with out-of-band execution-time confirmation above that (Rung 4). Each imports a trust infrastructure (platform or TEE attestation; transaction-confirming authenticators) this profile cannot supply; they are experimental and defined in Appendix A. Rungs 0 and 1 are the rungs of this profile's conformance.¶

No rung proves the Approver perceived or understood the disclosure; a compromised authenticator or trusted execution environment, or an Approver who confirms without reading, remains outside reach, as for any electronic-signature scheme. What the ladder provides is a verifiable, bounded reduction of the rendering trust base.¶

7. Consent Evidence Object

A Consent Evidence object has these members:¶

evidence_id:

REQUIRED. A string. Unique evidence identifier.¶

mission:

REQUIRED. An object binding the evidence to what was approved. Its shape depends on decision, because a Mission exists only after an approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): - When decision is approved, it contains id, issuer, intent_hash, authority_hash, and, when this profile records it on the Mission, consent_rendering_hash. - When decision is declined, no Mission was created (Section 8.1), so there is no id. It instead contains issuer and the intent_hash and authority_hash the disclosure corresponded to, matching the disclosure object's source_hashes (Section 4). It MUST NOT contain id. - When decision is narrowed, the review required a narrowing revision and no Mission was created (Section 8.2). Like a decline, it contains issuer and the reviewed disclosure's intent_hash and authority_hash, matching that disclosure's source_hashes, and MUST NOT contain id.¶

This descriptor follows the evidence-descriptor convention of the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): it is the mission claim shape extended with the collision-resistantly named audit members intent_hash and consent_rendering_hash, and it is not authority-bearing on its own.¶

approver:

REQUIRED. An object identifying the authenticated Approver. It MUST carry iss and sub, per the Mission record's approver ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so binding checks and record correlation are mechanical.¶

subject:

REQUIRED when different from the Approver. An object identifying the Subject.¶

client:

OPTIONAL. An object identifying the client or agent requesting the Mission. The AS MUST record it when it possesses the value at the approval event.¶

authentication_context:

OPTIONAL. An object recording the acr, amr, and authentication time used for the approval event. The AS MUST record each of these values it possesses at the approval event.¶

disclosure:

REQUIRED. The Consent Disclosure object, or a durable reference to it (Section 9.1) paired with the consent_rendering_hash it verifies against.¶

co_approvals:

OPTIONAL. An array of evidence descriptors, one per co-approver, each carrying the co-approver's iss and sub, its decision, and its timestamp, all under the same consent_rendering_hash. This is an additive hook; the issuance profile records one accountable Approver ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) and that model is unchanged.¶

approval_authority:

OPTIONAL. A reference identifying the standing policy or delegation the Approver acted under. An additive hook that does not change the single accountable Approver ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

rendering_attestation:

OPTIONAL and experimental. An object. Evidence that an attested, identified rendering component produced the rendering shown to the Approver (Rung 2, Appendix A). Its members are deployment-defined and identify the attested component and its attestation; this profile fixes the role, not the attestation format.¶

rendering_confirmation:

OPTIONAL and experimental. An object. A confirmation produced by the Approver's authenticator at approval (Rung 3, Appendix A). To bind the trust to the Approver rather than the Authorization Server, it MUST sign the consent_rendering_hash together with a per-approval value (the evidence_id, or a nonce echoed in authentication_context), so a captured confirmation cannot be replayed into another record, and it MUST carry or reference an authenticator credential that the verifier can confirm is bound to the recorded approver. This profile fixes what is signed and bound, not the authenticator protocol. A deployment SHOULD include it for a high-risk material-notice class (Section 4.2). When present, a verifier MUST check it as part of Section 7.1 and MUST treat a confirmation that does not verify, or whose authenticator is not bound to the recorded approver, as an integrity failure.¶

approved_at:

REQUIRED when decision is approved. An RFC 3339 [RFC3339] timestamp.¶

declined_at:

REQUIRED when decision is declined. An RFC 3339 timestamp.¶

narrowed_at:

REQUIRED when decision is narrowed. An RFC 3339 timestamp.¶

decision:

REQUIRED. One of approved, declined, or narrowed. narrowed records a revision-required outcome (Section 8.2).¶

decline_reason:

OPTIONAL. A string. Present when decision is declined and the deployment records a reason.¶

refused_dimensions:

REQUIRED when decision is narrowed. An object identifying the dimensions the review refused. It carries one or both of rejected_scope, a string of space-delimited scope tokens naming the refused scope, and rejected_authorization_details, an array of authorization-details-shaped subtrees the re-derived Authority Set must exclude or narrow, each naming a type and the members within it that must not survive re-derivation unchanged. These are the shapes the experimental approval-revision profile signals on its revision-required response ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval-revision]), recorded here as the review named them.¶

predecessor_intent_hashes:

OPTIONAL. An array of intent_hash values committing the revision chain that preceded this decision. Carried on the final evidence for an approval reached through one or more narrowed outcomes.¶

policy_version:

OPTIONAL. A string. The approval policy version in effect at the approval event. The AS MUST record it when it possesses the value. Because the issuance profile records policy_version on the Mission record unconditionally ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), the AS possesses it at an approval event, so it is present in practice.¶

sequence:

REQUIRED. An integer. A monotonic sequence value sufficient to reconstruct evidence order. A deployment MAY scope it per Mission Issuer, per Mission, or per audit scope, provided it is monotonic within the scope it chooses.¶

evidence_envelope:

REQUIRED when retained as a portable record. An object carrying format and value. This document defines jws-compact, a JWS Compact Serialization [RFC7515] over the JCS canonical bytes of the Consent Evidence object with evidence_envelope removed. Its protected header MUST carry a typ of mission-consent-evidence+jws and a kid that resolves in the Mission Issuer's published key material (its jwks_uri); that is the verification path (Section 7.1).¶

Example, over the worked disclosure of Appendix B:¶

{
  "evidence_id": "cns_7rP2kL9mQ4",
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_4Xp8kQ2rW9vT6nL1yB5sD3zC7mF0jH",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "intent_hash":
      "sha-256:6mIFoCz79uCHNzKLfBpBwqFjoFXdpmpuc65486IqimQ",
    "authority_hash":
      "sha-256:vUCCfjGulit9u0qJ0Z6pQSNerZtXMqRlfJNCr4PzLro",
    "consent_rendering_hash":
      "sha-256:W-aXkM2quCh07XvdixCTk8qHoMWOs2tA0hZej4kLGr0"
  },
  "approver": {
    "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
    "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"
  },
  "authentication_context": {
    "acr": "urn:example:acr:phishing-resistant",
    "amr": ["pwd", "hwk"],
    "auth_time": "2026-06-30T17:54:00Z"
  },
  "approved_at": "2026-06-30T17:55:00Z",
  "decision": "approved",
  "policy_version": "approval-policy:v12",
  "sequence": 88127,
  "disclosure": {
    "uri": "https://as.example.com/consent-evidence/disc_4pQ9z",
    "consent_rendering_hash":
      "sha-256:W-aXkM2quCh07XvdixCTk8qHoMWOs2tA0hZej4kLGr0"
  },
  "evidence_envelope": {
    "format": "jws-compact",
    "value": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImNvbnNlbnQt..."
  }
}

The decoded protected header of the evidence_envelope value:¶

{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "kid": "consent-evidence-2026",
  "typ": "mission-consent-evidence+jws"
}

8. Binding to Mission Approval

At an approval event, a Consent-Evidence-capable Mission Issuer MUST:¶

1. derive the Authority Set and compute intent_hash and authority_hash under [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission];¶

2. construct the Consent Disclosure object from that exact Authority Set and Mission Intent;¶

3. compute consent_rendering_hash;¶

4. render the disclosure to the Approver;¶

5. record Consent Evidence for the decision (approved, declined, or narrowed); and¶

6. when approved, bind the Mission record to the consent_rendering_hash.¶

For expansion approvals, the disclosure MUST identify the predecessor Mission and distinguish retained authority from newly requested authority.¶

9. Audit Reconstruction

A deployment claiming this profile MUST retain enough information for an authorized auditor to reconstruct:¶

• the Mission Intent and Authority Set approved;¶

• the Consent Disclosure object;¶

• the template, template version, and locale;¶

• the material notices presented;¶

• the Approver, Subject, and approval authentication context; and¶

• the integrity path from Consent Evidence to the Mission record.¶

Retention MUST last at least as long as the Mission's audit horizon, the term the issuance profile defines ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Declined and narrowed events create no Mission (Section 8.1, Section 8.2) and so have no Mission audit horizon; a deployment MUST retain their evidence for a deployment-declared window.¶

10. Conformance

A conforming Consent-Evidence-capable Mission Issuer MUST:¶

• construct a Consent Disclosure object for each approval event;¶

• compute consent_rendering_hash;¶

• record Consent Evidence for approval, decline, and narrowed decisions;¶

• bind approved Mission records to consent_rendering_hash;¶

• include material notices for high-risk authority, with the per-notice acknowledgment the high-risk classes require (Section 4.2); and¶

• retain evidence for audit reconstruction.¶

A conforming verifier of Consent Evidence MUST implement the checks in Section 7.1 and MUST treat failure to retrieve a referenced disclosure during the retention window as an audit failure.¶

11. Security Considerations

12. Privacy Considerations

Consent Evidence can contain sensitive task descriptions, business context, approver identity, subject identity, and high-risk authority details. Deployments SHOULD protect it at least as strongly as Mission records and runtime evidence. Where possible, portable records SHOULD carry hashes or references rather than full rendered text, while still allowing authorized audit reconstruction.¶

A global sequence counter leaks approval volume: a holder of two evidence records can read the gap between their sequence values as the count of approvals the Mission Issuer processed in between. A deployment sensitive to that side channel SHOULD scope sequence per Mission or per audit scope rather than use a single global counter.¶

13. IANA Considerations

14. References

Appendix A. Experimental Rendering-Assurance Rungs

This appendix is experimental: adopt it for evaluation, not as a stable interface. Each rung below extends the ladder of Section 6 by importing a trust infrastructure this profile does not supply: platform or trusted-execution-environment attestation for Rung 2, transaction-confirming authenticators for Rung 3. The cumulative rule of Section 6 applies: a rung is claimed only over a disclosure that also satisfies the rungs below it.¶

Rung 2, Attested rendering:

The Consent Evidence carries a rendering_attestation (Section 7): evidence that an attested, identified rendering component (a first-party AS-hosted consent surface, or a renderer attested by the platform or a trusted execution environment) produced the rendering. The trusted base shrinks from any rendering layer to an attested one.¶

Rung 3, Approver confirmation:

The Consent Evidence carries a rendering_confirmation (Section 7): a signature produced by the Approver's authenticator over the consent_rendering_hash at approval, binding the approval credential itself to the exact committed disclosure. The claim that the Approver approved this disclosure then rests on the Approver's authenticator, not on the Authorization Server. This is the what-you-see-is-what-you-sign rung, as in authenticator transaction-confirmation schemes. A deployment claiming this rung SHOULD apply it to a Mission whose Authority Set carries a high-risk material-notice class (Section 4.2).¶

Rung 4, Out-of-band confirmation:

For the most material actions, confirmation is obtained at execution time on a channel the rendering layer does not control, as the action-bound approval of the runtime layer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]); a rendering layer would then have to compromise two independent paths. That is a runtime-layer mechanism recorded as its own evidence; this profile records the approval-time rungs above.¶

At Rung 3 the claim that the Approver approved a specific disclosure is verifiable up to trust in the Approver's authenticator, rather than in an arbitrary rendering layer. The verifier obligations for these rungs are steps 7 and 8 of Section 7.1; their absence asserts no rung above the ones the record satisfies and is never an integrity failure.¶

Appendix B. Worked Disclosure and Test Vector

This non-normative vector lets an implementation verify its consent_rendering_hash computation (Section 5) byte for byte. The disclosure is the one the evidence example of Section 7 records. It renders the Authority Set of the issuance profile's test vectors ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): invoices.read and journal-entries.write bounded by a max_amount of 500.00 USD on https://erp.example.com, approved by alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR); source_hashes carries that profile's computed intent_hash and authority_hash. The template_hash value stands for the deployment's template commitment and is illustrative.¶

The Consent Disclosure object:¶

{
  "disclosure_id": "disc_4pQ9z",
  "source_hashes": {
    "intent_hash":
      "sha-256:6mIFoCz79uCHNzKLfBpBwqFjoFXdpmpuc65486IqimQ",
    "authority_hash":
      "sha-256:vUCCfjGulit9u0qJ0Z6pQSNerZtXMqRlfJNCr4PzLro"
  },
  "template_id": "mission-consent-standard",
  "template_version": "2026-06",
  "template_hash":
    "sha-256:50S2DpJfcfNGlzi_vzZJNJbJKkknFX65rhWJWLiMyok",
  "locale": "en-US",
  "mission_summary": {
    "goal": "Reconcile Q3 invoices",
    "expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
    "subject_display": "alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR)",
    "approver_display": "alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR)"
  },
  "authority_summary": [
    {
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"]
    },
    {
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
      "constraints": [
        {
          "constraint": "max_amount",
          "value": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" },
          "rendered":
          "Each journal entry is capped at 500.00 US dollars (USD)."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "material_notices": [
    {
      "condition": "irreversible_action",
      "applies_to": {
        "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
        "action": "journal-entries.write"
      },
      "statement":
        "Posted journal entries are not automatically reversible."
    }
  ],
  "risk_summary": [
    {
      "dimension": "data_access",
      "statement":
        "The agent can read invoices held in the ERP system."
    },
    {
      "dimension": "spend",
      "statement":
        "The agent can post journal entries of up to 500 US dollars."
    },
    {
      "dimension": "irreversibility",
      "statement":
        "Posted journal entries alter the ledger of record."
    }
  ],
  "constraint_provenance": [
    {
      "applies_to": {
        "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
        "constraint": "max_amount"
      },
      "source": "subject"
    }
  ],
  "approver": {
    "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
    "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR",
    "display": "alice"
  },
  "display_context": {
    "channel": "web",
    "rendered_at": "2026-06-30T17:54:30Z"
  },
  "approver_actions": [
    {
      "action": "acknowledge_notice",
      "applies_to": {
        "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
        "action": "journal-entries.write"
      },
      "condition": "irreversible_action"
    }
  ]
}

The read entry carries no constraints, so its element renders none. The write entry warrants a material notice and an irreversibility risk dimension because posted journal entries are not automatically reversible; constraint_provenance attributes the max_amount bound to the Subject, who stated it in the task request. The notice is of a high-risk class, so approver_actions carries its per-notice acknowledgment (Section 4.2). The Approver is the Subject, so the top-level subject member is absent.¶

consent_rendering_hash is the prefixed SHA-256 over the JCS [RFC8785] canonical bytes of the integrity-anchor envelope with typ mission-consent-disclosure, iss https://as.example.com, and this disclosure object as value. The canonical-bytes block is the exact JCS output: a single line, UTF-8, no whitespace. It is shown here wrapped only for layout; remove the layout line breaks, adding no characters, to recover the canonical form. Note that JCS sorts object member names and preserves array order.¶

Canonical bytes of the envelope:¶

{"iss":"https://as.example.com","typ":"mission-consent-disclosure"
,"value":{"approver":{"display":"alice","iss":"https://idp.example
.com","sub":"user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"},"approver_actions":[{"action":
"acknowledge_notice","applies_to":{"action":"journal-entries.write
","resource":"https://erp.example.com"},"condition":"irreversible_
action"}],"authority_summary":[{"actions":["invoices.read"],"resou
rce":"https://erp.example.com"},{"actions":["journal-entries.write
"],"constraints":[{"constraint":"max_amount","rendered":"Each jour
nal entry is capped at 500.00 US dollars (USD).","value":{"amount"
:"500.00","currency":"USD"}}],"resource":"https://erp.example.com"
}],"constraint_provenance":[{"applies_to":{"constraint":"max_amoun
t","resource":"https://erp.example.com"},"source":"subject"}],"dis
closure_id":"disc_4pQ9z","display_context":{"channel":"web","rende
red_at":"2026-06-30T17:54:30Z"},"locale":"en-US","material_notices
":[{"applies_to":{"action":"journal-entries.write","resource":"htt
ps://erp.example.com"},"condition":"irreversible_action","statemen
t":"Posted journal entries are not automatically reversible."}],"m
ission_summary":{"approver_display":"alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR)"
,"expires_at":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","goal":"Reconcile Q3 invoices
","subject_display":"alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR)"},"risk_summary"
:[{"dimension":"data_access","statement":"The agent can read invoi
ces held in the ERP system."},{"dimension":"spend","statement":"Th
e agent can post journal entries of up to 500 US dollars."},{"dime
nsion":"irreversibility","statement":"Posted journal entries alter
 the ledger of record."}],"source_hashes":{"authority_hash":"sha-2
56:vUCCfjGulit9u0qJ0Z6pQSNerZtXMqRlfJNCr4PzLro","intent_hash":"sha
-256:6mIFoCz79uCHNzKLfBpBwqFjoFXdpmpuc65486IqimQ"},"template_hash"
:"sha-256:50S2DpJfcfNGlzi_vzZJNJbJKkknFX65rhWJWLiMyok","template_i
d":"mission-consent-standard","template_version":"2026-06"}}

consent_rendering_hash =
  sha-256:W-aXkM2quCh07XvdixCTk8qHoMWOs2tA0hZej4kLGr0

An implementation that canonicalizes the same envelope, computes SHA-256, and encodes as sha-256: followed by base64url with no padding reproduces this value exactly. A divergence indicates a JCS or encoding difference to resolve before interoperating.¶

Acknowledgments

This document is part of the Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 set and binds the approval surface to the Mission authority record.¶

Author's Address