Mission Approval Revision for OAuth 2.0

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Mission Deferred Approval [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval] (the "deferred approval profile") moves the issuance profile's approval event ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) to an asynchronous review surface: the client submits a proposed Mission, receives the deferred substrate's pending response ([I-D.draft-gerber-oauth-deferred-token-response]), and polls until the approval resolves. When a reviewer will grant only a narrowed subset of the proposal, that profile resolves to access_denied and the client submits a fresh, narrower Mission Intent.¶

This document defines a revisable approval mode that keeps the deferred approval open instead: the Mission Issuer signals which dimensions it refused and invites the client to push a narrowing revision, then continues the same deferred approval. The client keeps its place; the approval resolves over the narrowed proposal.¶

This is narrowing only. A revision can reduce the proposed Mission; it can never broaden it. Widening an approved Mission is a different operation with its own fresh approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).¶

2. Status: An Experimental Extension

This document is optional and experimental: adopt it for evaluation, not as a stable interface. The stable path needs no revision mechanism at all. A deferred approval that cannot be granted as proposed resolves to access_denied, and the client submits a fresh, narrower Mission Intent via PAR [RFC9126]; the deferred approval profile and the issuance profile fully specify that path. What this document adds over deny-and-resubmit is continuity of a single deferred approval and machine-readable refusal hints, at the cost of a revision artifact and a per-dimension narrowing verification.¶

A deployment claims this profile only when it offers or consumes the revision handshake. A Mission Issuer or client that does not implement it remains fully conformant to the deferred approval profile: a revisable-unaware client polling a deferred approval observes only the substrate's ordinary pending responses (Section 6.1).¶

Like the deferred approval profile, this document tracks the in-progress deferred substrate ([I-D.draft-gerber-oauth-deferred-token-response]) and will track it as it evolves.¶

3. Relationship to the Deferred Approval Profile

This document depends normatively on the deferred approval profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval], on the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], and on the deferred substrate [I-D.draft-gerber-oauth-deferred-token-response], and is not implementable alone. It reuses, without restating:¶

• the deferred approval profile's sequencing of the approval event and its state machine;¶

• the issuance profile's Mission Intent, authority derivation, subset rule, and integrity anchors; and¶

• the deferred substrate's deferral response, continuation polling, cancellation, and sender-constraint rules.¶

It uses Proposed Mission as the deferred approval profile defines it.¶

4. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

Revision:

A narrowing of the proposed Mission, submitted by the client while the approval is deferred, that replaces the proposed Mission's Authority Set with a subset of it.¶

5. The Revision-Required State

This profile extends the deferred approval profile's state machine ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]) with one state, revision_required. The Mission Issuer:¶

• MAY move pending to revision_required instead of denied when the client offered revisable (Section 6);¶

• returns revision_required to pending on an accepted revision (Section 6.2);¶

• accepts a revision only while in revision_required;¶

• MUST move revision_required to denied when the revision-cycle bound is reached or no acceptable narrowing remains (Section 6.2); and¶

• moves revision_required to expired when the pending lifetime elapses ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]).¶

Client cancellation under the deferred substrate moves a pending or revision_required approval to cancelled ([I-D.draft-gerber-oauth-deferred-token-response]). approved, denied, expired, and cancelled are the terminal states. Resolving a deferred approval and replacing its proposed Mission with a revision are atomic with respect to each other: a concurrent approval of a proposal that a revision has superseded cannot commit, and a revision accepted after the approval resolved cannot reopen it.¶

       submit (PAR + deferred)
                |
                v
           +---------+   accept revision   +-------------------+
           | pending | <------------------ | revision_required |
           +---------+ ------------------>  +-------------------+
                |        needs narrowing
      approve   |
                v
             approved   (terminal; Mission created active)

   terminal exits from pending or revision_required:
     deny (from revision_required: cycle bound reached or
       no acceptable narrowing)  --> denied     (terminal)
     pending lifetime elapsed    --> expired    (terminal)
     client cancels              --> cancelled  (terminal)

6. Revisable Approval

A client signals that it accepts a narrowing revision by including revisable among its completion_mode values alongside deferred:¶

completion_mode=deferred revisable

revisable is a completion-mode value registered in the deferred substrate's OAuth Completion Mode Values registry (Section 12). It authorizes only the revision handshake defined here. A Mission Issuer MUST NOT invite a revision unless the client offered revisable. revisable has effect only together with deferred; a Mission Issuer that receives revisable without deferred MUST ignore it, because there is no deferred approval to revise.¶

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "authorization_pending",
  "deferral_code": "dc_9P2K7zT1mX8b3N",
  "revision_required": true,
  "revision_handle": "rvh_4QFJ3P9",
  "rejected_scope": "crm:write",
  "rejected_authorization_details": [
    { "type": "payment", "limit": "10000" }
  ],
  "expires_in": 420,
  "interval": 5
}

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "revision_not_narrowing",
  "error_description":
    "The re-derived Authority Set retains journal-entries.write"
}

7. Integration with the Mission Suite

Consent evidence:

A revised proposed Mission is a different disclosure. Where a deployment records Consent Evidence ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]), the re-reviewed revision MUST get a fresh consent_rendering_hash; prior consent does not transfer to the narrowed proposal. Each revision-required outcome produces Consent Evidence with decision narrowed, carrying the reviewed disclosure's consent_rendering_hash and the refused dimensions. The final evidence for the resulting approval MAY carry predecessor_intent_hashes committing the revision chain. The approver recorded on that final evidence is the principal who approved the final, narrowed set.¶

Approval governance:

Each revision_required outcome is interim: no Mission is created, so no Approval Governance Record commits for it, under the atomic commitment rule of Mission Approval Governance ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]). Where an Approval Governance Record is recorded for the final approval, it governs the final approval-governance facts.¶

Shaping:

The rejected_scope and rejected_authorization_details parameters are the machine-readable input a client-side shaper ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]) uses to plan the narrowed revision. Shaping narrows a proposal before submission; this profile narrows it during review. Together they let an orchestrator propose, learn what was refused, and re-propose without losing state.¶

Integrity anchors:

The approval commits the final, narrowed Authority Set. The intent_hash and authority_hash are computed over the revised Mission Intent and Authority Set actually approved, not the originating proposal; where the revision pushed an authorization_details proposal, proposal_hash commits that revised proposal as submitted ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

This profile narrows only, and only while an approval is deferred. It is distinct from widening an approved Mission, which requires a fresh approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).¶

8. Worked Example

Agent s6BhdRkqt3, acting for alice, proposes a Mission to reconcile Q3 invoices that asks for both read and write on the ERP. It expresses the ask in the Intent and pushes no authorization_details proposal, so no proposal_hash is committed; a proposal-carrying request revises the pushed proposal the same way (Section 6.2). It submits the Mission Intent through PAR and opts in to both deferral and revision on the token request:¶

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=authorization_code&code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA&
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
completion_mode=deferred%20revisable

The Mission Issuer routes the proposed Mission to alice for review and defers. The agent polls with the deferred grant type. On review alice approves read but not write. Rather than deny, the Mission Issuer narrows and invites a revision, extending the pending response:¶

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{ "error": "authorization_pending",
  "deferral_code": "dfc_7M2R4kP9sT1x",
  "revision_required": true,
  "revision_handle": "rvh_4QFJ3P9wZ2",
  "rejected_authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["journal-entries.write"] } ],
  "expires_in": 540, "interval": 5 }

Where the deployment records Consent Evidence ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]), this revision-required outcome is recorded with decision narrowed, carrying the reviewed disclosure's consent_rendering_hash and the refused dimensions; the anchor values are those of that profile's worked disclosure and test vector:¶

{
  "evidence_id": "cns_5tN8wQ2rD6",
  "mission": {
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "intent_hash":
      "sha-256:6mIFoCz79uCHNzKLfBpBwqFjoFXdpmpuc65486IqimQ",
    "authority_hash":
      "sha-256:vUCCfjGulit9u0qJ0Z6pQSNerZtXMqRlfJNCr4PzLro"
  },
  "approver": {
    "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
    "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR"
  },
  "narrowed_at": "2026-06-30T18:02:00Z",
  "decision": "narrowed",
  "refused_dimensions": {
    "rejected_authorization_details": [
      { "type": "mission_resource_access",
        "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
        "actions": ["journal-entries.write"] }
    ]
  },
  "policy_version": "approval-policy:v12",
  "sequence": 91427,
  "disclosure": {
    "uri": "https://as.example.com/consent-evidence/disc_4pQ9z",
    "consent_rendering_hash":
      "sha-256:y-XRrRqSKkeR6mjgXKqcM2DW8FMOwrjOqzZwjb1rNqY"
  },
  "evidence_envelope": {
    "format": "jws-compact",
    "value": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImNvbnNlbnQt..."
  }
}

No Mission exists yet, so the mission descriptor carries the proposal's anchors and no id.¶

The agent pushes a narrowed Mission Intent, dropping the write, to PAR with the revision handle:¶

POST /par HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

mission_intent=%7B%22intent%22%3A
  %7B...read-only%20Q3%20invoices...%7D%7D&
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
revision_handle=rvh_4QFJ3P9wZ2

The Mission Issuer verifies the handle, confirms the revised Authority Set is a subset of the proposed one, updates the deferred approval, and returns it to pending. alice reviews the narrowed read-only proposal, presented as a fresh disclosure with its own rendering (Section 7), and approves it; the recorded approver is alice, the principal who approved the final set. The agent keeps polling the same deferral_code, which now resolves to a Mission-bound token over the final, narrowed authority:¶

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{ "access_token": "eyJ...",
  "token_type": "DPoP",
  "expires_in": 300,
  "authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"],
      "constraints": { "period": "2026-Q3" } } ],
  "mission_id": "msn_5Jt9wX4kP7rN2vQ8yL3sD6zB0mF1hG-" }

The token carries the mission claim and its authority_hash as the issuance profile defines. The agent never abandoned its request; the approval resolved over the narrowed proposal, and the committed authority_hash is over the read-only Authority Set actually approved.¶

9. Conformance

A Mission Issuer conforming to this profile is a conforming Mission Issuer of the deferred approval profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]) and MUST additionally:¶

• offer a revision only when the client signaled revisable;¶

• enforce that a revision is a subset of the proposed Mission under the issuance profile's subset rule, never a broadening;¶

• treat each revision_handle as single-use and sender-constrained to the deferred approval; and¶

• commit the approval over the final narrowed Authority Set.¶

A client conforming to this profile MUST:¶

• treat a revision-required response as unapproved;¶

• submit only narrowing revisions; and¶

• continue polling the existing deferral_code.¶

10. Security Considerations

The deferred substrate's and the deferred approval profile's security considerations apply in full, including:¶

• deferral-code entropy;¶

• sender-constraint continuity;¶

• cancellation;¶

• oracle resistance; and¶

• the approval-event authentication requirements on the asynchronous review surface.¶

This section adds only what the revision handshake introduces.¶

• Narrowing only. A revision MUST NOT broaden the proposed Mission on any dimension. The Mission Issuer enforces the subset relation per parameter (scope, resource, authorization_details) before re-review.¶

• Single-use handle. A revision_handle MUST be invalidated after one submission, success or failure. A new handle is issued on a subsequent revision-required response.¶

• Sender-constraint continuity. The handle MUST be sender-constrained to the same key as the deferral_code. An attacker holding the handle without the key cannot push a revision.¶

• Handle lifetime. The handle lifetime MUST NOT exceed the remaining lifetime of the deferral_code, and SHOULD be shorter when the handle is exposed to orchestration layers outside the OAuth client.¶

• Stale consent. A re-reviewed revision MUST be presented to the reviewer as a new disclosure with a fresh consent commitment (Section 7); prior consent does not transfer.¶

• Policy disclosure. rejected_scope and rejected_authorization_details can reveal policy boundaries; a Mission Issuer SHOULD disclose only the minimum needed to narrow and MAY omit them.¶

• Revision bounding. The revision-cycle bound and the mandatory access_denied resolution at the bound (Section 6.2) keep a client from driving an unbounded reshape-and-retry loop to wear down a reviewer. A Mission Issuer SHOULD log excessive revision cycles as a security event.¶

11. Privacy Considerations

The rejected-dimension parameters and the revision history reveal what authority an agent sought and was refused. A Mission Issuer SHOULD treat them as sensitive, minimize what it discloses, and retain revision history under the same controls as other approval-event records.¶

12. IANA Considerations

This document registers one value in the OAuth Completion Mode Values registry established by the deferred substrate ([I-D.draft-gerber-oauth-deferred-token-response]):¶

• revisable: Change Controller IETF; Reference this document, Section 6.¶

This document registers the following in the "OAuth Parameters" registry. For each: Change Controller IETF; Reference this document, Section 6.1.¶

• revision_required (token response)¶

• revision_handle (token response)¶

• revision_handle (authorization request)¶

• rejected_scope (token response)¶

• rejected_authorization_details (token response)¶

The revision_handle (authorization request) usage location covers the handle when the client presents it on the pushed revision submission to the PAR endpoint (Section 6.2). PAR [RFC9126] carries the narrowed Mission Intent as an authorization-request parameter without a distinct usage location, so that pushed Intent needs no separate registration, as the issuance profile states ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

This document registers the following in the "OAuth Extensions Error" registry:¶

• Name: revision_not_narrowing¶

• Usage Location: token error response¶

• Protocol Extension: Mission Approval Revision (this document)¶

• Change Controller: IETF¶

• Reference: this document, Section 6.3¶

13. References

Acknowledgments

This document is part of the Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 work and extends Mission Deferred Approval with an experimental narrowing-revision handshake.¶

Author's Address