| Internet-Draft | OAuth Mission Continuation | October 2026 |
| McGuinness | Expires 28 April 2027 | [Page] |
This document profiles authorization continuity for Mission-Bound Authorization. A Mission is the durable, grant-anchored record of what work remains authorized, under which constraints, on whose approval. Mission Continuation binds that authorization to an identity-continuity transport that re-establishes who is acting, so a Mission's work continues across hops and over time without re-presenting the original credential and without widening authority. The Identity Continuation Assertion, async delegation, and cross-domain projection are the transports; the Mission binds all of them under one invariant: a continuation handle grants nothing.¶
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Long-running and multi-hop agentic work conflates three questions that must stay separate:¶
identity continuity: who is acting, and how that identity legitimately continues, whether across hops within a trust domain or across a trust boundary;¶
authorization continuity: what work remains authorized, under which constraints, on whose approval; and¶
execution-time evidence: what was actually done at each continued hop.¶
Identity-continuity mechanisms answer only the first. The Identity Continuation Assertion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]), async delegation ([I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]), and cross-domain projection ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]) each carry an acting identity onward, but none of them answers whether the work is still authorized, or within what bounds, beyond whatever a token happens to embed. Mission-Bound Authorization ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) answers the second: the Mission is the approved, constrained, state-gated, revocable record of the work.¶
This document connects the two, and adds the evidence that ties each continued action back to the Mission. It is transport-agnostic: it defines what a Mission requires of any identity-continuity transport, and it profiles the three transports above. It defines no new token type, grant type, or endpoint of its own; it constrains how the transports' existing mechanisms carry a Mission's authorization. Its place in the family is the Continue verb of the architecture ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]).¶
This document is optional and experimental: adopt it for evaluation, not as a stable interface. It is a profile layered between the issuance profile and an identity-continuity transport, not a change to either. A deployment that implements [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] and never continues a Mission across a transport is fully conformant to that profile and is unaffected by this document.¶
It defines no new token type, grant type, or endpoint of its own. No Standards-Track document depends on this one.¶
A Mission Issuer claims conformance to this document only when it continues a Mission across an Identity Continuation, async delegation, or cross-domain projection hop under the requirements of Section 4; otherwise it remains a plain issuance-profile Mission Issuer. Nothing here places a new requirement back on the issuance profile.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terms Mission, Authority Set, approval event,
Mission state, active, and derivation from
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]. It additionally defines:¶
The act of obtaining a fresh credential for a Mission's work after the original credential is unavailable or the acting identity must be re-established, without a new approval and without widening authority.¶
An identity-continuity mechanism that carries an acting identity onward and, under this profile, a reference to the Mission whose authorization is continued. This document profiles three (see Section 6).¶
A point at which a Mission's authorization has been established and from which a continuation may proceed.¶
An opaque reference that names an accepted hop. A continuation handle is not a credential (see Section 5). It differs from the async delegation transport's delegation handle (Section 6.2), an access token that carries authority.¶
The record binding a continuation to exactly one Mission. A rooting anchor is grant-anchored (durable) or session-anchored (see Section 4).¶
A credential a transport issues for a Mission's work as the result of a continuation.¶
This profile keeps the three continuities of Section 1 apart and assigns each an owner.¶
Identity continuity is owned by a Continuation Transport, never by this profile. This profile is transport-agnostic and states the requirements a transport MUST meet to carry a Mission continuation (Section 6).¶
Authorization continuity is owned by the Mission (Section 4).¶
Execution-time evidence is owned by the runtime and recorded against the Mission (Section 7).¶
The separation exists to prevent one failure: a transport that embeds authorization detail being treated as self-authorizing, so that possession of a continued credential substitutes for the Mission's live state. The invariant of Section 5 forbids exactly this.¶
The whole profile rests on one invariant:¶
A continuation handle grants nothing. It names an accepted hop. Every
continued grant re-passes the Mission's active gate. Continuity is
never authority.¶
Concretely: possession of a continuation handle, a refresh token, or any other transport artifact MUST NOT be treated as evidence that the work is still authorized. Authorization is established only by deriving a subset of the Mission's Authority Set under a live state check (Section 4) at each issuance. A relying party MUST NOT make an authorization decision from the mere existence or contents of a continuation artifact.¶
The family already holds this line elsewhere: the harness binds session continuity to Mission state and never to authority ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness]), and the UMA binding's persisted-claims token is a continuation handle that grants nothing while every requesting-party token re-passes fresh assessment ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-uma]). This profile generalizes the same rule to the OAuth transports.¶
A Continuation Transport carries an acting identity onward and a reference to the Mission being continued. Each transport MUST identify the accepted hop through a reference that resolves to the Mission's rooting anchor. Possession of that reference alone MUST NOT be treated as evidence that the Mission's work remains authorized. The reference can be a continuation handle, which is not a credential (Section 2), or a credential the transport defines, such as a refresh token (Section 6.2, Section 6.3). Every transport, whatever its wire mechanism, also MUST:¶
re-establish the acting identity at each hop and bind the continued credential to a confirmed key held by that identity; and¶
convey no authorization the Mission did not derive under Section 4.¶
This profile defines both cross-workload continuation (a different workload continues the Mission at the next hop) and over-time continuation (the same workload continues after its credential is gone). Neither is a universal mandatory-to-implement capability: a binding realizes the transports its substrate supports (Section 8). The three transports below partition the space this profile addresses.¶
The Identity Continuation Assertion
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]) is the
multi-hop, cross-workload transport among Resource Authorization Servers
that trust a common IdP authorization server (IdP). A Continuation
Assertion Issuer attests that a Resource Authorization Server accepted
an earlier ID-JAG and that its authorization remains active; the acting
workload presents that assertion to the IdP as an [RFC8693] subject
token and redeems the onward ID-JAG it receives at the next Resource
Authorization Server. Under this
profile the assertion's identity_continuation_handle MUST resolve to a
Mission rooting anchor; the issued ID-JAG's authorization detail MUST be a
subset of that Mission's Authority Set, state-gated, and lifetime-clamped
per Section 4; and the ID-JAG MUST be bound
([RFC9449]) to the acting identity's key.¶
The root ID-JAG
(Section 5.1.1 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion])
and each onward ID-JAG MUST identify the originating Mission by
carrying its mission claim ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission],
Section "Mission Claim") with that Mission's id, issuer and
expires_at. A Resource Authorization Server MUST refuse with
invalid_grant to redeem such an ID-JAG whose mission claim lacks
expires_at. A Resource Authorization Server's local access token
issued on such an ID-JAG MUST preserve that mission reference, and a
local token from which further credentials are issued MUST carry its
expires_at.¶
The IdP's hop record is continuation state, not an additional grant
lineage ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Binding the
Mission to the Grant"). A Resource Authorization Server's association
of a continuation handle with the authorization state it establishes is
not by itself a Mission grant binding; a redeemable grant lineage that
server establishes and maps to the Mission is one. That draft records
that the base ID-JAG profile recommends against a Resource
Authorization Server issuing a refresh token
(Section 6 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]); a
refresh-token family such a server creates by exception is a
destination-side
Mission grant binding, under the Mission's authority, state, expiry and
termination rules (Section 4). The ID-JAG's own
expiry bounds only its redemption, not that family's lifetime, which the
Mission's expires_at bounds.¶
The root exchange can coincide with a cross-domain projection exchange ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]) where both profiles' conditions hold. The two are not the same exchange in general, and where they coincide, both profiles' restrictions apply.¶
The IdP authorizes each continuation under the chain authorization
recorded at the root exchange and current policy, and that draft leaves
whether a requested action serves the authorized work to deployment
policy
(Section 5.5.3 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion],
Appendix A.5 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]);
under this profile the Mission answers it. A chain's lifecycle anchor
(Section 6.1 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion])
is its rooting anchor: the Mission's grant, which can carry unattended
work past logout, or a session bound to it. A Mission's terminal state
withdraws permission to continue and ends the chain
(Section 6.2 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]).
A refusal at this exchange uses that draft's codes
(Section 5.5.6 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]),
in place of the issuance profile's invalid_request: a terminal Mission
is invalid_continuation, a suspended Mission is unauthorized_client,
no remaining authority for the audience is invalid_target, and a
derivation or hop-count limit is invalid_grant. The issuance
profile's requirements for the mission_error diagnostic
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) apply unchanged.
The assertion carries no user subject: the IdP resolves the subject for
each target from the hop, so continuation preserves the Mission's
subject rather than projecting it; the actor is rebound per hop.¶
Mission delegation depth at this exchange, the depth at which the
issuance profile's per-entry delegation constraints apply
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Delegation
Constraints"), is counted over the selected hop's ancestry as the IdP's
hop records hold it, from the root to that hop, followed by the current
authenticated actor. Only consecutive entries with equal (iss, sub)
merge. The root entry is the Mission's approved client at depth 0, and
each remaining entry adds 1, so the chain A, B, B has depth 1 and A, B,
A has depth 2. Sibling branches, the presented assertion, and any
narrowing of what the onward act discloses do not change the depth
(Section 5.5.5 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]).
At depth 0 the approved agent continues for itself and no delegation
narrowing applies. This transport defines no reset: continuing to
another Resource Authorization Server, or returning to an earlier
actor, never restarts the count. Where the IdP cannot read a hop's
complete ancestry, it issues nothing.¶
The onward ID-JAG conveys each entry's delegation member under the
cross-domain projection rule
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain], Section
"Conveyed Delegation Policy"), so a requested authorization detail
that keeps an omitted delegation exceeds the grant's authority and
is refused. The rule changes only the conveyed copy: the delegation
constraints at this exchange apply at the depth counted above, act
attributes the same actors, and that profile's depth reset does not
apply. The dependency on that profile binds only a deployment that
adopts this transport.¶
Async delegation ([I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]) is the
intra-domain, disconnected, over-time transport, for background jobs,
scheduled tasks, agent queues, and multi-stage orchestration. A
delegated refresh-token family is established at the accepted hop and
redeemed later, after the original credential is gone. Under this profile
the family's delegated authorization state MUST be a subset of the
Mission's Authority Set; the family's absolute maximum delegation lifetime
MUST equal the Mission's expires_at; and the family MUST be invalidated
when the Mission reaches a terminal state, reusing that draft's
family-revocation and reuse-detection rules with the Mission lifecycle as
the trigger.¶
This transport's reference (Section 6) is the presented refresh token. It is bound to its family's delegated authorization state (Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]), through which it resolves to the Mission's rooting anchor, the family's grant binding. Rotation (Section 6 of [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]) preserves that state, and the issuance profile resolves the family, one grant lineage, to the same Mission for its whole lifetime ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Binding the Mission to the Grant"). The refresh token is a credential, not a continuation handle, protected by that draft's client binding (Section 5.2 of [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]).¶
The exchange's subject_token is a delegation handle (Section 4.3 of
[I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]): an access token whose
audience is the acting client's own client_id, sender-constrained to
the acting client's key. A Mission Issuer MUST refuse a
subject_token whose audience is not the authenticated acting client,
including a Mission access token audienced to a resource, and MUST
require proof of possession of the subject_token's own confirmation
key; client authentication never satisfies that sender constraint.¶
An agent obtains its delegation handle with a Token Exchange that
presents its own Mission access token, proves possession of that
token's key, and names its own client_id as audience. The
delegation handle keeps that key and carries the presented token's
authority narrowed by the Mission's current effective authority. The
exchange is a no-actor self-exchange under the issuance profile's
Self-Exchange Down-Scoping rules
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A dispatched Mission's
selected Agent instead redeems the Template profile's Dispatch Handoff
for its delegation handle
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template]), unless it is also
the Dispatcher (the same authenticated client), which obtains its
delegation handle through this exchange from the instance's access
token.¶
This is the "scheduled continuation roots in durable
authorization" case: the Mission is that durable authorization. Successive
refreshes within one family are one delegation and are not counted again
against derivation_limit (Section 4).¶
Establishing the family is a delegation-family-creating exchange, and a
client that loses the response retries with a fresh, valid proof; without
an idempotency identifier that retry mints a second live refresh-token
family. The exchange therefore carries creation_request_id, the
creation idempotency identifier of
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]. The parameter is
REQUIRED; a Mission Issuer MUST refuse an exchange missing it with
invalid_request. Its syntax, the (client, creation_request_id)
key uniqueness, fingerprint comparison, reservation ownership,
tombstone retention against the published retry horizon, and the
revalidation rules are that profile's, applied by reference and not
redefined here. A refresh-token family is not a Mission: its delivery
and recovery are defined below, not by that profile's
Mission-creation recovery.¶
In the operation fingerprint, op is async-delegation; iss and
client are as the expansion profile defines them; source is the
mission_id of the base Mission resolved from subject_token, never
the raw token; cnf is the acting client's verified confirmation,
which is the delegation handle's own key; proposal is the parsed
authorization_details array
naming the requested confined subset, when present; resource is the
target the family is audienced to; and request_refresh_token is the
parameter selecting this exchange. A repetition whose fingerprint
differs is refused with invalid_request.¶
The operation passes through three states. It is reserved when the
(client, creation_request_id) reservation is acquired, before any
side effect; family-created once the family and its single derivation
count exist, committed atomically, with the family's identity
recorded on the reservation; and completed once the response is
delivered. A derivation-gate rejection or creation failure
invalidates the provisional family and records the refusal, replayed
to a matching retry.¶
Recovery is delivery of the recorded family, never a second family
and never a second derivation count. A revalidated retry (the same
authenticated client proving possession of the recorded cnf, with a
matching fingerprint) recovers by state: a reserved operation yields
a retryable in-progress result; a family-created operation resumes
delivery, issuing the recorded family's initial tokens; a completed
operation returns the stored response while the initial refresh
token is unissued or unconsumed.¶
Consumption of the initial refresh token proves delivery: the client
held the response and rotated on it. Once it is consumed, the
operation is delivered and creation recovery MUST be refused with
invalid_grant; the client continues on the family's current refresh
token. A rotating refresh-token family is a single lineage
([RFC9700]); recovery MUST NOT mint an independent sibling refresh
token into it.¶
Cross-domain projection
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]) is the
cross-boundary transport: a single-hop grant that carries a Mission into a
partner trust domain, where a Resource Authorization Server mints a local
token bounded by the projected authority. This profile adds nothing to
projection's wire. Its reference (Section 6) is the Mission's
refresh token, which the projection exchange presents as its
subject_token and which resolves to exactly one Mission. The
cross-domain grant it yields is the continued grant, and carries the
mission claim naming that Mission
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]). It requires that
a Mission continued in the partner domain remains subject to this
profile there: continuation handles minted in the partner domain grant
nothing, and continued grants re-derive a
subset of the projected authority under the partner's state view.
Projection stays single-hop regardless of intra-domain continuation on
either side of the boundary.¶
Each action taken under a continued credential is a decision point that produces execution evidence and a Mission Receipt ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]), recorded against the Mission.¶
Under this profile that evidence MUST additionally record the continuation
hop's identifiers: the continued credential's jti and the Mission lineage it
carries (the mission claim's parent lineage or the resolved continuation
handle). An action taken through a continuation therefore attributes to
both the Mission that authorized it and the specific hop that carried the
authorization, so that a reviewer can reconstruct which continuation, of
possibly many under one Mission, produced a given effect.¶
This is an OAuth-wire profile, not a substrate requirement. The Mission
substrate restates no definition, and the continuity requirements of
Section 4 are applications of existing substrate
requirements (the Mission identifier, active-gated issuance, the subset
rule, revocation, and the anchors) rather than new obligations. A binding
therefore realizes continuation through its own surfaces, not through a
substrate row. Two non-OAuth bindings dispose of continuation as a
composition consequence.¶
AAuth ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]): over-time continuation is
native and needs no new transport. The mission reference (the
approving Person Server and s256) is a handle that grants nothing,
and the Person Server's state-gated, one-hour auth-token issuance and
federation is the continuation point, with revocation latency bounded
by the auth-token lifetime.¶
The cross-workload transports of this profile have no AAuth
substrate (AAuth has no token exchange, no act chain, and no ID-JAG),
and AAuth declines cross-hop authority carry-forward by design: a chained
hop is a fresh decision at its own decision point. AAuth-native
cross-workload continuation is therefore deferred work. AAuth over-time
continuation is scoped to the Person-Server-mediated, attributed path; an
AAuth federated re-issuance in Reference-only mode, where the Access
Server does not carry the Mission members, is a fresh federated decision,
not a Mission continuation, and is out of scope for this profile.¶
UMA ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-uma]): the persisted-claims token is the continuation handle and already realizes the grants-nothing invariant, with every requesting-party token re-passing fresh assessment.¶
Continuation handle theft yields no authority. Because a continuation handle grants nothing (Section 5), an attacker who steals one cannot obtain a continued grant without also satisfying the transport's identity re-establishment and key confirmation and passing the Mission's live state gate. This is the property that makes conveying a continuation handle through an intermediary safe: the intermediary gains no ability to act. A delegation handle does carry authority, and its sender constraint (Section 6.2) withholds that authority from a holder without the acting client's key. Neither the handle-theft claim nor the safe-intermediary claim extends to a transport reference that is a credential, such as a refresh token: a stolen refresh token protected only as a bearer credential can mint access tokens until detection, revocation or expiry (Section 11 of [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]).¶
Revocation latency for a continuation is bounded by the shorter of the continued credential's remaining lifetime and the transport's re-issuance interval, and never exceeds the Mission's expiry (Section 4). Terminating a Mission stops future continuation immediately but does not shorten a credential already issued; deployments requiring tighter bounds choose shorter transport lifetimes.¶
Replay is a transport concern this profile does not relax: the
Identity Continuation Assertion is single-use, keyed on (iss, jti)
(Section 5.5.7 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]),
and an async
delegation family rotates on each refresh with reuse detection over the
family. A continuation MUST NOT widen authority; the subset check of
Section 4 is enforced at every issuance, so a
compromised transport cannot escalate beyond the Mission's Authority Set.
Continued grants are audience-confined by their transport, limiting a
confused-deputy hop to the audiences the Mission already reaches.¶
Continuation preserves the Mission's subject rather than minting a new one, and the transports resolve audience-local subjects where they resolve a subject at all, so a continued Mission does not become a cross-audience correlation handle. The Identity Continuation Assertion carries no user subject, and its handles are hop-specific, but the IdP and a hop's participants can still correlate a chain (Section 10 of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]). Continuation handles are opaque and carry no authorization detail, so their exposure discloses neither the subject nor the granted authority.¶
This document has no IANA actions. The token types, grant types, and metadata parameters used by the transports are registered by their respective documents ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion], [I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]); this profile constrains their use and introduces none of its own.¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
The Identity Continuation Transport requires the root and onward
ID-JAGs to identify the originating Mission through the mission
claim, expires_at included, refuses a redemption without it, and
requires a Resource Authorization Server's local access token to
preserve it. It also places the hop record, a Resource Authorization
Server's handle association and any refresh family against grant
bindings, and says when the root exchange coincides with cross-domain
projection (#1589, D726).¶
Continuation Transports requires each transport to identify the accepted hop through a reference that resolves to the Mission's rooting anchor, and forbids treating possession of that reference alone as evidence that the work remains authorized. The reference no longer has to be a non-credential: the async delegation and cross-domain transports' references are refresh tokens. This is a normative applicability correction; the Grants-Nothing Invariant is unchanged (#1588). Execution-Time Evidence names the continuation hop's identifiers, so the term does not read as that reference.¶
The async transport's handle is called a delegation handle, an access token carrying authority, distinct from a continuation handle; the Rooting and Termination requirements name the continuation handle; and the document calls itself a profile, not a binding. No requirement changed.¶
The Identity Continuation Transport's onward ID-JAG conveys
delegation under the cross-domain projection rule, so a requested
authorization detail that keeps an omitted member exceeds the
grant's authority; the transport's depth count and act attribution
are unchanged, with no depth reset (#1374).¶
The Identity Continuation Transport's codes replace the issuance
profile's Token Exchange code, now invalid_request; the codes
themselves are unchanged (#1154).¶
Aligned with the published Identity Continuation Assertion (-02): the
transport runs among Resource Authorization Servers that trust a
common IdP, its assertion issuer is the Continuation Assertion
Issuer, the Mission binds the chain authorization, lifecycle anchor,
and chain ending, single use is keyed on (iss, jti), and Privacy
Considerations notes that a chain remains correlatable (#906).¶
The Identity Continuation Transport states the refusal codes at that
exchange, those of the Identity Continuation Assertion in place of
the issuance profile's invalid_grant, as the issuance profile
permits for a Token Exchange profile that assigns its own code. The
mission_error diagnostic requirements are unchanged (#921).¶
The Identity Continuation Transport states how Mission delegation depth is counted there: over the hop's IdP-held ancestry plus the current actor, merging only consecutive equal actors, from the approved client at depth 0, with no reset, and with nothing issued when the ancestry is incomplete (#960).¶
A dispatched Mission enters the async delegation transport through its selected Agent, which redeems the Template profile's Dispatch Handoff for a delegation handle of its own (#1158).¶
The async delegation transport's subject_token is a delegation
handle: its audience is the acting client and possession of its own
key is proved at the exchange, as Section 4.3 of the async delegation
draft requires, replacing the re-binding to the acting key. An agent
obtains its handle with a no-actor self-exchange naming its own
client_id as audience (#1157).¶
A dispatched Mission's selected Agent that is also its Dispatcher obtains its delegation handle through that self-exchange, from the instance's access token, instead of the Dispatch Handoff (#1195).¶