| Internet-Draft | OAuth Mission Template | November 2026 |
| McGuinness | Expires 8 May 2027 | [Page] |
An agent that runs a recurring task at machine speed cannot pause for a fresh human approval at every run, and a standing Mission broad enough to cover every run gives the agent that full breadth the whole time. This document defines an experimental option between the two: the Mission Template. A human consents once to a template: a ceiling of resources, actions, and constraints, a dispatch policy, and a set of bounds. Each run is then a Dispatch: the Mission Issuer instantiates an ordinary Mission from the template by policy, with no fresh human approval, and the instance is handed to its agent, which works it with ordinary Mission-bound tokens. Each instance is bounded by its own freshly derived Authority Set, is independently gated and revocable, and never exceeds the template ceiling. High-consequence authority classes stay on a fresh human decision, apart from one optional exception for recurring payment of approved invoices to committed destinations under an exact budget. Consent is given once, to the ceiling; dispatch draws within it deterministically.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
A recurring task runs many times: once per ticket, per document, per scheduled window. Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (the "issuance profile") commits a Mission's authority at a human approval event. A fresh human approval at every run does not scale to machine speed. The alternative, a single standing Mission broad enough to cover every run, over-provisions: the agent holds the full breadth the whole time.¶
This document defines an experimental third option: the Mission Template. A human consents once to a template, which fixes a ceiling of resources, actions, and constraints, names a dispatch policy, and publishes a set of bounds. Each dispatch then instantiates an ordinary Mission from the template by that policy, at machine speed, with no fresh human approval. Consent is given once, to the ceiling; each instance draws within it deterministically. The agent never holds the template: it obtains each dispatched instance and works it as it works any Mission (Section 4).¶
This follows the architecture's Approve verb: a deterministic, versioned policy can approve at machine speed within a ceiling a human consented to, because the policy approves the instance and a human approved the policy, with a policy version keeping that chain re-checkable ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]). The accountable principal for every dispatched Mission is the human who approved the template. The high-consequence classes stay on a fresh human decision, exactly as that verb requires (Section 9), with one optional exception: recurring payment of approved invoices to committed destinations under an exact budget (Section 9.1). Other unattended high-consequence work needs a directly approved Mission.¶
This document is optional and experimental: adopt it for evaluation, not as a stable interface. Removing the per-dispatch human from a consented template is a high-consequence capability, so this document conditions it on the ceiling, the bounds, the prohibited-class rule, and the audit linkage it requires. An ordinary human-approved Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) remains the better fit where each run can carry its own approval. No Standards-Track document depends on this one.¶
A Mission Issuer that does not implement this document creates every Mission through a fresh human approval and is a fully conforming issuance-profile Mission Issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Nothing here places a new requirement back on the issuance profile.¶
This document depends normatively on the issuance profile
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] and on the Consent Evidence
profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence], and is
not implementable alone. It reuses, without restating, the issuance
profile's approval event, integrity-anchor envelope, subset rule,
Authority Set derivation, Mission record, and active/terminated
Mission lifecycle; and the Consent Evidence profile's rule that a
consented object's disclosure is committed. It uses Agent, Subject,
Approver, Mission Issuer, Mission Intent, Authority Set, and Mission
as the issuance profile defines them.¶
The runtime enforcement profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime] is a normative dependency for its action classes, which the prohibited-class rule tests against (Section 9).¶
The expansion profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]
is also a normative dependency: Dispatch adopts its creation
idempotency apparatus (the operation fingerprint, the durable
reservation, revalidation, and recovery-as-delivery) by reference,
under its own op: dispatch fingerprint value, rather than restating
it (Section 7).¶
Progressive authorization ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]) is an informative sibling. Progressive removes the per-expansion human from a consented authority ceiling on a single evolving Mission; this document removes the per-dispatch human from a consented template that mints many independent Missions. Both concentrate one considered human consent to a ceiling in place of many hurried consents, and both hold the high-consequence classes back for a human, this document with one bounded exception (Section 9.1). Where progressive draws a successor within one chain, a template dispatches independent instances.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
All JSON shown in this document is non-normative and illustrative; the member definitions in the surrounding text are authoritative.¶
A consented object that fixes a Template Ceiling, a Dispatch Policy, the allowed dispatchers and recipients, per-instance bounds, and a review cadence, and from which Missions are dispatched by policy without a fresh human approval (Section 5).¶
The pre-consented maximum authority any Mission dispatched from a
Mission Template may reach: an array of authorization-details-shaped
entries, each the shape of an Authority Set entry
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), that every dispatched
instance MUST be within (Section 7). This bound is distinct from
the progressive profile's authority_ceiling on a single evolving
Mission and from the shaping companion's caller-supplied shaping
ceiling on a proposal
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive],
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]).¶
The act of instantiating an ordinary Mission from a Mission Template by policy, at machine speed, with no fresh human approval (Section 7).¶
A Mission dispatched from a Mission Template, also called a dispatched Mission. It is an ordinary Mission (Section 11).¶
The exchange that conveys an instance from its Dispatcher to its selected Agent (Section 8).¶
The authenticated principal that requests a Dispatch. A Dispatcher is not an Approver: it triggers instantiation within a template a human already approved, and its authority to do so is fixed by the template's allowed dispatchers.¶
The deployment-defined policy, identified and versioned, under which the Mission Issuer instantiates a Mission from a Mission Template. It is the policy the human approved when consenting to the template (Section 5), and it is trusted governance held by the Mission Issuer.¶
The deployment-level manifest the architecture defines ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]). The bounds, the action-class mapping, and the review cadence this document requires a deployment to publish are published there.¶
The Consent Evidence profile
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]) already uses
template_id and template_version to name a disclosure-rendering
template, the presentation template a Consent Disclosure object was
rendered from. The Mission Template of this document is a
different object on a different surface: a consented ceiling and
dispatch policy that instances are minted from, not a rendering of a
disclosure. The two never share a member. Where this document commits
a Mission Template's disclosure under Consent Evidence, that
disclosure carries the Consent Evidence profile's template_id and
template_version for its own rendering template, which are unrelated
to the Mission Template being disclosed.¶
This section is non-normative. It shows the roles, the messages from consent to work, and what an agent sees, using one example scenario that later sections continue.¶
| Role | Part in a template's life |
|---|---|
| Approver | The human who consents to the template, and re-consents at each review (Section 6). The accountable principal for every instance. |
| Mission Issuer | Holds the template and its retained consent record, adjudicates each Dispatch, and issues the instance's tokens. |
| Dispatcher | A client in allowed_dispatchers, such as a scheduler or an orchestrator. It requests a Dispatch; it is not an Approver and never chooses the instance's Subject or Agent. |
| Agent | A client in allowed_recipients agents, selected by the Dispatch Policy. It receives the instance and does the work. |
| Resource server | Enforces the instance's tokens as it enforces any Mission-bound token (Section 15). |
Consent, once. The Approver consents to the template at the
Mission Issuer, which commits it under template_hash
(Section 6, Section 5.1).¶
Dispatch, per run. The Dispatcher sends a token request with the Dispatch grant type, naming the template and carrying the run's dispatch intent (Section 7.1). The Mission Issuer adjudicates it against the template (Section 7), commits an ordinary Mission, the instance, selects its Agent, and returns the instance's access token to the Dispatcher, bound to the Dispatcher's key.¶
Handoff. The Dispatcher exchanges that access token for a handoff grant naming the selected Agent as its only redeemer, and passes the grant to the Agent (Section 8) over a channel this document does not define, such as a job queue.¶
Redemption. The Agent redeems the handoff grant, authenticating as itself and proving its own key, and receives its delegation handle for the instance (Section 8.3).¶
Work. The Agent presents the handle in the continuation profile's async delegation exchange ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]), receiving access tokens for the instance's resources and a refresh-token family, and calls resource servers with those tokens.¶
End. The instance ends at its own clamped expires_at or on
revocation, like any Mission. The template stops dispatching when
it is revoked or expires (Section 5.2), and pauses once
its most recent approval is older than review_cadence, until a
human re-consents (Section 6).¶
Approver Dispatcher Mission Issuer Agent Resource | | | | Server |-(1) consent to the template -->| | | | | | | | | |--(2) Dispatch --->| | | | |<-- instance token-| | | | |--(3) handoff ---->| | | | |<-- handoff grant -| | | | |------- handoff grant --------------->| | | | |<-(4) redeem -----| | | | |--- handle ------>| | | | |<-(5) async ------| | | | | delegation | | | | |--- tokens ------>| | | | | |-- call ->|¶
The Agent never holds or presents the template. Only a Dispatcher
names it, by template_id, and only to request a Dispatch. The Agent
works with an instance: an ordinary Mission with its own identifier,
Authority Set, and expires_at. The template member on its tokens
records where the instance came from; it grants nothing
(Section 7.4).¶
An Agent obtains an instance in one of two ways:¶
From a separate Dispatcher. The Dispatcher dispatches and hands the instance off, and the Agent redeems the handoff grant (steps 3 and 4 above).¶
As its own Dispatcher. An Agent that is both an allowed Dispatcher and the instance's selected Agent dispatches, already holds the instance's access token bound to its own key, and obtains its delegation handle through the continuation profile's handle exchange instead of a handoff (Section 8.4).¶
Either way, the instance's authority is at most the Template Ceiling,
narrowed by the run's dispatch intent and any proposal, and never
includes a prohibited class (Section 9) other than a
payment admitted under Section 9.1. Authority beyond
the ceiling takes a fresh human decision: a human-approved expansion
of the instance, which leaves the template behind, or a new template
consent (Section 11). Each run is a separate instance,
and max_active bounds how many are active at once.¶
The examples in this document follow one scenario. alice
(user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR at https://idp.example.com) consents once to
a template for nightly invoice reconciliation at
https://erp.example.com: read invoices, and post journal-entry
adjustments under $500. Each night the ERP's scheduler, the client
erp-scheduler, dispatches an instance for the previous day's
invoices, and the reconciliation agent, the client s6BhdRkqt3, works
it. The Mission Issuer is https://as.example.com. The deployment's
Mission Deployment Profile maps invoices.read to the consequential
read class and journal-entries.write to the reversible consequential
write class, so neither is prohibited (Section 9).¶
A Mission Template is a consented object with these members:¶
id:REQUIRED. A string. The Mission Template Identifier, stable across the template's lifetime.¶
issuer:REQUIRED. A string. The Mission Issuer that holds and dispatches from the template.¶
template_version:REQUIRED. A string. The version of this template's consented content.
A change to any consented member is a new template_version and, per
Section 6, a new human approval.¶
ceiling:REQUIRED. An array of authorization-details-shaped entries, each the shape of an Authority Set entry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). This is the Template Ceiling: the pre-consented maximum any dispatched instance may reach. A ceiling entry MAY name a resource family rather than a single resource, under the resource-narrowing semantics the subset rule fixes ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
dispatch_policy:REQUIRED. An activation policy reference, an object of id,
version, and digest
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance], Section
"Activation Policy Commitment"), identifying the Dispatch Policy under
which the Mission Issuer instantiates from this template and
committing its content. The policy's content is deployment-defined,
and includes the rule that selects the instance's Agent when
allowed_recipients lists more than one (Section 5).
Because template_hash covers this member, the template commits the
exact policy the human consented to, and the Mission Issuer verifies
its digest before each Dispatch under that section's rule, so a
machine-speed dispatch decision stays auditable against the policy
content, not only its identifier.¶
allowed_dispatchers:REQUIRED. A non-empty array of strings, each the client identifier
(client_id) of a principal permitted to dispatch from this
template. A Dispatch request whose authenticated client is not in
this set is refused (Section 7).¶
allowed_recipients:REQUIRED. An object bounding which Subjects and Agents a Mission
dispatched from this template may be created for, with two members,
each a non-empty array: subjects, each an object with iss and
sub identifying a Subject as the issuance profile's subject does,
and agents, each a client_id string.¶
The Mission Issuer establishes the instance's Subject as the
issuance profile requires, never from Dispatcher input
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). It selects the instance's
Agent (the instance's client_id) from agents under the Dispatch
Policy, never from Dispatcher input: with one listed Agent, that
Agent; with several, the Agent the Dispatch Policy's selection rule
names. agents bounds the selection and is not a selection rule;
its order carries no meaning.¶
The Mission Issuer refuses a Dispatch for which no Agent is selected,
whose established Subject does not equal an entry of subjects in
both iss and sub, or whose Agent is not an entry of agents, so
a template cannot mint a Mission for a party the human did not
consent to. The two lists are independent: any listed Agent may
serve any listed Subject, subject to the other Dispatch checks
(Section 7); a deployment that needs restricted pairings uses
separate templates.¶
instance_lifetime:REQUIRED. A positive integer number of seconds. The per-instance
lifetime clamp: a dispatched Mission's expires_at is clamped to no
more than this from its committed created_at (Section 7).¶
max_active:REQUIRED. A positive integer. The maximum number of Missions
dispatched from this template that may be active at once. A
Dispatch that would exceed it is refused until an active instance
terminates.¶
dispatch_rate:REQUIRED. An object with two members, each a positive integer:
limit, a number of instantiations, and window, a number of
seconds. A Dispatch is refused when its instantiation would bring the
instantiations committed from this template within the trailing
window seconds above limit, so a burst of up to limit within one
window is within the bound. Only committed instantiations count: a
refused Dispatch and a recovered retry (Section 7) count nothing.¶
expires_at:REQUIRED. A string, an RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time. The template's own expiry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). After it, the template dispatches nothing.¶
review_cadence:REQUIRED. A positive integer number of seconds. The maximum age of
the template's most recent human approval, measured from that
approval's approved_at (Section 7), past which the Mission Issuer
MUST NOT dispatch (Section 6).¶
The concrete values of instance_lifetime, max_active,
dispatch_rate, and review_cadence, and the action-class mapping the
prohibited-class rule needs (Section 9), MUST be published
in the Mission Deployment Profile
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]).¶
The following is the example scenario's template
(Section 4.4), version 3, as alice consents to it:¶
{
"id": "tmpl_DW1W29qP9RJRbsGyRGa9oJ2u",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"template_version": "3",
"ceiling": [
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["invoices.read"] },
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
"constraints": {
"max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" } } }
],
"dispatch_policy": {
"id": "nightly-reconciliation-dispatch",
"version": "4",
"digest": "sha-256:7irh90epn3d1Nn07PQhhOxwh3j4Mq5EI0_x4w12VDlk"
},
"allowed_dispatchers": ["erp-scheduler"],
"allowed_recipients": {
"subjects": [
{ "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }
],
"agents": ["s6BhdRkqt3"]
},
"instance_lifetime": 28800,
"max_active": 2,
"dispatch_rate": { "limit": 2, "window": 86400 },
"expires_at": "2027-03-31T23:59:59Z",
"review_cadence": 7776000
}
¶
Each instance lives at most eight hours, at most two are active at
once, at most two are committed in any 24 hours, and dispatch pauses
90 days after the most recent approval. The dispatch_policy digest
is illustrative: it commits a policy snapshot this example does not
show.¶
The consented Mission Template is committed by a template_hash,
computed with the issuance profile's integrity-anchor envelope
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]):¶
typ: mission-template;¶
hashed object: the Mission Template object above, canonicalized as the integrity-anchor envelope requires, so member order follows that canonicalization.¶
It is an envelope anchor under the issuance profile's commitment
mechanisms, which this document imports normatively. For the example
template (Section 5), template_hash is
sha-256:sAW-wLGtkDjse3U_XfPYZz-WnqC5uBP64ZYlGqCDxz4.¶
template_hash is to the template what authority_hash is to a
Mission's Authority Set: the anchor over the consented object. It plays
the same role the progressive profile's ceiling_hash plays for a
consented authority ceiling
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]). A dispatched
Mission commits its own intent_hash and authority_hash over its own
Intent and final Authority Set (Section 7); the template commits the
ceiling once, under template_hash. The Mission's anchors and the
template's anchor are never merged.¶
A Mission Template has its own lifecycle, distinct from the Mission lifecycle of the Missions it dispatches ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"). A template is in one of three states:¶
active: the template dispatches, subject to its bounds and review
cadence;¶
revoked: a human or administrator has retired the template; it
dispatches nothing;¶
expired: the template is past its expires_at; it dispatches
nothing.¶
Revoking or expiring a template stops further dispatch. It does not
retroactively terminate Missions already dispatched: each runs to its
own clamped expires_at and is independently revocable
(Section 11). A deployment that needs a faster cutoff on
outstanding instances uses a short instance_lifetime or revokes the
instances directly, exactly as the issuance profile bounds an ordinary
Mission's outstanding tokens.¶
Creating a Mission Template is itself a human approval under the
issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). It creates
no Mission, so it is not an approval event: it is the standing consent
under which each dispatched instance's approval event is decided. Its
consent object is the Mission Template: the human consents to the
ceiling, the
dispatch policy, the allowed dispatchers and recipients, and the
bounds, and the approval commits them under template_hash
(Section 5.1), the anchor over the object consented to.¶
Template consent also establishes the authority source the template's
instances draw on, under the issuance profile's rules: from trusted
configuration or authenticated governance state, never from client
assertion, with the consenting human authorized to activate it
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Approval").
The Mission Issuer MUST retain that source, including an
organizational source's policy reference, with its authenticated
record of the consent to that exact template_version. Like a
Mission's authority_source, it is provenance outside
template_hash; using another source or policy version takes a new
template_version and a fresh human approval.¶
Where Consent Evidence is claimed, the template-creation approval's
disclosure is committed as that profile commits any disclosure
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]). The template
is consented before any Mission exists, so, as the Consent Evidence
profile already handles for an approval that commits no Mission, the
disclosure and its evidence carry the Mission Issuer's issuer and the
committed anchor and no Mission id.¶
The consent disclosure MUST render, at minimum:¶
the Template Ceiling, as the maximum authority any dispatched Mission may reach;¶
that instances issue at machine speed, by policy, with no per-instance human approval; and¶
that the high-consequence classes (Section 9) are never dispatched by policy and still require a fresh human decision, other than an operation the template admits under Section 9.1, whose disclosure that section adds.¶
A consent that does not render these is standing dispatch authority obtained by omission. A template the human did not knowingly consent to is not a Mission Template under this document.¶
This paragraph binds only a deployment that also adopts Mission
Derivation Limits
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits]). The
Dispatch Policy states the rule that establishes each instance's
derivation_limit and its maximum, if any, so template_hash
commits them. The consent disclosure MUST render them as that
document's Approval Rendering section requires, beside max_active
and dispatch_rate: each instance establishes and counts its own
limit, so one consent admits up to max_active such limits at once
and more over time.¶
A Mission Template's consent is standing consent, and standing consent
decays. The Mission Issuer MUST NOT dispatch from a template whose most
recent human approval is older than the published review_cadence
(Section 5): dispatch stops until a fresh human approval
re-consents, or narrows, the template. The review approval is an
ordinary template-creation approval; its disclosure SHOULD render the
template's dispatch record since the prior review, so the reviewer sees
the cycle they renew.¶
A Dispatch instantiates an ordinary Mission from a Mission Template. It
is submitted on the binding's existing Mission creation surface as a
single authenticated back-channel request that references the template
by id and carries the dispatch intent, and it is answered in one
round trip. This document defines no new endpoint and no new
authorization server metadata: dispatch is a non-interactive Mission
creation under the pre-consented template, at the token endpoint under
the grant type this document defines (Section 7.1).¶
Because the human decision was made once, at template creation, a
Dispatch uses no Pushed Authorization Request, no front-channel
authorization request, and no interactive consent surface, and the
Mission Issuer never answers a Dispatch with authorization_pending:
there is no pending human step to wait for. A deployment that needs a
human in the loop for a given run does not dispatch it; it creates an
ordinary Mission through a fresh approval.¶
This document binds Dispatch to the token endpoint through a dedicated grant type, adding no new endpoint. A Dispatcher requests an instance with:¶
grant_type:REQUIRED. urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:mission-dispatch.¶
template_id:mission_intent:REQUIRED. The dispatch submission, in the issuance profile's
Mission Intent Submission envelope shape
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): its intent is the
dispatch intent from which the instance Authority Set is derived
(Section 7), and its OPTIONAL evidence array carries Intent
Submission Evidence under that profile's dispatch, refusal, and
never-authority rules and those of
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-submission-evidence].¶
authorization_details:OPTIONAL. The Dispatcher's authority proposal: the standard
[RFC9396] parameter carried on the same token request, itself
ordinary [RFC9396] token-request usage. This parameter is this
grant's proposal carriage, replacing the issuance profile's
PAR-only carriage rule; that profile's validation, derivation,
recording, and hashing semantics apply unchanged
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). It is a proposal, never
authority: it bounds the derivation of step 4 of Section 7 in
narrowing mode, and the double intersection of step 5 applies to
the result unchanged, so a proposal narrows the instance and never
widens it beyond the Template Ceiling. Absent a proposal, the
instance derives from the dispatch intent alone. An instance
created from a Dispatch carrying one records proposed_authority,
its proposal_hash recorded or implied.¶
dispatch_event_id:REQUIRED. The dispatch event identifier that makes the Dispatch idempotent (Section 7). A redemption bearing an identifier the Mission Issuer has already committed MUST return the previously committed instance and MUST NOT derive a second Mission.¶
The Dispatcher authenticates at the token endpoint with its own client
credential; the Mission Issuer authorizes it against the template's
allowed_dispatchers as step 2 of Section 7 requires. The request
names no Agent. The Mission Issuer selects the instance's Agent
(Section 5), and that selection is separate from the
Dispatcher's authentication and from the presenter binding of the
returned access token, which is sender-constrained to the
Dispatcher's key. This grant
performs exactly one creation derivation per dispatch_event_id: the
adjudication order of Section 7 runs once for a new identifier, and
a repeated identifier is gated to the previously committed instance
rather than a fresh creation. A retry is recovery of that instance's
delivery (Section 7.3): returning the delivered access
token counts nothing, and minting a replacement delivery counts once
under ordinary issuance accounting. This is the single creation
derivation the Dispatch performs per dispatch event; a Dispatch Handoff's
exchange and its redemption (Section 8) are each a further
derivation.¶
On success the Mission Issuer responds with an access token bound to the instance, sender-constrained to the Dispatcher's key:¶
access_token:REQUIRED. A Mission-bound access token for the dispatched instance.¶
token_type:REQUIRED. The token type of the issued access token, reflecting the
sender-constraining mechanism in use (DPoP where the deployment
uses DPoP).¶
expires_in:REQUIRED. The access token's lifetime in seconds.¶
mission_id:REQUIRED. The dispatched Mission's identifier.¶
mission_expires_at:REQUIRED. The instance's effective Mission expiry, the issuance
profile's common Mission-creating response member
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). expires_in above
describes only the access token.¶
authorization_details:REQUIRED. The instance's committed Authority Set.¶
A Dispatch refused under Section 7 or Section 9 carries
the OAuth error member together with mission_denial_reason
(Section 10), exactly as any other adjudication denial in this
family.¶
The following is an example of the scenario's nightly Dispatch
(Section 4.4). erp-scheduler proves its DPoP key; its
client authentication is omitted, and extra line breaks are for
display only:¶
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi... grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Amission-dispatch& template_id=tmpl_DW1W29qP9RJRbsGyRGa9oJ2u& mission_intent=%7B%22intent%22%3A%7B...%7D%7D& dispatch_event_id=5533f92b-fbe9-57c6-aa3f-f628b711f316¶
The mission_intent value, before form encoding, names one night's
run:¶
{
"intent": {
"goal":
"Reconcile 2026-11-03 invoices; post adjustments under $500.",
"target_resources": ["https://erp.example.com"],
"expires_at": "2026-11-04T12:00:00Z"
}
}
¶
The Mission Issuer commits the instance at 2026-11-04T02:00:07Z and
selects s6BhdRkqt3, the template's only Agent. The instance's expiry
is that instant plus instance_lifetime, earlier than both the
requested expires_at and the template's own. The response carries
an access token bound to erp-scheduler's key:¶
{
"access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6ImF0K2p3dCJ9...",
"token_type": "DPoP",
"expires_in": 300,
"mission_id": "msn_lDL9bWUSlLGl_dxI_WL_nwrTZPlm0RtA",
"mission_expires_at": "2026-11-04T10:00:07Z",
"authorization_details": [
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["invoices.read"] },
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
"constraints": {
"max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" } } }
]
}
¶
The Mission Issuer adjudicates a Dispatch in this order:¶
Authenticate the Dispatcher. Resolve and authenticate the principal making the request.¶
Authorize the Dispatcher. Verify the Dispatcher is in the
template's allowed_dispatchers. Refuse a request from any other
principal.¶
Verify the Dispatch Policy. Verify the Dispatch Policy snapshot
the Mission Issuer will evaluate against dispatch_policy.digest
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance], Section
"Activation Policy Commitment"). On a mismatch, refuse the Dispatch
with dispatch_policy_changed (Section 10).¶
Derive the instance Authority Set. Derive an Authority Set from the dispatch intent, and from the Dispatcher's authority proposal where one was submitted (Section 7.1), and bound it by the deployment's derivation policy, exactly as for any Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). This document adds no authority-derivation rule.¶
Double intersection. The derived instance Authority Set MUST be a
subset, under the issuance profile's subset rule
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), of both the
deployment's derivation-policy ceiling and the Template Ceiling.
Each surviving instance entry MUST be a subset of some ceiling
entry. If no entry survives the intersection with the Template
Ceiling, the Mission Issuer MUST refuse the Dispatch with
out_of_template_ceiling (Section 10). Raising the ceiling
is a new template consent, not a dispatch.¶
Prohibited-class check. Apply the prohibited-class rule
(Section 9) to the surviving post-intersection set. If
it would grant a high-consequence class that
Section 9.1 does not admit, refuse the Dispatch
with dispatch_prohibited_class (Section 10).¶
Enforce the bounds. Refuse the Dispatch if it would exceed
max_active or dispatch_rate, if no Agent is selected, or if the
instance's Mission-Issuer-established Subject or its selected Agent
falls outside allowed_recipients (Section 5).¶
Check the authority source. Verify that the source retained for
this template_version (Section 6) applies to the
instance's Subject and that the surviving set lies within that
source's ceiling. Refuse the Dispatch otherwise.¶
Commit the instance. Commit an ordinary Mission whose Authority Set is the surviving set and whose:¶
approval_basis is the authorization basis the issuance profile
defines ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), with type:
"template", a standing-consent basis meeting the Approval Basis
Contract ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]),
and:¶
consent_principal: the template's human approver, the
accountable principal; the Dispatcher is not the approver;¶
activation: the template's id (as template_id, the same
value the Dispatch grant names, Section 7.1),
template_version, and template_hash (the template lineage
member's fields, Section 7.4), plus this Dispatch's
dispatch_event_id;¶
activation_actor: the Dispatcher, as an object whose iss is
the Mission Issuer's identifier, the template's issuer, and
whose sub is the client_id the Dispatch request's client
authentication established, never a value taken from the
request's parameters or its dispatch intent; distinct from
consent_principal and never the instance's adjudicator
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Principals
and Approval Basis");¶
root_commitment: template_hash; and¶
approved_at (the standing-consent requirement of the Approval
Basis Contract,
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]): the
instant the consenting human approved this exact
template_version, read from the Mission Issuer's retained
template record at Dispatch, never from the Dispatch request.¶
The template lineage member (Section 7.4), present on
every dispatched Mission and absent on an ordinarily approved one,
remains the claim-carried record of which template and Dispatch
Policy adjudicated the instance; approval_basis is the
structured authorization-basis record, and the two are consistent
by construction;¶
approval_event_id identifies this Dispatch, never the template's
approval: a unique value the Mission Issuer allocates when it
creates the Dispatch's (authenticated client, dispatch_event_id)
reservation (below) and retains with the committed instance. A
retry recovers it; a reservation created after that key's
tombstone expires receives a new one;¶
subject is established as the issuance profile requires, never
taken from Dispatcher input, and is an entry of
allowed_recipients subjects
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]);¶
authority_source is the source retained for this
template_version (Section 6), read from the Mission
Issuer's retained template record, never from the Dispatch request
and never a source or policy version substituted after consent;¶
client_id is the Agent selected from allowed_recipients
agents (Section 5), never taken from Dispatcher
input. The selection is part of the committed instance: a retried
or recovered Dispatch returns the committed Agent and does not
select again;¶
intent_hash and authority_hash are computed over the instance's
own Intent and final Authority Set, never over the template; the
template commits the ceiling under template_hash
(Section 5.1);¶
expires_at is the effective Mission expiry of the issuance
profile's requested-versus-effective rule
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): the minimum of the
dispatch intent's requested expires_at, the committed Mission
created_at plus the template's instance_lifetime, and the
template's expires_at. The lifetime addend is measured from the
committed created_at, not a separate clock read, so audit
recomputation is exact. These are the complete expiry inputs for
Dispatch: a deployment that needs a tighter standing-consent
lifetime records it in instance_lifetime or the template's
expires_at under a newly consented template_version, rather
than applying an undisclosed fourth clamp;¶
derivation_limit, where the deployment also adopts Mission
Derivation Limits, is established afresh for this instance as
that document's Effective Limit section states, never above the
Dispatch Policy's maximum (Section 6); and¶
template lineage member is set (Section 7.4).¶
The Mission Issuer MUST make the step 8 check, and verify that the
effective expires_at is strictly later than the committed
created_at, atomically with the commit, against the source as it
stands at that commit; on failure no Mission is created.¶
The scenario's instance record (Section 4.4) carries, among its other members:¶
{
"subject": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"approval_basis": {
"type": "template",
"consent_principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
"activation": {
"template_id": "tmpl_DW1W29qP9RJRbsGyRGa9oJ2u",
"template_version": "3",
"template_hash":
"sha-256:sAW-wLGtkDjse3U_XfPYZz-WnqC5uBP64ZYlGqCDxz4",
"dispatch_event_id": "5533f92b-fbe9-57c6-aa3f-f628b711f316"
},
"activation_actor": { "iss": "https://as.example.com",
"sub": "erp-scheduler" },
"adjudication": { "kind": "policy",
"policy": { "id": "nightly-reconciliation-dispatch",
"version": "4" } },
"root_commitment":
"sha-256:sAW-wLGtkDjse3U_XfPYZz-WnqC5uBP64ZYlGqCDxz4",
"approved_at": "2026-11-01T16:20:00Z"
},
"approval_event_id": "ape_PF71gvedJVYvGQCqIX3C",
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"created_at": "2026-11-04T02:00:07Z",
"expires_at": "2026-11-04T10:00:07Z"
}
¶
alice is both the Subject and the accountable principal;
erp-scheduler triggered the instance and s6BhdRkqt3 is its Agent.¶
A Dispatch MUST be idempotent per dispatch_event_id. The Dispatcher
supplies a dispatch_event_id with the request, adopting the
expansion profile's creation idempotency apparatus by reference
under its own domain-separating op value, dispatch
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Creation
Idempotency").¶
The identifier and reservation key are (authenticated client,
dispatch_event_id), the Dispatcher being the authenticated client of
Section 7.1. In the operation fingerprint, op is dispatch;
iss and client are as the expansion profile defines them;
source is this Dispatch's template_id, since a Dispatch has no
source Mission or subject_token to resolve one from; cnf is the
Dispatcher's verified presenter confirmation, the DPoP proof key's
jkt or the mTLS certificate's x5t#S256; intent and evidence
are the parsed mission_intent Submission envelope's members
(Section 7.1); proposal is the parsed authorization_details
array, when present. actor, child_actor, requested_token_type,
and cross_check are absent: a Dispatch carries no acting-agent
token, no child actor, no token-exchange requested token type, and no
predecessor or parent cross-check to compare against a resolved
source. A dispatch-specific parameter affecting derivation, approval,
output, or side effects extends the fingerprint the same way an
extension parameter would under the expansion profile's own rule
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "The
Operation Fingerprint").¶
The reservation, its (client, dispatch_event_id) uniqueness, and
the fingerprint-comparison outcomes on a repeated presentation are
the expansion profile's, applied by reference: same fingerprint and
completed, recover it; same fingerprint and reserved or pending,
return the same in-progress result; different fingerprint, refuse
with invalid_request
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "The
Durable Reservation"). The reservation and the dispatched Mission's
identifier MUST be committed atomically with instance derivation and
max_active/dispatch_rate accounting. Evidence emission is not
part of that same atomic commit: the Mission Issuer atomically
commits the evidence record, or a durable outbox entry for it, with
Mission creation, and delivers or publishes it idempotently
afterward, since external emission cannot generally participate in
the datastore transaction.¶
A revalidated retry's obligations depend on whether the original
operation already committed creation. For a completed operation,
the Mission Issuer MUST verify the recorded template identity,
template_version, and fingerprint; the requester's continued
membership in allowed_dispatchers and possession of the recorded
cnf; and that the created Mission remains active, before
recovering it. Current template applicability, including whether the
checked template_version is still in force, is NOT re-evaluated for
a completed operation: a template's own lifecycle already governs
retirement, which stops further dispatch but does not terminate a
Mission already dispatched (Section 5.2), so recovery of
that Mission MUST survive later retirement of the template version
that created it. For a reserved or pending operation, which has
not yet committed creation, the Mission Issuer instead revalidates
the retry exactly as a fresh Dispatch: current allowed_dispatchers
membership, possession of cnf, and current template applicability
all apply, since no Mission yet exists for the retry to recover
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section
"Revalidation and Lookup Order").¶
Recovery is delivery of the already-dispatched Mission, never a
second instantiation and never a second count against max_active or
dispatch_rate. A retry recovered while the most recently recorded
delivery token remains valid, and carries no authority the instance
has since lost, returns that token and counts nothing. A retry
recovered after that token has expired, or after the instance's
authority has narrowed below what it carries, is answered by minting a
replacement access token for the same, still-active instance: an
ordinary delivery event, counted once under ordinary issuance
accounting, that repeats no creation accounting, as the expansion
profile's recovery defines for an expired delivery credential
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Recovery
Is Delivery"). Recording a replacement makes it the delivery that
subsequent retries recover. Concurrent retries recover the same
replacement delivery: the Mission Issuer mints one and returns it to
each. Tombstone retention follows the expansion profile's
rule, against the deployment's published retry horizon
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Tombstone
Retention"). This makes retry safe at machine speed and keeps
max_active and dispatch_rate accounting exact.¶
A dispatched Mission records a template lineage member, on both its
mission claim and its Mission record, linking it to the Mission
Template it was dispatched from:¶
template:An object carrying id, issuer, template_version,
template_hash, and dispatch_policy (the activation policy
reference: id, version, and digest). Present on every
dispatched Mission and absent on a Mission created by ordinary
approval.¶
Consistent with the issuance profile's open-mission-claim rule
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), the template member is
lineage and audit context only: it MUST NOT grant or widen authority,
and a consumer that does not understand it MUST ignore it. The
instance's authority comes only from its own authority_hash. The
template member exists so the dispatch is re-checkable in audit
(Section 12).¶
The scenario's instance (Section 4.4) carries this mission
claim on every token issued for it:¶
{
"mission": {
"id": "msn_lDL9bWUSlLGl_dxI_WL_nwrTZPlm0RtA",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"expires_at": "2026-11-04T10:00:07Z",
"template": {
"id": "tmpl_DW1W29qP9RJRbsGyRGa9oJ2u",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com",
"template_version": "3",
"template_hash":
"sha-256:sAW-wLGtkDjse3U_XfPYZz-WnqC5uBP64ZYlGqCDxz4",
"dispatch_policy": {
"id": "nightly-reconciliation-dispatch",
"version": "4",
"digest":
"sha-256:7irh90epn3d1Nn07PQhhOxwh3j4Mq5EI0_x4w12VDlk"
}
}
}
}
¶
A dispatched instance's approved agent is its selected Agent (Section 5), but the Dispatch returns the instance's access token to the Dispatcher, sender-constrained to the Dispatcher's key (Section 7.1). The Dispatch Handoff conveys the instance to its Agent: the Dispatcher exchanges that token for a handoff grant naming the Agent as its only redeemer, and the Agent redeems the grant for a token of its own. The handoff uses the token endpoint and existing grant types; it adds one token request parameter.¶
The Dispatcher requests a handoff with a Token Exchange ([RFC8693])
whose subject_token is the instance's access token
(subject_token_type urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token),
whose requested_token_type is
urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt, and which carries
mission_dispatch_handoff with the value true, the parameter that
selects this operation. It MAY carry authorization_details
([RFC9396]) naming a narrower subset. It presents a DPoP proof
([RFC9449]) under the key the subject token is bound to.¶
The Mission Issuer MUST refuse with invalid_request a
mission_dispatch_handoff with any value other than true, and one
combined with a parameter that selects another exchange, such as
request_refresh_token or a Child Mission creation parameter
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]); it never
treats such a request as another exchange. A mission_dispatch_handoff
sent without a value is treated as omitted (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]),
not as a value other than true. It then MUST:¶
verify the subject token, and that the DPoP proof's key is the key the token is bound to;¶
verify that the authenticated client is the client the subject token was issued to, the Dispatcher;¶
verify that the Mission carries the template lineage member
(Section 7.4) and is active;¶
take the recipient from the instance's recorded client_id, the
selected Agent, never from the request; and¶
confine the handed-off authority to the subject token's authority
and the instance's current Effective Authority Set
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), refusing with
invalid_authorization_details a requested authorization_details
that is not a subset of both; absent a request, the handed-off
authority is the subject token's authority narrowed by the Effective
Authority Set.¶
A failure of steps 1 or 2, or a Mission without the template lineage
member, is refused with invalid_grant. A Mission that is not active
is refused with invalid_request (Section 2.2.2 of [RFC8693]),
carrying the mission_error member
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶
A successful exchange is a derivation from the instance, gated and counted as the issuance profile requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), apart from the redemption of the grant it issues (Section 8.3).¶
In the example scenario (Section 4.4), erp-scheduler
requests the handoff of its instance, proving the key its access
token is bound to. Its client authentication is omitted, and extra
line breaks are for display only:¶
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi... grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange& subject_token=<the%20instance%27s%20access%20token>& subject_token_type= urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Aaccess_token& requested_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Ajwt& mission_dispatch_handoff=true¶
On success the response carries the handoff grant as access_token,
with issued_token_type urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt and
token_type N_A ([RFC8693]). The handoff grant is a JWT the
Mission Issuer signs with typ mission-dispatch-handoff+jwt: iss
identifies the Mission Issuer, aud identifies its token endpoint,
client_id names the selected Agent as the only redeemer, sub is the
instance's Subject, mission is the instance's mission claim,
authorization_details is the handed-off authority, and jti, iat
and exp bound it. Its lifetime is short and never outlasts the
instance's expires_at. The handoff grant establishes no grant lineage
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Binding the Mission to
the Grant"): the state the Mission Issuer keeps to
refuse its replay (Section 8.3) is not one.¶
The scenario's handoff response is:¶
{
"access_token":
"eyJ0eXAiOiJtaXNzaW9uLWRpc3BhdGNoLWhhbmRvZmYrand0Iiwi...",
"issued_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt",
"token_type": "N_A",
"expires_in": 120
}
¶
The grant's claims, with its mission claim (the one shown in
Section 7.4) omitted, are:¶
{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"aud": "https://as.example.com/token",
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR",
"authorization_details": [
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["invoices.read"] },
{ "type": "mission_resource_access",
"resource": "https://erp.example.com",
"actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
"constraints": {
"max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" } } }
],
"jti": "hgr_wMP7JCeZbsxcV1vV1SXJ",
"iat": 1793757610,
"exp": 1793757730
}
¶
erp-scheduler cannot redeem the grant itself: only s6BhdRkqt3,
authenticated as itself, can.¶
The Agent redeems the handoff grant with the JWT bearer authorization grant ([RFC7523]), authenticating as itself and presenting a DPoP proof under its own key. The Mission Issuer MUST:¶
verify the grant's signature, typ and exp, and that its aud
identifies its own token endpoint;¶
verify that the grant's client_id, the authenticated client, and
the instance's recorded client_id are one client;¶
verify that the instance is active;¶
consume the grant's jti atomically, and remember a consumed grant
for as long as it would otherwise be accepted, clock skew included,
refusing any further presentation with invalid_grant, while a
redemption that issues no token leaves the grant unconsumed; and¶
issue the Agent a token for the instance, bound to the key of its DPoP proof, whose authority is the grant's narrowed by the instance's current Effective Authority Set.¶
The Mission Issuer resolves the instance from the authenticated
mission claim of the grant that step 1 verifies, and applies steps 2
through 5 to that instance.¶
The token issued at redemption is the Agent's delegation handle: its audience identifies the Agent and it is sender-constrained to the Agent's key, so the Agent continues the instance as its approved agent on the continuation profile's async delegation transport ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]). The redemption is a derivation from the instance, gated and counted as the issuance profile requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). It issues a derived token for the instance, and creates or extends no grant binding; it needs none.¶
In the scenario, s6BhdRkqt3 redeems the grant under its own DPoP
key. Its client authentication is omitted:¶
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi... grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Ajwt-bearer& assertion=eyJ0eXAiOiJtaXNzaW9uLWRpc3BhdGNoLWhhbmRvZmYrand0Iiwi...¶
The response's access_token is the Agent's delegation handle. An
excerpt of its claims, other members omitted:¶
{
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"cnf": { "jkt": "hCXQ4ox8s33bY6PtWhuLMbn89LsBt8tpwnjKP0IS-yI" },
"mission": {
"id": "msn_lDL9bWUSlLGl_dxI_WL_nwrTZPlm0RtA",
"issuer": "https://as.example.com"
}
}
¶
The Agent then presents the handle as the subject_token of the
continuation profile's async delegation exchange
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]), proving the
same key:¶
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi... grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange& subject_token=<the%20delegation%20handle>& subject_token_type= urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Aaccess_token& resource=https%3A%2F%2Ferp.example.com& request_refresh_token=true& creation_request_id=7cdd0cf2-01ac-5239-b300-70ec9a30c1bc¶
The response carries an access token for https://erp.example.com
and the first refresh token of a family that ends no later than the
instance's expires_at. The Agent calls the ERP with those tokens and
refreshes within the family, as for any Mission. That family is the
instance's first grant binding: on this Dispatch path the instance
carries none until it exists.¶
A Dispatcher that is itself the selected Agent (the same authenticated
client) already holds the instance's access token, bound to its own
key, and skips the handoff. It obtains its delegation handle through
the continuation profile's handle exchange
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]): a no-actor
self-exchange that presents the instance's access token, proves
possession of that token's key, and names its own client_id as
audience. That exchange is a derivation from the instance, gated and
counted as the issuance profile requires.¶
Some authority classes are too consequential to activate without a human at the moment of the decision. Except as Section 9.1 admits, a Dispatch MUST NOT instantiate a Mission that grants authority in any of these classes, even when the class is within the Template Ceiling:¶
the irreversible, external-commitment, or privileged-administration class;¶
authority satisfying the runtime profile's external-communication predicate, the exfiltration leg ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]); or¶
cross-domain authority.¶
Progressive holds back the same set from its own policy adjudication ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]); this document applies it to dispatch, with the one exception of Section 9.1. To make the rule testable, a deployment MUST publish in the Mission Deployment Profile a mapping from its action identifiers to the runtime profile's action classes ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), or an equivalent declared classification.¶
The issuance profile's fourth high-risk class, a consumption bound
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), is not on this list. Each
instance draws down its own bound, so dispatch multiplies the bound
by max_active and dispatch_rate; the template consent renders the
bound with those limits, so the Approver consents to that product
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]). An instance's template
approval_basis already
carries the trace the issuance profile's approval-authentication floor
requires for that class, through consent_principal and
approved_at (Section 7); a deployment recording Consent Evidence
renders the bound at the same surface under the metering profile's
consent-integrity rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]).¶
Where a deployment adopts Approval Governance
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]) and records a
Governance Record for a dispatched instance, the instance's template
approval_basis satisfies that profile's accountable-approver rule
directly, through the same consent_principal, root_commitment,
and approved_at this document already requires: no assertion is
fabricated in the name of the Dispatcher or the Dispatch Policy to
stand in for a fresh human decision that did not occur. Approval
Governance's own high-risk-class default still binds that record: a
dispatched instance carrying a consumption bound activates only where
a committed, class-named exception admits it; absent the exception,
the Mission fails to activate under that profile's atomic-commitment
rule.¶
The deployment's configured dispatch-prohibited action set MUST cover every action the published mapping classifies as irreversible, external-commitment, or privileged-administration, as satisfying the runtime profile's external-communication predicate ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), or as cross-domain. A configured set narrower than the mapping is nonconformant: it lets a Dispatch confer a class the deployment's own mapping already identifies as prohibited, which is exactly the outcome this section forbids.¶
A Dispatch that would grant a prohibited class that
Section 9.1 does not admit is refused with
dispatch_prohibited_class (Section 10). Unlike the
progressive profile, which falls back to a fresh human approval in
band, a Dispatch has no interactive surface to escalate on: the human
path is an ordinary Mission created through a fresh approval
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), requested out of band. The
Dispatch Policy MUST NOT dispatch a Mission bearing a prohibited class
that Section 9.1 does not admit.¶
A Mission Issuer MAY admit one exception to the prohibited-class rule:
dispatch of one designated payment-execution operation, for recurring
payment of approved invoices. The exception never admits
external-commitment, privileged-administration, or cross-domain
authority, or authority satisfying the external-communication
predicate, and never waives another prohibited predicate the operation
satisfies. The operation stays in the configured dispatch-prohibited
set: the Mission Issuer admits it only where every condition below
holds, and otherwise refuses the Dispatch with
dispatch_prohibited_class (Section 10).¶
One operation. The Dispatch Policy names the designated operation, and the published mapping classifies it as irreversible and as no other prohibited class.¶
Committed destinations. The Dispatch Policy commits the approved
vendors, each with the payee account approved for it, and the
ceiling entry granting the operation carries a per-payment
max_amount.¶
An exact budget. The Dispatch Policy commits a budget: its owner,
an identifier qualified within that owner's accounting domain, its
limit, and a per-instance maximum. Each instance's Mission Intent
carries a max_budget no larger than the per-instance maximum. The
per-payment max_amount, the budget, and every max_budget share
one currency. Both bounds are enforced under the metering profile's
Exact profile: the instance's max_budget on its own counter, and
the budget on one counter keyed by its owner and identifier, shared
by every instance of any template committing that budget and by
their successors ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]).
Neither substitutes for the other.¶
Governed approval. Where the deployment records an Approval
Governance Record for an instance, its retained approval_policy
snapshot commits class-named exceptions for the irreversible class
and the consumption-bound class, each with its recency ceiling
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]).¶
A human approver. The consenting principal is a human Approver authenticated at the issuance profile's approval-authentication floor for the irreversible class ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), and is neither a Dispatcher nor the instance's Agent.¶
The Mission Issuer conveys the committed destinations and the budget to
the runtime with each instance's policy view, bound to the template's
dispatch_policy digest. Admission authorizes no execution. Each
payment still takes a fresh runtime decision, with parameter binding,
execution reverification, the transaction-assurance tier, and every
applicable action-approval requirement
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). The PDP compares the payee
the enforcing PEP establishes for the effect with the destination
committed for its vendor, and execution reverification binds that
payee: a vendor without a committed destination, or a payee account
other than the committed one, including a changed bank account for an
approved vendor, inherits no approval. A payment whose outcome is
failed remains charged until reconciliation. Work outside the
committed envelope is refused and escalates out of band to an
ordinary, freshly approved Mission.¶
Changing the destinations, or raising the budget or the per-payment
bound, is a new template_version and a fresh human approval, whose
disclosure MUST render the budget's consumption to date and its
outstanding reservations. The approval neither releases a reservation
that remains charged nor resets consumption
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]).¶
The consent disclosure of a template admitting the exception MUST render, beside the minimum of Section 6, the designated operation, the committed destinations, the per-payment bound, the budget with its per-instance maximum, and whether each payment requires an action-bound approval, and from whom.¶
This document defines a closed set of dispatch denial reasons, carried
in the shared mission_denial_reason member that the expansion profile
established for adjudication denials
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]):¶
out_of_template_ceiling:The dispatched instance's Authority Set is not within the Template Ceiling (Section 7), so it cannot be instantiated by policy. Raising the ceiling requires a fresh human template consent.¶
dispatch_prohibited_class:The dispatched instance would grant a high-consequence class (Section 9) that Section 9.1 does not admit, which a Dispatch never auto-approves. The authority is available only through a fresh human approval.¶
dispatch_policy_changed:The Dispatch Policy the Mission Issuer would evaluate no longer
matches the digest the template committed (Section 7). Dispatch
under the changed policy requires a fresh human template consent.¶
A consumer that does not implement this document treats any of these values as it treats any unrecognized reason code: the Dispatch stays denied, with no further semantics.¶
For example, a Dispatch in the scenario (Section 4.4) whose
proposal names only vendors.update at https://erp.example.com, an
action the deployment's derivation policy permits but no ceiling entry
grants, leaves nothing after the double intersection (step 5 of
Section 7) and is refused, here with invalid_request:¶
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error": "invalid_request",
"mission_denial_reason": "out_of_template_ceiling"
}
¶
A dispatched Mission is an ordinary Mission. Nothing about its origin makes it special to the rest of the family; the template bounded its creation and then steps out of the way.¶
Containable. A dispatched Mission is subject to Mission Containment ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]): its effective authority can be narrowed by event-triggered containment exactly as any Mission's can.¶
Continuable. A dispatched Mission's work continues under the continuation profile's transports ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]). Async delegation is the natural scheduled-dispatch path: a scheduled run dispatches an instance, hands it to its selected Agent (Section 8), and the Agent carries it forward on that transport.¶
Expandable, but not by the template. A dispatched Mission MAY be
expanded through a human-approved expansion
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]). Such an expansion
is not bound by the Template Ceiling: it is a fresh human consent
that supersedes the instance, and its successor derives its authority
from that new approval, not from the template. The successor
therefore MUST NOT carry the template lineage member
(Section 7.4): it was not dispatched, and an auditor
re-running the ceiling check (Section 12) MUST NOT be led to
test a freshly consented successor against the template.¶
Child-delegable within the ceiling. A dispatched Mission MAY create Child Missions ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]). As a consequence of the child-delegation profile's strict-subset rule, a Child Mission is a strict subset of the instance's Authority Set, which is itself within the Template Ceiling, so the whole delegation tree stays within the ceiling without any new rule here. An instance holding authority admitted under Section 9.1 differs: its Mission Issuer MUST refuse to create a Child Mission under it unless the child is charged to the budget's counters, and MUST refuse any cross-organization or cross-domain derivation from it ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]). An expansion successor of such an instance carries the budget forward and continues both counters, and its approval renders the budget's consumption to date and outstanding reservations.¶
A dispatched Mission is re-checkable in audit with no per-dispatch human in the record, because the human is at the template. For a dispatched Mission an authorized auditor can:¶
recompute template_hash, the envelope anchor of Section 5.1,
from the stored Mission Template object and match it to the committed
anchor the template-creation consent evidence carries in its
source_hashes ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence];
that disclosure's own rendering_template_digest commits the
rendering template, a different object) and to the instance's
template lineage member (Section 7.4), so the ceiling the
instance was checked against is the one the human consented to;¶
re-run the subset check of the instance's Authority Set against the Template Ceiling (Section 7), confirming the instance is within the ceiling;¶
recompute the instance's effective expires_at as the minimum of
the dispatch intent's requested expires_at, the committed
created_at plus instance_lifetime, and the template's
expires_at (Section 7), and match it to the recorded value, so
the granted lifetime is exactly the three-way clamp; and¶
verify that the instance's approval_basis.consent_principal equals
the template's approver at the recorded template_version, so the
accountable principal is the human who consented to that version of
the template.¶
Each Dispatch MUST record the Dispatch Policy id, version, and
digest that instantiated the Mission, and the dispatch event identifier
(Section 7), so the policy chain the architecture's Approve verb
requires stays re-checkable
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]). A deployment MUST
retain the consented template, template_hash, and dispatch records for
each instance's audit horizon
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so every dispatch is
verifiable to have stayed within the consented template.¶
The issuance profile's security considerations apply in full. This document adds the dispatch surface.¶
Standing consent decays. A template consented once and dispatched
from indefinitely is a standing grant with a calendar. The bounds
(instance_lifetime, max_active, dispatch_rate) cap breadth and
rate, not duration; the review_cadence (Section 6) is the
temporal bound, and dispatch stops past it until a human re-consents.
The signs of decay are checkable from the dispatch record: reviews
that never narrow the ceiling, ceilings that only grow, and a
dispatch_rate raised without a task that needs it. A review that
cannot cite the cycle it renews has not reviewed it.¶
A compromised Dispatcher is bounded. A Dispatcher is authenticated
and is not an Approver: it can trigger instantiation only within the
template a human approved. A compromised Dispatcher cannot exceed the
Template Ceiling (double intersection, Section 7), cannot dispatch
a high-consequence class (Section 9) beyond a payment the
template admits within its committed destinations, per-payment bound
and budget (Section 9.1), and cannot outrun
max_active or dispatch_rate. Its blast radius is therefore bounded
to no more than the human consented to when approving the template,
and every instance it dispatched is independently gated, revocable,
and enforced per action by the runtime layer
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]).¶
A standing payment spends only within its envelope. Under Section 9.1, a compromised Dispatcher or Agent can pay only committed destinations, up to the per-payment bound and the budget. The exception does not stop one invoice being paid twice; the operation's settlement identity does. A reservation that remains charged after an unknown outcome reduces the headroom of every instance sharing the budget until it is reconciled, so a lossy evidence channel stalls the template rather than overspending.¶
The Dispatch Policy is authority-bearing governance. A
misconfigured policy can over-instantiate within the ceiling, so it is
reviewed and versioned like other approval policy, and its id and
version are part of every dispatch record (Section 12).¶
The template bounds, and does not eliminate, standing exposure. A
deployment SHOULD pair a Mission Template with short
instance_lifetime values, constraint-bounded ceilings, and runtime
enforcement, so the authority any single dispatched Mission actively
holds stays narrow.¶
The Template Ceiling discloses, at template-consent time, the full
envelope every future dispatch may draw within, which can reveal more
about the anticipated recurring task than any single dispatched
Mission's Authority Set. The template lineage member correlates every
instance dispatched from one template across distinct Missions. Access
to the template, its ceiling, and the dispatch records SHOULD be scoped
to parties with a governance need. The issuance profile's Mission
Identifier correlation considerations apply to each dispatched Mission.¶
A Mission Issuer that claims Dispatch from a Mission Template is a conforming issuance-profile Mission Issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) and MUST:¶
record a consented Mission Template with the required members and
commit it under template_hash with typ mission-template
(Section 5, Section 5.1), and treat template
creation as a human approval under the issuance profile whose
disclosure renders the ceiling, the no-per-instance-approval fact,
the prohibited-class reservation, and, where Mission Derivation
Limits is adopted, the per-instance derivation-limit rule
(Section 6);¶
adjudicate a Dispatch in the order of Section 7: authenticate and authorize the Dispatcher, derive the instance Authority Set, double-intersect it with the derivation-policy ceiling and the Template Ceiling, apply the prohibited-class check, enforce the bounds, and commit an ordinary Mission whose anchors are over the instance's own Intent and Authority Set;¶
record every dispatched Mission's approval_basis with type:
"template": consent_principal the template's human approver,
activation the template lineage and this Dispatch's
dispatch_event_id, activation_actor the authenticated Dispatcher
(iss the Mission Issuer, sub its authenticated client_id), and
root_commitment the template_hash (Section 7);¶
record on every dispatched Mission the authority source retained at
template consent for its template_version, checking at the
creation commit that it applies to the instance's Subject and covers
the instance Authority Set, and that the effective expiry is later
than the creation instant (Section 6, Section 7);¶
refuse a Dispatch outside the ceiling with out_of_template_ceiling
and a Dispatch of a prohibited class that
Section 9.1 does not admit with
dispatch_prohibited_class (Section 10), and, where it
admits that exception, meet every condition and disclosure of that
section;¶
make every Dispatch idempotent per dispatch_event_id, adopting the
expansion profile's creation idempotency apparatus by reference
under op: dispatch, with the (client, dispatch_event_id)
reservation, fingerprint, revalidation, and delivery-as-recovery
bindings of Section 7;¶
answer a Dispatch in one authenticated back-channel round trip, using
no PAR, no interactive consent surface, and never
authorization_pending (Section 7);¶
record the template lineage member on the dispatched Mission
(Section 7.4);¶
stop dispatch past the published review_cadence until a fresh human
approval (Section 6); and¶
publish the bounds and the action-class mapping in the Mission Deployment Profile (Section 5, Section 9) and retain the audit linkage of Section 12.¶
A resource server requires no new behavior: it enforces a dispatched
Mission's tokens exactly as it enforces any Mission-bound token, and
treats the template member, if it reads it at all, as audit context
it MUST NOT use to grant authority (Section 7.4).¶
This document requests registration of the following value in the "OAuth URI" registry established by [RFC6755]:¶
urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:mission-dispatch¶
Mission Dispatch Grant Type¶
IETF¶
this document, Section 7.1¶
This is a proposed registration. The value is used under the reserved
urn:ietf:params:oauth arc by implementations of this document in
advance of registration completing; this document is the specification
that names and defines it.¶
This document also registers two parameters in the "OAuth Parameters" registry:¶
Name: dispatch_event_id¶
Parameter Usage Location: token request¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Reference: this document, Section 7.1, Section 7¶
Name: mission_dispatch_handoff¶
Parameter Usage Location: token request¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
IANA is also requested to register one media type per [RFC6838]:¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: mission-dispatch-handoff+jwt¶
Required parameters: none¶
Optional parameters: none¶
Encoding considerations: binary; JWS Compact Serialization¶
Security considerations: see Section 13¶
Interoperability considerations: see this document¶
Applications that use this media type: Mission Issuers and OAuth authorization servers implementing this profile¶
Fragment identifier considerations: n/a¶
Additional information: n/a¶
Person and email address to contact for further information: see the Authors' Addresses section¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage: none¶
Author: see the Authors' Addresses section¶
Change controller: IETF¶
dispatch_event_id is a distinct name from the expansion profile's
creation_request_id ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]),
even though it plays the identifier-and-reservation-key role that
parameter's registration defines: it is already load-bearing in
approval_basis.activation (Section 7) and in the Dispatch
grant-type parameter list (Section 7.1), so this document keeps
the name rather than
reusing the expansion profile's own registered parameter under
op: dispatch.¶
Beyond these registrations, this document requests no further IANA action. Following the restraint of the sibling profiles:¶
template_hash is a Mission integrity anchor whose typ,
mission-template, follows the issuance profile's collision-resistant
typ convention ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) and requires
no registration;¶
the template member of the mission claim (Section 7.4) is
carried inside the already-open mission claim and needs no separate
registration;¶
out_of_template_ceiling and dispatch_prohibited_class are
requested as registrations in the expansion profile's
Mission Denial Reasons registry
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]), each with its
semantics as defined in this document and Reference this document;
and¶
the Mission Template's type identifier,
application/mission-template+json, is used by local agreement
pending registration; an audit or transparency profile registers the
object by that value.¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
An instance created from a Dispatch carrying a proposal records
proposed_authority, its proposal_hash recorded or implied
(#1917).¶
The template basis meets Approval Governance's Approval Basis
Contract, and the Dispatch Policy reference, its verification and
approved_at cite that contract, which states the same requirements
the OAuth binding does. Approval Governance becomes a normative
reference. No requirement changed (#1915).¶
Adjudication cites the OAuth binding's Principals and Approval Basis
section for the roles activation_actor stays distinct from, since
that binding's Role Mapping appendix moved to the architecture
document. No requirement changed (#1892).¶
Changes a requirement (#813, D814, D830): Standing Payment Exception
admits, as an option, dispatch of one designated payment-execution
operation whose only prohibited class is the irreversible class,
under committed destinations per vendor, a per-payment bound, an
exact budget shared across every instance of any template committing
it and their successors with a per-instance max_budget in one
currency, Approval Governance's class-named exceptions where a
Governance Record is kept, and an authenticated human approver.
Every other prohibited class and predicate stays prohibited, a Child
Mission is refused under such an instance unless charged to the
budget, and each payment still takes a fresh runtime decision with
its payee bound through execution reverification. Metering becomes a
normative reference.¶
Clarification (#1661, D793): a Dispatch performs exactly one creation
derivation per dispatch_event_id, and a retry is recovery of its
delivery. Returning the delivered access token, while it is valid and
carries no authority the instance has since lost, counts nothing;
minting a replacement delivery, after expiry or narrowing, counts
once under ordinary issuance accounting and repeats no creation
accounting; concurrent retries recover the same replacement.¶
A successful Dispatch Handoff exchange is a derivation from the instance, counted once and apart from its redemption, as Derivation Limits' Token Exchange rule counts it (#1648, D764).¶
The Dispatch Handoff states its effect on grant bindings: the handoff
grant establishes no grant lineage, its redemption resolves the
instance from the grant's authenticated mission claim and issues a
derived token without creating or extending a binding, and the
delegation-family exchange creates the instance's first binding
(#1589, D726).¶
Dispatch and Conformance: a dispatched instance's
activation_actor has the Mission Issuer's identifier as iss and,
as sub, the Dispatcher's client_id that client authentication
established, never a value from the Dispatch request's parameters
or dispatch intent (#1325).¶
Editorial: a non-normative Template Overview (roles, the flow from
consent to work, how an agent uses a template) and examples that
follow one nightly-reconciliation scenario through the template,
Dispatch, instance record, mission claim, handoff, redemption,
and a denial. Dispatch is organized as request and response,
adjudication, and idempotency and recovery; the Dispatch Handoff is
its own section; the disclosure-rendering note moves to
Terminology, which defines Instance and Dispatch Handoff (#1176).¶
A Dispatcher that is itself the selected Agent skips the Dispatch Handoff and obtains its delegation handle through the continuation profile's handle exchange, a counted derivation (#1195).¶
The Dispatch Handoff conveys a dispatched instance to its selected
Agent: the Dispatcher exchanges the instance's token
(mission_dispatch_handoff) for a single-use grant naming the Agent,
which the Agent redeems for its own delegation handle (#1158). Its
redemption is a further derivation.¶
A dispatched instance's accountable principal is its
approval_basis.consent_principal. The template keeps its own
active, revoked, and expired states, distinct from the
active/terminated Mission lifecycle (#705).¶
Template Consent, Dispatch and Conformance: where Mission
Derivation Limits is adopted, the Dispatch Policy states the rule
that establishes each instance's derivation_limit and its
maximum, committed under template_hash; the template consent
renders them beside max_active and dispatch_rate, and each
instance establishes its own limit afresh, never above that
maximum (#1119).¶
Template Consent and Dispatch: template consent establishes the
authority source its instances draw on, retained with the consent to
that exact template_version. Each instance carries that source,
never Dispatcher input or a substituted policy. A new step 8 checks
that the source applies to the instance's Subject and covers the
instance Authority Set, and the creation commit makes that check
against the source as it stands then, with the effective-expiry
check (#1118).¶
Template Consent: creating a Mission Template is a human approval that creates no Mission, so it is the standing consent each dispatched instance's approval event is decided under, not an approval event itself (#1078).¶
Dispatch: a dispatched instance's approval_event_id identifies the
Dispatch, never the template's approval: a unique value allocated
with the Dispatch's reservation and retained with the instance, so a
retry recovers it and reuse of the key after its tombstone expires
receives a new one (#1017).¶
The Mission Issuer selects a dispatched instance's Agent from
allowed_recipients agents under the Dispatch Policy, never from
Dispatcher input: one listed Agent is selected directly, and several
need the Dispatch Policy's selection rule. The selection is recorded
at commit, kept on retries, and separate from Dispatcher
authentication and the token's presenter binding (#970).¶
dispatch_policy is an activation policy reference (id,
version, digest) under the issuance profile's Standing-Consent
Bases, replacing the SHOULD to commit the policy body. Dispatch
verifies it as a new step 3 and refuses a mismatch with the new
dispatch_policy_changed reason; the template lineage member and
each Dispatch record carry the digest.¶
The consumption-bound rationale under Prohibited Classes states
that dispatch multiplies an instance's bound by max_active and
dispatch_rate, and that the template consent renders that product
under the metering profile.¶
allowed_dispatchers lists client_id strings, and
allowed_recipients is an object of subjects (iss and sub)
and agents (client_id), each checked separately at Dispatch, so
any listed Agent may serve any listed Subject.¶
The dispatch bounds have stated encodings. instance_lifetime and
review_cadence are positive integer seconds, the latter measured
from the approval's approved_at; max_active is a positive
integer; dispatch_rate is a limit of committed instantiations per
trailing window of seconds, counting neither refused Dispatches nor
recovered retries; and expires_at is an RFC 3339 date-time.¶
This document is part of the Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 work and expresses, in family terms, a define-a-template-once, dispatch-per-run lifecycle: one considered human consent to a ceiling in place of a fresh approval at every machine-speed run.¶