An Architecture for Mission-Bound Authorization

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

A Mission is a durable governance object created by an explicit approval event: the approved task, with a lifecycle. Authority for the task is derived for the Mission, bound to it, and gated on its state. The Mission is not a new way to express authority: Rich Authorization Requests [RFC9396] and kindred mechanisms express authority, and the Mission is the approved task that authority serves.¶

The object fills a gap current practice pays for daily: an estate that cannot size authority to a task compensates with read-only scoping, a human executing every write, or permanently fenced pilots, and the Mission is the representation those controls substitute for.¶

The model is deliberately decomposed: a core profile (the "issuance profile", [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], here "the core") defines the object and its OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] binding, a standalone binding hosts the same object without changing an existing Authorization Server ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]), an AAuth binding gives that protocol's native mission concept the model's structure and lifecycle ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]), and optional companions layer approval, lifecycle, enforcement, runtime, delegation, and proof capabilities on top. The decomposition keeps each interface small but spreads the structure across many documents and four bindings; this document is the single structural view.¶

Read as one system, the family defines a delegated-authority layer, with OAuth 2.0, the standalone Mission Authority Server, AAuth, and (as an experimental sketch) UMA 2.0 as peer bindings into it (Section 4).¶

It defines no protocol, no object, and no requirement. It is a map, not the territory: every mechanism named points at the profile that normatively defines it, and where this document and a profile appear to differ, the profile governs.¶

2. Status: An Informational Architecture

This document is Informational. It establishes no conformance class and defines no new mechanism, claim, or wire format.¶

Its boundary with the Mission Security Model ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model]) is deliberate: this document describes components, interfaces, and data flows; the security model describes the trusted base and how each component's compromise degrades the guarantees. Each profile's own Security Considerations remain normative over both.¶

3. Conventions and Terminology

Where this document uses words like "must" or "should," they carry their ordinary English meaning and describe what a referenced profile establishes, not a requirement this document places. Terms are the core's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), and consequential action are the runtime profile's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]); Mission Authority Server (MAS) is defined by [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]; the AAuth binding is defined by [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth].¶

4. The Mission

OAuth 2.0 issues access tokens for individual resource requests; it has no durable, approved artifact for the larger task a client pursues on a user's behalf.¶

That matters for AI agents: given a mission (book the trip, reconcile the ledger), an agent takes many actions across many resources over a long time, spawning sub-agents and surviving restarts, and independently issued tokens cannot express the approved task, its boundary, or its end (the core's Introduction).¶

The family separates the task from the authority. The Mission is the approved task, with a lifecycle; the Authority Set is the concrete authority (resources, actions, constraints) derived for it. A Mission is not another authorization_details type: it is the durable, approval-backed object an Authority Set is derived for and gated by (the core's Why a New Object section).¶

A client proposes a Mission Intent; the Mission Issuer derives an Authority Set for it; an approval event commits both and creates the Mission.¶

The commitment is two integrity anchors, intent_hash over the approved Mission Intent and authority_hash over the consented Authority Set, each computed over a domain-separated, issuer-bound envelope with fixed canonicalization, so an auditor can reproduce either digest from the record alone (the core's Mission Approval, Integrity Anchors, and Canonicalization Rules sections). The record is immutable except for its state (the Mission Record section).¶

The core lifecycle states are active, revoked, and expired, and only active permits issuance or continued reliance.¶

Companions add states (suspended, completed, superseded, cascaded), and one rule keeps that safe without a registry: a consumer treats every state other than the exact value active, including one it does not recognize, as non-active, so an unrecognized state fails safe (the core's Mission Lifecycle and Gating section).¶

The Mission model is the beginning of a distinct layer. Authentication and token issuance answer who is acting and what a single credential carries; governance of standing entitlements answers what a principal should hold over time. Neither governs the approved task a delegate performs on a principal's behalf: its bounded authority, its lifecycle, the per-action check, and the evidence that binds back to it.¶

That is the delegated-authority layer this family defines, composing with the layers below rather than replacing them, and the Mission Authority Server ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]) is its binding-independent control plane across an estate, whichever party issues a given token. The control-plane vocabulary is exact, not loose:¶

• the issuer side holds desired state (the record, its authority, its lifecycle and state version), reconciles it (gating, the ceiling review, evidence reconciliation), and distributes bounded authority (policy views, status, the management surface);¶

• tokens and the PEP/PDP boundary are the layer's data plane; and¶

• Status and Signals are the channel between the two.¶

The plane the layer governs is authority, never operations: how an agent runs stays with the harness and the orchestrator.¶

5. Non-Goals

The model's boundary is deliberate. The family does not define:¶

• A new authority format, or a new grant protocol. Rich Authorization Requests [RFC9396] and kindred mechanisms already fill the authority-expression role; the family leaves that to them (Section 4). The same restraint holds against GNAP and the capability-system lineage (macaroons, Biscuit, UCAN, object-capability narrowing): this family composes with deployed grant protocols and attenuation primitives rather than introducing a competing one of its own; the core states the comparison ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

• A policy language. The PDP evaluates the Mission's Authority Set, constraints, and state; how a deployment authors policy beyond them is local ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]).¶

• Entitlement governance. What standing access a principal should hold over time belongs to existing governance layers; the delegated-authority layer composes with them (Section 4).¶

• Agent identity and deployment governance. Who the agent is, its concrete instance, and its approved behavioral version belong to the deployment's agent IAM and change governance; the family authenticates against and consumes those facts without defining them (Section 10.2).¶

• An agent framework. The harness constrains the execution environment's relationship to Mission state; it does not say how an agent plans, reasons, or calls tools ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness]).¶

• Semantic derivation. Whether a derived Authority Set is the right reading of the task is committed and auditable, not standardized (Section 12).¶

• Agent trustworthiness. The family bounds what a compromised or injected agent can do; it does not make the agent trustworthy ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model]).¶

6. The Reference Architecture

The family is a menu, but a reader should meet it as a meal. Four stacks, each containing the previous, are the shapes deployments actually take, and the second is the reference:¶

Protocol core:

the issuance profile alone: the standardizable primitive (approved, anchored, state-gated Missions), Mission-substrate conformance (Section 19), no per-action control.¶

Reference security architecture:

core plus runtime enforcement, its AuthZEN binding, and a freshness source (the Runtime-Enforced level, Section 16). This is the architecture this document means when it says a Mission is enforced, and the one an evaluation should picture by default.¶

Recommended agent architecture:

the reference architecture plus Consent Evidence and the harness (the Governed Agent level): what a deployment running autonomous AI agents should build.¶

High-assurance architecture:

the recommended architecture plus mediated custody, no unmediated path, action-bound approval, active freshness, and agent-isolated approval rendering (the High-Assurance Agent level).¶

7. The Capability Envelope

One tension organizes the whole family. A Mission commits its authority and intent once, at approval, but an agent's work is open-ended: the actions a task will take are not known when it is approved. "Reconcile Q3 invoices" must authorize reading any invoice and posting any adjustment under the cap, because the specific ones cannot be enumerated in advance.¶

So the Authority Set an Approver consents to is a capability envelope, not a task specification, and the gap between that envelope and what a given run actually does is where agent risk lives.¶

The family's mechanisms are levers that narrow that gap:¶

• constraint-bounding and the subset rule shrink the envelope at issuance;¶

• runtime enforcement checks each action against it at the point of use;¶

• action-bound approval re-consents the highest-consequence actions with their concrete parameters;¶

• progressive authorization trades many increment approvals for one bounded ceiling;¶

• metering caps cumulative consumption; and¶

• completion retires authority as the task finishes.¶

No single lever closes the gap; a deployment composes the ones its risk warrants (Section 16), and the verbs of Section 14 organize the levers by the question each answers.¶

The levers share one strategy: they convert semantic risk into structural signals. A policy decision point is never asked to judge whether content is harmful; provenance (the harness taint context), composition (the quarantine pattern), egress enumeration and volume bounds, separation of duty, and re-consent turn that question into facts a decision can gate on. A content evaluator a deployment adds composes as Resource policy at the decision point and only ever narrows.¶

The stance beneath the levers is survivable incorrectness: the agent is probabilistic, so the family never bets on the model being right and builds so that wrong is survivable, on two arms.¶

The action arm is this envelope and its levers, wire-backed, with in-flight work unwinding through recorded reversibility classes ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-orchestration]). The input arm is least exposure: everything the agent sees can steer it and everything it holds can leak, so a Mission budgets disclosure as well as authority, and mediated custody generalizes from credentials to context.¶

The arms differ in maturity, and the difference is stated rather than blurred: the exposure arm's enforceable edges are the harness taint rule, egress mediation, and catalog filtering ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]), while its interior, retrieval, memory, and context assembly scoped to the Mission, has no interoperable form yet and is deployment discipline, declared in the Deployment Profile (Section 17) rather than claimed.¶

The envelope meets its hardest case in the open world. The family inherits OAuth's ontology, authority client-proposed and enumerated at approval; an agent that discovers resources at encounter time breaks that premise, and some substrates invert it outright: the resource declares its own operations and consequences, and that declaration is the semantic material approval needs (the AAuth binding composes one such substrate, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]). Who owns meaning, and how it reaches derivation, consent, and enforcement, is stated once as the ontology contract (Section 13).¶

Where the resource self-declares, the declaration's digest is committed with the binding evidence: a third commitment beside intent_hash and authority_hash, recording what the resource claimed to be at the moment authority bound to it. The rest of the encounter, its routing through drawdown, catalog binding, projection, or fresh approval, and its identity pinning and floors, is the discovery companion's contract ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-discovery]).¶

8. A Mission's Life

The structure is easiest to see by following one Mission end to end under the OAuth binding: an operator gives an agent the task "reconcile Q3 invoices."¶

1. Propose. The client shapes the request into a structured Mission Intent, untrusted by construction, and submits it in a Pushed Authorization Request [RFC9126] ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]; the core).¶

2. Approve and record. The Authorization Server derives an Authority Set (read invoices, post adjustments under a cap), discloses it, and the Approver approves. The approval event commits intent_hash and authority_hash and creates the Mission, active with an expiry; Consent Evidence commits what was shown ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]).¶

3. Issue. Tokens are derived under the subset rule, carry the mission claim, and derivation and refresh are refused once the Mission leaves active (the core).¶

4. Enforce. Before each consequential action (posting an adjustment), the PEP obtains a PDP permit bound to the action's concrete parameters and to current Mission state ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]).¶

5. Delegate. A sub-agent that verifies ledger entries receives a child Mission with strictly narrower authority and lineage ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]).¶

6. Govern. Consumers observe state through Status and Signals; growth requires an approved successor ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]), and entries retire as their work completes ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]).¶

7. Stop. Revocation or expiry turns every gate at once: issuance refuses, the PDP denies, the harness pauses bound sessions and queues, and the orchestrator unwinds in-flight work ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-orchestration]).¶

8. Prove. The record, anchors, evidence, and receipts let an auditor reconstruct what was approved, shown, decided, and done, and a Mandate carries the committed facts to parties outside the deployment ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]).¶

The approval-to-permit path in sequence:¶

 Approver     Agent              AS          PEP/PDP        RS
    |           |                 |             |            |
    |           | 1 Mission       |             |            |
    |           |   Intent (PAR)  |             |            |
    |           |---------------->|             |            |
    | 2 disclose and approve      |             |            |
    |<--------------------------->|             |            |
    |           |  Mission active:|             |            |
    |           |  intent_hash,   |             |            |
    |           |  authority_hash |             |            |
    |           | 3 Mission-bound |             |            |
    |           |   token         |             |            |
    |           |<----------------|             |            |
    |           | 4 action, token, parameters   |            |
    |           |------------------------------>|            |
    |           |                 | 5 state and |            |
    |           |                 |   authority |            |
    |           |                 |<----------->|            |
    |           |                 |             | 6 permit,  |
    |           |                 |             |   evidence |
    |           | 7 permitted action executes   |----------->|

Under the standalone binding the same life runs with ordinary tokens and the Mission Join in place of step 3's claim carriage (Section 15); under the AAuth binding the Person Server plays the AS role for its native missions.¶

9. Mission Invariants

Seven invariants hold across every profile and binding; each is stated normatively by its home document and consumed everywhere else. A change that would break one is a change to the model, not to a profile.¶

Authority serves an approved task:

No Mission-bound authority exists except by derivation for a Mission, and a Mission is created only when rooted in an approved authorization basis that commits intent_hash and authority_hash (the core). Fields an agent can influence shape authority only through the pre-approval derivation the Approver consents to; once the Mission is approved they are inert and never derive, widen, or gate authority.¶

Only active permits:

Issuance, refresh, and reliance require the exact state active; every other state, including an unrecognized one, fails safe (the core's Mission Lifecycle and Gating section).¶

Authority only narrows:

Derived tokens, delegated child Missions, attenuated tokens, and cross-domain projections carry subsets; widening exists only as an approved successor: a fresh approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]), or policy drawdown within a ceiling a human pre-consented ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]).¶

Revocation is possession-independent:

A Mission ends by a state change at its issuer, not by finding and destroying credentials; outstanding credentials meet the issuance gate, the runtime re-check, or their own expiry, whichever comes first (Section 11.10).¶

Attribution is carried, never inferred:

Each role in the actor chain travels in its own construct, and the evidence layer records them together; no role is derived from another (Section 10.1). This invariant scopes the actor chain. The credential-to-Mission association is itself a carried fact only where a binding carries the mission claim; under the standalone binding the PDP's join establishes it by inference, bounded by that binding's join assurance (Section 15).¶

Enforcement fails closed; inert surfaces fail safe:

A PDP that cannot establish state or authority within the published staleness bound denies, and a consumer that cannot refresh state treats its cache as unreliable rather than as permission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]).¶

Anchors commit; they do not prove semantics:

The integrity anchors prove what was approved and committed, not that the derivation was the right reading of the task (Section 12).¶

Read against "approved" in the first invariant, the core names three authorization bases, never an eighth invariant: direct, a human's own approval; template, a dispatch drawing on a ceiling the human consented to once; and policy_drawdown, a child instance a policy adjudicates within a bound the parent's human already consented to. All three fix the same accountable human as consent_principal; they differ only in what activated this instance and what root that activation traces to (the core).¶

Read substrate-neutrally, the invariants carry the five laws the companion handbook names for the layer: durability, attribution, narrowing, termination, and containment.¶

Read on the artifact plane, the same invariants forbid authority from riding a work product an agent produces: no authority is acquired by information propagation alone, and a work product crossing into a Mission is input that the receiving Mission re-evaluates under its own Authority Set. This is a reading of the invariants above, not an eighth invariant; its normative home is the Mission Work Products companion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-work-products]).¶

Read under composition, the invariants bound one Mission's own Authority Set; they do not by themselves bound the aggregate surface a delegation tree, a cross-domain hop, or a chain of child generations reaches together. Delegation depth resets at each cross-domain hop and at each child generation, and a child's own derivation cap is independent of its parent's, so the authorized surface a body of work can reach can exceed what any single approval appears to bound. This is again a reading of the invariants above, not an eighth invariant; disclosing the composed bound at the consent surface is the cross-domain and child-delegation profiles' role ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]), and bounding aggregate consumption is the metering profile's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]).¶

10. Mission Roles and Components

For each component: what it does, what it holds, and which document specifies it. What its compromise costs is the security model's subject ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model]).¶

Agent (client):

Proposes the Mission Intent and executes the task; in the OAuth binding it holds derived Mission-bound tokens; outside the trusted base and assumed compromisable ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

A deployment may authenticate concrete agent instances under the client-instance-assertion profile and its AI-agent profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-client-instance-assertion], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-ai-agent-instance]), which sharpens delegation chains, joins, and evidence attribution to instance granularity without touching the Mission model.¶

Subject:

The user or system on whose behalf the Mission is approved, an (iss, sub) pair recorded immutably at approval (the core).¶

Approver:

The single accountable principal who approves the Mission; equal to the Subject for self-approval (the core's Single Accountable Approver section).¶

Mission Issuer:

Validates the Mission Intent, runs the approval event, records the Mission, and owns its state. Four bindings host it:¶

• OAuth Authorization Server: every derived token carries the mission claim, and issuance and refresh are gated on Mission state ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

• Mission Authority Server: the same record, anchors, and lifecycle without issuing tokens; the PDP joins ordinary credentials to the Mission at the point of use ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]).¶

• AAuth Person Server: the mission blob carries the record under AAuth's s256 commitment, and the Person Server issues or gates every auth token, so issuance gating holds ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]).¶

• UMA 2.0 Authorization Server (experimental sketch): the pushed Mission Intent rides UMA claims pushing, the resource owner's decision fills UMA's authorization assessment, and RPT issuance is gated on state ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-uma]).¶

Under every binding the Issuer also serves audience-scoped policy views, the authority-distribution artifact the runtime and MAS profiles define ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]).¶

Resource Server:

The protected resource. In the OAuth binding it enforces statelessly from the token and can check the mission claim (the core's Resource Server Enforcement section); in the standalone binding the token carries no Mission signal, and Mission properties reach it only through the enforcement path.¶

PEP and PDP:

The PEP sits at the last controllable boundary before an action and obtains a permit for each consequential action; under mediated custody it, not the agent, holds the sender-constraint key.¶

The PDP evaluates the action against the Mission's authority, constraints, actor chain, and current state, and fails closed ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]); in the standalone binding it also verifies the subject and client join (the MAS's Mission Join section).¶

Agent harness:

Hosts the agent; binds sessions, task graphs, queues, cached tool connections, and sub-agent handles to Mission state; establishes the environment with no unmediated path to mediated actions ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness]).¶

Orchestrator:

Assigns each workflow step a reversibility class, records an unwind plan before dispatch, and compensates in-flight work when a Mission stops ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-orchestration]).¶

Transparency Service:

An append-only SCITT log [RFC9943] that registers Mission evidence as Signed Statements and issues receipts verifiable offline ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]).¶

Verifiers:

Parties outside the deployment that check Mission facts without a token exchange: Mandate verifiers confirm what was approved ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate]); evidence consumers check consent, decision, and execution evidence against the anchors and receipts ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]).¶

The bindings converge on one object, and enforcement draws on it regardless of binding:¶

      Subject        Approver
          \             |
           \      approval event
            \           |
  +-------------------------------------------------------------+
  |                       Mission Issuer                         |
  | +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ |
  | | OAuth AS:  | | Standalone | | AAuth PS:  | | UMA 2.0 AS | |
  | | Mission-   | | MAS: no    | | native     | | (sketch):  | |
  | | bound      | | tokens;    | | missions;  | | pushed     | |
  | | tokens     | | the PDP    | | auth       | | Intent;    | |
  | | gated on   | | joins to   | | tokens     | | RPTs gated | |
  | | state      | | Mission    | | gated      | | on state   | |
  | +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ +------------+ |
  +-------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------+
          v              v              v              v
          the Mission: intent_hash,
       authority_hash, lifecycle state
                     |
                     | state and authority (claim,
                     | introspection, Status, Signals)
                     v
     Agent ------> PEP ----------> PDP
     (harness,      |  <- permit -
     orchestrator)  v
             Resource Server

Grouped as planes rather than parts, the same components form the delegated-authority layer of Section 4, with the evidence surface crossing all of them:¶

 control       Mission Issuer (OAuth AS | MAS | AAuth PS):
               record, anchors, lifecycle, status,
               authority distribution, management
                    |                       ^
                    | state, authority      | evidence
                    v                       |
 enforcement   PEP and PDP: a permit per consequential
               action, parameter binding, custody
                    |                       ^
                    | mediated actions      | outcomes
                    v                       |
 execution     harness, agent, orchestrator: sessions,
               sub-agents, queues, unwinding

 evidence      Consent Evidence, decision and execution
 (crossing)    evidence, Mission Receipts, the Mandate,
               audit transparency

11. The Mission Substrate

The companion profiles named without "oauth" are defined against the Mission model's substrate primitives rather than against OAuth mechanics; each names what it consumes in a Mission Substrate section of its own. This section consolidates that interface: eight primitives, each with its normative home and its consumers. Every sentence mirrors a rule the named profile states normatively.¶

12. The Authority Derivation Boundary

Deriving the Authority Set from the Mission Intent is the semantic heart of the model and the one step the family deliberately does not standardize. The consequence is a trust boundary worth stating plainly: interoperability begins at the committed result, not at the Intent. A Mission Intent has no portable semantics; two conforming Authorization Servers can derive different Authority Sets from the same Intent, and audit can establish what was derived (against intent_hash and policy_version), never whether it was the right reading of the task. A deployment whose partners must reason about its derivations can publish a derivation policy identifier and test fixtures that pin Intent-to-Authority-Set outcomes, making the local policy reviewable even though it does not travel. Narrowing mode ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) is the checkable path: where the client supplies candidate authority, derivation is a subset of it and reproducible, which is the closest the family comes to portable derivation.¶

The ceiling the derivation narrows against is itself a composition, not a single object. The derived Authority Set sits inside every authority source that bounds the task: the issuer's derivation policy, the Approver's own authority (an approval grants nothing the Approver could not grant), and, at enforcement time, the resource owner's and deployment's live policy at the decision point. The derivation step intersects the first two and commits the result; the runtime contract re-checks the rest on every action, which is why a permit is never implied by the Authority Set alone. A deployment adding further sources (a tenant boundary, an environment-specific floor) adds them as derivation-policy inputs or as decision-point policy, never as agent-negotiated widening.¶

The derivation modes rank by how portable their result is:¶

A deployment seeking interoperable authority uses the first; free-text and model-assisted derivation are local policy unless a profile pins them with a published policy identifier, version, and test fixtures.¶

13. The Ontology Contract

The derivation boundary settles who commits authority; this section settles who owns what an operation means. The ownership statement is one sentence: the resource owns the ontology, its operations, its constraint semantics, and their consequences, while derivation, consent rendering, and enforcement consume that meaning without owning it, and no layer invents meaning it does not own. The consuming contract is equally short: meaning binds at approval, is enforced at the point of use, and any translation between the resource's vocabulary and another party's is trusted, verified, or separately approved, never a place where authority widens (Section 11.9).¶

Resource-owned meaning reaches the three consuming layers through five mechanisms, each normative in its own home and composing as one contract:¶

Common Constraints:

The registered constraint vocabulary every conforming party evaluates identically, with the mission_constraints_supported protected-resource metadata member advertising which constraints a resource enforces. Home: the issuance profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).¶

Capability-source binding:

Catalog-sourced capability definitions (an MCP tool, an OpenAPI operation) content-digested at derivation and refused on drift at decision time, so the meaning authority bound to is the meaning enforced. Home: the AuthZEN binding ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]).¶

Operation Profiles:

The per-operation statement of normalization and binding rules, carrying resource-declared operation semantics such as idempotency, reversibility, and lease requirements into parameter binding. Home: the runtime profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]).¶

The encounter contract:

What is submitted, adjudicated, and recorded when an agent meets a resource the approval could not enumerate, so meaning that arrives late still binds before use. Home: the discovery companion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-discovery]).¶

Resource-Declared Semantics:

The full inversion: the resource publishes its operations, their human meaning, and their consequences, content-addressed by r3_s256 as a third commitment beside intent_hash and authority_hash, and consent composes the resource's own words. The declaration is not consent material alone; it returns to authority. The declared operations are the candidate vocabulary derivation narrows against, the issuer adjudicates the encounter against the Mission's Authority Set or a pre-consented ceiling, and the derived authority records the declaration's digest, so the Authority Set remembers which version of the resource's meaning it was derived under and enforcement refuses on declaration drift. Home: the AAuth binding, informative ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]).¶

Behind the five mechanisms sits one direction axis, and the direction is chosen per encounter, not fixed by binding. The family inherits OAuth's client-proposed default: the client names the authority it wants and the resource's meaning arrives through metadata, catalogs, and profiles (Section 7). Resource-Declared Semantics is the inversion, where the resource speaks first and approval consumes its declaration, and it is valid under every binding: the fundamentals, meaning bound at approval, enforced at use, translation never widening, hold in both directions. Under the OAuth binding the resource-declared direction runs entirely through seams the family already has: the encounter contract routes the declaration ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-discovery]), narrowing-mode derivation consumes the declared operations as candidate vocabulary ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), consent composes the resource-authored material, and the declaration's digest rides the derived authority (the progressive companion's resource_declaration_digest, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]). The AAuth binding's R3 composition is the worked example of the full inversion, not its only home. Proposed RAR-type metadata ([I-D.draft-zehavi-oauth-rar-metadata]), a resource publishing the authorization_details types and fields it understands, is the OAuth-native descriptive surface the direction builds on.¶

Both directions close the same loop: the meaning source's digest becomes part of the derived authority. A catalog-sourced capability pins its source_digest; a resource declaration pins r3_s256; in each case the Authority Set carries the version of the meaning it was derived under, and the point of use compares against the meaning in force. Meaning is not consulted at approval and assumed at enforcement; it is committed at approval and re-verified at use.¶

The contract's failure mode is already normative in each home: a consumer that cannot resolve an operation's meaning, a constraint it cannot evaluate, a drifted capability definition, an unrecognized declaration, refuses rather than guesses. Meaning, like state, fails closed.¶

The contract has a dual, and the two statements carry equal force. The resource owns what an action means; the Mission owns why it is happening and where the undertaking stands, and that context exists nowhere else in the stack. A resource evaluates each request at perfect local resolution and zero task resolution: it can price every consequence its ontology names and cannot see the undertaking the request belongs to. This is the context asymmetry, and a risk decision composes both sides of it: semantics without purpose prices every delete the same, and purpose without semantics cannot read the call.¶

"Delete database" in isolation is indistinguishable from catastrophe. "Delete database" inside an approved migration whose copy steps already completed is a priced, checkable step. The only place that judgment is possible is where Decision and Execution Evidence join on the Mission's identity, because that join is the undertaking's recorded history and no resource-local view contains it. The runtime profile names the mechanism: sequence-aware evaluation over the undertaking's history is an optional decision input, guarded so that history informs a decision and never widens one ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]).¶

14. The Mission Verbs

The family organizes along a verb spine: each verb answers one question, sits on one trust boundary, and is owned by named documents; the levers of Section 7 sort onto this spine by the question each answers.¶

 propose      Intent Shaping (client side, untrusted)
                        |
 approve      Mission Issuer: the OAuth AS, Mission
 and record   Authority Server, or AAuth Person Server
              binding (+ Consent Evidence, Deferred
              Approval)
                        |
              the Mission: intent_hash,
              authority_hash, lifecycle state
                        |
 govern       Status (pull), Signals (push),
              Expansion (widen), Completion (retire)
                        |
 enforce      Runtime contract -> AuthZEN binding:
 each action  a PDP permit before every consequential action
                        |
 run and      Harness (continuity is not authority),
 wind down    Orchestration (unwind in-flight work)

 delegate     Child Delegation, Offline Attenuation

 project      Cross-Domain Projection (a Mission honored
              in another trust domain)

 continue     Mission Continuation (authorization continuity
              over ICA, async delegation, and cross-domain
              transports)

 prove        Consent Evidence, Mandate, Audit

 analyze      Security Model (the trusted base)

15. Mission Deployment Patterns

 Client               MAS                Approver     PEP/PDP
   |                    |                  |            |
   | 1 submit Intent    |                  |            |
   |------------------->|                  |            |
   | 2 202 pending      |                  |            |
   |<-------------------|                  |            |
   |                    | 3 disclose       |            |
   |                    |----------------->|            |
   |                    | 4 approve        |            |
   |                    |<-----------------|            |
   |                    | Mission active   |            |
   | 5 poll             |                  |            |
   |------------------->|                  |            |
   | 6 approved,        |                  |            |
   |   mission_id       |                  |            |
   |<-------------------|                  |            |
   | 7 action, token,   |                  |            |
   |   Mission ref      |                  |            |
   |--------------------------------------------------->|
   |                    | 8 signed status: |            |
   |                    |   active         |            |
   |                    |<------------------------------|
   |                    |------------------------------>|
   |                    |                  | 9 join;    |
   |                    |                  |   evaluate |
   | 10 permit          |                  |            |
   |<---------------------------------------------------|

16. Mission Assurance Levels

Two questions get asked of a Mission deployment: what to deploy for a goal, and what guarantee it has earned. They share one progression, so this document states a single set of levels, each carrying both facets, the document set and the proof obligations, and names them so a deployment, a procurement, or a review can cite one level. The levels are guidance, not a conformance class; every companion is optional and states its own scoped conformance.¶

Because the family's strongest properties are deployment properties, not protocol properties (complete PEP placement, a trusted freshness source, and credential custody are things a deployment does, not things a token proves), a level is a claim, verifiable in the sense the runtime profile fixes ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), not a label: a deployment states the highest level it has earned in its Enforcement Scope Statement, and a consumer treats an unstated or unproven level as not claimed.¶

The levels build on one another: a deployment adopts recording and governing the approved task (Baseline Issuance), then per-action enforcement (Runtime-Enforced), then full agent safety (Governed and High-Assurance Agent), advancing to the level its risk warrants and stopping there.¶

A level is a dependency bundle: which documents a deployment runs, in adoption order. What a deployment can prove is the orthogonal claims axis (Section 16.1), and the proof obligations noted with each level below are the claims that become available at that level, not properties the level name itself asserts; the claims, not the level, are what a relying party compares.¶

The levels are one axis; the binding is an orthogonal one. Every level is reachable under any of the Mission Issuer bindings (the OAuth Authorization Server, the standalone Mission Authority Server, the AAuth Person Server, or the experimental UMA 2.0 Authorization Server), and a deployment names its binding separately from its level; what a level grants varies with what the binding provides.¶

The standalone MAS binding is the case that matters most: it provides the Mission record, lifecycle, and authority but no Mission-bound credential and no issuance gating, so under it the kill switch is the runtime layer alone, not the token gate, and a deployment states that. Binding is not a level.¶

The levels, cumulative:¶

Baseline Issuance:

the approved, anchored Mission record and its lifecycle: authority derived and committed at the approval event with the integrity anchors (the core).¶

Where the binding issues credentials (full provision), issuance is bounded by the subset rule and gated on Mission state, which grants task-bound, auditable authority and a possession-independent kill switch at the issuance gate; it grants no per-action control, and outstanding tokens run to their own expiry.¶

Sized deliberately, that expiry is the level's revocation bound: lifetime-bounded reliance, access-token lifetimes no longer than the deployment's tolerated staleness ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]), gives a quantified cutoff, revocation within one token lifetime, with no Resource Server changes and no status traffic; expiry is a state check performed by the clock. Revocation latency is a number, not a level: what the higher levels add is per-action enforcement, parameter binding, and evidence, not a faster clock.¶

Under a partial-provision binding (the standalone MAS), Baseline grants governance and audit; no kill switch of any kind exists until a freshness surface (the half-step) and runtime enforcement (the next level) arrive, and a deployment states that; the issuance join ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-issuance-grant]) restores gated issuance at each consuming Authorization Server, and Baseline with it.¶

Proof obligations: the anchored approval and, where credentials are issued, the subset rule. A deployment that adds only a freshness surface, Mission Status or introspection with a published staleness bound ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]), gains state-aware reliance, a revocation cutoff within that bound, without per-action enforcement: a half-step into the next level, not a level of its own.¶

Runtime-Enforced:

adds a PEP/PDP decision on every consequential action, a trusted state source with a published staleness bound, parameter binding, and runtime evidence ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime] and its AuthZEN binding). Grants per-action enforcement and revocation bounded, for gated classes, by the staleness bound plus the permit window plus the class's execution bound, and by token lifetime for ungated paths.¶

This is the smallest deployment that turns a Mission from governed issuance into action-time defense, and every normative dependency it needs is ratified; it is a substantial build, not a wedge, and a deployment sizes the effort from the runtime profile's conformance section rather than from this level's one-line summary.¶

Proof obligations: PEP-placement completeness and the declared freshness source and bound. Documents: Baseline plus runtime, its AuthZEN binding, and a freshness source.¶

Governed Agent (recommended for AI agents):

adds Consent Evidence and the harness, growing with Child Delegation, Expansion, Orchestration, and Discovery (experimental, with Progressive) as needed. Grants consent-rendering evidence and session-continuity discipline. Documents: Runtime-Enforced plus consent-evidence and the harness.¶

High-Assurance Agent:

adds the guarantees that resist a compromised agent. Two named claims live at this level, each with proof obligations the runtime profile fixes.¶

Agent-compromise-resistant enforcement: mediated (gateway) credential custody, a declared-and-audited path scope, action-bound approval for the high-consequence classes, an active-freshness state source, and approval disclosures rendered by a component isolated from the agent, so a compromised agent cannot unilaterally take a high-consequence action for which it does not hold a mediated credential.¶

Trifecta containment: least exposure, the harness taint rule enforced as a mandatory requirement of the harness profile, with pre-consented egress to Approver-named destinations as its one carve-out, and full mediation of the external-communication and external-commitment classes with the egress-channel enumeration, so an injected agent cannot egress on the strength of untrusted content alone.¶

These are named high bars, never implied by basic adoption; a deployment can bind its Enforcement Scope Statement to execution-environment attestation so a claim is technical rather than organizational ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness]).¶

Read as an adoption ladder, each level makes a broader class of agent work defensible to grant. The mapping is informative: the action classes are the runtime profile's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), resource policy remains authoritative for its own objects, and what a level grants varies with the binding; the Mission Deployment Profile (Section 17) is where a deployment states its own mediated_action_classes and exclusions.¶

Every level above Baseline Issuance also carries the cross-cutting obligations its mechanisms imply:¶

• operation-profile normalization where duration or parameter digests are metered ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]);¶

• evidence retention for the audit horizon; and¶

• a registration schedule where audit transparency is run ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]).¶

The evidence levels are accountability, not prevention: they make what was recorded tamper-evident, not what was perceived true or what was never recorded present.¶

17. The Mission Deployment Profile

The Mission Assurance Levels (Section 16) name what to deploy, and the assurance claims (Section 16.1) name what may be proven; a claim is only checkable if a deployment states, concretely, what it enforces and what it leaves outside the boundary. The Mission Deployment Profile is that system-level artifact: the published composition of the per-layer statements the profiles themselves demand (the runtime profile's Enforcement Scope Statement, the harness environment statement, the MAS mapping contract, the Resource Server coverage split, the transparency-service topology and schedule, and the progressive profile's bounds and ceiling-review cadence, each where its profile is run), composed into one object an auditor, a procurement, or a security review can read. It is one artifact, not a second one: each fact's owning profile governs its meaning and normative force, and this document fixes no serialization. A machine-readable manifest schema, with stable claim identifiers and validation rules, is deferred family work; until it exists, the shape below is illustrative and the per-profile statements are the checkable form.¶

Its distinguishing field is residual_risks: the profile is not credible unless it states, in the same object as its guarantees, what it does not cover. An illustrative shape:¶

{
  "profile": "mission-governed-agent-runtime",
  "assurance_level": "high-assurance-agent",
  "mission_issuer": "https://as.example.com",
  "state_sources": [
    { "type": "status_endpoint", "max_staleness_seconds": 30 }
  ],
  "issuance": {
    "binding": "oauth-core",
    "mission_claim_required": true,
    "refresh_gated_on_active_state": true
  },
  "runtime": {
    "pdp": "authzen",
    "pep_locations": ["tool-gateway", "browser-action-proxy"],
    "mediated_action_classes": [
      "irreversible_action", "external_commitment",
      "external_communication", "privileged_administration"
    ],
    "action_bound_approval_classes": [
      "irreversible_action", "privileged_administration"
    ],
    "unmediated_exclusions": [
      "internal_reasoning", "local_cache_read"
    ]
  },
  "credential_custody": {
    "held_by": "pep",
    "sender_constrained": true,
    "key_generated_in_pep": true,
    "agent_receives_bearer_token": false
  },
  "approval_rendering": {
    "rendered_by": "agent-isolated-component"
  },
  "harness": {
    "subagent_inheritance": "explicit_delegation_only",
    "resume_requires_active_state": true,
    "cached_credentials_revalidated": true,
    "secondary_egress_enumerated": true
  },
  "exposure": {
    "taint_rule": "enforced",
    "egress_channels_enumerated": true
  },
  "standing_charters": {
    "ceiling_review_cadence_days": 90,
    "per_drawdown_bound": "single_entry_delta",
    "drawdown_rate_bound_per_chain_per_hour": 60
  },
  "resource_servers": {
    "authorization_details_enforcing": ["https://erp.example.com"],
    "scope_projection_only": ["https://mail.example.com"],
    "constraint_enforcement_for_scope_only": "runtime_pep"
  },
  "evidence": {
    "decision_evidence": true,
    "execution_evidence": true,
    "retention_days": 365,
    "field_classification": "evidence-schema-v2",
    "evidence_access_audited": true,
    "erasure_policy": "erasure-records",
    "transparency": {
      "service_operator": "third_party",
      "monitor": "sec-ops",
      "registration_time_bound_seconds": 3600
    }
  },
  "residual_risks": [
    "unmediated local reasoning is outside enforcement",
    "revocation latency up to 30 seconds",
    "PEP compromise is not prevented",
    "per-entry constraints reach scope-only resources only via the PEP",
    "long-term memory and provider model context are not Mission-scoped exposure points"
  ]
}

The evidence member carries the deployment's evidence-handling posture beside its guarantees: the field-classification scheme its records use, whether access to Mission evidence is itself audited, and the erasure policy that pairs retention with deletion accountability ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]).¶

Two deployments that both "support Mission" but publish different Deployment Profiles provide different security properties, and the profile is what makes that difference legible. A deployment claiming a level (Section 16) states it here and lists the residuals that level leaves.¶

18. Prevention, Detection, and Residue

Each layer earns a specific property and leaves a specific residue. Stated as a table so a claim cannot be read as more than it is:¶

The pattern is uniform: the family commits and checks what a party was shown, decided, or did; it does not make the human attentive, the producer honest, or the unmediated path disappear. Those are the residues the Mission Assurance Levels (Section 16) and the security model make a deployment state rather than assume, and the exposure arm (Section 7) carries the same honesty in the other direction.¶

19. Mission Requirements

The requirements the family answers, stated implementation-neutrally; each names its answering documents by short form (Section 20). They stand on their own: a reader evaluating another design can use them as a checklist. The litmus splits at the family's own conformance seam, because the family itself defines conformant deployments at two strengths (Section 16).¶

A design provides Mission-substrate conformance, the bar the Baseline Issuance level and every binding meets ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-substrate]), when the first four properties hold:¶

1. An approved task object: the task is a durable, explicitly approved object rather than a session or a token, and its intent and derived authority are integrity-committed at approval.¶

2. Authority derived from the task: credentials and decisions derive from that object, never minted independently of it.¶

3. Narrow-only delegation: derived and delegated authority only narrows, and widening exists only as a fresh approval.¶

4. Observable lifecycle state: the object's current state is observable and gates issuance and reliance; only active permits, and unrecognized states fail safe.¶

A design provides Runtime-Enforced Mission conformance, the bar a design claiming action-time defense meets, when two more hold:¶

1. Per-action runtime enforcement: consequential actions are checkable against the object at the point of use.¶

2. Evidence that joins: what was approved, shown, decided, and done is reconstructible from evidence joined on the object's identity.¶

A design that relaxes one of the first four is not Mission-based in this family's sense. A design that holds the first four but not all six is Mission-based at issuance strength, which is what a Baseline deployment is, and claims nothing about action-time defense; the requirements below unpack all six.¶

20. Mission Document Map

One line per document, grouped as the family groups them; the short form drops the draft-mcguinness- prefix. The naming encodes a boundary: profiles extending the Authorization Server's own surfaces keep "oauth" in their names; profiles defined against the substrate of Section 11 are named without it. This document is named without it because the architecture is substrate-neutral by construction.¶

Maturity is a dependency boundary. A Standards-Track profile never depends normatively on an experimental one: the experimental profiles (tagged below) extend the stable interface only through its declared seams, the controls extension of the core and the coordinated-extension rules of the evidence objects, and a Standards-Track document cites them informatively at most. An experimental profile that stabilizes crosses the boundary by reclassification, not by a stable document absorbing a dependency.¶

The model and its bindings:¶

oauth-mission:

The core issuance profile: the Mission, the approval event and anchors, the mission claim, the subset rule, state-gated issuance.¶

mission-authority-server:

The standalone Mission Issuer and the PDP join of ordinary credentials to Missions.¶

oauth-mission-issuance-grant:

The issuance join: MAS-minted grants an estate Authorization Server redeems at its token endpoint for Mission-bound, state-gated tokens.¶

mission-aauth:

The AAuth binding: the Person Server as Mission Issuer, the mission blob as the record under AAuth's s256 commitment, issuance gating at the token endpoint.¶

mission-uma:

Experimental sketch. The UMA 2.0 binding: the pushed Mission Intent rides claims pushing, the resource owner's decision fills UMA's authorization assessment, the RPT is the Mission-bound credential, and the PCT is continuity that is never authority; the first binding authored against the substrate contract.¶

mission-substrate:

Normative requirements on any further binding of the model; the existing bindings and the core are unchanged by it.¶

Approval time:¶

mission-shaping:

Client-side shaping of a user's request into a candidate Mission Intent, as untrusted proposal.¶

oauth-mission-consent-evidence:

The consent_rendering_hash anchor and signed evidence of what the Approver was shown, with the translation floor and Disclosure Interrogation that keep the approval surface readable and questionable.¶

oauth-mission-approval:

Asynchronous approval over the deferred substrate.¶

oauth-mission-approval-revision:

Experimental: in-review narrowing revision of a deferred proposal.¶

oauth-mission-template:

Experimental: one consent to a task template's ceiling; each dispatch instantiates an ordinary Mission from it by policy, at machine speed, bounded by its own derived Authority Set and never exceeding the ceiling.¶

Lifecycle:¶

Status is the lifecycle suite's root document (state reading, including the swarm-scale Status List, lifecycle verbs, and completion), with Signals (the push channel) and Management (the operator plane) as its satellites.¶

oauth-mission-status:

The signed pull surface and the lifecycle endpoint, with suspended and completed, and per-entry discharge via the terminal_when constraint.¶

oauth-mission-signals:

A signed event per lifecycle transition, push or poll.¶

oauth-mission-expansion:

Widening through an approved successor Mission.¶

oauth-mission-containment:

Event-triggered, monotonic narrowing of a live Mission's effective authority, with restoration only through an approved successor.¶

oauth-mission-progressive:

Experimental: policy-adjudicated expansion within a pre-consented ceiling.¶

mission-discovery:

Experimental: the open-world encounter as a governed operation: identity pinning, ceiling adjudication with the lying-resource and tainted-session floors, Discovery Evidence.¶

oauth-mission-management:

Fleet enumeration and bulk lifecycle operations for operators and incident response; dry-run-first, per-Mission semantics.¶

oauth-mission-cross-domain:

Single-hop projection of a Mission to another trust domain via the cross-domain grant.¶

oauth-mission-continuation:

The authorization-continuity profile: a Mission continues its authorization over identity-continuity transports (Identity Continuation, async delegation, cross-domain), state-gated, with the invariant that a continuation handle grants nothing.¶

oauth-id-continuation-assertion:

A continuation transport: a short-lived token-exchange subject token yielding an ID-JAG for an intra-domain hop, bound to a Mission's authorization by mission-continuation.¶

Runtime enforcement:¶

mission-runtime:

The per-action decision contract: parameter binding, custody, fail-closed behavior.¶

mission-authzen:

The concrete decision-API binding and its Decision and Execution Evidence objects.¶

mission-metering:

Experimental: cumulative consumption bounds and the metering that enforces them.¶

Agent runtime:¶

mission-harness:

Binding sessions, queues, and sub-agent handles to Mission state; the mediated environment.¶

mission-orchestration:

Experimental: reversibility classes, unwind plans, and compensation after a stop.¶

Sub-agents:¶

oauth-mission-child-delegation:

Child Missions with lineage, strict-subset authority, cascade revocation.¶

oauth-mission-attenuation:

Experimental: narrower Mission-bound tokens minted offline; the kill switch preserved by runtime re-check.¶

Work products:¶

oauth-mission-work-products:

Experimental: work-product provenance, attribution and not authority, and the non-transitive Mission-to-Mission handoff rule; a work product crossing into a Mission is input, re-evaluated under the receiver's Authority Set.¶

Proof and portability:¶

mission-mandate:

A signed, portable statement of a Mission's committed facts; evidence, not a credential.¶

mission-audit:

Registration of Mission evidence in a SCITT Transparency Service; receipts verifiable offline.¶

Security model:¶

mission-security-model:

The trusted base in one view: what each component must achieve and what its compromise costs.¶

21. Security Considerations

This document introduces no mechanism and therefore no new security considerations. The consolidated trusted base and compromise analysis are the Mission Security Model's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model]), and each profile's own Security Considerations remain normative.¶

22. Privacy Considerations

The privacy properties of the Mission record and the Mission Intent are the core's ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) and each adopted profile's; this document describes them and adds no data element of its own. The core's Privacy Considerations cover Mission Identifier correlation, token payload disclosure, and Intent retention, with the audit profile's erasure record as the transparency-side mechanism ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]). The status profile's anti-oracle property bounds what its status surfaces disclose ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]).¶

23. IANA Considerations

This document makes no IANA request.¶

24. Informative References

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]

McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for AAuth", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-audit]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Audit Transparency", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-audit.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Authority Server", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-authority-server.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen]

McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement: AuthZEN Profile", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-authzen.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-discovery]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Open-World Discovery", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-discovery.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-harness]

McGuinness, K., "Mission-Aware Agent Harnesses", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-harness.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Mandate", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-mandate.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Consumption Metering", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-metering.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-orchestration]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Orchestration and Unwinding", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-orchestration.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]

McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Security Model", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Intent Shaping", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-substrate]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Substrate Requirements", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-substrate.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-uma]

McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for UMA 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-uma.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-ai-agent-instance]

McGuinness, K., "OAuth 2.0 AI Agent Instance Profile", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-ai-agent-instance-00, 4 July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcguinness-oauth-ai-agent-instance-00>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-client-instance-assertion]

McGuinness, K., "OAuth 2.0 Client Instance Assertion", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-client-instance-assertion-01, 24 June 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcguinness-oauth-client-instance-assertion-01>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion]

McGuinness, K., "Identity Continuation Assertion for OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-id-continuation-assertion/>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]

McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Deferred Approval for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-approval.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-attenuation]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Offline Attenuation for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-attenuation.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Child Delegation for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Consent Evidence for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Containment for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Continuation: Authorization Continuity for Mission-Bound Authorization", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Cross-Domain Projection for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-cross-domain.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-issuance-grant]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Issuance Grant for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-issuance-grant.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-management]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Management for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-management.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Progressive Authorization for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Lifecycle Signals for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-signals.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Status and Lifecycle for OAuth 2.0", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-status.html>.

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-work-products]

McGuinness, K., "Mission Work Products", 2026, <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-work-products.html>.

[I-D.draft-zehavi-oauth-rar-metadata]

Zehavi, Y., "OAuth 2.0 RAR Metadata and Error Remediation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-zehavi-oauth-rar-metadata-06, 9 August 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zehavi-oauth-rar-metadata-06>.

[I-D.draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation]

Zhu, L. and Z. Berg, "Delegated Refresh Tokens for OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation-05, 3 August 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zhu-oauth-async-delegation-05>.

[RFC6749]

Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.

[RFC8693]

Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.

[RFC9126]

Lodderstedt, T., Campbell, B., Sakimura, N., Tonge, D., and F. Skokan, "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests", RFC 9126, DOI 10.17487/RFC9126, September 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9126>.

[RFC9396]

Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396>.

[RFC9943]

Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande, Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, June 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9943>.

Acknowledgments

This document is part of the Mission-Bound Authorization work and maps the structure that its profiles establish individually.¶

Author's Address