Internet-Draft OAuth Mission Template October 2026
McGuinness Expires 29 April 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Web Authorization Protocol
Internet-Draft:
draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template-latest
Published:
Intended Status:
Experimental
Expires:
Author:
K. McGuinness
Independent

Mission Template for OAuth 2.0

Abstract

An agent that runs a recurring task at machine speed cannot pause for a fresh human approval at every run, and a standing Mission broad enough to cover every run gives the agent that full breadth the whole time. This document defines an experimental option between the two: the Mission Template. A human consents once to a template: a ceiling of resources, actions, and constraints, a dispatch policy, and a set of bounds. Each run is then a Dispatch: the Mission Issuer instantiates an ordinary Mission from the template by policy, with no fresh human approval, and the instance is handed to its agent, which works it with ordinary Mission-bound tokens. Each instance is bounded by its own freshly derived Authority Set, is independently gated and revocable, and never exceeds the template ceiling. High-consequence authority classes stay on a fresh human decision, apart from one optional exception for recurring payment of approved invoices to committed destinations under an exact budget. Consent is given once, to the ceiling; dispatch draws within it deterministically.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 April 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

A recurring task runs many times: once per ticket, per document, per scheduled window. Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] (the "issuance profile") commits a Mission's authority at a human approval event. A fresh human approval at every run does not scale to machine speed. The alternative, a single standing Mission broad enough to cover every run, over-provisions: the agent holds the full breadth the whole time.

This document defines an experimental third option: the Mission Template. A human consents once to a template, which fixes a ceiling of resources, actions, and constraints, names a dispatch policy, and publishes a set of bounds. Each dispatch then instantiates an ordinary Mission from the template by that policy, at machine speed, with no fresh human approval. Consent is given once, to the ceiling; each instance draws within it deterministically. The agent never holds the template: it obtains each dispatched instance and works it as it works any Mission (Section 4).

This follows the architecture's Approve verb: a deterministic, versioned policy can approve at machine speed within a ceiling a human consented to, because the policy approves the instance and a human approved the policy, with a policy version keeping that chain re-checkable ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]). The accountable principal for every dispatched Mission is the human who approved the template. The high-consequence classes stay on a fresh human decision, exactly as that verb requires (Section 9), with one optional exception: recurring payment of approved invoices to committed destinations under an exact budget (Section 9.1). Other unattended high-consequence work needs a directly approved Mission.

This document is optional and experimental: adopt it for evaluation, not as a stable interface. Removing the per-dispatch human from a consented template is a high-consequence capability, so this document conditions it on the ceiling, the bounds, the prohibited-class rule, and the audit linkage it requires. An ordinary human-approved Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) remains the better fit where each run can carry its own approval. No Standards-Track document depends on this one.

A Mission Issuer that does not implement this document creates every Mission through a fresh human approval and is a fully conforming issuance-profile Mission Issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). Nothing here places a new requirement back on the issuance profile.

2. Relationship to Other Profiles

This document depends normatively on the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission] and on the Consent Evidence profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence], and is not implementable alone. It reuses, without restating, the issuance profile's approval event, integrity-anchor envelope, subset rule, Authority Set derivation, Mission record, and active/terminated Mission lifecycle; and the Consent Evidence profile's rule that a consented object's disclosure is committed. It uses Agent, Subject, Approver, Mission Issuer, Mission Intent, Authority Set, and Mission as the issuance profile defines them.

The runtime enforcement profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime] is a normative dependency for its action classes, which the prohibited-class rule tests against (Section 9).

The expansion profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion] is also a normative dependency: Dispatch adopts its creation idempotency apparatus (the operation fingerprint, the durable reservation, revalidation, and recovery-as-delivery) by reference, under its own op: dispatch fingerprint value, rather than restating it (Section 7).

Progressive authorization ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]) is an informative sibling. Progressive removes the per-expansion human from a consented authority ceiling on a single evolving Mission; this document removes the per-dispatch human from a consented template that mints many independent Missions. Both concentrate one considered human consent to a ceiling in place of many hurried consents, and both hold the high-consequence classes back for a human, this document with one bounded exception (Section 9.1). Where progressive draws a successor within one chain, a template dispatches independent instances.

3. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

All JSON shown in this document is non-normative and illustrative; the member definitions in the surrounding text are authoritative.

Mission Template:

A consented object that fixes a Template Ceiling, a Dispatch Policy, the allowed dispatchers and recipients, per-instance bounds, and a review cadence, and from which Missions are dispatched by policy without a fresh human approval (Section 5).

Template Ceiling:

The pre-consented maximum authority any Mission dispatched from a Mission Template may reach: an array of authorization-details-shaped entries, each the shape of an Authority Set entry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), that every dispatched instance MUST be within (Section 7). This bound is distinct from the progressive profile's authority_ceiling on a single evolving Mission and from the shaping companion's caller-supplied shaping ceiling on a proposal ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]).

Dispatch:

The act of instantiating an ordinary Mission from a Mission Template by policy, at machine speed, with no fresh human approval (Section 7).

Instance:

A Mission dispatched from a Mission Template, also called a dispatched Mission. It is an ordinary Mission (Section 11).

Dispatch Handoff:

The exchange that conveys an instance from its Dispatcher to its selected Agent (Section 8).

Dispatcher:

The authenticated principal that requests a Dispatch. A Dispatcher is not an Approver: it triggers instantiation within a template a human already approved, and its authority to do so is fixed by the template's allowed dispatchers.

Dispatch Policy:

The deployment-defined policy, identified and versioned, under which the Mission Issuer instantiates a Mission from a Mission Template. It is the policy the human approved when consenting to the template (Section 5), and it is trusted governance held by the Mission Issuer.

Mission Deployment Profile:

The deployment-level manifest the architecture defines ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]). The bounds, the action-class mapping, and the review cadence this document requires a deployment to publish are published there.

The Consent Evidence profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]) already uses template_id and template_version to name a disclosure-rendering template, the presentation template a Consent Disclosure object was rendered from. The Mission Template of this document is a different object on a different surface: a consented ceiling and dispatch policy that instances are minted from, not a rendering of a disclosure. The two never share a member. Where this document commits a Mission Template's disclosure under Consent Evidence, that disclosure carries the Consent Evidence profile's template_id and template_version for its own rendering template, which are unrelated to the Mission Template being disclosed.

4. Template Overview

This section is non-normative. It shows the roles, the messages from consent to work, and what an agent sees, using one example scenario that later sections continue.

4.1. Roles

Table 1
Role Part in a template's life
Approver The human who consents to the template, and re-consents at each review (Section 6). The accountable principal for every instance.
Mission Issuer Holds the template and its retained consent record, adjudicates each Dispatch, and issues the instance's tokens.
Dispatcher A client in allowed_dispatchers, such as a scheduler or an orchestrator. It requests a Dispatch; it is not an Approver and never chooses the instance's Subject or Agent.
Agent A client in allowed_recipients agents, selected by the Dispatch Policy. It receives the instance and does the work.
Resource server Enforces the instance's tokens as it enforces any Mission-bound token (Section 15).
  1. Consent, once. The Approver consents to the template at the Mission Issuer, which commits it under template_hash (Section 6, Section 5.1).

  2. Dispatch, per run. The Dispatcher sends a token request with the Dispatch grant type, naming the template and carrying the run's dispatch intent (Section 7.1). The Mission Issuer adjudicates it against the template (Section 7), commits an ordinary Mission, the instance, selects its Agent, and returns the instance's access token to the Dispatcher, bound to the Dispatcher's key.

  3. Handoff. The Dispatcher exchanges that access token for a handoff grant naming the selected Agent as its only redeemer, and passes the grant to the Agent (Section 8) over a channel this document does not define, such as a job queue.

  4. Redemption. The Agent redeems the handoff grant, authenticating as itself and proving its own key, and receives its delegation handle for the instance (Section 8.3).

  5. Work. The Agent presents the handle in the continuation profile's async delegation exchange ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]), receiving access tokens for the instance's resources and a refresh-token family, and calls resource servers with those tokens.

  6. End. The instance ends at its own clamped expires_at or on revocation, like any Mission. The template stops dispatching when it is revoked or expires (Section 5.2), and pauses once its most recent approval is older than review_cadence, until a human re-consents (Section 6).

Approver   Dispatcher        Mission Issuer          Agent    Resource
   |            |                   |                  |       Server
   |-(1) consent to the template -->|                  |          |
   |            |                   |                  |          |
   |            |--(2) Dispatch --->|                  |          |
   |            |<-- instance token-|                  |          |
   |            |--(3) handoff ---->|                  |          |
   |            |<-- handoff grant -|                  |          |
   |            |------- handoff grant --------------->|          |
   |            |                   |<-(4) redeem -----|          |
   |            |                   |--- handle ------>|          |
   |            |                   |<-(5) async ------|          |
   |            |                   |    delegation    |          |
   |            |                   |--- tokens ------>|          |
   |            |                   |                  |-- call ->|

4.3. How an agent uses a template

The Agent never holds or presents the template. Only a Dispatcher names it, by template_id, and only to request a Dispatch. The Agent works with an instance: an ordinary Mission with its own identifier, Authority Set, and expires_at. The template member on its tokens records where the instance came from; it grants nothing (Section 7.4).

An Agent obtains an instance in one of two ways:

  • From a separate Dispatcher. The Dispatcher dispatches and hands the instance off, and the Agent redeems the handoff grant (steps 3 and 4 above).

  • As its own Dispatcher. An Agent that is both an allowed Dispatcher and the instance's selected Agent dispatches, already holds the instance's access token bound to its own key, and obtains its delegation handle through the continuation profile's handle exchange instead of a handoff (Section 8.4).

Either way, the instance's authority is at most the Template Ceiling, narrowed by the run's dispatch intent and any proposal, and never includes a prohibited class (Section 9) other than a payment admitted under Section 9.1. Authority beyond the ceiling takes a fresh human decision: a human-approved expansion of the instance, which leaves the template behind, or a new template consent (Section 11). Each run is a separate instance, and max_active bounds how many are active at once.

4.4. Example scenario

The examples in this document follow one scenario. alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR at https://idp.example.com) consents once to a template for nightly invoice reconciliation at https://erp.example.com: read invoices, and post journal-entry adjustments under $500. Each night the ERP's scheduler, the client erp-scheduler, dispatches an instance for the previous day's invoices, and the reconciliation agent, the client s6BhdRkqt3, works it. The Mission Issuer is https://as.example.com. The deployment's Mission Deployment Profile maps invoices.read to the consequential read class and journal-entries.write to the reversible consequential write class, so neither is prohibited (Section 9).

5. The Mission Template

A Mission Template is a consented object with these members:

id:

REQUIRED. A string. The Mission Template Identifier, stable across the template's lifetime.

issuer:

REQUIRED. A string. The Mission Issuer that holds and dispatches from the template.

template_version:

REQUIRED. A string. The version of this template's consented content. A change to any consented member is a new template_version and, per Section 6, a new human approval.

ceiling:

REQUIRED. An array of authorization-details-shaped entries, each the shape of an Authority Set entry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). This is the Template Ceiling: the pre-consented maximum any dispatched instance may reach. A ceiling entry MAY name a resource family rather than a single resource, under the resource-narrowing semantics the subset rule fixes ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).

dispatch_policy:

REQUIRED. An activation policy reference, an object of id, version, and digest ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Standing-Consent Bases"), identifying the Dispatch Policy under which the Mission Issuer instantiates from this template and committing its content. The policy's content is deployment-defined, and includes the rule that selects the instance's Agent when allowed_recipients lists more than one (Section 5). Because template_hash covers this member, the template commits the exact policy the human consented to, and the Mission Issuer verifies its digest before each Dispatch under that section's rule, so a machine-speed dispatch decision stays auditable against the policy content, not only its identifier.

allowed_dispatchers:

REQUIRED. A non-empty array of strings, each the client identifier (client_id) of a principal permitted to dispatch from this template. A Dispatch request whose authenticated client is not in this set is refused (Section 7).

allowed_recipients:

REQUIRED. An object bounding which Subjects and Agents a Mission dispatched from this template may be created for, with two members, each a non-empty array: subjects, each an object with iss and sub identifying a Subject as the issuance profile's subject does, and agents, each a client_id string.

The Mission Issuer establishes the instance's Subject as the issuance profile requires, never from Dispatcher input ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). It selects the instance's Agent (the instance's client_id) from agents under the Dispatch Policy, never from Dispatcher input: with one listed Agent, that Agent; with several, the Agent the Dispatch Policy's selection rule names. agents bounds the selection and is not a selection rule; its order carries no meaning.

The Mission Issuer refuses a Dispatch for which no Agent is selected, whose established Subject does not equal an entry of subjects in both iss and sub, or whose Agent is not an entry of agents, so a template cannot mint a Mission for a party the human did not consent to. The two lists are independent: any listed Agent may serve any listed Subject, subject to the other Dispatch checks (Section 7); a deployment that needs restricted pairings uses separate templates.

instance_lifetime:

REQUIRED. A positive integer number of seconds. The per-instance lifetime clamp: a dispatched Mission's expires_at is clamped to no more than this from its committed created_at (Section 7).

max_active:

REQUIRED. A positive integer. The maximum number of Missions dispatched from this template that may be active at once. A Dispatch that would exceed it is refused until an active instance terminates.

dispatch_rate:

REQUIRED. An object with two members, each a positive integer: limit, a number of instantiations, and window, a number of seconds. A Dispatch is refused when its instantiation would bring the instantiations committed from this template within the trailing window seconds above limit, so a burst of up to limit within one window is within the bound. Only committed instantiations count: a refused Dispatch and a recovered retry (Section 7) count nothing.

expires_at:

REQUIRED. A string, an RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time. The template's own expiry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). After it, the template dispatches nothing.

review_cadence:

REQUIRED. A positive integer number of seconds. The maximum age of the template's most recent human approval, measured from that approval's approved_at (Section 7), past which the Mission Issuer MUST NOT dispatch (Section 6).

The concrete values of instance_lifetime, max_active, dispatch_rate, and review_cadence, and the action-class mapping the prohibited-class rule needs (Section 9), MUST be published in the Mission Deployment Profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]).

The following is the example scenario's template (Section 4.4), version 3, as alice consents to it:

{
  "id": "tmpl_DW1W29qP9RJRbsGyRGa9oJ2u",
  "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
  "template_version": "3",
  "ceiling": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"] },
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
      "constraints": {
        "max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" } } }
  ],
  "dispatch_policy": {
    "id": "nightly-reconciliation-dispatch",
    "version": "4",
    "digest": "sha-256:7irh90epn3d1Nn07PQhhOxwh3j4Mq5EI0_x4w12VDlk"
  },
  "allowed_dispatchers": ["erp-scheduler"],
  "allowed_recipients": {
    "subjects": [
      { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
        "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" }
    ],
    "agents": ["s6BhdRkqt3"]
  },
  "instance_lifetime": 28800,
  "max_active": 2,
  "dispatch_rate": { "limit": 2, "window": 86400 },
  "expires_at": "2027-03-31T23:59:59Z",
  "review_cadence": 7776000
}

Each instance lives at most eight hours, at most two are active at once, at most two are committed in any 24 hours, and dispatch pauses 90 days after the most recent approval. The dispatch_policy digest is illustrative: it commits a policy snapshot this example does not show.

5.1. Template integrity anchor

The consented Mission Template is committed by a template_hash, computed with the issuance profile's integrity-anchor envelope ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]):

  • typ: mission-template;

  • hashed object: the Mission Template object above, canonicalized as the integrity-anchor envelope requires, so member order follows that canonicalization.

It is an envelope anchor under the issuance profile's commitment mechanisms, which this document imports normatively. For the example template (Section 5), template_hash is sha-256:sAW-wLGtkDjse3U_XfPYZz-WnqC5uBP64ZYlGqCDxz4.

template_hash is to the template what authority_hash is to a Mission's Authority Set: the anchor over the consented object. It plays the same role the progressive profile's ceiling_hash plays for a consented authority ceiling ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]). A dispatched Mission commits its own intent_hash and authority_hash over its own Intent and final Authority Set (Section 7); the template commits the ceiling once, under template_hash. The Mission's anchors and the template's anchor are never merged.

5.2. Template lifecycle

A Mission Template has its own lifecycle, distinct from the Mission lifecycle of the Missions it dispatches ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Mission Lifecycle"). A template is in one of three states:

  • active: the template dispatches, subject to its bounds and review cadence;

  • revoked: a human or administrator has retired the template; it dispatches nothing;

  • expired: the template is past its expires_at; it dispatches nothing.

Revoking or expiring a template stops further dispatch. It does not retroactively terminate Missions already dispatched: each runs to its own clamped expires_at and is independently revocable (Section 11). A deployment that needs a faster cutoff on outstanding instances uses a short instance_lifetime or revokes the instances directly, exactly as the issuance profile bounds an ordinary Mission's outstanding tokens.

7. Dispatch

A Dispatch instantiates an ordinary Mission from a Mission Template. It is submitted on the binding's existing Mission creation surface as a single authenticated back-channel request that references the template by id and carries the dispatch intent, and it is answered in one round trip. This document defines no new endpoint and no new authorization server metadata: dispatch is a non-interactive Mission creation under the pre-consented template, at the token endpoint under the grant type this document defines (Section 7.1).

Because the human decision was made once, at template creation, a Dispatch uses no Pushed Authorization Request, no front-channel authorization request, and no interactive consent surface, and the Mission Issuer never answers a Dispatch with authorization_pending: there is no pending human step to wait for. A deployment that needs a human in the loop for a given run does not dispatch it; it creates an ordinary Mission through a fresh approval.

7.1. Dispatch request and response

This document binds Dispatch to the token endpoint through a dedicated grant type, adding no new endpoint. A Dispatcher requests an instance with:

grant_type:

REQUIRED. urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:mission-dispatch.

template_id:

REQUIRED. The Mission Template's id (Section 5).

mission_intent:

REQUIRED. The dispatch submission, in the issuance profile's Mission Intent Submission envelope shape ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): its intent is the dispatch intent from which the instance Authority Set is derived (Section 7), and its OPTIONAL evidence array carries Intent Submission Evidence under that profile's dispatch, refusal, and never-authority rules and those of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-submission-evidence].

authorization_details:

OPTIONAL. The Dispatcher's authority proposal: the standard [RFC9396] parameter carried on the same token request, itself ordinary [RFC9396] token-request usage. This parameter is this grant's proposal carriage, replacing the issuance profile's PAR-only carriage rule; that profile's validation, derivation, recording, and hashing semantics apply unchanged ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). It is a proposal, never authority: it bounds the derivation of step 4 of Section 7 in narrowing mode, and the double intersection of step 5 applies to the result unchanged, so a proposal narrows the instance and never widens it beyond the Template Ceiling. Absent a proposal, the instance derives from the dispatch intent alone. An instance created from a Dispatch carrying one records proposed_authority and proposal_hash.

dispatch_event_id:

REQUIRED. The dispatch event identifier that makes the Dispatch idempotent (Section 7). A redemption bearing an identifier the Mission Issuer has already committed MUST return the previously committed instance and MUST NOT derive a second Mission.

The Dispatcher authenticates at the token endpoint with its own client credential; the Mission Issuer authorizes it against the template's allowed_dispatchers as step 2 of Section 7 requires. The request names no Agent. The Mission Issuer selects the instance's Agent (Section 5), and that selection is separate from the Dispatcher's authentication and from the presenter binding of the returned access token, which is sender-constrained to the Dispatcher's key. This grant performs exactly one creation derivation per dispatch_event_id: the adjudication order of Section 7 runs once for a new identifier, and a repeated identifier is gated to the previously committed instance rather than a fresh creation. A retry is recovery of that instance's delivery (Section 7.3): returning the delivered access token counts nothing, and minting a replacement delivery counts once under ordinary issuance accounting. This is the single creation derivation the Dispatch performs per dispatch event; a Dispatch Handoff's exchange and its redemption (Section 8) are each a further derivation.

On success the Mission Issuer responds with an access token bound to the instance, sender-constrained to the Dispatcher's key:

access_token:

REQUIRED. A Mission-bound access token for the dispatched instance.

token_type:

REQUIRED. The token type of the issued access token, reflecting the sender-constraining mechanism in use (DPoP where the deployment uses DPoP).

expires_in:

REQUIRED. The access token's lifetime in seconds.

mission_id:

REQUIRED. The dispatched Mission's identifier.

mission_expires_at:

REQUIRED. The instance's effective Mission expiry, the issuance profile's common Mission-creating response member ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). expires_in above describes only the access token.

authorization_details:

REQUIRED. The instance's committed Authority Set.

A Dispatch refused under Section 7 or Section 9 carries the OAuth error member together with mission_denial_reason (Section 10), exactly as any other adjudication denial in this family.

The following is an example of the scenario's nightly Dispatch (Section 4.4). erp-scheduler proves its DPoP key; its client authentication is omitted, and extra line breaks are for display only:

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Amission-dispatch&
template_id=tmpl_DW1W29qP9RJRbsGyRGa9oJ2u&
mission_intent=%7B%22intent%22%3A%7B...%7D%7D&
dispatch_event_id=5533f92b-fbe9-57c6-aa3f-f628b711f316

The mission_intent value, before form encoding, names one night's run:

{
  "intent": {
    "goal":
      "Reconcile 2026-11-03 invoices; post adjustments under $500.",
    "target_resources": ["https://erp.example.com"],
    "expires_at": "2026-11-04T12:00:00Z"
  }
}

The Mission Issuer commits the instance at 2026-11-04T02:00:07Z and selects s6BhdRkqt3, the template's only Agent. The instance's expiry is that instant plus instance_lifetime, earlier than both the requested expires_at and the template's own. The response carries an access token bound to erp-scheduler's key:

{
  "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6ImF0K2p3dCJ9...",
  "token_type": "DPoP",
  "expires_in": 300,
  "mission_id": "msn_lDL9bWUSlLGl_dxI_WL_nwrTZPlm0RtA",
  "mission_expires_at": "2026-11-04T10:00:07Z",
  "authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"] },
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
      "constraints": {
        "max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" } } }
  ]
}

7.2. Adjudication

The Mission Issuer adjudicates a Dispatch in this order:

  1. Authenticate the Dispatcher. Resolve and authenticate the principal making the request.

  2. Authorize the Dispatcher. Verify the Dispatcher is in the template's allowed_dispatchers. Refuse a request from any other principal.

  3. Verify the Dispatch Policy. Verify the Dispatch Policy snapshot the Mission Issuer will evaluate against dispatch_policy.digest ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Standing-Consent Bases"). On a mismatch, refuse the Dispatch with dispatch_policy_changed (Section 10).

  4. Derive the instance Authority Set. Derive an Authority Set from the dispatch intent, and from the Dispatcher's authority proposal where one was submitted (Section 7.1), and bound it by the deployment's derivation policy, exactly as for any Mission ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). This document adds no authority-derivation rule.

  5. Double intersection. The derived instance Authority Set MUST be a subset, under the issuance profile's subset rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), of both the deployment's derivation-policy ceiling and the Template Ceiling. Each surviving instance entry MUST be a subset of some ceiling entry. If no entry survives the intersection with the Template Ceiling, the Mission Issuer MUST refuse the Dispatch with out_of_template_ceiling (Section 10). Raising the ceiling is a new template consent, not a dispatch.

  6. Prohibited-class check. Apply the prohibited-class rule (Section 9) to the surviving post-intersection set. If it would grant a high-consequence class that Section 9.1 does not admit, refuse the Dispatch with dispatch_prohibited_class (Section 10).

  7. Enforce the bounds. Refuse the Dispatch if it would exceed max_active or dispatch_rate, if no Agent is selected, or if the instance's Mission-Issuer-established Subject or its selected Agent falls outside allowed_recipients (Section 5).

  8. Check the authority source. Verify that the source retained for this template_version (Section 6) applies to the instance's Subject and that the surviving set lies within that source's ceiling. Refuse the Dispatch otherwise.

  9. Commit the instance. Commit an ordinary Mission whose Authority Set is the surviving set and whose:

    • approval_basis is the authorization basis the issuance profile defines ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), with type: "template" and:

      • consent_principal: the template's human approver, the accountable principal; the Dispatcher is not the approver;

      • activation: the template's id (as template_id, the same value the Dispatch grant names, Section 7.1), template_version, and template_hash (the template lineage member's fields, Section 7.4), plus this Dispatch's dispatch_event_id;

      • activation_actor: the Dispatcher, as an object whose iss is the Mission Issuer's identifier, the template's issuer, and whose sub is the client_id the Dispatch request's client authentication established, never a value taken from the request's parameters or its dispatch intent; distinct from consent_principal and never the instance's adjudicator ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Role Mapping");

      • root_commitment: template_hash; and

      • approved_at (the issuance profile's standing-consent requirement): the instant the consenting human approved this exact template_version, read from the Mission Issuer's retained template record at Dispatch, never from the Dispatch request.

      The template lineage member (Section 7.4), present on every dispatched Mission and absent on an ordinarily approved one, remains the claim-carried record of which template and Dispatch Policy adjudicated the instance; approval_basis is the structured authorization-basis record, and the two are consistent by construction;

    • approval_event_id identifies this Dispatch, never the template's approval: a unique value the Mission Issuer allocates when it creates the Dispatch's (authenticated client, dispatch_event_id) reservation (below) and retains with the committed instance. A retry recovers it; a reservation created after that key's tombstone expires receives a new one;

    • subject is established as the issuance profile requires, never taken from Dispatcher input, and is an entry of allowed_recipients subjects ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]);

    • authority_source is the source retained for this template_version (Section 6), read from the Mission Issuer's retained template record, never from the Dispatch request and never a source or policy version substituted after consent;

    • client_id is the Agent selected from allowed_recipients agents (Section 5), never taken from Dispatcher input. The selection is part of the committed instance: a retried or recovered Dispatch returns the committed Agent and does not select again;

    • intent_hash and authority_hash are computed over the instance's own Intent and final Authority Set, never over the template; the template commits the ceiling under template_hash (Section 5.1);

    • expires_at is the effective Mission expiry of the issuance profile's requested-versus-effective rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]): the minimum of the dispatch intent's requested expires_at, the committed Mission created_at plus the template's instance_lifetime, and the template's expires_at. The lifetime addend is measured from the committed created_at, not a separate clock read, so audit recomputation is exact. These are the complete expiry inputs for Dispatch: a deployment that needs a tighter standing-consent lifetime records it in instance_lifetime or the template's expires_at under a newly consented template_version, rather than applying an undisclosed fourth clamp;

    • derivation_limit, where the deployment also adopts Mission Derivation Limits, is established afresh for this instance as that document's Effective Limit section states, never above the Dispatch Policy's maximum (Section 6); and

    • template lineage member is set (Section 7.4).

The Mission Issuer MUST make the step 8 check, and verify that the effective expires_at is strictly later than the committed created_at, atomically with the commit, against the source as it stands at that commit; on failure no Mission is created.

The scenario's instance record (Section 4.4) carries, among its other members:

{
  "subject": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
    "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
  "approval_basis": {
    "type": "template",
    "consent_principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
      "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
    "activation": {
      "template_id": "tmpl_DW1W29qP9RJRbsGyRGa9oJ2u",
      "template_version": "3",
      "template_hash":
        "sha-256:sAW-wLGtkDjse3U_XfPYZz-WnqC5uBP64ZYlGqCDxz4",
      "dispatch_event_id": "5533f92b-fbe9-57c6-aa3f-f628b711f316"
    },
    "activation_actor": { "iss": "https://as.example.com",
      "sub": "erp-scheduler" },
    "adjudication": { "kind": "policy",
      "policy": { "id": "nightly-reconciliation-dispatch",
        "version": "4" } },
    "root_commitment":
      "sha-256:sAW-wLGtkDjse3U_XfPYZz-WnqC5uBP64ZYlGqCDxz4",
    "approved_at": "2026-11-01T16:20:00Z"
  },
  "approval_event_id": "ape_PF71gvedJVYvGQCqIX3C",
  "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "created_at": "2026-11-04T02:00:07Z",
  "expires_at": "2026-11-04T10:00:07Z"
}

alice is both the Subject and the accountable principal; erp-scheduler triggered the instance and s6BhdRkqt3 is its Agent.

7.3. Idempotency and recovery

A Dispatch MUST be idempotent per dispatch_event_id. The Dispatcher supplies a dispatch_event_id with the request, adopting the expansion profile's creation idempotency apparatus by reference under its own domain-separating op value, dispatch ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Creation Idempotency").

The identifier and reservation key are (authenticated client, dispatch_event_id), the Dispatcher being the authenticated client of Section 7.1. In the operation fingerprint, op is dispatch; iss and client are as the expansion profile defines them; source is this Dispatch's template_id, since a Dispatch has no source Mission or subject_token to resolve one from; cnf is the Dispatcher's verified presenter confirmation, the DPoP proof key's jkt or the mTLS certificate's x5t#S256; intent and evidence are the parsed mission_intent Submission envelope's members (Section 7.1); proposal is the parsed authorization_details array, when present. actor, child_actor, requested_token_type, and cross_check are absent: a Dispatch carries no acting-agent token, no child actor, no token-exchange requested token type, and no predecessor or parent cross-check to compare against a resolved source. A dispatch-specific parameter affecting derivation, approval, output, or side effects extends the fingerprint the same way an extension parameter would under the expansion profile's own rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "The Operation Fingerprint").

The reservation, its (client, dispatch_event_id) uniqueness, and the fingerprint-comparison outcomes on a repeated presentation are the expansion profile's, applied by reference: same fingerprint and completed, recover it; same fingerprint and reserved or pending, return the same in-progress result; different fingerprint, refuse with invalid_request ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "The Durable Reservation"). The reservation and the dispatched Mission's identifier MUST be committed atomically with instance derivation and max_active/dispatch_rate accounting. Evidence emission is not part of that same atomic commit: the Mission Issuer atomically commits the evidence record, or a durable outbox entry for it, with Mission creation, and delivers or publishes it idempotently afterward, since external emission cannot generally participate in the datastore transaction.

A revalidated retry's obligations depend on whether the original operation already committed creation. For a completed operation, the Mission Issuer MUST verify the recorded template identity, template_version, and fingerprint; the requester's continued membership in allowed_dispatchers and possession of the recorded cnf; and that the created Mission remains active, before recovering it. Current template applicability, including whether the checked template_version is still in force, is NOT re-evaluated for a completed operation: a template's own lifecycle already governs retirement, which stops further dispatch but does not terminate a Mission already dispatched (Section 5.2), so recovery of that Mission MUST survive later retirement of the template version that created it. For a reserved or pending operation, which has not yet committed creation, the Mission Issuer instead revalidates the retry exactly as a fresh Dispatch: current allowed_dispatchers membership, possession of cnf, and current template applicability all apply, since no Mission yet exists for the retry to recover ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Revalidation and Lookup Order").

Recovery is delivery of the already-dispatched Mission, never a second instantiation and never a second count against max_active or dispatch_rate. A retry recovered while the most recently recorded delivery token remains valid, and carries no authority the instance has since lost, returns that token and counts nothing. A retry recovered after that token has expired, or after the instance's authority has narrowed below what it carries, is answered by minting a replacement access token for the same, still-active instance: an ordinary delivery event, counted once under ordinary issuance accounting, that repeats no creation accounting, as the expansion profile's recovery defines for an expired delivery credential ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Recovery Is Delivery"). Recording a replacement makes it the delivery that subsequent retries recover. Concurrent retries recover the same replacement delivery: the Mission Issuer mints one and returns it to each. Tombstone retention follows the expansion profile's rule, against the deployment's published retry horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Tombstone Retention"). This makes retry safe at machine speed and keeps max_active and dispatch_rate accounting exact.

7.4. The template lineage member

A dispatched Mission records a template lineage member, on both its mission claim and its Mission record, linking it to the Mission Template it was dispatched from:

template:

An object carrying id, issuer, template_version, template_hash, and dispatch_policy (the activation policy reference: id, version, and digest). Present on every dispatched Mission and absent on a Mission created by ordinary approval.

Consistent with the issuance profile's open-mission-claim rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), the template member is lineage and audit context only: it MUST NOT grant or widen authority, and a consumer that does not understand it MUST ignore it. The instance's authority comes only from its own authority_hash. The template member exists so the dispatch is re-checkable in audit (Section 12).

The scenario's instance (Section 4.4) carries this mission claim on every token issued for it:

{
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_lDL9bWUSlLGl_dxI_WL_nwrTZPlm0RtA",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
    "expires_at": "2026-11-04T10:00:07Z",
    "template": {
      "id": "tmpl_DW1W29qP9RJRbsGyRGa9oJ2u",
      "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
      "template_version": "3",
      "template_hash":
        "sha-256:sAW-wLGtkDjse3U_XfPYZz-WnqC5uBP64ZYlGqCDxz4",
      "dispatch_policy": {
        "id": "nightly-reconciliation-dispatch",
        "version": "4",
        "digest":
          "sha-256:7irh90epn3d1Nn07PQhhOxwh3j4Mq5EI0_x4w12VDlk"
      }
    }
  }
}

8. Dispatch Handoff

A dispatched instance's approved agent is its selected Agent (Section 5), but the Dispatch returns the instance's access token to the Dispatcher, sender-constrained to the Dispatcher's key (Section 7.1). The Dispatch Handoff conveys the instance to its Agent: the Dispatcher exchanges that token for a handoff grant naming the Agent as its only redeemer, and the Agent redeems the grant for a token of its own. The handoff uses the token endpoint and existing grant types; it adds one token request parameter.

8.1. Handoff request

The Dispatcher requests a handoff with a Token Exchange ([RFC8693]) whose subject_token is the instance's access token (subject_token_type urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token), whose requested_token_type is urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt, and which carries mission_dispatch_handoff with the value true, the parameter that selects this operation. It MAY carry authorization_details ([RFC9396]) naming a narrower subset. It presents a DPoP proof ([RFC9449]) under the key the subject token is bound to.

The Mission Issuer MUST refuse with invalid_request a mission_dispatch_handoff with any value other than true, and one combined with a parameter that selects another exchange, such as request_refresh_token or a Child Mission creation parameter ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]); it never treats such a request as another exchange. A mission_dispatch_handoff sent without a value is treated as omitted (Section 3.2 of [RFC6749]), not as a value other than true. It then MUST:

  1. verify the subject token, and that the DPoP proof's key is the key the token is bound to;

  2. verify that the authenticated client is the client the subject token was issued to, the Dispatcher;

  3. verify that the Mission carries the template lineage member (Section 7.4) and is active;

  4. take the recipient from the instance's recorded client_id, the selected Agent, never from the request; and

  5. confine the handed-off authority to the subject token's authority and the instance's current Effective Authority Set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), refusing with invalid_authorization_details a requested authorization_details that is not a subset of both; absent a request, the handed-off authority is the subject token's authority narrowed by the Effective Authority Set.

A failure of steps 1 or 2, or a Mission without the template lineage member, is refused with invalid_grant. A Mission that is not active is refused with invalid_request (Section 2.2.2 of [RFC8693]), carrying the mission_error member ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]).

A successful exchange is a derivation from the instance, gated and counted as the issuance profile requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), apart from the redemption of the grant it issues (Section 8.3).

In the example scenario (Section 4.4), erp-scheduler requests the handoff of its instance, proving the key its access token is bound to. Its client authentication is omitted, and extra line breaks are for display only:

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange&
subject_token=<the%20instance%27s%20access%20token>&
subject_token_type=
  urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Aaccess_token&
requested_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Ajwt&
mission_dispatch_handoff=true

8.2. The handoff grant

On success the response carries the handoff grant as access_token, with issued_token_type urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt and token_type N_A ([RFC8693]). The handoff grant is a JWT the Mission Issuer signs with typ mission-dispatch-handoff+jwt: iss identifies the Mission Issuer, aud identifies its token endpoint, client_id names the selected Agent as the only redeemer, sub is the instance's Subject, mission is the instance's mission claim, authorization_details is the handed-off authority, and jti, iat and exp bound it. Its lifetime is short and never outlasts the instance's expires_at. The handoff grant establishes no grant lineage ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Binding the Mission to the Grant"): the state the Mission Issuer keeps to refuse its replay (Section 8.3) is not one.

The scenario's handoff response is:

{
  "access_token":
    "eyJ0eXAiOiJtaXNzaW9uLWRpc3BhdGNoLWhhbmRvZmYrand0Iiwi...",
  "issued_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt",
  "token_type": "N_A",
  "expires_in": 120
}

The grant's claims, with its mission claim (the one shown in Section 7.4) omitted, are:

{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "https://as.example.com/token",
  "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR",
  "authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"] },
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
      "constraints": {
        "max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" } } }
  ],
  "jti": "hgr_wMP7JCeZbsxcV1vV1SXJ",
  "iat": 1793757610,
  "exp": 1793757730
}

erp-scheduler cannot redeem the grant itself: only s6BhdRkqt3, authenticated as itself, can.

8.3. Redemption

The Agent redeems the handoff grant with the JWT bearer authorization grant ([RFC7523]), authenticating as itself and presenting a DPoP proof under its own key. The Mission Issuer MUST:

  1. verify the grant's signature, typ and exp, and that its aud identifies its own token endpoint;

  2. verify that the grant's client_id, the authenticated client, and the instance's recorded client_id are one client;

  3. verify that the instance is active;

  4. consume the grant's jti atomically, and remember a consumed grant for as long as it would otherwise be accepted, clock skew included, refusing any further presentation with invalid_grant, while a redemption that issues no token leaves the grant unconsumed; and

  5. issue the Agent a token for the instance, bound to the key of its DPoP proof, whose authority is the grant's narrowed by the instance's current Effective Authority Set.

The Mission Issuer resolves the instance from the authenticated mission claim of the grant that step 1 verifies, and applies steps 2 through 5 to that instance.

The token issued at redemption is the Agent's delegation handle: its audience identifies the Agent and it is sender-constrained to the Agent's key, so the Agent continues the instance as its approved agent on the continuation profile's async delegation transport ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]). The redemption is a derivation from the instance, gated and counted as the issuance profile requires ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). It issues a derived token for the instance, and creates or extends no grant binding; it needs none.

In the scenario, s6BhdRkqt3 redeems the grant under its own DPoP key. Its client authentication is omitted:

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Ajwt-bearer&
assertion=eyJ0eXAiOiJtaXNzaW9uLWRpc3BhdGNoLWhhbmRvZmYrand0Iiwi...

The response's access_token is the Agent's delegation handle. An excerpt of its claims, other members omitted:

{
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "cnf": { "jkt": "hCXQ4ox8s33bY6PtWhuLMbn89LsBt8tpwnjKP0IS-yI" },
  "mission": {
    "id": "msn_lDL9bWUSlLGl_dxI_WL_nwrTZPlm0RtA",
    "issuer": "https://as.example.com"
  }
}

The Agent then presents the handle as the subject_token of the continuation profile's async delegation exchange ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]), proving the same key:

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange&
subject_token=<the%20delegation%20handle>&
subject_token_type=
  urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Aaccess_token&
resource=https%3A%2F%2Ferp.example.com&
request_refresh_token=true&
creation_request_id=7cdd0cf2-01ac-5239-b300-70ec9a30c1bc

The response carries an access token for https://erp.example.com and the first refresh token of a family that ends no later than the instance's expires_at. The Agent calls the ERP with those tokens and refreshes within the family, as for any Mission. That family is the instance's first grant binding: on this Dispatch path the instance carries none until it exists.

8.4. When the Dispatcher is the Agent

A Dispatcher that is itself the selected Agent (the same authenticated client) already holds the instance's access token, bound to its own key, and skips the handoff. It obtains its delegation handle through the continuation profile's handle exchange ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]): a no-actor self-exchange that presents the instance's access token, proves possession of that token's key, and names its own client_id as audience. That exchange is a derivation from the instance, gated and counted as the issuance profile requires.

9. Prohibited Classes

Some authority classes are too consequential to activate without a human at the moment of the decision. Except as Section 9.1 admits, a Dispatch MUST NOT instantiate a Mission that grants authority in any of these classes, even when the class is within the Template Ceiling:

Progressive holds back the same set from its own policy adjudication ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]); this document applies it to dispatch, with the one exception of Section 9.1. To make the rule testable, a deployment MUST publish in the Mission Deployment Profile a mapping from its action identifiers to the runtime profile's action classes ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), or an equivalent declared classification.

The issuance profile's fourth high-risk class, a consumption bound ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), is not on this list. Each instance draws down its own bound, so dispatch multiplies the bound by max_active and dispatch_rate; the template consent renders the bound with those limits, so the Approver consents to that product ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]). An instance's template approval_basis already carries the trace the issuance profile's approval-authentication floor requires for that class, through consent_principal and approved_at (Section 7); a deployment recording Consent Evidence renders the bound at the same surface under the metering profile's consent-integrity rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]).

Where a deployment adopts Approval Governance ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]) and records a Governance Record for a dispatched instance, the instance's template approval_basis satisfies that profile's accountable-approver rule directly, through the same consent_principal, root_commitment, and approved_at this document already requires: no assertion is fabricated in the name of the Dispatcher or the Dispatch Policy to stand in for a fresh human decision that did not occur. Approval Governance's own high-risk-class default still binds that record: a dispatched instance carrying a consumption bound activates only where a committed, class-named exception admits it; absent the exception, the Mission fails to activate under that profile's atomic-commitment rule.

The deployment's configured dispatch-prohibited action set MUST cover every action the published mapping classifies as irreversible, external-commitment, or privileged-administration, as satisfying the runtime profile's external-communication predicate ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), or as cross-domain. A configured set narrower than the mapping is nonconformant: it lets a Dispatch confer a class the deployment's own mapping already identifies as prohibited, which is exactly the outcome this section forbids.

A Dispatch that would grant a prohibited class that Section 9.1 does not admit is refused with dispatch_prohibited_class (Section 10). Unlike the progressive profile, which falls back to a fresh human approval in band, a Dispatch has no interactive surface to escalate on: the human path is an ordinary Mission created through a fresh approval ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), requested out of band. The Dispatch Policy MUST NOT dispatch a Mission bearing a prohibited class that Section 9.1 does not admit.

9.1. Standing Payment Exception

A Mission Issuer MAY admit one exception to the prohibited-class rule: dispatch of one designated payment-execution operation, for recurring payment of approved invoices. The exception never admits external-commitment, privileged-administration, or cross-domain authority, or authority satisfying the external-communication predicate, and never waives another prohibited predicate the operation satisfies. The operation stays in the configured dispatch-prohibited set: the Mission Issuer admits it only where every condition below holds, and otherwise refuses the Dispatch with dispatch_prohibited_class (Section 10).

  • One operation. The Dispatch Policy names the designated operation, and the published mapping classifies it as irreversible and as no other prohibited class.

  • Committed destinations. The Dispatch Policy commits the approved vendors, each with the payee account approved for it, and the ceiling entry granting the operation carries a per-payment max_amount.

  • An exact budget. The Dispatch Policy commits a budget: its owner, an identifier qualified within that owner's accounting domain, its limit, and a per-instance maximum. Each instance's Mission Intent carries a max_budget no larger than the per-instance maximum. The per-payment max_amount, the budget, and every max_budget share one currency. Both bounds are enforced under the metering profile's Exact profile: the instance's max_budget on its own counter, and the budget on one counter keyed by its owner and identifier, shared by every instance of any template committing that budget and by their successors ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]). Neither substitutes for the other.

  • Governed approval. Where the deployment records an Approval Governance Record for an instance, its retained approval_policy snapshot commits class-named exceptions for the irreversible class and the consumption-bound class, each with its recency ceiling ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]).

  • A human approver. The consenting principal is a human Approver authenticated at the issuance profile's approval-authentication floor for the irreversible class ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), and is neither a Dispatcher nor the instance's Agent.

The Mission Issuer conveys the committed destinations and the budget to the runtime with each instance's policy view, bound to the template's dispatch_policy digest. Admission authorizes no execution. Each payment still takes a fresh runtime decision, with parameter binding, execution reverification, the transaction-assurance tier, and every applicable action-approval requirement ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). The PDP compares the payee the enforcing PEP establishes for the effect with the destination committed for its vendor, and execution reverification binds that payee: a vendor without a committed destination, or a payee account other than the committed one, including a changed bank account for an approved vendor, inherits no approval. A payment whose outcome is failed remains charged until reconciliation. Work outside the committed envelope is refused and escalates out of band to an ordinary, freshly approved Mission.

Changing the destinations, or raising the budget or the per-payment bound, is a new template_version and a fresh human approval, whose disclosure MUST render the budget's consumption to date and its outstanding reservations. The approval neither releases a reservation that remains charged nor resets consumption ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]).

The consent disclosure of a template admitting the exception MUST render, beside the minimum of Section 6, the designated operation, the committed destinations, the per-payment bound, the budget with its per-instance maximum, and whether each payment requires an action-bound approval, and from whom.

10. The Denial Reasons

This document defines a closed set of dispatch denial reasons, carried in the shared mission_denial_reason member that the expansion profile established for adjudication denials ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]):

out_of_template_ceiling:

The dispatched instance's Authority Set is not within the Template Ceiling (Section 7), so it cannot be instantiated by policy. Raising the ceiling requires a fresh human template consent.

dispatch_prohibited_class:

The dispatched instance would grant a high-consequence class (Section 9) that Section 9.1 does not admit, which a Dispatch never auto-approves. The authority is available only through a fresh human approval.

dispatch_policy_changed:

The Dispatch Policy the Mission Issuer would evaluate no longer matches the digest the template committed (Section 7). Dispatch under the changed policy requires a fresh human template consent.

A consumer that does not implement this document treats any of these values as it treats any unrecognized reason code: the Dispatch stays denied, with no further semantics.

For example, a Dispatch in the scenario (Section 4.4) whose proposal names only vendors.update at https://erp.example.com, an action the deployment's derivation policy permits but no ceiling entry grants, leaves nothing after the double intersection (step 5 of Section 7) and is refused, here with invalid_request:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "invalid_request",
  "mission_denial_reason": "out_of_template_ceiling"
}

11. Instance Composition

A dispatched Mission is an ordinary Mission. Nothing about its origin makes it special to the rest of the family; the template bounded its creation and then steps out of the way.

12. Audit Linkage

A dispatched Mission is re-checkable in audit with no per-dispatch human in the record, because the human is at the template. For a dispatched Mission an authorized auditor can:

Each Dispatch MUST record the Dispatch Policy id, version, and digest that instantiated the Mission, and the dispatch event identifier (Section 7), so the policy chain the architecture's Approve verb requires stays re-checkable ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]). A deployment MUST retain the consented template, template_hash, and dispatch records for each instance's audit horizon ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), so every dispatch is verifiable to have stayed within the consented template.

13. Security Considerations

The issuance profile's security considerations apply in full. This document adds the dispatch surface.

14. Privacy Considerations

The Template Ceiling discloses, at template-consent time, the full envelope every future dispatch may draw within, which can reveal more about the anticipated recurring task than any single dispatched Mission's Authority Set. The template lineage member correlates every instance dispatched from one template across distinct Missions. Access to the template, its ceiling, and the dispatch records SHOULD be scoped to parties with a governance need. The issuance profile's Mission Identifier correlation considerations apply to each dispatched Mission.

15. Conformance

A Mission Issuer that claims Dispatch from a Mission Template is a conforming issuance-profile Mission Issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]) and MUST:

A resource server requires no new behavior: it enforces a dispatched Mission's tokens exactly as it enforces any Mission-bound token, and treats the template member, if it reads it at all, as audit context it MUST NOT use to grant authority (Section 7.4).

16. IANA Considerations

This document requests registration of the following value in the "OAuth URI" registry established by [RFC6755]:

URN:

urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:mission-dispatch

Common Name:

Mission Dispatch Grant Type

Change Controller:

IETF

Specification Document:

this document, Section 7.1

This is a proposed registration. The value is used under the reserved urn:ietf:params:oauth arc by implementations of this document in advance of registration completing; this document is the specification that names and defines it.

This document also registers two parameters in the "OAuth Parameters" registry:

IANA is also requested to register one media type per [RFC6838]:

dispatch_event_id is a distinct name from the expansion profile's creation_request_id ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]), even though it plays the identifier-and-reservation-key role that parameter's registration defines: it is already load-bearing in approval_basis.activation (Section 7) and in the Dispatch grant-type parameter list (Section 7.1), so this document keeps the name rather than reusing the expansion profile's own registered parameter under op: dispatch.

Beyond these registrations, this document requests no further IANA action. Following the restraint of the sibling profiles:

17. References

17.1. Normative References

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Consumption Metering", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-metering.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission.html>.
McGuinness, K., "Mission Consent Evidence for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Derivation Limits for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-submission-evidence]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Intent Submission Evidence for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-submission-evidence.html>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339]
Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC6755]
Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6755>.
[RFC6838]
Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
[RFC7523]
Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7523>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.
[RFC9396]
Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.

17.2. Informative References

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Approval Governance", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]
McGuinness, K., "An Architecture for Mission-Bound Authorization", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Intent Shaping", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Child Delegation for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Containment for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Continuation for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-continuation.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Progressive Authorization for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive.html>.

Appendix A. Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

Acknowledgments

This document is part of the Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 work and expresses, in family terms, a define-a-template-once, dispatch-per-run lifecycle: one considered human consent to a ceiling in place of a fresh approval at every machine-speed run.

Author's Address

Karl McGuinness
Independent