| Internet-Draft | OAuth Mission Progressive Authorization | November 2026 |
| McGuinness | Expires 21 May 2027 | [Page] |
Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0 widens an agent's authority only through a fresh human approval that creates a successor Mission. An open-ended agentic task often cannot have its full authority enumerated at the initial approval, which leaves a deployment choosing between over-provisioning a broad standing Mission and interrupting the user for a fresh approval at every step.¶
This document defines progressive authorization, an experimental third option. At the initial approval, the Approver additionally consents to a bounded authority ceiling and a drawdown policy. The Mission Issuer may then adjudicate an expansion that stays within that ceiling by policy rather than by a fresh human approval. Authority grows within the ceiling at runtime while the active authority any single Mission yields stays narrow, and each policy-adjudicated drawdown is bounded incrementally, never activating the whole ceiling at once. Authority classes named by the runtime profile's high-consequence classification, and the external-communication exfiltration leg, always require a fresh human approval, even within the ceiling.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion] (the "expansion profile") defines the governed path from an authority shortfall to a new approval: a successor Mission, freshly consented, that supersedes its predecessor. Every expansion under that profile is adjudicated by a fresh human approval.¶
For a task whose growth is anticipated, that discipline has a human cost. Each expansion is another approval moment, and an Approver asked too often stops reading what is asked (the consent-fatigue residual of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model]). A deployment that avoids the prompts over-provisions a broad standing Mission instead.¶
Progressive authorization is a third option. The Approver consents once to a bounded envelope, the authority ceiling, and to a rule for drawing authority from it, the drawdown policy. Authority then grows within the envelope at runtime without a fresh human approval each time, while the active authority any single Mission yields stays narrow. The envelope can name a class of resources the agent will only meet during execution: the Approver consents once to the family, and every concrete binding stays inside it (Section 3.1.1). One considered consent to a ceiling replaces many hurried consents to increments.¶
This document is optional and experimental: adopt it for evaluation, not as a stable interface. It removes the per-expansion human from a consented envelope, which is the highest-consequence capability in the expansion family. This document therefore conditions the capability on the rate bounds, prohibited-class rules, and audit linkage it requires, and plain expansion remains the better fit where task authority can be anticipated per step.¶
A Mission Issuer that does not implement this document adjudicates every expansion as a fresh human approval and is a fully conforming expansion-capable Mission Issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]). Nothing here places a new requirement back on the expansion profile or the issuance profile.¶
This document depends normatively on the expansion profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion] and on the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], and is not implementable alone. It reuses, without restating:¶
the expansion profile's expansion request, adjudication,
predecessor member, superseded termination reason, and
reconciliation; and¶
the issuance profile's approval event, integrity-anchor envelope, and subset rule.¶
The following table summarizes how other companions interact with a drawdown request. The cited sections control each requirement and when it applies; adopting this document does not require adopting any listed companion.¶
| Companion | Interaction | Section |
|---|---|---|
| Mission Derivation Limits | A policy-adjudicated drawdown carries the derivation count and limit forward | Section 3.1.8 |
| Mission Child Delegation | Live Child Missions require a fresh approval | Section 3.1.3 |
| Mission Entry Discharge | Discharged authority is not restored by policy | Section 3.1.3 |
| Mission Containment | Contained capability is not restored by policy | Section 3.1.3 |
| Mission Consumption Metering | A policy-adjudicated drawdown grants no new capacity | Section 3.1.7 |
| Mission Approval Governance | The basis meets the accountable-approver rule; a consumption-bound policy-adjudicated drawdown needs a class-named exception | Section 3.1.7 |
| Mission Consent Evidence | Commits the ceiling and review disclosures | Section 3, Section 3.2 |
| Mission Open-World Discovery | Defines the encounter adjudication contract for a self-declared resource | Section 3.1.1 |
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses Predecessor Mission, Successor Mission, and Expansion request as the expansion profile defines them.¶
The pre-consented maximum authority any expansion of a Mission may reach without a further human approval (Section 3). This bound is distinct from the template profile's Template Ceiling on Missions dispatched from a template and from the shaping companion's caller-supplied shaping ceiling on a proposal ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]).¶
The policy under which the Mission Issuer may adjudicate an in-ceiling expansion by policy rather than by a fresh human approval (Section 3).¶
An expansion request of a Mission that carries an authority ceiling, whether the Mission Issuer adjudicates it by policy or by a fresh human approval (Section 3.1).¶
A drawdown request that the Mission Issuer adjudicates under the
drawdown policy and that commits a ceiling_drawdown successor
(Section 3.1.2).¶
The deployment-level manifest the architecture defines ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]). The bounds, mappings, and cadence this document requires a deployment to publish are published there.¶
A progressive Mission begins with an ordinary approval and grows through a chain of successor Missions:¶
At the initial approval, the Approver consents to the Mission, an
authority ceiling, and a drawdown policy. The Mission Issuer records
the ceiling and the policy on the Mission and commits them with
ceiling_hash (Section 3).¶
When the agent needs authority its Mission lacks, the client sends an expansion request: a token exchange presenting the Mission's access token ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).¶
A request outside the ceiling is never policy-adjudicated: it falls back to an ordinary, freshly approved expansion, subject to the Mission Issuer's policy (Section 3.1.1).¶
A request within the ceiling falls back to an ordinary, freshly approved expansion when it meets a fresh-approval condition (Section 3.1.3), when it exceeds a drawdown bound or would activate the entire remaining ceiling (Section 3.1.4), when the chain is past its ceiling review cadence (Section 3.2), or when the drawdown policy does not authorize it (Section 3.1.2).¶
Otherwise the drawdown policy adjudicates the request. If the expansion profile's activation checks and any derivation limit admit it, the Mission Issuer creates the successor, supersedes the predecessor, and returns the successor's access token in the token-exchange response (Section 3.1.5).¶
A ceiling review, a fresh human approval that explicitly re-consents the ceiling (a narrowed one included), restarts the review cadence; approving a successor's authority alone does not (Section 3.2).¶
Approver consents to Mission M0, ceiling C, drawdown policy P
|
v
+------+ drawdown +------+ drawdown +------+
| M0 |----------->| M1 |----------->| M2 |---> ...
+------+ under P +------+ under P +------+
terminated terminated active
(superseded) (superseded)
Every successor drawn under P stays within C, and each policy-adjudicated drawdown is bounded incrementally.¶
The examples in this document follow one scenario, the
ceiling-drawdown variant of the family's Q3 reconciliation baseline.
At 2026-11-02T08:00:00Z, alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR at
https://idp.example.com) approves Mission
msn_pasG9An7Ivj9cOdd3RqWWonuaLAbDHtM at https://as.example.com for
the reconciliation agent, the client s6BhdRkqt3. Its Authority Set
allows only reading Q3 invoices at https://erp.example.com. alice
also consents to an authority ceiling that adds posting journal
entries of at most USD 500 and correcting Q3 invoices, under the
drawdown policy q3-reconcile-drawdown version 1.¶
The deployment's Mission Deployment Profile publishes a per-drawdown
bound of one added action, a chain rate bound of two policy-adjudicated
drawdowns per hour, and a 30-day ceiling review cadence. It maps
invoices.read to the consequential read class, and
journal-entries.write and invoices.write to the reversible
consequential write class, so no ceiling action requires a fresh
approval by class (Section 3.1.3). The Mission has no Child
Missions and its chain has no discharge or containment restrictions.¶
This document extends the expansion profile's closed set of expansion
denial reasons ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]) by
specification, as that profile's IANA considerations anticipate, with
one value, carried in mission_denial_reason exactly as that
profile's reasons are:¶
out_of_ceiling:The requested authority is not within the Mission's consented authority ceiling (Section 3), and the Mission Issuer refused the expansion instead of taking it to a fresh human approval (Section 3.1.1).¶
A consumer that does not implement this document treats
out_of_ceiling as it treats any unrecognized reason code: the
expansion stays denied.¶
The expansion profile surfaces a denial on the token-exchange response
as an OAuth error with the reason code in mission_denial_reason
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Expansion
Denial Reasons"). Had the Mission Issuer's policy refused the
scenario's request at 09:18:00 (Section 3.1.1) instead of taking it
to alice, the following is an example of a refusal that carries the
code:¶
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error": "invalid_request",
"mission_denial_reason": "out_of_ceiling"
}
¶
Each policy-adjudicated drawdown is an approval event and MUST be recorded as one, in which:¶
the decision mechanism is the drawdown policy rather than a human,
recorded as the basis's adjudication (Section 3.1.7);¶
the Approver who consented the ceiling remains the accountable
consent_principal ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section
"Principals and Approval Basis"); and¶
the successor's predecessor member links the drawdown chain for an
authorized auditor exactly as for human-approved expansions
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).¶
Every Mission record in a chain that carries a ceiling MUST carry the
chain's cumulative drawdown count as drawdown_count, a nonnegative
integer counting the chain's committed policy-adjudicated drawdowns, so
the rate bound of Section 3.1.4 is auditable from the records
alone. It is zero on the chain's root Mission, whose approval consented
the ceiling, and each committed ceiling_drawdown successor's is one
more than its predecessor's. A retried or refused request leaves it
unchanged, and a human-approved successor carries it unchanged, a
re-consent included; neither a review nor a narrowing resets it.¶
A deployment MUST retain, with every Mission record in the chain for
the audit horizon, its authority_ceiling, drawdown_policy,
ceiling_hash and ceiling_consent_hash, and the consented
authority_ceiling and drawdown_policy that each
ceiling_consent_hash commits. An auditor can then verify that every
policy-adjudicated drawdown was within the consented envelope and, by
resolving the retained drawdown policy document at the policy_version
each one's ceiling_drawdown approval basis already records, that it
was adjudicated within the cadence that applied at the time
(Section 3.2).¶
The record of every successor whose adjudication, by policy or by a
fresh human approval, evaluated a resource's self-declaration
(Section 3.1.1) MUST carry the declaration's digest as
resource_declaration_digest, so the encounter is reproducible in
audit: what the resource claimed to be when authority bound to it. A
refused request creates no successor and so no such record.¶
A Mission Issuer that claims Expansion with Progressive Authorization is a conforming expansion-capable Mission Issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]) and MUST:¶
for a Mission whose Approver consented to a ceiling, record the
consented authority_ceiling and drawdown_policy on the Mission
and commit them with ceiling_hash, recording that hash as
ceiling_consent_hash (Section 3);¶
render the ceiling, and the fact that in-ceiling expansion is policy-adjudicated, in the initial approval's consent disclosure (Section 3);¶
evaluate a requested successor Authority Set as in-ceiling by the subset rule, never policy-adjudicate an out-of-ceiling request, and, where a drawdown request is triggered by a resource's content-addressed self-declaration, evaluate the declaration against the ceiling (Section 3.1.1);¶
for a policy-adjudicated successor, carry the predecessor's ceiling
members unchanged or narrowed and its ceiling_consent_hash
unchanged, and commit its activation, the
predecessor's supersession and the creation reservation in one
atomic step before the token-exchange response
(Section 3.1.5);¶
record a policy-adjudicated successor's ceiling_drawdown approval
basis, its REQUIRED adjudication included and its
root_commitment the ceiling_consent_hash, and an
approval_event_id that identifies that drawdown
(Section 3.1.7);¶
for a successor that a fresh human approval creates in a chain that
carries a ceiling, carry the predecessor's ceiling members unchanged
unless the Approver explicitly re-consents a ceiling and drawdown
policy, record a re-consent under a recomputed ceiling_hash, as
the new ceiling_consent_hash, with its own instant and Approver,
render the re-consented ceiling and
policy in that approval's disclosure, and preserve the chain's
history and restrictions (Section 3.1.6);¶
bound each policy-adjudicated drawdown incrementally, so a single one never activates the entire remaining ceiling, and publish the concrete per-drawdown bound in the Mission Deployment Profile (Section 3.1.4);¶
fall back to a fresh human approval for a drawdown request that would activate the entire remaining ceiling, or that exceeds the per-drawdown bound or the chain rate bound (Section 3.1.4);¶
enforce the prohibited-class rule, requiring a fresh human approval for a drawdown request that grants irreversible, external-commitment, or privileged-administration authority, that satisfies the external-communication predicate, or that grants cross-domain authority, and publish the action-class mapping in the Mission Deployment Profile (Section 3.1.3);¶
require a fresh human approval for an in-ceiling drawdown request while the predecessor has non-terminal Child Missions (Section 3.1.3);¶
require a fresh human approval for a drawdown request whose complete Authority Set overlaps authority under a containment or discharge restriction of its chain, from any Mission in the chain, and name the discharged entry or contained capability, with its cause, in that approval's disclosure (Section 3.1.3);¶
rate-bound policy-adjudicated drawdowns per expansion chain, keyed by
the chain's root Mission and counted across predecessor links,
publish the concrete rate bound in the Mission Deployment Profile, and
record each as an approval event carrying the chain's cumulative
drawdown count (Section 3.1.4, Section 5);¶
carry drawdown_count on every Mission record of a chain that
carries a ceiling, and record resource_declaration_digest on every
successor whose adjudication, by policy or by a fresh human approval,
evaluated a resource's self-declaration (Section 5);¶
as a deployment obligation, retain the consented ceiling members with every Mission record of the chain for the audit horizon (Section 5);¶
publish a ceiling review cadence in the Mission Deployment Profile, bound each chain by it, refusing policy adjudication past it, rendering the chain's record since the prior review, or since the initial ceiling consent, in every re-consent's disclosure, and stating the cadence effective under each drawdown policy version in that policy's own versioned content (Section 3.2);¶
as a deployment obligation, review and version the drawdown policy like approval policy (Section 7.2); and¶
where the deployment also adopts Mission Derivation Limits, carry a policy-adjudicated drawdown's derivation count and limit forward without letting concurrent derivations or competing or duplicate drawdown requests fork or replenish the allowance, count its successor access token once, return the recorded result to an exact creation retry without repeating its accounting, refuse a drawdown request that would exceed the limit without creating a successor or superseding the predecessor, and state this inheritance in the ceiling consent's disclosure (Section 3.1.8).¶
This checklist summarizes the body. A requirement it omits still applies, with the role, strength and applicability its section gives it.¶
The expansion profile's security considerations apply in full ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]). This document adds the drawdown surface.¶
The ceiling is broad by construction, since it must cover the open-ended task. What stays narrow is the active authority any single Mission in the chain yields: each in-ceiling successor is derived for the authority actually needed at that step and is independently gated and revocable.¶
The ceiling is consented once and drawn on many times, so a compromised agent can make in-ceiling drawdown requests unattended. It cannot instantly wield the ceiling: it can exercise only the current active authority, and each drawdown request it makes is subject to the per-drawdown and chain rate bounds (Section 3.1.4), held to the prohibited-class rule (Section 3.1.3), taken to a fresh human approval when the drawdown policy does not authorize it (Section 3.1.2), recorded for audit (Section 5), and enforced per action by the runtime layer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]).¶
Progressive authorization bounds, and does not eliminate, standing-authority exposure. A deployment SHOULD pair it with short successor lifetimes, constraint-bounded ceilings, and runtime enforcement.¶
The drawdown policy is authority-bearing governance. A misconfigured policy over-grants within the ceiling; it MUST be reviewed and versioned like approval policy, and its identity and version are recorded as the decision mechanism (Section 5).¶
The ceiling is a consent artifact: every policy-adjudicated drawdown it later admits acts on the ceiling consent, given at the initial approval or at the latest re-consent. Section 3 and Section 3.1.6 require that approval's disclosure to render the ceiling and the fact that in-ceiling expansion is policy-adjudicated. Without this disclosure, the Approver has not knowingly consented to the ceiling.¶
A refusal that carries out_of_ceiling tells the requester that its
request fell outside the ceiling, so repeated requests can map the
ceiling. Omitting the code keeps the ceiling undisclosed
(Section 3.1.1). The expansion profile's per-predecessor rate limit
bounds such probing either way
([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Policy
Probing").¶
Standing consent requires periodic human review even when nothing is misconfigured: the per-drawdown and rate bounds cap rate, not duration, and the ceiling review (Section 3.2) is the temporal bound. The chain's own records show when the consent no longer matches the work:¶
reviews that never narrow the ceiling;¶
ceilings that only grow;¶
guard exceptions trending toward zero because the policy was widened; and¶
discharge that never fires because no unit of work is scoped tightly enough to complete.¶
The review uses the chain evidence listed in Ceiling Review (Section 3.2).¶
The ceiling discloses, at initial approval time, the full envelope a task may grow into, which can reveal more about the anticipated task than any single Mission's Authority Set.¶
The expansion profile's predecessor-chain correlation considerations apply to the drawdown chain ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Predecessor-Chain Correlation"). Access to the ceiling and drawdown records SHOULD be scoped to parties with a governance need.¶
This document requests one registration (Section 9.1).
authority_ceiling, drawdown_policy, ceiling_consent_hash,
drawdown_count, and resource_declaration_digest are Mission record
members defined by this profile, and the mission-authority-ceiling
anchor typ follows the issuance profile's collision-resistant typ
convention; none of these requires registration.¶
This document requests registration of the following value in the "Mission Denial Reasons" registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Mission Denial Reasons Registry"):¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
The ceiling_drawdown basis meets Approval Governance's Approval
Basis Contract, and the drawdown policy reference, its verification
and the ceiling review cadence cite that contract, which states the
same requirements the OAuth binding does. Approval Governance becomes
a normative reference. No requirement changed (#1915).¶
-01¶
Audit Linkage cites the OAuth binding's Principals and Approval Basis
section for the accountable consent_principal, since that binding's
Role Mapping appendix moved to the architecture document. No
requirement changed (#1892).¶
ceiling_consent_hash keeps the latest explicitly human-consented
ceiling's hash apart from a policy-narrowed ceiling_hash; the
ceiling_drawdown basis's root_commitment and approved_at name
that consent, and a narrowing resets neither the cadence nor the
drawdown count (#1468, D593).¶
The Ceiling Review: a review is a fresh human approval that explicitly re-consents the ceiling and policy (a narrowed ceiling included); every re-consent discloses the chain's record since the prior review or the initial consent; an overdue cadence forces human approval but not a re-consent; policy-only narrowing is no review (#1437, D572).¶
Audit Linkage names drawdown_count; the ceiling_drawdown basis
requires adjudication; Conformance gains pointers to the
requirements it omitted and states that omission waives none (#1438,
D572).¶
Terminology defines a drawdown request and a policy-adjudicated drawdown, and every use follows them; authority outside the ceiling is permitted and needs human approval while a successor retains it; the approval surface establishes the ceiling, with no OAuth parameter or token claim defined for it; a refusal points to the expansion profile's completion-mode mapping (#1439, D572).¶
Audit Linkage requires resource_declaration_digest on every
successor whose adjudication, by policy or by a fresh human approval,
evaluated a resource's self-declaration (D582).¶
Rulings on the editorial restructure's author's calls (D569): the
discharge and containment prohibitions bind the Mission Issuer,
whatever its drawdown policy permits; one ceiling-disclosure
requirement remains, in Progressive Authorization, with Security
cross-referencing it; What It Bounds moves into Security, merged
with Unattended Drawdown; declaration evaluation moves into Ceiling
Test, with the resource_declaration_digest record in Audit
Linkage; plain statements replace persuasive phrases; the companion
table is labelled a summary.¶
Ceiling Test and new Ceiling Re-Consent: a request outside the
ceiling is never policy-adjudicated and falls back to an ordinary,
freshly approved expansion, subject to the Mission Issuer's policy; a
refusal MAY carry out_of_ceiling, which a response starting the
human approval never carries. A human-approved successor carries the
ceiling members unchanged unless the Approver explicitly re-consents
a ceiling and drawdown policy; the chain's history and restrictions
continue either way (#1413, #1415, D555).¶
Drawdown Bounds: a drawdown that would activate the entire remaining ceiling, or that exceeds the per-drawdown bound or the chain rate bound, falls back to a fresh human approval. A drawdown activates the entire remaining ceiling unless the Mission Issuer can show ceiling authority that the successor's entries, judged together, do not authorize, so the final increment always takes a fresh human approval (#1414, D555).¶
Editorial: In-Ceiling Expansion in subsections, Relationship and
Terminology under the Introduction, a Protocol Overview, Title Case
headings, Security Considerations in subsections, and the IANA
request as a registration template. The Derivation Limits adoption
condition covers its whole subsection, as the #1119 entry below
describes. Examples on the baseline fixture's ceiling-drawdown
variant: the ceiling members and policy snapshot, a drawdown request
and response, the successor record, and an out_of_ceiling refusal.
No requirement is added or removed.¶
Relationship to the Expansion Profile: superseded is the
expansion profile's termination reason, not a lifecycle state
(#705).¶
In-ceiling expansion: a ceiling_drawdown successor keeps its
predecessor's subject and authority_source, and its activating
commit checks that source's ceiling, as the expansion profile
requires of every successor (#1118).¶
In-ceiling expansion: where Mission Derivation Limits is also adopted, the ceiling consent's disclosure states that policy-adjudicated successors carry the Mission's derivation count and limit forward, or that no finite limit is guaranteed where the Mission has none (#1119).¶
In-ceiling expansion: where Mission Derivation Limits is also adopted, a policy drawdown carries its predecessor's committed derivation count and limit forward (a stricter ceiling can narrow the limit; nothing raises or resets it), counts its successor access token once in the atomic creation step, and is refused under Mission Derivation Limits' enforcement rule, creating and superseding nothing, when the limit would be exceeded (#1079).¶
Audit Linkage and In-Ceiling Expansion name the drawdown policy as
the approval event's decision mechanism, not its approver; the
Approver who consented the ceiling stays the consent_principal,
matching the issuance profile's Role Mapping.¶
In-ceiling expansion: a ceiling_drawdown successor's
approval_event_id identifies the drawdown: a unique value allocated
with the exchange's (client, creation_request_id) reservation and
retained with the successor, so a retry recovers it and reuse of the
key after its tombstone expires receives a new one; no new member
(#1017).¶
In-ceiling expansion: a drawdown that passes every policy-adjudication
guard completes synchronously in the token-exchange response,
committing activation, supersession and the creation reservation
before the response; the undefined request_uri redemption is
removed.¶
In-ceiling expansion: the discharge guard tests the complete successor Authority Set against the chain's discharge restrictions, from any later Mission, and the ceiling review discloses outstanding discharge restrictions.¶
In-ceiling expansion: a policy-adjudicated drawdown whose complete Authority Set overlaps capability under a containment restriction of its chain falls back to a fresh human approval naming the contained capability and its cause, from any later Mission in the chain; the ceiling review discloses outstanding restrictions and does not clear them.¶
drawdown_policy is an activation policy reference (id,
version, digest) under the issuance profile's Standing-Consent
Bases, replacing the string or URI and the SHOULD to commit the
policy body; ceiling_hash covers the object, and a snapshot that
does not match falls back to a fresh human approval. The
ceiling_drawdown activation maps to drawdown_policy.id and
.version, and the review cadence, part of the policy content, is
anchored with it.¶
The consumption-bound rationale rests on the metering profile's successor rule: a successor continues its predecessor's counters, and a policy-adjudicated successor cannot raise a bound.¶
Editorial: disambiguated authority_ceiling from the template
profile's Template Ceiling and the shaping companion's shaping
ceiling at its first definition (Section 1.2), no
normative change.¶
Mirrored the OAuth binding's Mission Template uncommitted-policy-body
pattern onto drawdown_policy: a SHOULD to additionally commit the
policy body under an integrity anchor or disclose it under Consent
Evidence (Section 3). Reframed the ceiling
review cadence as a recency ceiling on the ceiling_drawdown
approval basis's approved_at, reproducible from the drawdown
policy's own versioned content identified by the existing
policy_id/policy_version rather than a new commitment or a new,
separately versioned member (Section 3.2, Section 5).¶
This document is part of the Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 work and extends Mission Expansion with an experimental pre-consented drawdown mechanism.¶