Internet-Draft OAuth Mission Progressive Authorization October 2026
McGuinness Expires 28 April 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Web Authorization Protocol
Internet-Draft:
draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive-latest
Published:
Intended Status:
Experimental
Expires:
Author:
K. McGuinness
Independent

Mission Progressive Authorization for OAuth 2.0

Abstract

Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0 widens an agent's authority only through a fresh human approval that creates a successor Mission. An open-ended agentic task often cannot have its full authority enumerated at the initial approval, which leaves a deployment choosing between over-provisioning a broad standing Mission and interrupting the user for a fresh approval at every step.

This document defines progressive authorization, an experimental third option. At the initial approval, the Approver additionally consents to a bounded authority ceiling and a drawdown policy. The Mission Issuer may then adjudicate an expansion that stays within that ceiling by policy rather than by a fresh human approval. Authority grows within the ceiling at runtime while the active authority any single Mission yields stays narrow, and each policy-adjudicated drawdown is bounded incrementally, never activating the whole ceiling at once. Authority classes named by the runtime profile's high-consequence classification, and the external-communication exfiltration leg, always require a fresh human approval, even within the ceiling.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-progressive/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/mcguinness/mission-bound-authorization.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0 [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion] (the "expansion profile") defines the governed path from an authority shortfall to a new approval: a successor Mission, freshly consented, that supersedes its predecessor. Every expansion under that profile is adjudicated by a fresh human approval.

For a task whose growth is anticipated, that discipline has a human cost. Each expansion is another approval moment, and an Approver asked too often stops reading what is asked (the consent-fatigue residual of [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model]). A deployment that avoids the prompts over-provisions a broad standing Mission instead.

Progressive authorization is a third option. The Approver consents once to a bounded envelope, the authority ceiling, and to a rule for drawing authority from it, the drawdown policy. Authority then grows within the envelope at runtime without a fresh human approval each time, while the active authority any single Mission yields stays narrow. The envelope can name a class of resources the agent will only meet during execution: the Approver consents once to the family, and every concrete binding stays inside it (Section 3.1.1). One considered consent to a ceiling replaces many hurried consents to increments.

This document is optional and experimental: adopt it for evaluation, not as a stable interface. It removes the per-expansion human from a consented envelope, which is the highest-consequence capability in the expansion family. This document therefore conditions the capability on the rate bounds, prohibited-class rules, and audit linkage it requires, and plain expansion remains the better fit where task authority can be anticipated per step.

A Mission Issuer that does not implement this document adjudicates every expansion as a fresh human approval and is a fully conforming expansion-capable Mission Issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]). Nothing here places a new requirement back on the expansion profile or the issuance profile.

1.1. Relationship to Other Specifications

This document depends normatively on the expansion profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion] and on the issuance profile [I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], and is not implementable alone. It reuses, without restating:

  • the expansion profile's expansion request, adjudication, predecessor member, superseded termination reason, and reconciliation; and

  • the issuance profile's approval event, integrity-anchor envelope, and subset rule.

The following table summarizes how other companions interact with a drawdown request. The cited sections control each requirement and when it applies; adopting this document does not require adopting any listed companion.

Table 1: Companion Interactions
Companion Interaction Section
Mission Derivation Limits A policy-adjudicated drawdown carries the derivation count and limit forward Section 3.1.8
Mission Child Delegation Live Child Missions require a fresh approval Section 3.1.3
Mission Entry Discharge Discharged authority is not restored by policy Section 3.1.3
Mission Containment Contained capability is not restored by policy Section 3.1.3
Mission Consumption Metering A policy-adjudicated drawdown grants no new capacity Section 3.1.7
Mission Approval Governance The basis meets the accountable-approver rule; a consumption-bound policy-adjudicated drawdown needs a class-named exception Section 3.1.7
Mission Consent Evidence Commits the ceiling and review disclosures Section 3, Section 3.2
Mission Open-World Discovery Defines the encounter adjudication contract for a self-declared resource Section 3.1.1

1.2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This document uses Predecessor Mission, Successor Mission, and Expansion request as the expansion profile defines them.

Authority ceiling:

The pre-consented maximum authority any expansion of a Mission may reach without a further human approval (Section 3). This bound is distinct from the template profile's Template Ceiling on Missions dispatched from a template and from the shaping companion's caller-supplied shaping ceiling on a proposal ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template], [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]).

Drawdown policy:

The policy under which the Mission Issuer may adjudicate an in-ceiling expansion by policy rather than by a fresh human approval (Section 3).

Drawdown request:

An expansion request of a Mission that carries an authority ceiling, whether the Mission Issuer adjudicates it by policy or by a fresh human approval (Section 3.1).

Policy-adjudicated drawdown:

A drawdown request that the Mission Issuer adjudicates under the drawdown policy and that commits a ceiling_drawdown successor (Section 3.1.2).

Mission Deployment Profile:

The deployment-level manifest the architecture defines ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]). The bounds, mappings, and cadence this document requires a deployment to publish are published there.

2. Protocol Overview

A progressive Mission begins with an ordinary approval and grows through a chain of successor Missions:

  1. At the initial approval, the Approver consents to the Mission, an authority ceiling, and a drawdown policy. The Mission Issuer records the ceiling and the policy on the Mission and commits them with ceiling_hash (Section 3).

  2. When the agent needs authority its Mission lacks, the client sends an expansion request: a token exchange presenting the Mission's access token ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).

  3. A request outside the ceiling is never policy-adjudicated: it falls back to an ordinary, freshly approved expansion, subject to the Mission Issuer's policy (Section 3.1.1).

  4. A request within the ceiling falls back to an ordinary, freshly approved expansion when it meets a fresh-approval condition (Section 3.1.3), when it exceeds a drawdown bound or would activate the entire remaining ceiling (Section 3.1.4), when the chain is past its ceiling review cadence (Section 3.2), or when the drawdown policy does not authorize it (Section 3.1.2).

  5. Otherwise the drawdown policy adjudicates the request. If the expansion profile's activation checks and any derivation limit admit it, the Mission Issuer creates the successor, supersedes the predecessor, and returns the successor's access token in the token-exchange response (Section 3.1.5).

  6. A ceiling review, a fresh human approval that explicitly re-consents the ceiling (a narrowed one included), restarts the review cadence; approving a successor's authority alone does not (Section 3.2).

   Approver consents to Mission M0, ceiling C, drawdown policy P
                                |
                                v
      +------+  drawdown  +------+  drawdown  +------+
      |  M0  |----------->|  M1  |----------->|  M2  |---> ...
      +------+  under P   +------+  under P   +------+
     terminated          terminated            active
    (superseded)        (superseded)
Figure 1: A Drawdown Chain

Every successor drawn under P stays within C, and each policy-adjudicated drawdown is bounded incrementally.

2.1. Example Scenario

The examples in this document follow one scenario, the ceiling-drawdown variant of the family's Q3 reconciliation baseline. At 2026-11-02T08:00:00Z, alice (user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR at https://idp.example.com) approves Mission msn_pasG9An7Ivj9cOdd3RqWWonuaLAbDHtM at https://as.example.com for the reconciliation agent, the client s6BhdRkqt3. Its Authority Set allows only reading Q3 invoices at https://erp.example.com. alice also consents to an authority ceiling that adds posting journal entries of at most USD 500 and correcting Q3 invoices, under the drawdown policy q3-reconcile-drawdown version 1.

The deployment's Mission Deployment Profile publishes a per-drawdown bound of one added action, a chain rate bound of two policy-adjudicated drawdowns per hour, and a 30-day ceiling review cadence. It maps invoices.read to the consequential read class, and journal-entries.write and invoices.write to the reversible consequential write class, so no ceiling action requires a fresh approval by class (Section 3.1.3). The Mission has no Child Missions and its chain has no discharge or containment restrictions.

3. Progressive Authorization

At the initial approval event ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), the Approver MAY additionally consent to an authority ceiling and a drawdown policy, recorded as these Mission members:

authority_ceiling:

An array of authorization-details-shaped entries, each the shape of an Authority Set entry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). It is the pre-consented maximum any expansion of this Mission may reach without a further human approval, and every in-ceiling successor MUST be within it (Section 3.1).

drawdown_policy:

An activation policy reference, an object of id, version, and digest ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Standing-Consent Bases"). It identifies the policy under which the Mission Issuer MAY adjudicate an in-ceiling expansion by policy rather than by a fresh human approval, and commits its content. The policy's content is deployment-defined.

Where present, authority_ceiling and drawdown_policy are recorded on the Mission and committed by a ceiling_hash. Because ceiling_hash covers drawdown_policy, the ceiling commits the exact policy the human consented to, and the Mission Issuer verifies its digest before each policy-adjudicated drawdown under the issuance profile's activation policy commitment rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Standing-Consent Bases").

The ceiling_hash is computed with the issuance profile's integrity-anchor envelope ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]):

ceiling_hash is an envelope anchor under the issuance profile's commitment mechanisms, which this document imports normatively.

The Mission Issuer also records ceiling_consent_hash, the ceiling_hash of the ceiling and drawdown policy as the Approver consented them. At a consent the two are equal. A policy-adjudicated drawdown that narrows the ceiling recomputes ceiling_hash and leaves ceiling_consent_hash unchanged (Section 3.1.5); only an explicit re-consent replaces it (Section 3.1.6).

Neither member is committed under authority_hash: authority_hash commits only the consented Authority Set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), and the ceiling is a bound on future expansions, not present authority.

At the initial approval, the consent disclosure MUST render the ceiling to the Approver, together with the fact that in-ceiling expansion is policy-adjudicated ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]).

The approval surface establishes the consented ceiling and drawdown policy, which the Mission Issuer retains as Mission-record provenance. This document defines no OAuth parameter or token claim that proposes a ceiling or reports the consented one. A deployment's approval surface can take its own proposal, but client input alone never establishes the consent.

A Mission that carries no authority_ceiling has no progressive authorization: every expansion of it is an ordinary, freshly approved expansion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]).

The following is an example of the ceiling members the Mission Issuer records for the scenario's Mission at the initial approval (Section 2.1), other members omitted:

{
  "authority_ceiling": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"],
      "constraints": {
        "resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
        "resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
      },
      "delegation": {
        "max_depth": 2,
        "allowed_delegates": [{ "sub_profile": "ai_agent" }]
      } },
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
      "constraints": {
        "max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" } } },
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.write"],
      "constraints": {
        "resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
        "resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
      } }
  ],
  "drawdown_policy": {
    "id": "q3-reconcile-drawdown",
    "version": "1",
    "digest":
      "sha-256:HS89ur28PoDZuYR2YEAPKaqYTIawABGKnIyjTWDQNGc"
  },
  "ceiling_hash":
    "sha-256:8PkE9J8vIWBKyPTG21yYer3W3BPP8opLI2moZr3S-kw",
  "ceiling_consent_hash":
    "sha-256:8PkE9J8vIWBKyPTG21yYer3W3BPP8opLI2moZr3S-kw"
}

The Mission's Authority Set is the first ceiling entry alone. The policy snapshot that digest commits has content_type application/json and consists of exactly the following bytes, which state the per-drawdown bound and the ceiling review cadence in seconds (Section 3.2):

{"ceiling_review_cadence":2592000,"max_added_actions":1}

3.1. In-Ceiling Expansion

An in-ceiling expansion is an expansion, adjudicated per the expansion profile ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]), whose successor Authority Set is within the predecessor's consented authority_ceiling.

3.1.1. Ceiling Test

A requested successor Authority Set is in-ceiling when every one of its entries is a subset of some authority_ceiling entry under the issuance profile's subset rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]). A constraints-bounded ceiling uses the same subset semantics.

A Mission's Authority Set need not lie within its ceiling. The ceiling test covers the complete requested successor Authority Set, so a successor that retains authority outside the ceiling requires a fresh human approval unless an explicit re-consent has brought that authority within the ceiling (Section 3.1.6).

A ceiling entry MAY name a resource family rather than a single resource, under the same resource-narrowing semantics the subset rule fixes: a successor entry's resource is in-ceiling when it narrows the ceiling entry's.

Where a drawdown request is triggered by the agent encountering a resource not named at approval, and the resource self-declares its operations and consequences in a content-addressed form, the adjudication MUST evaluate the declaration against the ceiling, and the record of any successor the request creates, by policy or by a fresh human approval, carries the declaration's digest (Section 5). An AAuth deployment adopting Rich Resource Requests composes one such self-declaring substrate ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]). The discovery companion ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-discovery]) defines the encounter adjudication contract, the identity pinning, and the floors this drawdown path carries.

The Mission Issuer MUST NOT policy-adjudicate a requested authority that is not within the consented authority_ceiling. Such a request falls back to an ordinary, freshly human-approved expansion (Section 3.1.2), subject to the Mission Issuer's policy, which can refuse it as it can refuse any expansion. A refusal MAY carry out_of_ceiling (Section 4); a response that starts the human approval never carries it. A refusal surfaces as the expansion profile maps a denial for each completion mode ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Expansion Denial Reasons"). Approving that authority does not raise the ceiling (Section 3.1.6).

In the example scenario (Section 2.1), the agent finds an adjustment of USD 1,200 at 09:18:00. The client presents the access token issued at 09:15:00 and requests a successor whose journal-write entry allows USD 2,000, which is within no ceiling entry. The request falls back to a fresh human approval. The following is an example of the response, the expansion profile's deferred response with no denial reason; no Mission is created yet, and msn_uG1kkHwXSlzUs4OKztGGk5FOmBnkpTOb stays active:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "authorization_pending",
  "deferral_code": "dfc_mgumqI7ZWFKY71J9GLLeo7",
  "expires_in": 600,
  "interval": 5
}

If alice approves the USD 2,000 entry without re-consenting the ceiling, the successor carries the ceiling unchanged, and the USD 2,000 entry stays outside it (Section 3.1.6).

3.1.2. Policy Adjudication

When the predecessor consented to a drawdown policy that authorizes the requested widening, the Mission Issuer MAY satisfy the adjudication's approval event by policy rather than by a fresh human approval, exactly as a parent Mission's Authority Set may permit policy-approved child creation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]). This is an explicit override of the expansion profile's consent step for the in-ceiling case only.

This does not widen authority without consent ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]). The consent is the human consent given at the initial approval to the ceiling and the drawdown policy; policy adjudication only draws within that pre-given consent and can never exceed the ceiling.

An in-ceiling request the drawdown policy does not authorize is not refused with out_of_ceiling; it falls back to an ordinary, freshly human-approved expansion. A drawdown policy snapshot that does not match drawdown_policy.digest authorizes nothing, so a request under it falls back the same way. A drawdown request that falls back to a fresh human approval completes deferred or interactively, as any expansion does.

3.1.3. Conditions That Require a Fresh Approval

Prohibited classes. Some authority classes always require a fresh human approval even within the ceiling. To make that testable, a deployment MUST publish in the Mission Deployment Profile a mapping from its action identifiers to the runtime profile's action classes ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]), or an equivalent declared classification.

A drawdown request MUST be adjudicated by a fresh human approval when it:

  • grants authority in the irreversible, external-commitment, or privileged-administration class;

  • satisfies the runtime profile's external-communication predicate (the exfiltration leg, [I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]); or

  • grants cross-domain authority.

The drawdown policy MUST NOT permit policy-only adjudication of such a drawdown request.

Live Child Missions. Policy adjudication skips the interactive prompt, and with it the expansion profile's child-cascade consent notice ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]), while supersession terminally cascades to the predecessor's non-terminal Child Missions ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]). The Mission Issuer therefore MUST NOT policy-adjudicate an in-ceiling drawdown request while the predecessor has non-terminal Child Missions: such a request falls back to a fresh human approval, at which that notice can be rendered.

Discharged authority. The Mission Issuer MUST NOT policy-adjudicate a successor whose complete Authority Set, including authority carried forward from its predecessor, overlaps in authority the authority a discharge restriction of its expansion chain covers ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-discharge]), whatever its drawdown policy permits. The test is overlap in authority, not structural equality or entry identity. Such a request falls back to a fresh human approval whose consent disclosure names the discharged entry and the condition that discharged it.

The Mission Issuer MUST apply this test to every drawdown request in the chain after the discharge, not only to one from the Mission that holds the discharged entry, and neither an approval of unrelated authority nor a ceiling review clears the restriction (Section 3.2). Policy adjudication cannot restore discharged authority.

Contained authority. The Mission Issuer MUST NOT policy-adjudicate a successor whose complete Authority Set, including authority carried forward from its predecessor, overlaps in authority capability under a containment restriction of its expansion chain ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]), whatever its drawdown policy permits. Such a request falls back to a fresh human approval whose consent disclosure names the contained capability and the event class that caused its containment.

The Mission Issuer MUST apply this test to every drawdown request in the chain after the containment, not only to one from the Mission that holds the overlay, and neither an approval of unrelated authority nor a ceiling review clears the restriction (Section 3.2). A drawdown request whose authority overlaps no restricted capability remains eligible for policy adjudication under the other guards of Section 3.1. Contained authority therefore cannot be restored by policy.

Both tests are re-applied at successor activation, so a containment or discharge that lands after adjudication is caught there ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Concurrent Expansion Reconciliation").

Review cadence. A drawdown request for a chain past its ceiling review cadence also falls back to a fresh human approval (Section 3.2).

3.1.4. Drawdown Bounds

Policy adjudication is bounded per drawdown request and across the chain, so a pre-consented ceiling cannot become a standing grant that a compromised agent reaches through unattended drawdown requests.

A single policy-adjudicated in-ceiling drawdown MUST NOT activate the entire remaining ceiling. A drawdown request would activate the entire remaining ceiling unless the Mission Issuer can show a request the ceiling admits that no entry of the successor's Authority Set authorizes: one of an authority_ceiling entry's actions, with resource and constraint values that entry admits ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Subset Rule"). The successor's entries are judged together, so ceiling authority it splits across several entries counts as held. Policy adjudication therefore never reaches the entire ceiling: the final increment always takes a fresh human approval.

The drawdown policy MUST bound each policy-adjudicated drawdown incrementally, by one or both of:

  • a per-drawdown delta bound; or

  • narrowing the successor's Authority Set to what the triggering action needs.

The concrete per-drawdown bound MUST be published in the Mission Deployment Profile.

Each policy-adjudicated drawdown creates a successor Mission, so a per-Mission bound would reset at every step. A deployment:

  • MUST rate-bound policy-adjudicated drawdowns per expansion chain, keyed by the chain's root Mission and counted across predecessor links per unit time;

  • MUST publish the concrete rate bound in the Mission Deployment Profile; and

  • MUST record each policy-adjudicated drawdown as an approval event whose decision mechanism is the drawdown policy that authorized it (Section 5).

A drawdown request that would activate the entire remaining ceiling, or that exceeds the per-drawdown bound or the chain rate bound, falls back to a fresh human approval, exactly as a request the drawdown policy does not authorize does (Section 3.1.2).

3.1.5. The Successor Mission

The successor is created as the expansion profile requires: its Authority Set freshly derived and bound by the ceiling, its predecessor member set, the predecessor superseded. The successor's subject and authority_source are the predecessor's, and the commit that activates it checks that source's ceiling ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Successor Subject and Authority Source").

A policy-adjudicated successor MUST carry the predecessor's authority_ceiling and drawdown_policy unchanged or narrowed, committed under the same or, when narrowed, a recomputed ceiling_hash. Any change to either beyond narrowing requires an explicit re-consent (Section 3.1.6), never policy adjudication. The successor MUST carry ceiling_consent_hash, and the instant and Approver of that consent, unchanged: a narrowing is not a consent, so it resets neither the review cadence (Section 3.2) nor the cumulative drawdown count (Section 5).

A drawdown request that passes every policy-adjudication guard of Section 3.1 completes synchronously in the token-exchange response ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "The Expansion Request"), which returns the successor's access token. The successor is still created through the full approval-event machinery of the expansion profile, under the ceiling_drawdown basis (Section 3.1.7); only the interactive prompt is skipped. The Mission Issuer MUST commit the successor's activation, the predecessor's supersession, and the creation reservation, applying the expansion profile's activation checks in that same atomic step, before it delivers the response. A lost response is recovered through creation_request_id ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Creation Idempotency").

In the example scenario (Section 2.1), the agent finds an adjustment of USD 180 to post at 09:15:00. Its Mission lacks journal-entries.write, so the client requests an expansion as an [RFC8693] token exchange, proving possession of the Mission's access token with a DPoP proof [RFC9449]. The mission_intent carries the baseline Q3 Intent. The following is an example of the request; client authentication is omitted, and extra line breaks are for display only:

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi...

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange&
requested_token_type=
  urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Aaccess_token&
subject_token=<the%20Mission%27s%20access%20token>&
subject_token_type=
  urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Aaccess_token&
mission_intent=%7B%22intent%22%3A%7B...%7D%7D&
predecessor=msn_pasG9An7Ivj9cOdd3RqWWonuaLAbDHtM&
creation_request_id=787d127f-df08-5d87-bf49-ed64a323194a

The derived successor Authority Set is the baseline's: the read entry and the journal-write entry, each a ceiling entry. It adds one action, within the per-drawdown bound, and leaves invoices.write undrawn. No condition of Section 3.1.3 applies, it would be the chain's first policy-adjudicated drawdown, the ceiling consent is 75 minutes old against a 30-day review cadence, and the policy snapshot matches its digest and authorizes the widening. The drawdown policy therefore adjudicates the request. The following is an example of the response, which carries the successor's access token and its granted authorization_details:

{
  "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6ImF0K2p3dCJ9...",
  "issued_token_type":
    "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
  "token_type": "DPoP",
  "expires_in": 300,
  "mission_id": "msn_uG1kkHwXSlzUs4OKztGGk5FOmBnkpTOb",
  "mission_expires_at": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z",
  "authorization_details": [
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["invoices.read"],
      "constraints": {
        "resource_issued_after": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
        "resource_issued_before": "2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"
      },
      "delegation": {
        "max_depth": 2,
        "allowed_delegates": [{ "sub_profile": "ai_agent" }]
      } },
    { "type": "mission_resource_access",
      "resource": "https://erp.example.com",
      "actions": ["journal-entries.write"],
      "constraints": {
        "max_amount": { "amount": "500.00", "currency": "USD" } } }
  ]
}

A fresh human approval in a chain that carries a ceiling, whether the request fell back from policy adjudication or lay outside the ceiling, makes two separate decisions: the Approver approves the successor's authority and can, separately, re-consent the ceiling.

Without an explicit re-consent, the successor MUST carry the predecessor's authority_ceiling, drawdown_policy, ceiling_hash and ceiling_consent_hash unchanged, together with the instant and the Approver of the ceiling consent ceiling_consent_hash commits, and the ceiling review cadence does not restart. Authority approved beyond the ceiling stays outside it: a later expansion whose Authority Set retains that authority is outside the ceiling (Section 3.1.1).

Where the Approver explicitly re-consents a ceiling and drawdown policy at that approval, the successor MUST record the re-consented authority_ceiling and the selected drawdown_policy under a recomputed ceiling_hash, record that hash as its ceiling_consent_hash, and record the re-consent's instant and Approver as those of the ceiling consent. The ceiling review cadence restarts from that instant (Section 3.2). The consent disclosure MUST render the re-consented ceiling and policy as at the initial approval (Section 3). A re-consent is a ceiling review, so its disclosure also renders the chain's record that Section 3.2 requires.

Either way the expansion chain continues: its root, predecessor links, rate-bound window, cumulative drawdown count, and every discharge and containment restriction carry forward, and a re-consent clears none of them.

3.1.7. The ceiling_drawdown Approval Basis

A policy-adjudicated in-ceiling successor is rooted in a standing-consent approval_basis, under the issuance profile's open type set ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]), with type ceiling_drawdown, defined and owned by this profile. Its members are:

  • consent_principal: the Approver who consented the ceiling;

  • activation: an object with exactly two members, policy_id (the Mission's drawdown_policy.id) and policy_version (its drawdown_policy.version, the version whose content drawdown_policy.digest commits and this adjudication evaluated);

  • activation_actor: the requesting client;

  • adjudication: REQUIRED for this basis, the decision mechanism ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Principals and Approval Basis"): kind policy, and a policy whose id and version are activation's policy_id and policy_version, the drawdown policy this adjudication evaluated;

  • root_commitment: the predecessor's ceiling_consent_hash, the latest explicitly human-consented ceiling and drawdown policy, never a ceiling_hash a policy narrowing recomputed; and

  • approved_at (the issuance profile's standing-consent requirement): the instant the Approver consented the ceiling that root_commitment commits, read from the Mission Issuer's retained record of that consent, never from the drawdown request.

The successor record's approval_event_id identifies this policy-adjudicated drawdown, never the ceiling consent: a unique value the Mission Issuer allocates when it creates the exchange's (client, creation_request_id) reservation and retains with the committed successor ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Creation Idempotency"). A retry recovers it; a reservation created after that key's tombstone expires receives a new one.

The following is an example of the scenario's successor record (Section 2.1), other members omitted:

{
  "id": "msn_uG1kkHwXSlzUs4OKztGGk5FOmBnkpTOb",
  "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
  "predecessor": "msn_pasG9An7Ivj9cOdd3RqWWonuaLAbDHtM",
  "subject": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
    "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
  "approval_basis": {
    "type": "ceiling_drawdown",
    "consent_principal": { "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
      "sub": "user_3p2q8mN1a0kV7tR" },
    "activation": { "policy_id": "q3-reconcile-drawdown",
      "policy_version": "1" },
    "activation_actor": { "iss": "https://as.example.com",
      "sub": "s6BhdRkqt3" },
    "adjudication": { "kind": "policy",
      "policy": { "id": "q3-reconcile-drawdown", "version": "1" } },
    "root_commitment":
      "sha-256:8PkE9J8vIWBKyPTG21yYer3W3BPP8opLI2moZr3S-kw",
    "approved_at": "2026-11-02T08:00:00Z"
  },
  "approval_event_id": "ape_1hJEKlr4vhnTLqwrYhpX",
  "ceiling_hash":
    "sha-256:8PkE9J8vIWBKyPTG21yYer3W3BPP8opLI2moZr3S-kw",
  "ceiling_consent_hash":
    "sha-256:8PkE9J8vIWBKyPTG21yYer3W3BPP8opLI2moZr3S-kw",
  "drawdown_count": 1,
  "created_at": "2026-11-02T09:15:00Z"
}

approved_at is the instant of the ceiling consent, not of the policy-adjudicated drawdown. The successor carries the predecessor's authority_ceiling and drawdown_policy unchanged, so its ceiling_hash is the predecessor's and equals ceiling_consent_hash, the root_commitment.

The child delegation profile's policy_drawdown basis ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]) is not reused: that value names policy-approved child creation, not a ceiling drawdown.

The issuance profile's fourth high-risk class, a consumption bound ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission], Section "Approver Authentication Strength"), is not held back here. A successor continues its predecessor's consumption counters, and a policy-adjudicated successor cannot raise a bound ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]), so a policy-adjudicated drawdown widens authority within the ceiling without granting new capacity.

The ceiling_drawdown approval_basis already carries the trace the issuance profile's approval-authentication floor requires for a consumption bound, through the consent_principal and approved_at fields this section defines. A deployment recording Consent Evidence renders the bound at the same surface under the metering profile's consent-integrity rule ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]).

Where a deployment adopts Approval Governance ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]) and records a Governance Record for a policy-adjudicated drawdown, the ceiling_drawdown approval_basis satisfies that profile's accountable-approver rule directly, through the same consent_principal, root_commitment, and approved_at this document already requires. No assertion is fabricated in the name of the requesting client or the drawdown policy to stand in for a fresh human decision that did not occur. Approval Governance's own high-risk-class default still binds that record: a policy-adjudicated drawdown carrying a consumption bound activates only where a committed, class-named exception admits it; absent the exception, the Mission fails to activate under that profile's atomic-commitment rule.

3.1.8. Derivation Limits

This section binds only a deployment that also adopts Mission Derivation Limits ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits]). A policy-adjudicated drawdown continues its predecessor's undertaking, so it cannot replenish the predecessor's allowance of counted derivations:

  • The successor MUST carry forward the predecessor's committed derivation count. Where the predecessor has a derivation_limit, the successor's derivation_limit MUST NOT exceed it: a stricter authorization-server policy ceiling or requested_derivation_limit narrows it further, and omitting or raising the request neither removes nor raises it. A predecessor without a derivation_limit has no finite limit to pass on, and the successor's is established as Mission Derivation Limits states ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits], Section "Effective Limit").

  • The Mission Issuer MUST read the predecessor's committed count and transfer it in the atomic step above that activates the successor, supersedes the predecessor, and commits the creation reservation, after any predecessor derivation that commits first. Concurrent derivation under the predecessor and competing or duplicate drawdown requests MUST NOT fork or replenish the remaining allowance.

  • The successor access token the drawdown response returns is one derivation, charged to the successor in that same atomic step and never again to the predecessor. Where the carried-forward count plus that derivation would exceed the successor's derivation_limit, the Mission Issuer MUST refuse the drawdown request as Mission Derivation Limits refuses a derivation ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits], Section "Enforcement at Issuance"), with invalid_grant and its mission_error diagnostic, creating no successor, superseding no predecessor, and counting nothing.

  • An exact creation retry MUST return the recorded result without repeating its accounting; returning the existing access token adds no derivation. A fresh delivery token minted on recovery is ordinary issuance ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Recovery Is Delivery"), counted against and gated by the successor's derivation_limit.

The ceiling consent's disclosure (Section 3) MUST state this inheritance, as Mission Derivation Limits requires of a standing consent ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits], Section "Approval Rendering"): policy-adjudicated successors carry forward the Mission's derivation count and never exceed its rendered derivation_limit, or, where the Mission has none, no finite limit is guaranteed for them.

A successor created by a fresh human approval establishes its limit afresh, as Mission Derivation Limits states. This bounds counted derivations through the drawdown succession only, not a Mission's descendants, other tokens, or resource effects.

3.2. The Ceiling Review

A pre-consented ceiling is standing consent. Standing consent requires periodic human review, so this profile bounds the chain in time, not only per drawdown request and per unit time (Section 3.1.4).

A deployment MUST publish a ceiling review cadence in its Mission Deployment Profile. The Mission Issuer MUST NOT policy-adjudicate an in-ceiling drawdown request for a chain whose ceiling consent, the initial consent or the latest re-consent, is older than that cadence: the request falls back to a fresh human approval, exactly as a request the drawdown policy does not authorize does (Section 3.1.2).

The cadence is a recency ceiling on the ceiling_drawdown approval basis's approved_at, the kind of declared maximum standing-consent age the issuance profile permits a deployment to declare ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]); this profile makes publishing one mandatory rather than optional.

The cadence is part of the drawdown policy's own versioned content: a deployment's drawdown policy document MUST state the cadence effective under a given version, identified by the policy_id and policy_version the ceiling_drawdown activation carries (Section 3.1.7), per the issuance profile's own rule that a mutable, unversioned value MUST NOT serve this role.

Because ceiling_hash commits that policy's digest, the cadence is anchored with it. Changing the cadence changes the policy snapshot, so a drawdown request under the changed policy no longer matches the committed digest and falls back to a fresh human approval until a review re-consents the ceiling under the new policy. An auditor recovers the cadence that governed a given policy-adjudicated drawdown from the retained snapshot that digest names, exactly as it resolves the drawdown logic itself.

A ceiling review is a fresh human approval that explicitly re-consents the ceiling and drawdown policy, a narrowed ceiling included (Section 3.1.6). No request asks for a review on its own: a review rides a fresh human approval of an expansion in the chain.

An overdue cadence sends the chain's next widening to a fresh human approval but does not require a re-consent. Where the Approver approves only the successor's authority, the ceiling consent stays overdue and policy adjudication stays unavailable. A ceiling narrowed by a policy-adjudicated drawdown (Section 3.1.5) has not been reviewed: the narrowing keeps the instant of the consent it narrows, and the cadence does not restart.

Every re-consent is a review, including one before the cadence expires. Its consent disclosure MUST render the chain's record since the prior review or, for the chain's first review, since the initial ceiling consent:

  • the count and rate of policy-adjudicated drawdowns;

  • the guard exceptions escalated to human approval;

  • the out_of_ceiling refusals;

  • the entries discharged under the Entry Discharge companion's completion machinery ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-discharge]), and the chain's outstanding discharge restrictions, which re-consenting the ceiling does not clear;

  • the chain's outstanding containment restrictions, each with its contained capability and the event class that caused it ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]), which re-consenting the ceiling does not clear; and

  • where the metering profile runs, consumption against its bounds ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]).

Where consent evidence is claimed, that disclosure is committed like any other ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence]), so the record shows the reviewer saw the cycle they renewed. Section 7.5 lists the signs in the chain's records that a reviewer checks.

3.3. Realizing an Approved Access Request

Progressive authorization grows authority that a deployment anticipated well enough to express as a ceiling. The runtime enforcement layer handles the unanticipated case: it can let an agent request authority it discovers it needs at the point of use, through an access-request and approval workflow ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]). That workflow yields a permit for the single re-evaluated action.

To persist the newly approved authority for the rest of the task, rather than have the agent re-request it on every call, the Mission Issuer MAY realize an approved access request as an expansion:

  • a request whose authority is within the Mission's consented ceiling is realized as a policy-adjudicated drawdown (Section 3.1); and

  • a request whose authority exceeds the ceiling is realized only on the fresh human approval the request carries, as an ordinary expansion (Section 3.1.1); the ceiling rises only where the Approver also re-consents it (Section 3.1.6).

Realizing a request as an expansion is subject to every rule of the expansion profile: the successor's authority is freshly derived and bound, the predecessor is superseded, and authority is never widened without the consent the request carries ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]). An access request not realized as an expansion grants only the single runtime permit and no durable Mission authority.

4. The out_of_ceiling Denial Reason

This document extends the expansion profile's closed set of expansion denial reasons ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]) by specification, as that profile's IANA considerations anticipate, with one value, carried in mission_denial_reason exactly as that profile's reasons are:

out_of_ceiling:

The requested authority is not within the Mission's consented authority ceiling (Section 3), and the Mission Issuer refused the expansion instead of taking it to a fresh human approval (Section 3.1.1).

A consumer that does not implement this document treats out_of_ceiling as it treats any unrecognized reason code: the expansion stays denied.

The expansion profile surfaces a denial on the token-exchange response as an OAuth error with the reason code in mission_denial_reason ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Expansion Denial Reasons"). Had the Mission Issuer's policy refused the scenario's request at 09:18:00 (Section 3.1.1) instead of taking it to alice, the following is an example of a refusal that carries the code:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error": "invalid_request",
  "mission_denial_reason": "out_of_ceiling"
}

5. Audit Linkage

Each policy-adjudicated drawdown is an approval event and MUST be recorded as one, in which:

Every Mission record in a chain that carries a ceiling MUST carry the chain's cumulative drawdown count as drawdown_count, a nonnegative integer counting the chain's committed policy-adjudicated drawdowns, so the rate bound of Section 3.1.4 is auditable from the records alone. It is zero on the chain's root Mission, whose approval consented the ceiling, and each committed ceiling_drawdown successor's is one more than its predecessor's. A retried or refused request leaves it unchanged, and a human-approved successor carries it unchanged, a re-consent included; neither a review nor a narrowing resets it.

A deployment MUST retain, with every Mission record in the chain for the audit horizon, its authority_ceiling, drawdown_policy, ceiling_hash and ceiling_consent_hash, and the consented authority_ceiling and drawdown_policy that each ceiling_consent_hash commits. An auditor can then verify that every policy-adjudicated drawdown was within the consented envelope and, by resolving the retained drawdown policy document at the policy_version each one's ceiling_drawdown approval basis already records, that it was adjudicated within the cadence that applied at the time (Section 3.2).

The record of every successor whose adjudication, by policy or by a fresh human approval, evaluated a resource's self-declaration (Section 3.1.1) MUST carry the declaration's digest as resource_declaration_digest, so the encounter is reproducible in audit: what the resource claimed to be when authority bound to it. A refused request creates no successor and so no such record.

6. Conformance

A Mission Issuer that claims Expansion with Progressive Authorization is a conforming expansion-capable Mission Issuer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]) and MUST:

This checklist summarizes the body. A requirement it omits still applies, with the role, strength and applicability its section gives it.

7. Security Considerations

The expansion profile's security considerations apply in full ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]). This document adds the drawdown surface.

7.1. What Progressive Authorization Bounds

The ceiling is broad by construction, since it must cover the open-ended task. What stays narrow is the active authority any single Mission in the chain yields: each in-ceiling successor is derived for the authority actually needed at that step and is independently gated and revocable.

The ceiling is consented once and drawn on many times, so a compromised agent can make in-ceiling drawdown requests unattended. It cannot instantly wield the ceiling: it can exercise only the current active authority, and each drawdown request it makes is subject to the per-drawdown and chain rate bounds (Section 3.1.4), held to the prohibited-class rule (Section 3.1.3), taken to a fresh human approval when the drawdown policy does not authorize it (Section 3.1.2), recorded for audit (Section 5), and enforced per action by the runtime layer ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]).

Progressive authorization bounds, and does not eliminate, standing-authority exposure. A deployment SHOULD pair it with short successor lifetimes, constraint-bounded ceilings, and runtime enforcement.

7.2. The Drawdown Policy as Governance

The drawdown policy is authority-bearing governance. A misconfigured policy over-grants within the ceiling; it MUST be reviewed and versioned like approval policy, and its identity and version are recorded as the decision mechanism (Section 5).

7.4. Probing the Ceiling

A refusal that carries out_of_ceiling tells the requester that its request fell outside the ceiling, so repeated requests can map the ceiling. Omitting the code keeps the ceiling undisclosed (Section 3.1.1). The expansion profile's per-predecessor rate limit bounds such probing either way ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Policy Probing").

8. Privacy Considerations

The ceiling discloses, at initial approval time, the full envelope a task may grow into, which can reveal more about the anticipated task than any single Mission's Authority Set.

The expansion profile's predecessor-chain correlation considerations apply to the drawdown chain ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Predecessor-Chain Correlation"). Access to the ceiling and drawdown records SHOULD be scoped to parties with a governance need.

9. IANA Considerations

This document requests one registration (Section 9.1). authority_ceiling, drawdown_policy, ceiling_consent_hash, drawdown_count, and resource_declaration_digest are Mission record members defined by this profile, and the mission-authority-ceiling anchor typ follows the issuance profile's collision-resistant typ convention; none of these requires registration.

9.1. Mission Denial Reasons Registration

This document requests registration of the following value in the "Mission Denial Reasons" registry ([I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion], Section "Mission Denial Reasons Registry"):

  • Value: out_of_ceiling

  • Semantics: The requested authority is not within the Mission's consented authority ceiling, and the Mission Issuer refused the expansion.

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Reference: this document, Section 4

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Runtime Enforcement", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-runtime.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission]
McGuinness, K., "Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Derivation Limits for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-derivation-limits.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Expansion for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-expansion.html>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

10.2. Informative References

[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Context Binding for AAuth", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-aauth.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Approval Governance", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-approval-governance.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture]
McGuinness, K., "An Architecture for Mission-Bound Authorization", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-architecture.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-discovery]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Open-World Discovery", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-discovery.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-metering]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Consumption Metering", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-metering.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Security Model", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-security-model.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Intent Shaping", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-mission-shaping.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Child Delegation for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-child-delegation.html>.
McGuinness, K., "Mission Consent Evidence for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-consent-evidence.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Containment for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-containment.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-discharge]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Entry Discharge for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-discharge.html>.
[I-D.draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template]
McGuinness, K., "Mission Template for OAuth 2.0", , <https://mcguinness.github.io/mission-bound-authorization/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-template.html>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.

Appendix A. Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

-01

Acknowledgments

This document is part of the Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0 work and extends Mission Expansion with an experimental pre-consented drawdown mechanism.

Author's Address

Karl McGuinness
Independent